REDD+ COMPARATIVE REPORT

Instituting REDD+

An analysis of the processes and outcomes of two pilot projects in Brazil and Tanzania

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Poverty and sustainable development impacts of REDD architecture; options for equity growth and the environment

About this project...

Poverty and sustainable development impacts of REDD architecture is a multi-country project led by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED, UK) and the University of Life Sciences (Aas, Norway). It started in July 2009 and ended in May 2013. The project is funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) as part of the Norwegian Government's Climate and Forest Initiative. The project has been in partnership with Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (Brazil); Civic Response (Ghana); SNV (Vietnam); Sokoine University of Agriculture, Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation (Tanzania); and Makerere University, Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation (Uganda).

The project aims to increase understanding of how different options for REDD+ design and policy at international, national and sub-national levels will affect achievement of greenhouse gas emission reduction and co-benefits of sustainable development and poverty reduction. As well as examining the internal distribution and allocation of REDD+ payments under different design option scenarios at both international and national level, the project will work with selected REDD+ pilot projects in each of the five countries to generate evidence on and improve understanding of the poverty impacts of REDD+ pilot activities, the relative merits of different types of payment mechanisms and the transaction costs.

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Acronyms

ACS	Association for the RDS
APA	Environmental protected area (*área de proteção ambiental*)
FBD	Forest and Beekeeping Division (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Tanzania)
BFA	Association component of BFP
BFF	Family component of BFP
BFR	Income component of BFP
BFS	Social component of BFP
BFP	Bolsa Floresta Programme
CBFM	Community-based forest management
CECLIMA	State Climate Change Centre
CEUC	State Conservation Units Centre
COP	Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC
DD	Deforestation and forest degradation
FAS	Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (*Fundação Amazonas Sustentável*)
FGD	Focus group discussion
FCPF	World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FPIC	Free, prior and informed consent
IDAM	Institute for Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Forestry of the State of Amazonas (*Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agropecuário e Florestal Sustentável do Estado do Amazonas*)
IGA groups	Income-generation activity groups
INPA	National Institute for Amazonian Research (*Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia*)
IPAAM	Amazon Environmental Research Institute (*O Instituto de Proteção Ambiental do Amazonas*)
JFM	Joint forest management
MJUMITA	Community Forest Conservation Network of Tanzania (*Mtandao wa Jamii wa Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania*)
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PFM	Participatory forest management
PFRA	Participatory forest resource assessment
PRA	Participatory resource assessment
RDS	Sustainable development reserve (*Reserva de Desenvolvimento Sustentável*)
REDD+	Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
RESEX	Extractivist reserve
SDS	Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development
TFCG	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group
UC	Conservation unit (*Unidade de Conservação*)
UGMUC	State Climate Change Centre and State Conservation Unit Centre Managing Unit
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
VLFR	Village land forest reserve
VLUPC	Village land-use planning committee
VNRC	Village natural resource committee

Contents

List of boxes and figures

Introduction

Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is being developed as a potentially core element of a future climate policy regime. Deforestation and forest degradation (DD) is presently taking place mostly in the South. Since halting DD will impair important livelihoods – not least for poor rural communities – the idea has been that the North should compensate the South for its livelihood losses – i.e. the incurred opportunity costs.

Since the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at Bali in 2007, substantial resources have been put into the REDD readiness process under the leadership of UN-REDD and the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Several initiatives have also been undertaken at a bilateral level. Norway has been the most significant financial supporter of REDD+ so far.

REDD readiness is about developing national strategies for REDD+ including the necessary systems to ensure reduced DD, encompassing systems for monitoring/carbon accounting and distribution of international compensations. Establishing REDD+ is a process of change not least regarding actions on the ground. To facilitate the process, new institutions – e.g. rules – for the use of forests must be created. Clarification of property and use rights to forests may also be necessary as part of this process. Moreover, systems for monitoring and control must be developed. Finally, the creation of new organisations – both at national and local levels – may be necessary.

From this perspective, establishing REDD+ is about creating the necessary governance structures. A core question in that respect is the legitimacy of such a process and its outputs. Concerning the former, issues regarding participation in decision-making, accountability and transparency are key. Concerning the latter, the focus is on how acceptable the changes in the governance structure are found to be by the involved groups.

Establishing REDD+ is a learning process. Hence, a set of pilot projects have been set up to facilitate this. In this report, we document experiences from two such pilots. The first is a project in the RDS Rio Negro in Amazonas, Brazil. The other is in Kilosa, Tanzania. Our objective was to document and evaluate experiences with the process and outputs of introducing REDD+ in these two pilots. More specifically, in this report we will respond to the following questions:

- What kind of institutional and organisational changes have been undertaken in the area since the pilot started and which processes have been initiated for those changes to happen?
- How do a) people living within the area and b) the responsible implementing organisations (NGOs, public authorities, community organisations) evaluate the changes undertaken and the associated processes?
- How well do processes and outputs stand as evaluated against general norms of legitimacy?
- Are there any important similarities and differences between the pilots regarding the implied changes in governance structures and in the way these are evaluated? If so, how can the differences be explained?

The last research question can be answered only tentatively, since our study is based on just two cases with quite substantial variations in e.g. cultural, political and ecological conditions. At the same time, the practical relevance of the results depends on understanding which experiences seem generalisable and which are contextual.

Data for the studies in the pilots were collected from written sources and from fieldwork in each pilot in January–February 2013. The instruments for the fieldwork were developed by the authors, while the fieldwork itself was undertaken by Rubén Leiva-Montoya and Elvis Mosi in the Brazilian and the Tanzanian pilots respectively. They had assistance in the collection of data – especially the household interviews. More information about the instruments can be found in Chapters 4 and 5.

Our report is divided in four main sections. First, we frame the analysis by presenting its conceptual basis. Next we analyse the RDS Rio Negro case and the Kilosa case in two separate chapters, focusing on the first three research questions. Finally, we turn to the fourth research question – the comparison between the two cases. Our report also includes a short conclusion.

Framing the analysis

REDD+ is foremost about governance of land and attached resources. Hence, our focus will be on the implications of REDD+ regarding changes in the governance structures of these resources in the pilot areas. We are moreover interested in the process of such change and to what extent both the process and the outputs in the form of changes in the governance structures are found to be legitimate among the involved parties (internal or subjective legitimacy). At the same time we want to do an evaluation using more general principles of what may be considered legitimate processes and outputs (external or objective legitimacy).

2.1 REDD+ as organisational and institutional change

Governance encompasses both the structures and processes that shape social priorities and how human coordination is facilitated, but also how conflicts are acknowledged and possibly resolved. Governance is hence more than government as it includes also actors such as communities, businesses and NGOs (see Lemos and Agrawal 2006). The framing of human action and interaction is key to governance emphasising the role of power, involvement and legitimacy.

In relation to the latter, the form of governance – the governance structure – is central. Governance structures or 'architectures' can be seen as consisting of two main components:

- The **type of actors** involved (characterised by their interests, capacities and competencies, rights and responsibilities); and
- The **institutional structures** influencing access to resources and facilitating the interaction/coordination between the actors (see also Vatn 2011).

Hence, a change of governance structures is a change in actor constellations and institutions. Concerning the actors, one may distinguish between private, public and community actors. Certainly, each category covers a wide variety of agents. Nevertheless, each type carries some distinct characteristics regarding what goals they are pursuing and how they can realise these. Regarding the institutional structures influencing access to resources, property and use rights to resources are of special interest. In the case of REDD+, rights to land and forest resources are of special interest. Concerning interaction between actors, we may typically distinguish between market exchange, command and various cooperative/reciprocal arrangements.

Focusing on governance structures is important since they define the 'field of play'. Hence, building new structures influences both the future involvement and positions of various actors as well as how effective one can be at realising the goals set. Our aim here is to describe and assess the experiences with the establishment of REDD+ governance structures in two cases. Therefore the focus is on how various actors are treated and how they themselves evaluate both the process and its outputs in the form of new rules and organisations. We do, however, also intend to undertake an external evaluation.

In this study, the main focus will be on rural people/forest dwellers and on the NGOs. They are the key actors. REDD+ is foremost focused on rural communities and their use of forest resources. NGOs are responsible for initiating the establishment of the REDD+ structures. Public authorities have also been involved, but in varying degrees and forms.

2.2 Legitimacy

The development of new governance structures implies deciding upon a set of common rules for a society. There are two very important issues related to this. First, there is the issue of how a society treats its members regarding decisions that are in some way common. Second, for collective rules to be effective, it is generally assumed that they must be accepted by the people involved. Deciding upon such rules or institutions will often imply taking side between different interests – e.g. protection or use. A core problem for societies is how to treat the losers in such decisions and how the losers respond to the rules that work in their disfavour. It is these types of issues that are discussed in the literature on legitimacy.

2.2.1 The concept of legitimacy

A simple definition of legitimacy is that a decision is accepted by those it concerns, not necessarily because they find it right or good, but because it has been made in the right way. This links to people's beliefs about political authority – how common decisions should be made. Understanding legitimacy as acceptability is often called the 'descriptive' understanding of legitimacy. There is, however, also a normative perspective emphasising that what is legitimate has to abide by some defined standards. While there can be no universal definition of such standards – they will typically have some historical and cultural specificity – the normative perspective goes beyond the descriptive one in demanding that there is a justification for the standards that is supported by reason and judged favourably by society (see e.g. Habermas 1979; Bernstein 2005).

In relation to this, one may also make a distinction between 'subjectivist/internal' and 'objectivist/external' assessments of what is legitimate. The first concerns the judgment made by the members of a society or community itself. The second regards an evaluation against a standard for what a legitimate decision should be like. While the 'subjectivist' assessment may include both descriptive and normative elements – the latter as viewed by people themselves – the 'objectivist' evaluation would emphasise normative aspects only. In that respect, it may even go beyond the normative issues as emphasised by the involved people themselves and include more general standards.

The literature also distinguishes between the legitimacy of the decision-making process itself – i.e. 'input legitimacy' – and the legitimacy of results – i.e. 'output legitimacy' (e.g. Bäckstrand 2006). There is a strong normative or 'objectivist' orientation at the basis of this literature. Regarding process or input legitimacy, issues like participation/representativeness, accountability and transparency are typically emphasised. Concerning output legitimacy, issues like effectiveness, efficiency, but also equity are core aspects – i.e. impacts. Note that in this report we do not look at outputs in this meaning. This has first of all to do with the aim, while we also note that the projects need to run for a longer period before any full impact assessments can be undertaken in a meaningful way. 'Outputs' in this report – as already emphasised – refer to changes in governance structures, while the evaluation of these also include some equity aspects not least related to how the governance structures influence people's access to resources including what rules are set for the distribution of compensation.

In relation to this, it is notable that the concept of legitimacy is closely linked to that of justice. There is the distinction between procedural and distributive justice that resembles the above division in the literature between input and output legitimacy. More importantly, many of the normative claims underpinning the reasons behind why something is seen as legitimate build on theories of justice or fairness.

Environmental resources are in a fundamental way common. Hence, the issue of legitimacy and justice is of special importance when decisions regarding the use and protection of these are made. The literature on environmental justice follows very much the above distinction between procedural and distributive justice, but according to a more Southern conceptualisation, the concept of compensatory justice is added (e.g. Ikeme 2003). It relates to the injustice established by historical patterns of resource use and economic growth and is especially emphasised in the domain of climate change where the history of unequal use of the atmosphere is put at the fore.

In the analyses – both on process and outputs as defined here – we will combine 'subjectivist' and 'objectivist' assessments. Concerning the former, we will try to establish how various involved actors evaluate the process. Concerning the latter, we will do an evaluation based on normative theory of participation, deliberation, accountability and transparency, but also on the more overarching issue of justice.

2.2.2 Participation, deliberation, transparency and accountability

The roles different actors play in the process of establishing REDD+ is a core element when judging legitimacy. One issue is whether people themselves consider the system of participation to be legitimate. Another it is whether it stands up to accepted norms about what are 'good' forms and levels of participation. Following Lukes's understanding of power (Lukes 2005), there is the power of 'elites' – be they internal or external – to rule and prevent protest by shaping perceptions, cognition and preferences so that people accept solutions that are against their 'objective' interests. Analysing legitimacy demands including this dimension also, hence the distinction between the 'subjectivist' and 'objectivist' accounts. However, defining what is an objective interest is very demanding, and while the distinction is important, there are obvious limitations to such analyses.

The literature on participation is voluminous. A core emphasis concerns the role or position given to local people. Inoue (1998) presents a rather simple categorisation that is useful as an introduction to the issues. He distinguishes between three levels: top-down approaches, professionally guided participatory approaches and endogenous bottom-up approaches. In top-down approaches, local people are consulted about decisions *post factum* to the decision-making process. Within professionally guided participatory approaches, drafts and plans are elaborated by external professionals. People may be consulted, but only after core decisions have been made by outsiders. In contrast, bottom-up approaches are locally initiated and characterised as a continuous learning process, where external professionals take actions according to local needs; they act as facilitators.

Arnstein (1969) and Pretty (1995) are examples of more detailed categorisations. Pretty specifies seven types: manipulative participation, passive participation, participation by consultation, participation for material incentives, functional participation, interactive participation, and self-mobilisation – see Box 1 for further details. While the match is not complete, one may see the first six categories as a specification of Inoue's top-down and professionally guided approaches respectively.

From a normative perspective on legitimacy, one may conclude that legitimacy increases from the first to the last typology. Certainly, there is no simple relationship here, and one may not find a straightforward ordering of e.g. categories 3–5. At the same time, we should note that REDD+ is a programme established 'from the outside'. Hence, the form of participation will have to be found among the categories 6 or lower, and REDD+ may certainly also stimulate some self-mobilisation over time. From the perspective of legitimacy, one may deduce from this that the challenges for REDD+ are substantial.

Box 1. A typology of participation: how people participate in development programmes and projects (Pretty 1995: 1252)

Typology	Characteristics of each type
1. Manipulative participation	Participation is simply a pretence, with 'people's' representatives on official boards, but who are unelected and have no power.
2. Passive participation	People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an administration or project management, without any listening to people's responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External agents define problems and information-gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision making, and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by contributing resources, for example labour, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. Farmers may provide the fields and labour, but are involved in neither experimentation nor the process of learning.
5. Functional participation	Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People may participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project. Such involvement may be interactive and involve shared decision making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have been made by external agents. At worst, local people may still only be co-opted to serve external goals.
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and the formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just the means of achieving project goals. As groups take control over local decisions and determine how available resources are used, so they have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
7. Self-mobilisation	People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Such self-initiated mobilisation may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.

According to UN-REDD (2013)[1] the implementation of REDD+ measures should be based on the principles of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). FPIC – as defined – includes a list of normative demands regarding communities' participation, and in this case in REDD+. UN-REDD (2013) defines these demands as follows:

- 'Free' refers to a consent given voluntarily and absent of 'coercion, intimidation or manipulation'. 'Free refers to a process that is self-directed by the community from whom consent is being sought, unencumbered by coercion, expectations or timelines that are externally imposed' (p.18).
- 'Prior' means 'consent is sought sufficiently in advance of any authorisation or commencement of activities'. 'Prior refers to a period of time in advance of an activity or process when consent should be sought, as well as the period between when consent is sought and when consent is given or withheld' (p. 19).
- 'Informed refers mainly to the nature of the engagement and type of information that should be provided prior to seeking consent and also as part of the ongoing consent process' (p. 19).
- 'Consent refers to the collective decision made by the rights-holders and reached through the customary decision-making processes of the affected peoples or communities. Consent must be sought and granted or withheld according to the unique formal or informal political–administrative dynamic of each community' (p. 20).

1. Guidance has been available from UN-REDD for a few years now as there are earlier versions of this publication.

Ensuring FPIC is by no means simple. Hence, Leggett and Lovell (2012:115) conclude from a study in Papua New Guinea that 'Several cases of institutional biases and uneven power relationships have been exploited by local elites to prevent landowners from making free and informed choices about their involvement in the project, although landowners and local communities are well positioned to capture forthcoming project benefits'.

The format of the participation will be influenced by the power relations both internally in the communities and with the actors who, in our case, are implementing the REDD+ pilots. The challenge here is that weak groups may not be able to signal their concerns because they are afraid of possible repercussions. Since marginalisation often influences perceptions of what is possible, right or just, such groups may even be unable to envision a different position for themselves than at 'the bottom' – i.e. Lukes's (2005) perspective on power.

If one demands that the decisions should be reasoned to be legitimate, the quality of the decision-making process becomes an issue, too. Here two aspects need to be mentioned. First, we have the issue of transparency: how open the process is and how it supports the flow of information so that all relevant groups are informed about what is happening and what the various issues are. Second, we have the depth of the decision-making process: how thoroughly the various issues are treated, how free all parties are to voice their concerns and what possibilities there are to test arguments and develop well-supported solutions. This concerns the deliberative aspect of the process. According to Habermas (1996) the legitimacy of democratic decisions depends both on procedural characteristics and the practical quality of the outcomes that these procedures generate. Hence, 'Deliberative politics acquires its legitimating force from the discursive structure of an opinion- and will-formation that can fulfil its socially integrative function only because citizens expect its results to have a reasonable quality' (Habermas 1996:304).

Not all decisions can be made by involving all relevant actors. Power to decide may have to be delegated. Because of this, the issue of accountability is important. It concerns the basis on which decision makers acquire their right to decide, including who has the right to call back their mandate. Bäckstrand (2006) notes that many new initiatives in environmental governance are network based with competing or overlapping authorities. Hence, standard assumptions about hierarchical accountability may not apply. Some of the models for REDD+ have network characteristics and instead of accountability via democratic election – e.g. elected governments who are accountable to the citizens (internal accountability) – we are in a situation where 'decision makers have to justify their action vis-à-vis stakeholders' (ibid:295) – i.e. external accountability. Referring to Witte *et al.* (2003), Bäckstrand mentions professional peer accountability, reputational accountability, market accountability and financial/fiscal accountability. At present, no agreed system of conceptualisations has been developed. Both research and practice in this field are very immature, and regarding this issue we would rather look at what characterises accountability in the concrete cases than undertaking normative evaluations.

2.2.3 Just distribution

Equity or distributive justice is – as we have seen – a core element of evaluating the output legitimacy of a policy. According to Johansson-Stenman and Konow (2010:151) 'Distributive justice [...] concerns moral preferences over the distribution of social and economic benefits and burdens among a group of individuals'. This understanding seems to focus on consequences only – on the distribution of benefits and costs. In the justice literature there is, however, also emphasis on deontological philosophies – i.e. rights-based philosophies as opposed to the goal orientation of its consequentialist counterpart.

A series of general principles for distributive justice is found in the literature e.g. strict egalitarianism; the difference principle (e.g. Rawls); resource-based principles; welfare-based principles (e.g. utilitarianism); desert-based principles; libertarian principles; and feminist principles. Some of these notions are based on consequentialist philosophies – e.g. strict egalitarianism; welfare-based principles – or deontological philosophies – e.g. resource-based principles; libertarianism – or a combination of consequentialist and deontological principles – e.g. feminist principles.

In practical contexts we observe a huge variation and combination of 'principles' typically fought out in political battles between different perspectives and interests. Various social and political cultures put different emphases on the diverse aspects of justice as implicit in the above principles. Often they become embedded in the culture and we rarely observe references to specific philosophies underpinning them.

In the sub-field of 'environmental justice' – e.g. Ikeme (2003) – we have observed also the concept of compensatory justice. Here the emphasis is on the fact that the poor typically have to carry a non-proportionate amount of environmental costs. This can be explained by a lack of power resulting in e.g. low representation in decision-making processes. Hence, the unequal distribution of environmental hazards or risks (consequentialist aspect) is explained by procedural injustice.

In the case of REDD+ several of the above issues are relevant. First, we observe that the typical 'northern argument' for REDD+ is based on cost-efficiency arguments. This is a welfare-based motivation where the idea is that the actions with the lowest cost are preferred as they will maximise total welfare. As the North still accepts to pay, there is also an element of compensatory justice involved. Key here is again the principle of compensation according to opportunity costs – or the costs of lost livelihoods experienced by protecting forests.

One could argue that it is the South itself that is the cause of emissions due to the fact that the deforestation takes place there. This in itself is a contested argument in the sense that at least parts of the deforestation stem from activities undertaken by northern companies and/or the products are consumed in the North. What is maybe more notable is that it is the North that turns to the South and wants to 'buy' access to cheaper mitigation actions that are 'offered' there, implying reduced needs for cutting emissions 'at home'. So REDD+ can be seen as a way to continue 'business-as-usual' in the North adding to the historically unjust use of the atmosphere as a dump for carbon emissions.

We observe, hence, a very complex situation concerning the intertwined relationship between efficiency and fairness. Moreover, a core reason for action in the South being low cost is poverty. People in the South are poor and 'the poor sell cheap' (Martinez-Alier 2003). Hence, REDD+ could infringe upon development opportunities of the poor living in forested areas in the South. As a response to this, REDD+ is presented as a win-win – as both reducing emissions and combating poverty. Therefore principles related to going beyond ensuring that groups in the South do not lose out compared to the status quo have been emphasised. The emphasis on FPIC should also be understood in this context.

Our study of the introduction of REDD+ in the two contexts of Brazil and Tanzania is undertaken against this backdrop of highly sensitive issues regarding distributional justice. While our focus is on the local experiences concerning the right to say 'no' and the distribution of costs and benefits locally, the wider global context of justice needs also to be kept in mind when evaluating the legitimacy of the projects.

The case of RDS Rio Negro, Brazil

The main focus of this chapter will be on the REDD+ project in the RDS[2] Rio Negro. It is established under the so-called Bolsa Floresta Programme (BFP) in the State of Amazonas. Data about the programme and people's evaluation of the implementation in the RDS Rio Negro are based on information from the Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (FAS), on household surveys, focus group discussions and interviews with local resource persons in the RDS. The information was gathered by Rubén Leiva-Montoya during a field visit in January–February 2013 with assistance from MSc students from the National Institute for Amazonian Research (INPA). It should be noted that Arild Vatn also visited the RDS in 2010.

However, before we look more in detail at the Rio Negro project, we will offer some background information about forest policy and REDD+ in Brazil and the situation in the State of Amazonas.

3.1 The context

3.1.1 Forest policies and REDD+ in Brazil

According to FAO (2013) more than 60 per cent – about 5.2 million km^2 – of Brazil is covered by forests. They are spread over six biomes: Amazônia, Cerrado, Mata Atlântica, Caatinga, Pampa and Pantanal. Natural forests constitute the largest category (92 per cent), followed by naturally regenerated forests (7 per cent) and lastly planted forests (1 per cent). The country's total forest area ranks second in the world after Russia (McNeish *et al.* 2011).

Most of the forests in Brazil are, according to FAO (2009), publicly owned – 81 per cent. The rest are categorised as private forests. The publicly owned forests are divided in different sub-categories, where some can be considered largely protected and some of the used forests are managed by others than the state. An important category is that of indigenous lands where indigenous communities are granted use rights. According to Barreto *et al.* (2008) there is a lack of clarity around land ownership in Brazil, including competing claims. The country lags behind in officially registering rural properties. The situation is gradually getting better after passing the Public Forest Management Act (Law no 11.284) in 2006 (Presidência da República 2006) with the launching of the Programme Terra Legal in 2009 as an important step.

Until 2005, deforestation rates were high in Brazilian forests. This development was driven by policies encouraging settlement in forest areas. As recent as the early 2000s, government policies promoted large-scale cattle ranching, extensive soy-bean production, large-scale mining as well as occupation by smallholder farmers. Acquisition of credit and formalisation of land ownership was tied to proof of 'productive activities' which essentially meant land uses that replaced forests with activities such as agriculture and cattle rearing (May *et al.* 2011). Illegal logging was moreover rampant. It is also notable that for decades the government also prioritised the construction of several highways to socially and economically integrate remote forest areas of the Amazon with the rest of Brazil and to maintain territorial integrity (Presidência da República 2006). As result of these factors, Brazil lost over 600,000km^2 of forest over the past two generations with losses peaking in 1995 and 2004 – close to 30,000km^2 per year (INPE 2013).

2. RDS means 'sustainable development reserve'. It is one of nine different types of 'sustainable use units' (Governo do Estado do Amazonas 2007a).

Although there have been some attempts to counter this trend of deforestation by – among others – passing the Brazilian Forest Code in 1965 (Presidência da República 1965), deforestation forces dominated until about 2005. The change in policies started in 2000 with the passing of the Law 9.985 (Presidência da República 2000) on the national system for nature conservation units. This law made the basis for the formation of a system of protected areas. Today there are altogether 15 different types of designated forest protection areas – differentiated according to the specific purpose – e.g. environmental protection areas, biological reserves, indigenous lands and sustainable development reserves. They cover at present altogether about 20 per cent of Brazil's total land surface (Blaser *et al.* 2011). It is notable that the law defines a ban on commercial logging in protected areas – the conservation units – while logging becomes allowed if a forest management plan is developed and approved. Also important is the plan to control deforestation in the Amazon (PPCDAM) from 2004 and the Public Forest Management Act from 2006. Together, these form the most important elements of the substantial shift in the Brazilian policy on forest protection implying a reduction in the deforestation rate going gradually down to less than 5000km^2 in 2012 (INPE 2013).

It is notable that much of the action taken in Brazil was initiated before REDD+ became an issue on the international agenda. Nevertheless, Brazil has also taken some more specific REDD+ actions. The responsibility for REDD+ is put under the Interministerial Committee on Climate Change. It has an executive group led by the Ministry of the Environment. The REDD+ strategy – while yet not approved – has been drafted by this group. It should be noted that at present the financial resources for REDD+ are administered by the Amazon Fund (established 2008). It operates quite independently of the more general climate change policy/forest protection initiatives made by the federal and state administrations (Dalene 2011).

3.1.2 Actions taken by the State of Amazonas

The State of Amazonas is in many senses a forerunner regarding climate change policies and forest protection in Brazil. For example, state-protected areas increased from 7 million ha in 2002 to 19 million ha in 2010 (Viana 2010). Moreover, the state launched a RED initiative at the UNFCCC COP held at Montreal in 2005[3] (Viana pers. comm.). In 2007, the state government sanctioned Law 3.135 (Governo do Estado do Amazonas 2007b) in which the state policy for climate change, environmental conservation and sustainable development was established. The goal was to create instruments to enable the state to work towards the conservation of forests, by facing the challenges and opportunities of climate change. Except with the establishment of the Amazon Fund, the REDD+ process was slow at the federal level. According to May *et al.* (2011:75) states/sub-national levels were filling a 'policy vacuum at the federal level regarding the specific architecture and intergovernmental coordination'. Moreover, they state that 'REDD+ strategies have responded to policy development by sub-national authorities in collaboration or independently of major national or international NGO initiatives regarding policies for environmental conservation and sustainable development'. Modifying institutions and creating new organisations was necessary, and consequently done by the state government.

A core element of this policy is the State of Amazonas Conservation Units (UCs) system – SEUC – established through the Complementary Law 57/2007. Finally, there is the Law 3.244/2008 that created the State Climate Change Centre (CECLIMA), the State Conservation Units Centre (CEUC) and the State Climate Change Centre and State Conservation Unit Centre Managing Unit (UGMUC). It should be noted that the management of the conservation units is the responsibility of CEUC, as directed by the state's Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development (SDS). It is CEUC – under the leadership of SDS – that determines and defines the policies, plans and partnerships for the UCs.

3. It was called the Amazon Initiative and reflected the fact that the first 'D' in REDD – deforestation – was the main focus early on.

In Law 3.135/2007 it is stated that the State of Amazonas is to support and fund a non-profit foundation 'whose purpose is the development and administration of the programmes and projects on climate change, environmental conservation and sustainable development, as provided in Law 3.135 of 5th June 2007, and the Complementary Law 53 of 5th June 2007, and to manage environmental services and products, as defined in this law...' (Governo do Estado do Amazonas 2007b: Article 6, our translation; see also Viana 2008). Based on this, the foundation – Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (FAS) – was created in late 2007 (SDS 2009). Its aim was to undertake investments to improve the quality of life of local populations and the conservation of forests in the UCs.

From 2008, FAS was given the responsibility to manage the programme based on an agreement with the state government. According to Tezza (pers. comm.) the idea was that FAS should have the capability to implement a long-term programme efficiently and transparently and independent of political interests. Also, the private foundation was to be governed by a board of administration including equal representation for government, academia, civil society and business. According to the director of FAS, Virgilio Viana[4] (pers. comm.), the state did not create a governmental organisation because a non-governmental one supported by the state would be more free to act and avoid the bureaucratic inefficiency of governmental agencies. Tezza (pers. comm.) emphasised also the advantage of a private organisation in attracting private funding.

The State of Amazonas supported the creation of FAS with R$20 million.[5] The funds were aimed at long-term investments. The yearly profits are invested so as to ensure financial sustainability of the foundation's programmes. This endowment fund is administered by Bradesco Bank, which itself contributed R$20 million for the creation of the foundation and has added R$60 million to the fund since 2008. The rest of the funds FAS receive come from donations. Coca-Cola Brazil has donated R$20 million; the Amazon Fund has donated R$19.3 million over four years; Samsung Brazil gave R$3.8 million to support the education programme in the Rio Negro Environmental Protected Area. Marriott International has given US$500,000 per year for four years. A few other more minor donations have also been made.

3.1.3 FAS and the Bolsa Floresta Programme

The Bolsa Floresta Programme (BFP) has become the core element in combating climate change and poverty among traditional and indigenous populations in the State of Amazonas. According to the four components of BFP, FAS compensates the communities for managing the environmental services and invests in income-generation activities, social strengthening, education and health. All four represent an annual investment of over R$1300 yearly per family – about US$600. It is distributed and regulated in the following way (FAS 2012):

1. ***Bolsa Floresta Familiar* – BFF – or family component:** a monthly payment of R$50 (R$600 yearly) to the mother/female head of each family. The payment is done using electronic cards. Eligibility for payment demands signing a contract where the condition is to abide by the rules of the UC, plus send children to school. Note that BFP only operates in already-established UCs that are committed to the conservation of the environment and sustainable development (see also Section 3.2).
2. ***Bolsa Floresta Associação* – BFA – or association component:** an investment destined for community associations in the UCs. It corresponds to 10 per cent of the payments made under the family component. Its goal is to strengthen social organisation of the communities in each UC.

4. It is notable that Virgilio Viana was State Secretary of Environment and Sustainable Development at the time Law 3.135 (2007) was written and passed.
5. The value of R$1 is about US$0.45.

3. ***Bolsa Floresta Renda* – BFR – or income-generation component:** supporting the sustainable production of forest products such as timber, essential oils, fruit and nuts, and honey. Each community receives R$396 per year and per registered family. These resources are meant for the purchase of equipment, capacity building through training and facilities, and support for income-generation activities.
4. ***Bolsa Floresta Social* – BFS – or social component:** an investment focused on supporting improvements in education, health, communications and transport, which are areas of vital importance for the livelihoods of the communities. This component is implemented and developed with both public and private organisations as partners. Each community receives R$350 per year and per registered family. Like the BFR, the sum of money is invested in the community.

The programme was developed within the state's Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development (SDS) during 2006 (Viana 2010). FAS was given the responsibility of implementing it in 2008. In the early stages of the process there were a series of meetings in Manaus including discussions among representatives of the state and various socio-economic movements, including indigenous associations. Also important for the structure chosen were consultations during the establishment of the first BFP area – the Uatumã RDS.

The overall structure of BFP was set during these processes. There is one exception to this. The BFR and BFS were originally one component – on investment. Regarding the fixedness of the structure, Viana (2013:2) notes that 'the programme had to have a uniform structure throughout the territory. After long and in-depth discussions, it was concluded that having a uniform structure was essential for an efficient management of the programme as well as in preventing conflicts among different communities if different payment schemes were implemented'. Since 2011, changes in the rules of the BFP have been made by a leaders' assembly comprised of the presidents and leaders of grassroots organisations representing each of the UCs, which meets twice a year in Manaus (Viana pers. comm.). One of the substantive changes made by this assembly was the introduction of some flexibility regarding allocation of funds between the BFR and BFS components (Viana 2013).

We note that payments to families are made by using an electronic card. Viana (pers. comm.) emphasises that this solution was chosen to both reduce transaction costs and avoid corruption at the local level.

In an agreement between the Government of the State of Amazonas and FAS it is stated that BFP should be implemented in 15 conservation units – i.e. 11 RDS (Juma, Amanã, Uacari, Rio Amapá, Mamirauá, Uatumã, Piagaçu Purus, Cujubim, Canumã, Rio Madeira and Rio Negro); 3 RESEX[6] (Catuá Ipixuna, Rio Gregório, Floresta Estadual de Maués); and one APA[7] (Rio Negro) (FAS 2013a).

3.2 Establishment of REDD+ in RDS Rio Negro

The sustainable development reserve in Rio Negro was established with effect from 1st January 2009 by the State of Amazonas. The legal basis was found in the Law 3.355/2008 (Governo do Estado do Amazonas 2008a). It is located in the municipalities of Manacapuru, Iranduba and Novo Airão, 100km northwest of Manaus. The RDS is divided in three areas (Polo 1, Polo 2 and Polo 3) including altogether 19 communities (villages) – see map in Figure 1. The size of the reserve is about 1030km^2 and the distance from the northwest to the southeast along the river is approximately 75km.

6. RESEX stands for extractivist reserves.
7. APA stands for environmental protected area.

A reserve management plan was developed for the RDS defining rules regarding use. This plan is specific to the RDS Rio Negro. It is notable that people in general may cut timber for their own use – e.g. buildings, canoes/boats – but also for small-scale ecotourism and wood crafts. This follows from the Resolution CEEMAM (Governo do Estado do Amazonas 2008b). They may also engage in commercial logging if a forest management plan is developed and approved by IPAAM (Amazon Environmental Research Institute). Such plans are typically made for each community and define the amount of timber that can be harvested without reducing the volume of standing forests in the long run. Harvests are then allowed both in primary and secondary forests. The volumes defined depend on the status of the forest and the species found. The area had been an APA – an environmental protection area – since 1995. The regulations on resource use are less strict under APA regulations while this also depends on the zoning within the APA (Marostica pers. comm.).

Figure 1. Map of the RDS Rio Negro. Delimitation in yellow, villages in white

Source: FAS 2009

Primary sector income activities in the RDS Rio Negro are agriculture, fishing and the extraction of forest products (timber and non-timber). Wages and remittances are also very important sources of income. Average yearly income at the household level has been estimated to be about US$3000 (Marostica pers. comm.). The method used deviates somewhat from the one used later for the Tanzanian pilot. Movik *et al.* (2012) offer, however, a calculation for the Rio Negro APA – the area at the opposite side of the Rio Negro – using the same method as for Tanzania. The total per household income per year – both subsistence and non-subsistence – was here calculated to be in the order of US$6000 with off-farm income accounting for more than 50 per cent. The difference between the estimates creates some uncertainty when we later compare the two cases. It should also be mentioned that it is reasonable to believe that none of these figures capture income from illegal timber harvests

Most of the land is owned by the state while some is privately owned.[8] It is notable that the families perceive that they own the land around their houses and the agricultural plots. Land per family – for agriculture, gardens, houses – is typically small. According to our survey, about 21 per cent state that they have no such land. Close to 70 per cent of those having such land hold land less than 2 hectares. It is notable that there are also some that have more than 10ha – about 15 per cent of those having land for agriculture.

There were 524 households registered in the RDS Rio Negro at the time of our study (FAS 2013b). The average size of the families is four members. Mostly '*caboclos*' (traditional population and miscegenation of local indigenous and whites) inhabit the reserve. Based on data from our survey – see Section 3.3 – we can conclude that education levels are low. On average, each person has attended three years of school while two thirds have only two years or less of formal education.

The introduction of BFP in RDS Rio Negro started a few months after the reserve was set up – i.e. in April 2009. FAS organised a two-day workshop in each community where they informed community members about the full programme and consulted with them about having the programme in the reserve. To be eligible for the payment – BFF – a representative from each family had to participate in this introductory workshop. In some cases – where distances were fairly small – communities could have joint meetings. Information provided concerned both the programme and issues related to climate change and sustainable development. The content of the programme was discussed, and we have already noted that the basic structure of BFP was a predefined package, which was also introduced to the inhabitants of the RDS Rio Negro. While proposals for changes could be made at these and other meetings, the core forum for decision-making about rules is the state-wide leaders' assembly as referred to in section 3.1.3

Based on what people learnt at these workshops, people decided whether to join or not. This decision was individual in the sense that each household – represented by the female head – was invited to sign a contract implying a commitment by the household to respect the following instructions (FAS undated):

1. Follow the rules of the RDS management plan.
2. Be associated with and up-to-date on the contribution to the Association of the RDS and actively participate in their activities.
3. Maintain the size of the agricultural areas as no larger than the one registered at the beginning of the BFP in the community, only growing crops in open or resting areas of shrub and of forest management areas, and not advancing into primary forest areas.
4. Have children who are of school age in schools close to their residence, registered and attending.
5. Make firebreaks in the vicinity of areas of clearings (secondary forests) and communicate with the community on the day of burning.

8. Viana (pers. comm.) notes that the state does not expropriate existing private land unless there is a conflict with the objectives of the reserve.

It is notable that the most important regulations – those of timber harvests – are regulated by the RDS management plan and the forest management plan. The BFP adds some restrictions though, related to clearings for agriculture – cf. points 3 and 5 above. In the case of RDS Rio Negro, 88 per cent of households had signed by early 2013. Note that FAS has no rules defining a minimum number of signatories to establish the programme. The limiting factor is the resources available to include new families in the programme (Viana pers. comm.). Enrolment percentages are high throughout the entire state.

Point 2 above relates to the establishment of an association for the whole RDS. The people committed themselves to participate in such an organisation at the introductory workshops. The idea behind the association is to establish a common organisation – a 'mother association' – at the RDS level. Previously, each community had only a local association and a president. The establishment was done in two steps. First, community council representatives met with CEUC to draft the rules for the association. Next, decisions over these rules and elections of the board and president were done in a common meeting where people from all of the involved communities were invited and every head of a registered household could vote. Hence, the ACS Rio Negro was in place already in 2009. According to the rules, the election of the ACS president and board is to be done every second year using the same rules as when established.

Concerning the running of the programme, Viana (pers. comm.) informs that a community-level association meeting is held at least once a year to discuss and define investment priorities for the income and social components. Groups of communities can make joint investments – e.g. decide on investments at polo level such as in the case of emergency boats. Community presidents – accompanied by other community members – meet moreover for a workshop at the reserve level, which FAS also attends. The reserve-level meeting functions as an arena for communication between FAS and the communities. At these meetings, decisions are also made regarding the resources allocated to the association component. It is notable that from June 2010 the association decided to make the resources available regarding the income and social components equal per community – i.e. not dependent on the number of people signing per community as is the 'normal rule' for Bolsa Floresta.[9]

A core aspect of the BFR component has been to learn how to establish what are defined as sustainable activities, including the development of forest management plans, community-based tourism, handcrafting, fishing and the harvesting and refinement of cocoa, nuts and oils etc. The help FAS offers in legalising timber harvests is especially important. In the RDS Rio Negro, 15 out of 19 communities have in 2013 acquired approval of forest management plans and have started many activities related to tourism, handcrafting, aviculture etc. For example, forest management plans are presently generating an average income of R$92,000 per community and per year (Nascimento[10] pers. comm.).

There are reasons to believe that this sum can be increased quite substantially while still operating within the rules set by the forest management plans. Average allowed timber harvests given such plans seem to be in the order of $1m^3$ per ha and year (Marostica pers. comm.). Prices paid for legal timber is higher than for illegal. It has, however, not been possible to establish firm evidence about how large the difference is. It is at the same time important to note that the global demand for hardwood is decreasing. Hence, there is substantial uncertainty regarding what the future potential will be. Box 2 offers an overview of core components of a forest management plan.

9. It is notable that FAS has accepted that rules are becoming somewhat differentiated across the different project areas.
10. President of the association ASC Rio Negro.

Box 2. Forest management plans

Forest management plans are licenses the government of the State of Amazonas grants the communities in the RDS to legally extract timber. Most of these licenses are valid for two years. These plans have a set of rules aimed at the protection of the environment e.g. limiting the extraction of certain species or protecting water sources from toxic substances etc. They also define the maximum allowed number of trees to be cut, the total amount of timber to be extracted (in m^3) and the maximum intensity of extraction (in m^3/ha) amongst other things (see below).

Area of the property (ha): 500	Municipality: Iranduba
Total area of the plan (ha): 500	Community: Carão
Authorised area for exploration (ha): 22.4	Transcript/registration: ---
Area for actual extraction (ha): 436.04	Property registration number: CDRU no. 0666
Area of the field (ha): ---	Technical adviser responsible: Priscillia Adriano Silva
Maximum extraction intensity (m3/ha): 16.51	CREA/AM No.: 14.431-D
Total number of authorised trees: 91	Total volume authorised (m^3): 373.31

The specifications of each plan depend on the area of the community and the area intended for the plan. In the License L.O. No. 379/06-02, for example, considering the area intended for the plan is 500ha and the area for actual extraction is 436.04ha, the community of Carão is granted with a permit to cut up to 91 trees, with a maximum intensity of 16.51m^3/ha, having a total volume of 373.31 m^3 authorised for extraction.

Source: Based on Governo do Estado do Amazonas (2013)

Necessary training for various components of the BFR has also been undertaken by FAS – alone or in cooperation with partners. By 2012, the total investments in the component in RDS Rio Negro amounted to R$561,250.

Regarding the social component – BFS – it is notable that a common communication base has been established and by 2011, 10 out of 19 communities had acquired a radio. The issue of ambulance boats is handled at the polo level, and each polo has now invested in one. Other investments include transportation facilities, potable water, building/refurbishment of wells/water network, construction of community social centres, investments in schools and churches, and one power-generating house. By 2012 total investments in the BFS component were R$540,669.

3.3 Local people's evaluation of REDD+ in RDS Rio Negro

Data for the analysis of people's evaluations of the programme are based on three sources – a questionnaire, a set of focus group discussions (FGDs) and a set of interviews with local resource persons. Altogether, 100 household representatives in 10 out of 19 villages spread across the three polos were interviewed – 43 in Polo 1, 47 in Polo 2 and 10 in Polo 3 – the latter being the smallest of the three. The villages chosen covered a range of sizes – the largest having 64 and the smallest including 17 households. The number of household heads interviewed in each village was in the order of 30–40 per cent of all households. People were somewhat reluctant to participate. We interpret that as due to some distrust towards outsiders. Hence, the final sample may not be fully representative.

Four FGD sessions were also held – one with only females and one with only males, while the two others were mixed. The number of people attending in each group was 4–6. These figures also reflect some resistance to interact with outsiders. Regarding resource persons, we interviewed the president of the association, four community presidents and five other local representatives – e.g. members of community associations and organised production groups. These interviews were semi-structured. Finally, we had several informal talks with people when staying in the villages. Note that we will explicitly clarify if data comes from FGDs or resource persons' interviews. Otherwise, they originate from the survey responses.

3.3.1 People's overall evaluation

We asked local people both about their general assessment of the programme and their evaluation of the more specific components. Concerning the overall evaluation, we note that people expressed more positive than negative views about the BFP. Figure 2 offers an overview of the respondents' answers to a question about their opinion of the programme, where 1 is 'very negative' and 5 'very positive'.

Figure 2. Respondents' opinion about BFP (N=98)



Figure 3. Respondents' opinion about BFP by area (N=98)



As observed, almost all respondents were willing to respond to this question. The average score is 3.3. About 43 per cent had a 'positive' or 'very positive' view; 42 per cent were indifferent, while about 15 per cent responded that they viewed the programme as 'negative' or 'very negative'. Reasons for positive responses were given as a response to an open question and related to payments/benefits, support to the community and to environmental protection. However, a large number of respondents – about half – answered that it was too little money for BFF, while some of these still added that 'it helps'.

Figure 3 offers an overview where this assessment is presented per polo. While the distributions seem somewhat different across polos, statistical tests – i.e. Fishers Exact and non-parametric tests[11] – do not confirm any difference between the three areas concerning the evaluations. We should note, however, that the number of observations in Polo 1 is low. At the same time, we recognise that there were more disagreements related to the BFP reported especially in Polo 3. We asked people if there were any conflicting issues raised at the introductory workshop. In Polo 3, we found that 58 per cent of the respondents reported disagreements, while the figures were 45 per cent and 30 per cent in Polos 2 and 1 respectively. While these figures do not say anything about how many issues there were, they are an indication of their relative importance. The most often-mentioned cause of the disagreements related to timber extraction.

The data from the resource persons' interviews and FGDs shed some further light on this issue. Here we found that timber extractors disagreed with the BF programme because of the restrictions they believed it put on logging and that the compensation offered by the BFF did not cover the implied losses. This argument was especially emphasised in Polo 3 – the one closest to Manaus. According to the president of the community of Saracá (Ribeiro pers. comm.), the locals had not understood that it was not the BFP that set the rules for the extraction of timber, but the regulations following the establishment of the reserve.[12] He saw this as the reason why

11. Two-sample F-test (=Wilcoxon) and Folded F for equivalence of variance (=Ansari-Bradley) and a more general test of difference between the samples (=Kolmogorov-Smirnov).
12. Actually, the president of Saracá also seems to be confused. As already noted – see section 3.1.1 – all commercial logging without a forest management plan in UCs was legally banned from 2000. This means that the regulation on logging came into force many years before the RDS was established. It seems, however, that people were not very aware of these rules before the RDS and the BFP were created. Remember that the area was an APA from 1995.

timber extractors mistakenly disagreed with Bolsa Floresta. So, while BFP might to large an extent be seen as a 'free lunch' for them, many do not seem to see it like that.

During the FGDs and interviews with locals, it was noted that the illegal extraction of timber still continues. While there are indications that this practice is lower than before the RDS was established, it is common knowledge among the people in the RDS that boats carrying illegal timber frequently leave the area of Polo 3 (Acajatuba) early in the morning and that the authorities do not intervene. So even though people are receiving benefits from the various components of BFP and can sell legal timber for a higher price than for illegal trade, some seem still to continue to extract and sell timber illegally. At the same time, Viana (pers. comm.) notes that there is a substantial change going on here as legal timber production was practically zero before the establishment of the BFP. The forest management plans legally approved by the time of data collection allow an average yearly harvest of 350 cubic metres per community (ibid.).

Three-quarters of the respondents to the survey stated that the BFF payment does not cover the costs incurred by the regulations. In the household interviews, disagreements over the issue of low compensation did not, however, come through as linked to restrictions on logging. The main argument was that most of the payment is consumed by the process of receiving it – i.e. going to the bank to make the withdrawal. While not an irrelevant argument, one may wonder about its significance since making the withdrawal from the bank most probably occurs when one is in town anyway. Rather, this could be seen as a somewhat constructed argument.[13] It may signal that people consider the sums to be small – signalling greater expectations. Given the misunderstanding regarding BFP and logging restrictions, one may also wonder if people implied that the costs for them are more substantial.

All respondents seem to know of the programme and that FAS is organising it. This is quite impressive, noting that we asked in a manner where we could ascertain if this knowledge was substantiated. People were also somewhat happier with the way FAS implemented the programme than with the programme itself: 48 and 9 per cent responded respectively 'good' or 'very good', while 10 and 4 per cent responded 'bad' or 'very bad'. At the same time, we observed that the local people were a bit confused about who else is involved in the BFP. Forty-six per cent of those surveyed thought that the federal government was also involved in the programme. They were moreover not clear about how BFP is financed – with 'do not know' or 'federal government' accounting for 66 per cent of the answers.

3.3.2 Evaluating the introduction of the family component – BFF

Regarding the evaluation of the processes of introducing each component, we were interested in issues concerning the level of participation and people's evaluation of the dissemination of information, the discussions and the final decisions made. In the case of the BFF, it should be noted that this component was the basis for establishing the programme. Hence, it is the process of establishing the BFF component that functions as the FPIC process in this case.

Most households participated in the introductory workshops. While noting that only three-quarters of the sample responded to questions about the quality of the workshops and the information offered, most of those responding were positive – see Figure 4. The quality of the information offered – see Figure 5 – was the main reason for people ranking the quality of the workshops as 'good' or 'very good'. Others noted that they learnt a lot. Some – around 20 per cent – noted, however, that information was unclear while a similar number found the meetings boring with too many people.

13. At the same time, we note that FAS has been developing a solution through a partnership with Bradesco Bank and locals to install local ATMs. A pilot has been established in the Tumbira community, managed by themselves.

Figure 4. Overall impression of the workshops (N=76)



Figure 5. Evaluation of the information offered (N=76)



Survey participants recollected that people were active in asking questions and discussing the concerned topics during the workshops. In the majority of the communities, the questions asked by the families were said to have been extensively discussed: 75 per cent (N=74) concurred that the workshops were open to villagers' views. None said that they had not been open to such views. One could maybe expect that this should have eliminated any further enquiries and possible conflicts related to misunderstanding of the role of the programme, while we have already noted the confusion between the reserve and the BFP rules.

The people in the communities also made clear that FAS representatives responded openly to questions and statements both during and outside the workshops. Respondents stated that they could contact FAS representatives/field officers in person or through phone calls at almost any time previous to and during the implementation of BFP.

The information that people acquired about the BFP came mainly through FAS. About 20 per cent of respondents had information from sources independent of FAS, mainly being people from the municipality, state officials or people representing the reserve authorities.

There do not seem to have been extensive disagreements at the introductory meetings – 61 per cent (N=75) noted 'no disagreement'. Nevertheless, more than a third stated the opposite. Again, the reference was mainly to the level of payments – almost three-quarters of those noting disagreements referred to this as the core reason. A few also mentioned the BFP rules as a reason. Given this, it is logical that most found that where there were disagreements, these were understood to be between villagers and FAS, while some more specifically noted disagreements between timber extractors and FAS and some mentioned disputes between the villagers themselves. We seem again to encounter the confusion about what rules followed from the RDS and which were specific to the BFP. Disagreements seem to have been resolved to some extent, while most of those reporting disagreements (N=29) replied that they were not (72 per cent). Given that the overall structure of the BFP was set, this seems logical.

In the end, 96 per cent of the respondents (N=98) informed us that they had signed the BFF agreement and became registered in the programme. Their reasons for signing were mainly related to an improvement in the living standards of families and the livelihoods of the communities. So, although many were not satisfied with the amount paid through the BFF component, the most important reason for signing was to get the money (27 per cent, N=94). Others referred to the programme benefits more in general (18 per cent), some to the specific income-generation projects (5 per cent). About 12 per cent referred to the protection of the forest as the core reason. A few noted that they did it because others did so (7 per cent), or

they said they had no alternative (4 per cent). Those who did not sign the agreement explained that it was because they were not in their community at the time of the registration or because they had not yet had the chance, but they said they planned to sign.

By signing the contract, the people confirmed that they would not cut down primary forests and to using fire in a controlled manner in exchange for receiving the payment in the family component. Asking specifically about whether people felt that the BFF payment covered their costs, the above picture was repeated: 82 per cent of people (N=94) emphasised that the payment from BFF did not cover the costs they face by following the rules as they perceive the situation. They argued first that the amount was too low; and second that the areas in which they could extract timber or make use of the land for agricultural or other purposes were too small and did not allow a recovery of the costs. We note again that the regulations on logging were not the result of the BFP but were demanded by the law.

A core question concerned whether people were free to decide to join REDD+ or not. A large majority – 81 per cent of the respondents (N=96) – stated 'yes' to the following proposition: 'Do you think everybody felt free to take whatever position they wanted concerning establishing the REDD+ project?' 19 per cent said 'no'. During FGDs we observed some uneasiness when answering questions related to this topic. During informal conversations with people from the communities, several (14 out of 24) argued that even though registering for the programme had not been compulsory, pressure had been exercised. It was explained that the source of this pressure was from some of the community presidents. Note that some villagers specifically contacted us to inform us of this. Some even said that they had been told by presidents that if they did not commit to the BFP, they would lose their rights to live in the RDS. Similar statements were found in the survey data collected, even though the respondents rarely mentioned who had said so.

3.3.3 Evaluating the BFA, BFR and BFS components

The data gathered also covered the processes of establishing the association and meetings regarding the allocation of resources under the *'renda'* (income) and 'social' components of Bolsa Floresta. Regarding participation in meetings at community level, it was quite good: 36 per cent stated that they participated in 'all' or 'most of them' (N=91), 45 per cent stated that they participated in a few, while 19 per cent stated they had not participated. Note that some were represented by their spouse. According to the survey data, the attendants participated and actively asked questions during the meetings. Most of these questions concerned the investments on BFR in particular, but also BFS. Some issues also concerned the distribution of resources. Issues were said to be extensively discussed and disagreements were observed.

In this case, most of the disagreements were amongst the people from the communities themselves and rarely between FAS and the communities. Apparently, there were several reasons why a discussion could turn into a disagreement. According to information from the FGDs, it happened mostly over the destination of the investment, the people who were meant to manage the project and/or the distribution of the profit. Most of these disagreements were resolved through discussions and consensus, while some persisted and were in the end settled through voting.

In general, the respondents felt that the information offered at the meetings was sufficient for them to decide on the *renda*, social and association components (see Figure 6). People who considered that the information was 'very poor' or 'poor' referred mostly to the fact that they did not understand how the money was channelled to the projects and where the money came from. Another issue that was raised in the FGDs and mentioned in some resource persons' interviews concerned difficulties regarding knowing how the money allocated to the association (ACS Rio Negro) was used. Some – the issue was raised in all FGDs – said they had asked for accounts and records from the ACS, but that no answer had yet been given to them.

Figure 6. Information quality for BFA, BFR and BFS (N=84)



Figure 7. Participation in investment decisions (N=60)



At the end of the meetings, the investments for the three different components were decided. According to FAS, communities made the decision with technical support from FAS. Villagers seemed to concur that the power to decide over these components was with the villagers (67 per cent, N=90), while some thought that decisions were made jointly by the villagers and FAS together (26 per cent). The decisions seemed to have high support: 54 per cent and 25 per cent responded that they 'agreed' and 'somewhat agreed' (N=84) with the decisions made. Only 5 per cent 'disagreed' while 17 per cent 'disagreed somewhat'.

We note that about 25 per cent of those responding (N=60) said they had not taken part in any of the decisions taken and 30 per cent in only a few – see Figure 7. According to the respondents, meetings involved asking questions about proposals and deciding on whether or not to support an investment for a specific project. Note that while most decisions were taken at the community level, some decisions were also made at the RDS level. Just a few from each community participated in this latter meeting. Hence, it may be unclear if people referred to the local or the RDS decisions.

Asking next about the trust people had in those deciding on their behalf, 35 per cent and 32 per cent of the respondents (N=60) said that they trusted them 'somewhat' or had 'high trust' in those deciding, while 18 and 15 per cent 'somewhat distrusted' or 'distrusted' them respectively. The explanations most often given for the level of trust concerned 'leaders' duty to represent the villagers' or that people knew the leader. There is again, however, a clear indication of distrust in their own leaders among some respondents, since as many as 20 out of 52 answers to explain the level of trust had to do with leaders not acting in a trustworthy manner. Moreover, during the FGDs, attendants argued repetitively that certain investments of BFR and BFS had been decided outside the meetings by the communities' representatives and/or presidents to favour certain private interests or groups.

Asking finally about new investments people may want for the future, about half of the total sample responded by offering altogether 24 ideas. Hence, the same idea was proposed often by just one or two people, indicating a high diversity of ideas and interests among villagers. A few proposals were mentioned by more people. Agriculture and fishing facilities were both mentioned by six respondents. A similar number wanted a health centre or a hotel.

3.3.4 Knowledge about the BFP rules

To establish if the people had sufficient knowledge and information regarding BFP, they were asked about the rules they had committed to when they signed the agreement with FAS. There was a special emphasis on establishing if the people knew the difference between the RDS rules and those of the BFP. From the questionnaires and FGDs, we observed that people felt

they had rather weak knowledge about the specific BFP rules. When asked about these, the answers were varied and often incorrect. Figure 8 gives an overview based on respondents' self-evaluation.

As a control question, people were asked which BFP rules they knew; 70 per cent of those responding (N=79) gave answers related to preventing fires and not cutting down trees. The answers were not very precise, but we observed that many recognised that rules were linked to avoiding deforestation. It may therefore not necessarily be confusing that most of the respondents answered that they followed most or all of the rules, even when they stated not to have knowledge of them – see Figure 9. Accordingly, most considered the BFP rules to have effectively contributed to reducing deforestation in their communities – 46 per cent rated the rules' effectiveness as high, while 41 per cent rated it as medium (N=91).

Figure 8. Knowledge of the BFP rules (N=91)



Figure 9. Do people follow the rules? (N=80)



Even though the families did not know the specific programme rules very well – as evidenced by the data collected – they demonstrated that they were quite knowledgeable about the overall aims of the RDS/BFP. Their responses confirm that many people are confused about which rules were introduced by the law/the RDS and which were specific to the BFP.

3.4 How did FAS evaluate the introduction of the programme?

During the field visit we had extensive contact with FAS. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with several representatives.[14] We also conducted interviews with a representative from CEUC[15] and IDAM (Agricultural Development and Sustainable Forestry of Amazonas).[16]

FAS representatives emphasised that their relationships with the communities were very good. However, establishing the BFP has been a demanding process as the level of education among people in the RDS Rio Negro is low. According to Solidade (pers. comm.), FAS approached the communities by first contacting community presidents and other community leaders to learn about the situation in the community in terms of e.g. education, infrastructure and livelihoods. She emphasised that they had to adapt the format of introductory workshops to the specific setting into which it was to be established – explaining the programme components and the topic of climate change had to be done e.g. using a series of short plays etc. She also

14. Virgilio Viana (Superintendent-General of FAS), Valcleia Solidade (FAS Bolsa Floresta Programme General Coordinator), João Tezza (Technical and Scientific Superintendent of FAS), Michelle Costa (FAS Project coordinator), Hygor Goellner (FAS Field Coordinator) and Marilson Silva (FAS Field Logistics Assistant), Suelen Marostica (FAS International Cooperation and Research Coordinator).
15. Francisco Pinto (sub-Coordinator of CEUC).
16. Malvino Savador (Director of Technical Assistance and Forestry Extension, IDAM).

emphasised the importance of how FAS as outsiders talked to people, what kind of language they used and how they related to their day-to-day activities. This was seen as crucial to both getting their messages across and building trust.

The latter was a serious challenge as people were initially not very open to outsiders, especially when they had to sign something. At the beginning, the relationships were somewhat constrained. However, when the credit cards arrived and people realised that FAS had kept to their word, there seems to have been a major change in attitudes (Solidade pers. comm.).

In relation to this, it should be mentioned that the communities had mixed experiences with the state and its representatives visiting the area on earlier occasions. The president of the ACS Rio Negro emphasised that public officials from the municipalities mainly visited during election campaigns. People in the Rio Negro felt somewhat abandoned by the state and municipal governments, and when the authorities made payments to support community activities, villagers tended to believe that the funds were misplaced or affected by corruption (Nascimento pers. comm.). Solidade (pers. comm.) emphasised that relations between state organisations and the communities have improved substantially since the beginning of the BFP, because the needs of the communities are now taken into account. The government (SDS, CEUC, IDAM and others) now has a calendar and a plan of action for the RDS that complements the programme. Today, the government is more actively engaged with the communities and apparently has constant contact. According to CEUC (Pinto pers. comm.), the data collected by FAS was important in the way that it informed state representatives about the situation in the communities. He saw FAS as both filling an existing gap while ensuring stronger engagement by the state. This was confirmed by IDAM (Salvador pers. comm.).

Also Nascimento (pers. comm.) concurred that the relationship with state officials changed with the establishment of the BFP, although he argued that the communities consider that government actions are much slower than those undertaken by FAS.

The core strategy of FAS is to build local competencies. The individual payment (BFF) is important, but it is thought that the three other components will have a much larger impact on the future situation in the communities. FAS representatives (Solidade and Silva pers. comm.) noted that if households had all the money they needed, there would be no motivation to look for new livelihoods. Instead, if the people in the communities want to improve their livelihoods, they need to discuss and participate in a way that helps to make it happen. R$50 is only a small contribution to the families' incomes and they need to understand that they must look for other income sources. While there was substantial pressure upon FAS to increase this sum, Viana (pers. comm.) clarified that changing this level would depend on having more funds available and that the priority for fundraising by FAS is for medium-/long-term projects related to education and income generation.

According to him, education is one of the main investments for helping the communities to change their quality of life. He emphasised that FAS's investment in formal education is significant. Since the BFP began, high school education is now being offered in the schools built by FAS. In addition, a number of professional courses have also been offered. At the same time, Solidade (pers. comm.) emphasised that in the short term, organising people in the communities to discuss issues, form new habits and institute changes, while integrating these new attitudes into their culture is very important. Education has a more long-term impact.

FAS also cooperates with consultants and agencies to be able to have a deeper impact. For the income component, they have established contact with IDAM and other partners from government to engage in workshops and courses on supply chains. These are normally done

in such a way that support from both FAS and the government is provided to the communities during the whole process.

FAS representatives also noted that implementing BFP generated considerable debate among the people in the reserve. While most meetings and workshops were peaceful, some were not. Solidade (pers. comm.) specifically mentioned a conflict with timber extractors in Polo 3 who faced, among other problems, power games and corruption. There were real conflicts of interest, but some of these conflicts originated because of distrust and a lack of information. This was confirmed also by Pinto (pers. comm.).

Aside from disagreements, there were also misunderstandings to deal with. FAS was often confronted with questions like 'Why do other communities receive more money?' or 'Why have we received only this amount?' According to FAS representatives, they use dialogue to explain the situation to the communities and help them to understand the differences between the various communities. Silva (pers. comm.) described how FAS field officers use examples of different types of issues and problems to demonstrate how they could be resolved. According to Viana (pers. comm.) almost all issues were resolved on a consensus basis following well-informed discussions.

FAS representatives argued that the rules concerning forest protection had been effective. Both FAS and the state representatives interviewed noted that they had observed a reduction in illegal timber extraction, and that the number of children attending school had increased substantially. Although only a few people recalled that making sure their children attended school was part of their responsibilities under the BFF contract, people still seemed to take that 'duty' seriously.

While the BFP is a fixed structure when introduced to communities, Viana (pers. comm.) emphasises that the programme is still changing over time, due to feedback from the involved communities and their leaders. As an example, some flexibility has been included in the allocation of funds to the BFR and BFS components. He also notes that there is a continuous process of improving the format of meetings.

3.5 Summary of the evaluation

Introducing REDD+ in the RDS Rio Negro was done through the Bolsa Floresta Programme (BFP). Historically, this is a development programme with a combined emphasis on conserving forests and improving people's quality of life through education and sustainable production. Regarding organisational changes, the programme supported the establishment of an RDS-wide association – the ACS Rio Negro – which is the BFA component. Regarding institutional changes, we observed the introduction of three components – i.e. the Bolsa Floresta Family (BFF) which includes a payment to female family heads; the Bolsa Floresta Renda (BFR) which supports investments in income-generating activities; and the Bolsa Floresta Social (BFS) which supports investments in education, social infrastructure and health services. By signing the individual contract under the BFF, each household agreed to follow the rules defined in the RDS management plan, not to expand land for agriculture and to follow rules regarding the use of fire.

The BFP was developed in 2006 by the state's Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development involving also meetings with community representatives. When implemented in e.g. RDS Rio Negro, the rules defined, the structure of components and the distribution of funds between them were considered as given. It is notable that the BFP did not include restrictions on forest use that went much beyond those already included in the law/the RDS regulations as defined by the State of Amazonas.

Credit: Arild Vatn

Community meeting, Bolsa Floresta Programme in RDS Rio Negro.

A rather comprehensive information programme explaining the aims and components of the BFP was used. Introductory meetings were undertaken at community level. While the structure of the programme required FAS to inform communities, meetings were open to people's questions and views. Moreover, people were quite satisfied both with the meetings and the way FAS communicated with them.

Participation in the programme was an individual decision. By signing a contract, each household received access to a monthly payment in return for accepting the BFP rules, including agreeing to follow the rules of the RDS management plan, to support the association, not to expand the size of the agricultural areas, to send their children to school and to control fires. Added to this, communities would have access to resources through BFR and BFS. The volume of the latter was made dependent on the number of households signing. While the structure of BFP was non-negotiable as introduced in the RDS Rio Negro, the communities had control over the allocation of resources made available under the BFR and BFS programme elements. We also note that the programme supported communities in developing management plans for their forests, giving them the opportunity to continue with some logging but for a better price than what they would receive for illegal timber. Together with other income-generating activities, the programme offers income opportunities far beyond that of the individual payments.

FAS has emphasised their very good relationships with the communities involved. Also a majority of local people are happy with FAS operations. Nevertheless, local people's overall evaluation of the programme is somewhat modest – i.e. an average of 3.3 on a 5 point Lickert scale where '1' is 'very negative' and '5' is 'very positive'. This is despite the favourable benefits outlined above and high enrolment rates. The main motivation for the positive responses related to payments/ benefits. The reason for the negative reactions was mainly the low level of the individual

payments. People said it did not cover the costs incurred by the programme, even though the BFP rules seem to incur only small extra costs regarding forest use and most of the restrictions were due to the general law/RDS rules. Instead, one could argue that the individual payment may be seen largely as a 'free lunch', an evaluation supported also by Börner *et al.* (unpubl.).

In trying to understand this seemingly confusing observation, we note the following. First, the villagers seem to have had problems with distinguishing between the general law/RDS and the BFP. The BFP was introduced just a few months after the RDS was established. Hence, any loss of forest income was seen by many as due to the BFP and not the RDS. Moreover, perhaps knowing that there are legal restrictions and a reserve with some rules may be perceived as very different from personally signing a contract including a statement to also follow what the law/the RDS rules anyway demand. It may be that the signature makes people feel much more bound by the rules. Second, the level of individual payments was seen as too low. Many inhabitants seem to have had higher expectations. Third, the allocation of funds between components was predefined at the point of introducing the BFP in the RDS. Fourth, some people felt pressured to sign the contracts by their leaders. Finally, some issues regarding transparency appeared, notably related to the money going to the association and claims that decisions over how to spend the money for BFR and BFS had been taken by leaders outside of community meetings. We have not been able to verify whether the latter actually happened but it seems to signal some distrust in the communities' leaders.

While the problems observed seem mainly to relate to factors internal to the villages, one may ask if any of them were in a way linked to the structure of the BFP. We have already noted that the programme structure was already established when the RDS Rio Negro citizens were asked if they wanted to enrol. While it is obvious that an initiative like this hardly could be developed from the 'bottom-up', this characteristic could create some scepticism. It is notable that people were uncertain about FAS's intentions from the beginning, although this distrust was much reduced as the project developed.

We note the arguments from FAS for having a uniform system across the whole state both regarding equal treatment and management costs. We also note that over time a system has been developed, where leaders from the various BF programmes across the State of Amazonas have been given the opportunity to engage in rule development and that there is now some flexibility regarding the internal distribution between the BFR and BFS components. Nevertheless, one may ask what might be lost or gained by a procedural change which offers local communities more influence on the overall programme structure at the point when the programme is first introduced in an area. If the total sum per household is already established, the argument of unequal treatment across reserves loses much of its weight. The core issue raised by the respondents was the perceived low level of individual payments. We understand that FAS may hesitate in letting communities decide, as such an opening most probably implies that fewer resources will go to the investment/educational components of BFR and BFS.[17] It is very clear that FAS considers these elements to be the bedrock for community development. On the other hand, offering this opportunity could strengthen local people's 'ownership' of the programme.

17. Observations documented in Mohammed *et al.* (forthcoming) support this argument – but only partly. They did a choice experiment in RDS Juma, RDS Rio Negro and RDS Uatumã where a strong majority favoured a solution where the individual payment (BFF) was increased at the expense of the BFR and BFS components. At the same time people were asked an open-ended question regarding what kind of benefits they would prefer. Here results were different. A majority – almost as strong as the above – preferred that more of the budget should be allocated to community-based benefits rather than as more cash for individuals.

We observe that some seem to have been pressured to sign. This pressure was internal – coming from (some of) the community presidents. At the same time we observe that according to the programme structure, the amount of money that comes to the community through the BFR, BFS and BFA components depends on how many people have signed the individual contract. Perhaps because of this, presidents may have felt responsible for ensuring that the programme pays as much as possible to the village/RDS, and may have felt tempted to 'push' some people who were hesitant about signing the contract. Such an explanation is not unreasonable. At least we advise FAS to examine how the structure of the programme could be developed to reduce opportunities for 'internal games' in a situation where trust within communities seems to be rather weak.

Turning to a more general or 'external' assessment of the programme, we conclude that it bears resemblance to the types 4, 5 and 6 under Pretty's typology of participation. The introduction of the programme is partly 'participation for material incentives' (4) and 'functional participation' implying that e.g. 'people [...] participate [...] to meet predetermined objectives' (5). At the same time, we note that while Pretty, in relation to type (5), emphasises reduced costs for achieving the aims of the programme as a reason for involving people, this seems too narrow a description to fit the introductory phase of our case. When it comes to the running of the programme – the components BFR, BFS and BFA – it should rather be characterised as 'interactive participation' (6). The communities seem to have had a stronger influence here. One could even talk of some elements of self-mobilisation being facilitated. The establishment of the RDS-level association may create a further basis for this.

We have observed that the RDS Rio Negro communities were not involved in defining the initial BFP structure and rules. They are, however, involved in the further development of the rules through their association representatives who – together with representatives of the other communities involved in BFP across the State of Amazonas – meet in the state-wide leaders' assembly. We have noted changes in BFP since the start in 2007, while FAS emphasises that is not viable to have a system with separate rules across the hundreds of villages where the BFP is implemented.

Concerning deliberation, we observe increased levels from the inception to the running phase. This may indicate a gradual empowerment of communities as it may also result in more internal disagreements. We observe this as respondents reported more divergence with FAS when the programme was first introduced, while later we see a shift to more disagreements among villagers themselves.

While FAS seems to offer substantial and adequate information, issues have been raised concerning transparency over the use of common resources by the associations. This may mainly reflect low levels of trust in the communities' own leaders. However, increased transparency concerning the use of money by the association seems warranted to avoid any future issues.

Was the establishment of the BFP in RDS Rio Negro based on free, prior and informed consent? We conclude that it was prior and informed, and perceived as free by the majority of participants (81 per cent) although a minority (19 per cent) indicated some pressure to sign coming from within the community. At the same time, we note the effect of decisions being individual. If the BFP had demanded a collective decision to join, it seems safe to conclude that it would have been supported by a large majority.

We note that the programme was introduced by an external actor with considerable resources and competences. In evaluating the potential power asymmetry involved in this, we observe that the local population seems to acknowledge that FAS engages more with the communities than the public authorities used to. Moreover, it looks like the presence of the BFP has strengthened the authorities' political will to engage more with the communities.

Regarding accountability, the larger issues observed are internal to the communities. The amount of resources brought in for common use creates challenges in a system where there seems to be some distrust between ordinary villagers and their leaders. We are informed that one of FAS's priorities is to strengthen the accountability of the associations.

FAS defines itself as an NGO, while we note that there are state representatives on its board. It has also a trust fund, which is unusual for an NGO. Formally, it is foremost accountable to its financial supporters. At the same time, its accounts are publicly available. Hence, transparency should be good. The more subtle issue is, however, the relationship between FAS and the local communities. As an external and 'independent' actor, FAS's power resides with the resources it brings in, including its knowledge and persuasive strength. In relation to this, one may wonder how the 'NGO route' and the respective 'retreat' of the state affects the building of relationships with democratically elected leaders – from the municipality to the state level. So far, we observe that the BFP actually seems to have strengthened this tie – partly through education, partly through the creation of the association at RDS level and involving community leaders and leaders of grassroots organisations in the development of the BFP, and finally because it has engaged state agencies more in community activities. We note also that FAS may be much less bureaucratic and hence more effective than state agencies. In a democratic system the main relationship – the line of accountability – nevertheless must go between citizens and their elected representatives – between the communities, municipalities and the state. While FAS seems to have helped in reducing the gap here, it may over time be necessary to support action that is explicitly focused on how to develop the link between the inhabitants of the Amazonian forest and actors at the political level.

Turning finally to what type of distributive justice characterises this case, we conclude that FAS does not differentiate payments according to the opportunity costs for actions taken to reduce deforestation.[18] The overall level of payments is the same across all villages involved in the BFP. The same concerns the distribution among individuals and communities. Rather payments are seen as a way to help families and communities to ease daily demands and develop their competencies and income-generating opportunities. There is a strong egalitarian dimension to this, while in particular the BFR component is more resource or desert based – i.e. it offers opportunities, but depends on people's own will and capacity to engage.

18. To be clear, we do not claim that payments are lower than the opportunity costs following from the BFP. As argued in the text, they are probably higher. The point here regards the format of the payments.

The case of Kilosa, Tanzania

Turning now to the Kilosa pilot in Tanzania, we will again start by offering some information on the wider context regarding forests, forest policies and REDD+ in the country. Data on the Kilosa case are produced using the same instruments as in the Brazilian study. This ensures comparability. The data are mainly collected by Elvis Mosi and assistants – MSc students from the Sokoine University of Agriculture. The main fieldwork was undertaken in January–February 2013. Additional information was gathered by Deus Ngabo (Ngabo 2013), George Kajembe, Dos Santos Silayo and Arild Vatn while visiting Kilosa District and other Tanzanian REDD+ pilot areas in 2010–2013 – e.g. Kajembe *et al.* (in review). We also use information from one interview conducted by Cecilie Dyngeland – see reference list.

4.1 The context

4.1.1 Forests, forest policies and REDD+ in Tanzania

With approximately 33.4 million hectares of forest land on its mainland, Tanzania has the largest share of forest resources in East Africa. Forests cover around 40 per cent of the country's total area. Woodlands dominate, occupying more than two thirds of the forested land. The rest are mangrove forests, mountain forests, small patches of coastal forests and plantations of softwood and hardwood. In addition, Zanzibar also has another 64 ha of forests (Vice-President's Office 2013).

In Tanzania all land is public in the sense that it is 'vested in the president'. There is nevertheless a subdivision of ownership or management responsibilities: 16 million ha are what are called reserved forests – central and local government forest reserves, managed by central and local government respectively. Two million ha are forests in national parks managed by the Tanzania National Parks and Wildlife Division. The remaining 15.4 million ha are village forests or so-called general land. Much of this land is in reality subjected to open access and is under heavy pressure from deforestation and/or degradation from competing land uses (op.cit.).[19] There are, however, also substantial 'encroachments' in reserved forests (e.g. Sjaastad *et al.* 2003). Certainly, much of the reserved forests form part of the livelihoods of local communities.

Tanzanian forest management used to be very centralised – a result not least of colonial rule. In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a process towards establishing local government through the creation of e.g. district and village councils. Decentralisation is also a core element of the forest policy as developed at the turn of the century – i.e. the National Forest Policy of 1998 (URT 1998), the Forest Act of 2002 (URT 2002), but also the Land and Village Land Acts of 1999 (URT 1999a; URT 1999b). The National Forest Programme (2001–2010) (URT 2001) was finally developed as a core instrument to implement the Forest Policy of 1998. We should note that in 2010 the Tanzanian Forest Service Agency was established and given the responsibility of managing the central government forest reserves (Nashanda pers. comm.).

A core element of the decentralisation in the forest sector was to institute participatory forest management (PFM) – either as joint forest management (JFM) in reserved forests or community-based forest management (CBFM) in village land forests. At present almost 13 per cent of the total forest in mainland Tanzania is under PFM. There are several obstacles to this process, not least related

19. There seems to be disagreement between different public sources about the relative size of village and general lands. This may partly be due to the fact that many village lands are not yet formalised as such. The Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development states that most of the forests outside of reserves and national parks are on village land (MJUMITA and TFCG 2011).

to a lack of capacity in the forest administration, but also due to conflicts over rights and revenue-sharing arrangements. Hence, the process of decentralisation is emerging more slowly than expected.

Generally, deforestation rates in Tanzania are high. In the period 2005–2010, the average rate in the country was estimated to be 1.16 per cent of the total forest area per year (FAO 2010). In contrast to Brazil, there seems to be no trend towards reduction of this rate.

A core driver of deforestation and degradation is the harvesting of timber for charcoal and firewood as these form 90 per cent of the country's energy sources for domestic and industrial use. Another important driver is the conversion of forest land to agricultural use caused by reduced productivity on already-established agricultural lands, increasing population and market expansion. Overgrazing is also causing deforestation and degradation. Other drivers include unsustainable and illegal harvesting of forest products, forest fires, infrastructure development and settlement, as well as the introduction of alien and invasive species. These direct causes are – according to the vice-president's office (2013) – indirectly caused by market and policy failures, rapid rural settlement expansion, urbanisation and poverty.

Tanzania started its engagement in REDD+ in 2008 after signing a letter of intent on a Climate Change Partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania has also received support from e.g. the United Nations collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries (UN-REDD Programme). Two somewhat separate REDD+ readiness processes have manifested. First, a series of nine pilot projects were established in 2009. These have been run by various NGOs and were directly contracted with the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania. Second, there is the national process including the establishment of a national REDD+ task force, a REDD+ secretariat and a set of technical working groups on various issues. In 2013 a national REDD+ strategy and action plan were endorsed by the government (op.cit.).

According to the strategy, the division of environment at the vice-president's office has the mandate to coordinate all climate change actions as identified by the Environment Management Act of 2004 (URT 2004) and the National Climate Change Strategy (URT 2012). Under its guidance an inter-ministerial national climate change steering committee has been formed, which is also responsible for REDD+ policies. A national climate change technical committee has been established to oversee technical issues regarding the implementation of climate change policies including REDD+. According to the strategy, a REDD+ fund is moreover to be established. This fund may in the end become part of a more general climate change fund that is also planned (Ningu pers. comm.). Decisions are also being made concerning a national climate-monitoring centre. General principles regarding national and regional/local responsibilities are clarified, but a description of the more specific systems for e.g. allocating funds to various agencies and geographical levels is still lacking.

4.1.2 TFCG, MJUMITA and their strategy for REDD+

The REDD+ pilot in Kilosa is part of the project Making REDD Work for Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania. It is implemented by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) in partnership with the Tanzania Community Forest Conservation Network (MJUMITA) and is one of the NGO-led REDD+ pilots that have received funding from the climate change partnership between Norway and Tanzania (TFCG 2009).

In a contract between TFCG and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2009, Norway committed up to NOK 41.4 million to TFCG for engagement in two pilot projects over a five-year period beginning in September 2009 and ending in August 2014 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Added to the pilot in Kilosa in the Eastern Arc Mountains, there is also one pilot in Lindi district in southern Tanzania (op.cit.).

TFCG was established in 1985. Today, it is the largest NGO working on forest conservation in Tanzania. They have more than 20 years of experience in conserving natural forests and implementing PFM. MJUMITA, on the other hand, is a national network of community groups involved in PFM. Currently it consists of 108 affiliated community networks with representation from 452 villages across the country (Meshack pers. comm.). By the end of the project timeframe, the project also aims to develop a self-financing carbon enterprise, functioning within MJUMITA, to enable members to aggregate emission reductions and sell them on the international carbon market (TFCG and MJUMITA 2012a). MJUMITA aims at validating emission reductions through the Verified Carbon Standard with social and environmental impacts being validated and verified based on Climate, Community and Biodiversity Project standards (Meshack pers. comm.).

Project operations are based on establishing PFM and doing land-use planning in the villages. Hence, it links with the existing Tanzanian strategy of decentralised management. TFCG has aimed to create PFM in the form of CBFM by supporting a process of turning general land into (formalised) village forests. According to the guidelines – see Box 3 – this demands the establishment of e.g. village natural resource committees (VNRC) and village forest reserves with forest resource management plans, village land-use plans, establishing village-land titles and creating bylaws defining rules for use of forest resources and the distribution of payments.

In addition, income-generating activities including improved agricultural practices, beekeeping and chicken rearing are among the ways to reduce pressure on forest resources. The project also includes a monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) component comprising carbon data analysis and remote sensing in addition to participatory forest assessments at village level.

Box 3. Participatory forest management (PFM) (CBFM) guidelines

Stage one: getting started
- District level: select the villages for PFM, brief district staff, create a district PFM facilitation team
- Village level: district PFM team to meet with village council and village assembly and establish a village natural resource committee (VNRC)

Stage two: assessment and management planning
- Identify and agree on the boundaries of the village and village forest reserve
- Carry out a participatory forest resource assessment (PFRA) with the VNRC, measure and assess the forest and consult stakeholders and natural resource users
- Develop a village management plan and village bylaws draft

Stage three: formalising and legalising
- VNRC presents the draft to the village council and assembly for approval
- Village chairman takes the draft to the ward development committee
- The ward development committee informs the neighbouring villages in the ward about the location and rules of the new village forest reserve
- Together with the district PFM team, the VNRC takes the draft to the district council for final approval

Stage four: implementing
- Awareness-raising among village members concerning the management plan and bylaws
- Strengthening the VNRC and its ability to hold meetings, undertake patrols, perform record-keeping and monitor the forest
- Starting afforestation activities if there is any forest encroachment
- District monitoring and supervising and facilitating conflict resolution if necessary

Stage five: revising and gazettement
- Three years after implementation the forest management plan is reviewed and revised if necessary
- Request that the FBD officially gazette their VLFR

Stage six: expansion to new areas
- CBFM villagers can expand their VLFR if needed
- Neighbouring villages or others in the district can request CBFM
- If so, priorities need to be balanced, action plans created, an administrative framework and support system set up and a budget set.

Source: Based on MNRT-FBD (2007)

4.2 Establishment of REDD+ in Kilosa

Kilosa District lies about 300km west of Dar es Salaam. The district covers an area of 14,918km^2 (Forrester Kibuga and Samweli 2010). The climate is semi-arid. According to a national census conducted in 2002, the total population was estimated to be 489,513 people living in Kilosa District and distributed over 105,635 households (KDC 2010). Administratively, Kilosa is divided into nine divisions. The divisions are further sub-divided into 37 wards, with 168 officially registered villages (op.cit.) of which 14 were included in the Kilosa REDD+ project, selected among others on the criteria of having potentially large areas of forests available (TFCG 2009).

Figure 10. Map of Kilosa District



Source: Ministry of Land and Housing (2013)

The villages included in the TFCG/MJUMITA pilot are situated to the west of Kilosa Town – see Figure 10. The number of people living in these villages is about 25,400 (Forrester Kibuga *et al.* 2011). About two-thirds of the area is forested (MJUMITA forthcoming).[20] As we will discuss later, two of the 14 villages are no longer included in the pilot.

The district is divided into three physio-geographic zones according to their altitudes. The first is the highlands with altitudes from 1200–2200m above sea level. These areas are part of the Eastern Arc mountain range, where cultivation of temperate crops e.g. wheat is claimed to be possible. The second is the plateau, with altitudes of around 1100m. This part is characterised by plains with dissecting hills and well-drained sandy soils that are moderately fertile. The last zone are the floodplains which lie around 550m above sea level and comprise both flat and undulating plains – being subjected to seasonal floods from Mkondoa River and mainly occupied by Maasai pastoralists (KDC 2010). Most of the forests in the Kilosa District are found in the western part where the Eastern Arc mountain range is located. The pilot villages are situated in this area. Miombo forests and evergreen mountain forests dominate.

In Kilosa District, about 28 per cent of the land is under government management – i.e. Mikumi National Park (22.5 per cent) and forest reserves (5.5 per cent). Except for a small fraction of urban areas, the rest is village and general land (KDC 2010). While all land is 'vested in the president', people consider the agricultural plots to be their own private land and such land is traded (Mwakalobo *et al.* 2011). The amount of agricultural land per household is rather small. In the case of our sample – see Section 4.3 – 42 per cent had up to 2 hectares of land, 44 per cent had between 2 and 4 ha, 10 per cent had between 4 and 6 ha, while 4 per cent had holdings of more than 6 ha.

The average income is estimated to be in the order of US$1000 per household per year when including both cash income and income from production for their own consumption. Agriculture is the dominant income source covering on average almost 50 per cent of all income while income from forest products covers about 30 per cent (Movik *et al.* 2012).

Looking finally at education levels, 96 per cent of our sample has attained primary education implying 7 years in school. Two per cent have received secondary education and 2 per cent have had no education at all. Compared to the Brazilian sample, we observe a more formally educated population. The average age of the respondents was 40 years – with the age group 31–40 dominating.

There are several different ethnic groups in the area. The larger ethnic groups are the Wakaguru people dominating the northern part of the district, Sagala people dominating the central areas and the Vidunda people dominating the southern part of the district. Recently, the district has experienced an influx of other ethnic groups from all over the country, mainly the Maasai and Sukuma which are predominantly pastoral ethnic groups (Luoga *et al.* 2009; Mwakalobo *et al.* 2011).

The process of establishing the Kilosa pilot started in September 2009. Since the core element was introducing PFM, TFCG involved district officials in the process – cf. Box 3 on the PFM guidelines. A series of meetings between TFCG/MJUMITA and representatives from the Kilosa District authorities – including the district executive director, the forest department including the district forest officer and district natural resource officer and the planning department including the district planning officer – was undertaken throughout late 2009 (Pima pers. comm.). The district officials were informed about the content of the pilot project. A core outcome of these meetings was the establishment of a REDD+ facilitation team comprising district representatives and people from TFCG and MJUMITA.

20. This figure is calculated based on data including six more villages in the Kilosa District/Eastern Arc, which are financed by another source. Hence, the figure assumes that the distribution of forested land is rather homogeneous across the Arc.

Note that since the project was defined by the contract with Norway, the district representatives had no direct influence on the content of the project. At the same time, the selection of the final site in Kilosa was based on communication with several districts around the Eastern Arc. Hence, the districts had the opportunity to choose whether or not to accept a REDD+ pilot to be established in their area (East and Southern Africa Katoomba Group 2010).

Furthermore, the REDD+ facilitation team and TFCG/MJUMITA visited the selected villages where they met with the village council and informed them about the REDD+ project. The council was specifically informed about the endorsement of the REDD+ project by the district authorities. They were also informed about how the village could implement it and what benefits they could receive from reducing deforestation. According to the PFM guidelines, the next step was to organise a village assembly meeting to establish a village natural resource committee (VNRC). TFCG proposed to start at the sub-village level as their experience of working with PFM in other parts of Tanzania was that few people would attend the general assembly meetings (Pima pers. comm.).

Meetings at the sub-village level were mostly held during the afternoon after most villagers had finished their daily activities. The meeting typically took two to three hours (Forrester Kibuga *et al.* 2011) and started with the village chairperson introducing the REDD+ facilitation team and NGO representatives and why they were visiting. The district forest officers explained that the district had endorsed the project because forest conservation was urgently needed. The meaning of REDD+ was explained, what a village was required to do before implementing REDD+, how REDD+ would be implemented and also the benefits villagers would receive by implementing the project – e.g. support villagers to manage forests sustainably; achieving secure land tenure; education for improved agriculture; payments for carbon credits; strategies to reduce deforestation (ibid). As far as we can see from this documentation, there seems to have been no emphasis on costs. TFCG explained the formation of a VNRC and its role in implementing PFM. According to our sources (Forrester Kibuga *et al.* 2011; Pima pers. comm.), they also explained that the communities were free to accept or reject the project. Villagers could ask questions and make proposals. If a particular sub-village agreed to implement the REDD+ pilot project – which all did in the villages visited – a member of the VNRC from the sub-village was elected to be approved by the village general assembly.

Also the final meeting at the village level – the general assembly – included information and discussion sessions as described above. According to our sources, villagers could comment and ask questions. This opportunity was utilised by the villagers – see also Section 4.3.2. It was again emphasised that villagers were free to accept or reject the project. The village chairperson asked all villagers if they understood what a REDD+ pilot project was and if they accepted the project to be implemented in their village. The villagers responded mainly with a majority voice. Next, the village assembly approved the members of VNRC as proposed by the sub-villages. According to data from Forrester Kibuga *et al.* (2011) about 22 per cent of the adult population[21] participated in the sub-village meetings. Regarding the village assembly, participation levels were somewhat lower – e.g. about 18.5 per cent on average (ibid).

An important next step was to establish village land forest reserves (VLFRs) and define land-use categories in all the villages. It started by undertaking a participatory resource assessment (PRA) including a forest resources assessment (PFRA). The aim of this exercise was to survey village land and demarcate it into various user zones including village forest reserves and firewood collection, agriculture, burial, residential and future development areas. The PRA was done by the VNRC, the village land-use planning committee (VLUPC – responsible for land outside the village forest reserve), and TFCG/MJUMITA staff. Thereafter, TFCG/MJUMITA, the VNRCs and the

21. Assuming that the adult part of the total population is 50 per cent – see Forrester Kibuga *et al.* (2011).

village councils prepared a draft proposal of the village boundaries, forest reserves, areas for agriculture etc. and a draft set of REDD+ bylaws. This process was accomplished in all villages by early 2012. As we will see later, this process created some disagreement/conflict.

It is notable that all forest reserves within the village boundaries were defined to be 'under REDD+'. Meshack (pers. comm.) emphasised that a novel aspect of the project in Kilosa (and Lindi) was to combine land-use planning and participatory forest management – in this case CBFM – whereas these activities were previously implemented separately in Tanzania.

The village bylaws included rules about who could enter the village forest reserve/REDD+ forest and on what conditions, which resources could be utilised without permission and which needed permission with or without payment. Using the bylaws for the Chabima village – which are typical – we note that collecting firewood and cutting poles and bamboo for building purposes demands a permit, but no payment. Taking timber and burning charcoal demands both permit and payment. Farming, human settlements, grazing and mining are not allowed at all. Starting fires close to the forest is strongly regulated. Any person with a paid permit must be accompanied by a guide from the VNRC.

Both the proposed new village boundaries and proposed village forest bylaws were then taken to the village general assembly for approval. If the village assembly approved the proposed drafts with/without amendments, then the bylaws, the new village boundaries and land-use plan were taken to the district council for final approval. This was a time-consuming process, and also because bylaws must be in both Swahili and English as the latter is the official language in Tanzania. According to Pima (pers. comm.), TFCG/MJUMITA went ahead with establishing the REDD+ project without waiting for the formal approval from the district e.g. setting up signs defining village borders and the borders of areas set aside for certain activities as agreed in the village general assemblies.

Alongside this, TFCG/MJUMITA also facilitated the establishment of income-generating activity (IGA) groups to achieve the REDD+ pilot project objectives of improving local people's livelihoods. This included improved agricultural practices, beekeeping, chicken rearing and the use of improved stoves. According to Pima (pers. comm.) the groups are so far established as 'test cases'. Hence, not all villagers are included. TFCG/MJUMITA is coordinating and offering financial support for starting these activities. What activities to prioritise were decided at a village general assembly including decisions on who should be included in the current round. Hence, we note that the project had the capacity to reach only a fraction of the households. To the extent that improved agricultural practices were among the chosen activities, typically it is the district extension officer who has been asked to provide the relevant training while TFCG/MJUMITA would buy improved seeds and fertiliser if required and distribute them to the groups. So far, the costs for this programmes average US$90,000 per year – i.e. US$18 per household per year (based on data from TFCG and MJUMITA 2012b; 2012c; 2013a).

The third core step – as defined in the contract agreement between TFCG/MJIMUTA and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – was to introduce payments for reduced deforestation/ CO2 emissions. A process of undertaking so-called trial payments started in 2011. According to Pima (pers. comm.) previous CBFM-based projects typically failed to provide a good benefit-sharing mechanism. Due to this, MJUMITA developed a mechanism based on a so-called individual dividend, implying that the external REDD+ income would be given to each eligible villager as agreed by the villages' general assemblies. According to Pima the motive behind the choice of individual dividends was that it should increase the sense of community-wide ownership over the forest. Another issue was that of ensuring transparency in the distribution of funds making it easier to hold leaders accountable. It is also notable that MJUMITA created

a 'carbon enterprise' whose main goal is to serve as an intermediary between international carbon traders and villagers. It also aims at supporting villagers to build their technical competence in monitoring.

According to TFCG and MJUMITA (2012a) the village assemblies could choose between different options within the frame of the individual dividend. They could decide to pay all the money to individuals or keep a certain fraction of the individual dividend for community development projects and/or payments to the VNRC for protection purposes. All village assemblies where payments have been instituted decided to allocate a certain percentage to common projects. Modalities were established by the village council, including the establishment of a REDD+ revenue-sharing committee for deciding which villagers were eligible for payments. The assembly also decided on the size of the fraction of the total payment that should be retained for community projects and which projects should be supported after the issues had been discussed at sub-village level.

Meshack (pers. comm.) commented that TFCG/MJUMITA found it difficult to propose a payment system based on covering individual opportunity costs – which seems to be the general idea underlying REDD+. It was found to go against local norms since the charcoal producers – those loosing most income from REDD – were considered to be 'bad people' by most villagers. Hence, they proposed an undifferentiated payment per eligible inhabitant. Village assemblies supported this and typically defined everybody older than six months of age as eligible, while limits were set regarding how many could be compensated per family. A rather rigorous process of checking eligibility seems to have been put in place.[22]

The level of total payments to each village was, however, performance based. Calculating the amount followed a rather complex procedure. The aim was to try to mimic a market-driven scenario i.e. to set a price similar to what could reasonably be expected from the market once the REDD-readiness phase was complete. Hence, a long list of factors were taken into account, e.g. a) the historical deforestation rate and potentially avoided deforestation level/ calculated reductions in CO2 emissions for each type of forest; b) interventions put in place to reduce deforestation, e.g. the area of the village forest reserve and forest areas left outside the reserve; c) the potential area likely to be subjected to leakage within and outside the village land for each type of forest; and d) estimated price of CO2/t. While the money for payments comes from the contract with Norway, TFCG and MJUMITA have used the present price in carbon markets when paying. This price is considered very low. Based on data from five of the villages (TFCG and MJUMITA 2013b), we have calculated that the average trial payment per individual was about US$8 – i.e. on average close to US$40 per household.

According to TFCG and MJUMITA (2012a), 90 per cent of the eligible inhabitants participated in the meetings where payments were made. It is moreover stated that 'Dividend payments also provide a rare opportunity for government and civil society to reach nearly all village members at one time' (op.cit.:5). Because of this, the organisations were able to use this opportunity to provide more information about the programme.

22. Meshack (pers. comm.) also mentioned some attempts to use 'ghost names'– i.e. the names of people that did not exist, such as those who had passed away. Moreover, people had to attend sub-village meetings in person to receive the money.

4.3 Local people's evaluation of REDD+ in Kilosa

The data for the analysis of people's evaluations of the programme are based on the same three sources as in the Brazilian case – a questionnaire, a set of focus group discussions (FGDs) and a set of interviews with local resource persons. Five out of 13 villages were visited – i.e. Chabima, Dodoma Isanga, Ibingu, Ilonga and Kisongwe. The total number of questionnaire responses was 125, evenly spread across the five villages. Since only about 25 per cent attended any meeting, we chose to stratify the sample aiming for 80 per cent (= 100 respondents) attending at least one meeting – the sub-village or village assembly meeting. Hence, 80 per cent of the sample was randomly selected from attendance lists, while the rest was recruited among those who were not on these lists.

Altogether ten FGDs were organised – two in each village comprising 12 people in each case. One meeting in the village included only members from the VNRC. The other one was established by selecting members among the ordinary villagers – both male and female. Resource persons included the village chair persons, the heads of VNRCs and the TFCG district field coordinator. As before, data are from the survey if it is not explicitly stated that they are based on another source.

4.3.1 People's overall evaluation

Following the same structure used for the analysis of the RDS Rio Negro case, we will first look at people's overall assessment of the pilot project. Next we will examine the process of joining the REDD+ initiative in Kilosa. Thereafter we will look at how people evaluated the rules for forest management that came out of the process of land-use planning. Finally, we look at their evaluation of the establishment of the payment system.

Figure 11 offers an overview of the respondents' answers to a question about their overall opinion of the programme. Figure 12 offers the same information, but split across the various villages. The average score regarding respondents' opinion of the pilot project is 4.12. Only 3 respondents gave a response of 'negative' or 'very negative'. Even 'indifferent' accounts for only 5 responses. Reasons offered for the positive attitudes – given in response to an open question – related to the importance of forest conservation, income-generating activities and payments offered. The former was mentioned by most respondents – almost 70 per cent. In relation to that, it is notable that a vast majority of household respondents defined the REDD+ pilot project to be about forest conservation (67 per cent) or environmental conservation (26 per cent). Only 2 and 5 per cent specified that it is about climate change or the reduction of carbon emissions respectively. This seems to reflect the fact that TFCG introduced REDD+ very much as a conservation project linking it to well-known strategies like PFM.

Figure 11. Respondents' opinions about the REDD+ project (N=125)



Figure 12. Respondents' opinions about the REDD+ project by village (N=125)



According to a Fisher's Exact test, the distribution in Ibingu is significantly different from the rest of the sample (P=0.008). Two issues came up that can explain this. First, some households in Ibingu had to leave their homes and resettle elsewhere in the village as the area where they lived was included in the designated forest, which excluded settlements. Second, we also observed during FGDs in this village that there was some distrust in the village chairperson and some VNRC members were accused of receiving money from illegal loggers and charcoal makers.

Concerning the organisers – TFCG and MJUMITA – the respondents were at least as positive as regarding the programme itself. Our findings show that 75 and 21 per cent of the respondents evaluated TFCG/MUJUMITA's way of implementing the REDD+ project as 'good' or 'very good'. Only 3 per cent rated it as 'bad', while 1 per cent was indifferent (N=125). These findings are in line with those of Deloitte (2012). In their mid-term review of the NGOs implementing the REDD+ pilot projects across Tanzania, they give a very positive evaluation of TFCG – their competence and accomplishments in Kilosa (ibid).

We otherwise note that regarding who is paying for the REDD+ project, 61 per cent did not know (N=125). Of those saying they knew, 90 per cent knew that it was the Norwegian government. Concerning who is involved in the project, all respondents mentioned either TFCG or MJUMITA. Two thirds were aware that the district government was also involved.

4.3.2 Evaluating the process of introducing REDD+

Regarding the more specific evaluation of the processes of introducing each element of the REDD+ pilot project in Kilosa, we were also in this case interested in issues concerning people's overall impressions of meetings, people's evaluation of the dissemination of information, the discussions and the final decisions made. This section covers the meetings involved in the decision as to whether the villages should participate in REDD+ or not. As already emphasised, there were meetings both at sub-village and village level.

Figures 13 and 14 provide information about the evaluation made concerning the overall impression of the meetings at sub-village and village level and the information given at these meetings. It should be noted that 73 and 87 per cent of the sample attended the sub-village and village assembly meetings respectively. Hence, we see that more than 80 per cent of the sample attended at least one of the meetings. As we selected 80 per cent from attendance lists, either people remembered wrongly, or the lists we were offered when sampling were incorrect – i.e. did not include all people participating in meetings.

Figure 13. Overall impression of meetings (N=114)



Figure 14. Evaluation of the information offered (N=114)



Again the assessments were positive. We note that nobody responded 'bad' or 'very bad' concerning the impression of the meetings. The respondents informed us that the timings of meetings were well adapted to their needs as they were undertaken during evenings or weekends. Regarding the overall impression of the meetings, villagers emphasised the following positive attributes: provision of knowledge, creation of awareness (environment and REDD+), the emphasis on village development and high attendance. There was also a mention of 'poor consideration of villagers' ideas' (3 respondents).

It was clarified that TFCG/MJUMITA was the main source of information (96 per cent, N=114). Actually most – 88 per cent – had these organisations as their only source of information. Other sources were radio, newspapers and people from neighbouring villages. It is notable that TFCG/MJUMITA is also the main source for information from these media as the organisations used them to spread information.

Our data indicate that villagers were quite active at the meetings: 75 per cent noted that 'many questions were asked', while 24 per cent noted 'a few' (N=114). Twenty-six per cent said that 'many proposals' were made by villagers, while 42 per cent stated that 'a few proposals' were made. Meetings were considered 'very open to villagers' views' (91 per cent), while the rest saw them as 'somewhat open'. The data also confirm that people felt that their inputs were listened to and to a large extent responded to/taken into account. This observation was also supported by data from the FGDs, including those with the VNRCs.

Concerning issues raised, questions regarding access to land and land-use planning dominated. Forty-one per cent noted that there were disagreements in the meetings and that land demarcation was the dominating issue (N=112). The discussions on these questions seem to have been most serious where people had to relocate – e.g. mountain dwellers in Ibingu. The disagreements were not only among those having to relocate and TFCG. They also came out as conflicts between low-land villagers and mountain dwellers as the former wanted the latter to give up their land so that a village land forest reserve could be established. Mountain villagers complained that TFCG/MJUMITA wanted to take/grab their land. They also saw the relocation as implying an income loss since the mountain slopes were more fertile than the land to which they had to relocate.[23] It is notable that there were no serious episodes reported. Disagreements – it was explained – were at least partly resolved at meetings through mediation and offering more information on the importance of conserving forests and the potential benefits villages would receive by accepting the REDD+ pilot project.

Nevertheless, a few (12 respondents) mentioned the above conflict as an issue that was not taken into account concerning the way REDD+ should be organised. Neglect of infrastructure was, however, mentioned by many more (50 respondents), while 10 respondents noted that there should be more frequent feedback from TFCG.

Another disagreement reported to have occurred was between 'ordinary' villagers and charcoal makers/ loggers. Pima (pers. comm.) informed us that charcoal makers and timber makers disagreed on the size of land to be demarcated as village land forest reserves. According to him, some actors tried to mislead their fellow villagers in believing that TFCG was taking their land. In the case of Dodoma Isanga, this developed into a serious discussion related to the size of the reserved village forests. An Arab investor had 'grabbed' land for a sisal plantation.[24] This had resulted both in increased land scarcity and distrust among villagers. They were now

23. It should be noted that it was the definition of the borders of the VLFR that resulted in their relocation. If areas where these households were undertaking farming had been defined as agricultural land, they could have remained (although they could not expand beyond these confines).

24. The land was on general land and the trade was made with the district authorities. The price was low and communities claimed they had a customary right to the land.

afraid that TFCG would operate similarly. But after TFCG explained to them their intentions and demonstrated through their actions their seriousness, this distrust seems to have vanished. Finally, there was a border dispute between Dodoma Isanga and Chabima where both claimed ownership of a mountain area. This dispute was also resolved through communication and negotiations. In relation to the issues raised, we note that while talking to both village chairpersons and members of the VNRCs, neither liked to class these as conflicts. They saw them as disagreements that it was possible to resolve.

Two villages – i.e. Masugu and Munisagala – stand out in relation to this. Masugu lies close to Kilosa Town and charcoal making is a very import source of income there. While not part of our sample, it is relevant to note that TFCG decided to desist in introducing REDD+ in this village. The main argument was that Masugu had become part of the Kilosa township authority. At the same time, we note that TFCG had already decided not to select villages with very high opportunity costs as carbon prices were low (Dyngeland *et al.* forthcoming). Hence, in the end not including Masugu may have been fine with TFCG.

Regarding Munisagala, there was strong opposition to the pilot in the village. According to Enos (pers. comm.) villagers were afraid that their land might be lost if they introduced REDD+. The activities of establishing REDD+ have since stopped in this village. Enos noted that they will be taken up again in the future only if people in the village change their minds.[25]

So did people in the Kilosa villages feel free to decide on joining REDD+ or not? According to the questionnaire responses, a large majority – 87 per cent of those responding (N=114) – in the visited villages stated 'yes'. They explained their position by referring to issues like meetings being open, everyone was free to ask any type of question about the proposed REDD+ pilot project, and that all questions asked were answered by the TFCG/MJUMITA staff. This observation was confirmed in the FGDs. Nevertheless, 13 per cent of the respondents did not feel that everybody was free to take any position they wanted. Reasons offered included that the 'minority say is not considered' (11 responses), but also a few mentioned issues relating to loss of lands and income.

Data shows that some disagreed publicly regarding participation in REDD+. We do not have data on how many, but 16 per cent of those responding to this question (N=113) stated that this happened. Altogether about 10 per cent said they disagreed with the decision to join REDD+, while the rest agreed (N=125). All of those disagreeing did actually attend the village general assembly. The reasons offered are similar to those above. Loss of land/income are the main reasons against introducing REDD+ while environmental conservation, new income opportunities in agriculture, social services and payments were noted as arguments for it. The first two clearly dominated among the responses.

From the above, we conclude that the conflict level related to introducing REDD+ in Kilosa seems to be fairly low as far as the responses in the visited villages go. We note, though, that some villagers have been forced to relocate due to the introduction of the programme. This created conflicts, although they seem to have been resolved. At the same time, we note that Munisagala has not endorsed REDD+. While this shows that the option of saying 'no' to REDD+ is real, it indicates that introducing the programme seems more demanding than the data from the five visited villages indicate. As we have mentioned, TFCG/MJUMITA also introduced REDD+

25. Just prior to printing, we were informed that according to briefings made in the MJUMITA annual general meeting in late November 2013 in Dodoma, the Munisagala village said 'no' not only as a result of resistance against setting aside forests for REDD+. The decision seems also to relate to their cultural belief that dead family members should be buried in their own lands instead of in a 'common' cemetery as designated by the land-use plan.

in Lindi. According to Meshack (pers. comm.) conflict levels have been higher there, not least due to a substantial engagement among villagers in charcoal making. Data from the introduction of REDD+ in the Kondoa District (Kajembe *et al.* in review) also show higher conflict levels. In this case, the issues are more related to the rules around grazing in REDD+ forests. Two out of 21 villages in Kondoa refused to engage in REDD+ and one village was not compensated because it did not follow the rules.

Finally, we must note the issue of pastoralist groups in Kilosa – mainly the Maasai and the Sukuma. Building REDD+ in Tanzania on PFM and land-use planning fits well only where people are settled. According to Dyngeland *et al.* (forthcoming) there are issues between the Maasai and settled peoples in some areas in the district. REDD+ may exacerbate the problem as either access to pasture for the pastoralists will be reduced or the size of REDD+ forests will have to be reduced. While this is in itself an issue, the main challenge is the inability of the present strategy for REDD+ in Kilosa to handle relations between pastoralists and settled peoples.

4.3.3 People's views on the rules defined

In Ilonga the process of land-use planning was not completed. Hence, data in this section on views on the rules defined is from the four other villages only. The rules established for the use of land – i.e. the demarcation of forests, land-use plans and bylaws – were, as we have seen, developed by the VNRC and VLUPC. They were next taken to the sub-villages for comments before the village general assembly and later the district council approved them. Figure 15 offers an overview of people's impressions of their own knowledge of the rules developed for participating in REDD+.

Figure 15. People's rating of their knowledge about the rules of participating in REDD (N=100)



Figure 16. Do people follow the rules? (N=100)



The picture is quite varied, with few people believing that they know them all. About 42 per cent state that that they know 'most', while 43 per cent say they know 'a few'. Asking more specifically about what rules they knew, the ones mentioned most often related to rules for forest conservation (49 per cent, N=100). We note, however, that the descriptions of the rules were again typically very general. Several also mentioned the system of fines and permits for harvesting forest products – e.g. poles. Also the existence of a patrolling system was mentioned as an example of rules. It is notable that villagers see the responsibilities for conservation as common to all, and not only a duty for the VNRCs.

After asking respondents about specifying rules, we enquired if they followed them (see Figure 16). Again we observe similarities with the observations in the Brazilian pilot. People demonstrated a weak knowledge of the rules, yet maintained that they followed them to a large extent. This may simply reflect that they do not want to come forward as rule breakers – hence, their answers are biased. Still, they were willing to say that they did not know (all) the rules. An alternative interpretation could be that they referred only to the rules they know, or the answers may reflect that they have a pretty good understanding of what the aims of the project are and refer to an intention to follow rules supporting the aims. In relation to this, it is notable that in FGDs in Chabima, Ibingu and Kisongwe, it was mentioned that some illegal charcoal making and logging was still going on. Pima (pers. comm.) confirmed this.

At the same time, villagers' support for the rules is strong, with 74 per cent and 15 per cent respectively having a 'positive' or 'very positive' view of them, while 8 per cent had a 'negative' view. None claimed to be 'very negative' – see Figure 17. Motivating their position, environmental conservation was the core motive for all seeing the rules as positive. At the same time, 38 per cent stated that the rules influenced their livelihoods negatively, while 62 per cent stated the opposite (N=100). This indicates that a large group are willing to take on costs for REDD+, or they think that the compensation will cover the losses.

Figure 17. People's impressions of the rules (N=125).



Figure 18. People's impression of the impact of the rules (N=125)



According to Figure 18, people seem to evaluate the impact of the rules as somewhat weak. When we asked for suggestions as to how to make the rules better, 78 out of 100 respondents offered inputs. Their advice was spread fairly equally between 'more education' (20), 'frequent patrols in the forest' (17) and 'high fines' (17). Also efficient leadership (14) and 'imprisonment' (10) was mentioned by several.

4.3.4 Evaluating the process of introducing payments

Setting up the system for payments in Kilosa started in 2011. The first payments – being 'trial payments' – started from September the same year. By the time we collected our data, payments had not been done in Ilonga – again, because their land-use planning was not completed. Hence, regarding individual payments, the data in the following section is only taken from Chabima, Dodoma Isanga, Ibingu and Kisongwe. Data regarding community projects cover responses from Ilonga, too, as such projects were also initiated there.

As described in Section 4.2, payments were made in the form of a fixed amount to all eligible inhabitants, while a percentage of the money was retained for financing activities/investments at the village level. Looking at people's evaluation of the process of introducing payments, we first note that 70 out of 100 participated in the village general assembly meeting where the rules for payments were defined. This is somewhat lower than the number participating in meetings about whether to join REDD+ and is in accordance with what is generally observed.[26] Participants' evaluation of their impression of the meeting and the quality of the information provided was again positive – 59 per cent considered the meeting as 'good', while 26 per cent considered it 'very good' (N=70). People considered the information offered to be 'good' (43 per cent) or 'very good' (also 43 per cent) (N=69). The respondents emphasised that the information provided was detailed and that they themselves were allowed to decide on the distribution of the resources.[27]

The respondents verified that a substantial number of questions were raised at the general assembly meeting – 57 per cent reported that 'many questions' were asked (N=68). Issues raised concerned mainly the payment level, payment format, payment frequency, but also issues related to the land-use plan/boundary issues. According to the questionnaire data, there seems to have been some disagreement about payments – especially the formats. Data from the FGDs indicate that there were disappointments about the level of payments. In fact, the FGD responses – including those with VNRC members – indicate that disappointments were overall higher than the questionnaires indicated.

A few seem to have disagreed publicly on the issue of payments. Again, the loss of land and poverty seem to be the main issues. Nevertheless, according to our data, all seem to have 'agreed' or 'agreed somewhat' to the final decision made. Also in the case of payments, some (13 per cent, N=70) stated, however, that not all felt free to take whatever position they wanted. Only half of those expressing this offered a reason. They all referred to issues concerning power dynamics, however, we have no further explicit data on what was meant by that.

As already mentioned, parts of the payments were allocated to community projects. Meshack (pers. comm.) noted that some villages were weakly organised or that there was a lack of trust between villagers and their leaders. In these instances, either few resources were set aside for community activities or money was set aside in a fund until the village 'was ready'. These funds were held by MJUMITA.

We have also seen that there were money or investments channelled through other mechanisms than the payment – the so-called income-generating activities. Only fifty-six per cent (N=124) stated that such activities existed in their village, although in fact, programmes were launched in all five villages. Therefore it seems that not all were aware of what was happening. We rather seem to have captured mainly those involved in one or more projects themselves. Forty-five per cent (N=119) stated that they participated in such TFCG/MJUMITA-promoted activities. When asked to order the activities from the most to the least important, we find chicken rearing at the top, followed by loans and savings, beekeeping and finally stove making. Most villagers involved seem to have benefitted from the activities while about 20 per cent stated that they had not (N=56) – mainly due to the fact that they were still in the process of getting started. Among the 55 per cent not involved in any of these activities, most said it was because they had not been selected by the leaders or that the entrance fee was too high.

26. In the eight villages where data exists, about 18.5 per cent of the adult population participated in these meetings, while in these villages on average 22.5 per cent participated in the general assembly meeting on whether to join REDD+ or not. Data on participation in meetings on rules for payments are offered by Meshack (pers. comm.).
27. We observe that the latter related rather to the quality of the process and not information per se.

4.4 How did TFCG evaluate the introduction of the programme?

How did TFCG – as responsible for the Kilosa REDD+ pilot – view the process of establishing the project? To find out, we interviewed Charles Meshack – head of TFCG – and Wilfred Pima – the TFCG/MJUMITA field coordinator.

TFCG has based the pilot on the PFM/CBFM framework. The representatives stated that they did so because the goals of CBFM and REDD+ are quite similar. They are both about reducing deforestation rates and improving local people's livelihoods. This implies that the pilot demanded cooperation with the district authorities. Pima (pers. comm.) emphasised that TFCG managed to establish good relationships with the district. He noted, though, that the process of approving bylaws and granting land certificates to villages has been rather slow. We observe that TFCG has a long history in cooperating with district officials.

Concerning the more general experiences, Meshack (pers. comm.) noted several key points. REDD+ has brought new thinking to the villages and district authorities about how to address the issues. He mentioned especially the inclusive strategy chosen – e.g. starting the process at sub-village level. 'REDD brings people together,' he said. This perspective was confirmed by several of the FGDs with the VNRCs. Village forums such as the village assembly were revitalised.

Meshack also emphasised the importance of creating a wider understanding of what forests do. To reduce emissions demands long-term thinking, changing customs and even cultural values. He noted that moving away from shifting agriculture is quite profound. Changing to e.g. conservation agriculture is good, but takes time. Nevertheless, Pima also noted that the project messages were easily understood by the villagers.

Both noticed that REDD+ brought up several conflicting issues. While the situation in Kilosa was clearly better than in Lindi, Meshack (pers. comm.) also mentioned the following:

- There are many local stakeholders – and many different interests – involved. Therefore there are many possibilities for creating conflicts when introducing REDD+.
- Conflicts over land ownership/village land boundaries often follow on from the process of land-use planning (LUP). At the same time, LUP/PFM/CBFM help people to clarify what is theirs and how to use the resources. This is a positive 'side-effect' of introducing REDD+.
- TFCG has also observed conflicts over defining what amount of land should become village land forest reserves. Again, the challenges were greater in Lindi than in Kilosa, particularly because more charcoal making takes place there. Meshack noted that even a few charcoal makers could ruin the process of establishing REDD+.
- Payments are low, and one challenge is that carbon markets have almost collapsed. At the same time, gains from the project do not only depend on payments. There are also local gains from conserving forests.

Pima (pers. comm.) confirmed that some charcoal and timber traders had initially created problems by – according to him – trying to mislead fellow villagers into thinking that TFCG/MJUMITA were after their land. But by informing people about the importance of conserving forests and the potential benefits of REDD+, the situation changed.

Meshack noted that no government forests were included in the Kilosa pilot – only general land/village forests. This may also explain why conflicts are lower than e.g. what has been observed in Kondoa (Kajembe *et al.* in review). He especially noted that there is a problem with REDD+ in state forests as the state has not been willing to specify a benefit-sharing system. He believed that the Tanzania Forest Services (TFS) may be able to come up with a mechanism as

Credit: Håvard A. Eriksson

Fuelwood use in Kilosa

it is more autonomous and focused at the local level. He also emphasised that as REDD implies turning general land into village forests, this will shrink the economic base for the district forest authorities since much of their income comes from issuing permits on forests on general land. Hence, according to him, district authorities are somewhat against CBFM.

Charles Meshack noted that future funding for the Kilosa and other REDD+ pilots is an important and problematic issue. Pilots end in 2014. No further financing is guaranteed and the current carbon price is very low. Hence, people engaged in piloting may have invested a lot in REDD+ institutions and practices, but may get little reward. They may in the end feel cheated.

4.5 Summary of the evaluation

Introducing REDD+ in Kilosa, TFCG linked up to the already-existing systems for participatory forest management (PFM) and land-use planning (LUP). This implied defining village land/forests, and specifying the size of forest reserves and a set of bylaws with respect to PFM. To do so, new organisations were established at village level – the village natural resource committee (VNRC) and the village land-use planning committee (VLUPC). A payment system was also created requiring the establishment of a REDD+ revenue-sharing committee in each village.

PFM guidelines also require engagement with district authorities. Hence, TFCG established cooperation with the Kilosa District council following the PFM guidelines. They also worked in tandem with MJUMITA, who have a central role in PFM trying to build engagement from the communities' side. MJUMITA has also come to play a core role regarding payments and monitoring.

While the system of PFM and LUP is based on standardised national guidelines, other components of the TFCG/MJUMITA programme are open to local influence. Hence, rules for payments were defined by village general assemblies based on proposals from TFCG/MJUMITA. Also income-generating activities were to a large extent initiated by the two organisations, but again local communities influenced the actual principles for the allocation of resources.

Also in this case we observe a rather comprehensive informational programme explaining the aims and components of the Kilosa REDD+ project. Information meetings were held at sub-village levels before a final village general assembly was called to decide on whether to participate in the project or not. Meetings seem to have been open to people's questions and views. Moreover, people were satisfied both with the meetings and the way TFCG/MJUMITA kept them informed.

Participation in the programme was a collective decision. One of the 14 villages invited was in the end not included, mainly due to the fact that it became part of Kilosa Town. In another, the process has stopped as the village decided not to endorse REDD+. The other 12 villages decided, however, to engage in REDD+ through the TFCG/MJUMITA programme. According to the responses from the people interviewed in five of these villages, we note that the overall evaluation of the programme is good. The average score for the sample is 4.1 on the 5 point Lickert scale used. We note this as we recognise that only about 25 per cent of the adult population participated in the decision. We also recognise that the compensation offered was rather low and that about 10 per cent of our sample disagreed regarding joining REDD+. TFCG emphasised that villagers will also gain from the income-generating projects and the conservation of the forests. Perhaps the creation of village land titles is the most important positive outcome of the project as seen from villagers' point of view.

Nevertheless, as TFCG/MJUMITA decided to pay according to existing carbon prices, it is clear that these 'other' gains must be substantial to cover the difference between the payments and loss of income from forests. We see also that villagers have complained that the payments were low. We note that some people had to relocate as an result of introducing REDD+ in Kilosa. The net costs of REDD+ are unevenly distributed also because charcoal making and logging is an activity undertaken mainly by a few that may lose a substantial income because of REDD+.

It seems also that in the Kilosa case, not all felt free to express their own opinion on whether or not to take part in REDD+. Our observations indicate that some power issues were involved. Regarding the embracement of the programme, the main argument among those holding a negative view was that the 'minority say was not considered', while in the case of the decision about the payment system, there was a clearer reference to 'power dynamics'. It is notable that most of the conflicts seem to have been internal, perhaps reflecting that the cost/benefit ratio differed across the community. The way the payment system was in the end formulated – an equal payment per person – may explain some of this disagreement. Nevertheless, paying according to opportunity costs would – it seems – have created more conflict. Also in the Kilosa case we observed a lack of trust in some village leaders.

The strategy of TFCG is to use the first five years to establish the systems and then hand over to MJUMITA, a membership organisation. As we see it, there is a challenge for MJUMITA to obtain the necessary support as a membership organisation. For them to succeed, it implies a shift towards giving more responsibility to the villagers themselves. The idea is moreover to link up with the global carbon market. This is also challenging since this market is weak. It is finally an issue for the partners that the Tanzanian government is pursuing a national model for REDD, including a national fund, although elements of a market-based governance structure are not excluded (Vice-Presidents Office 2013). If a national REDD+ strategy is followed, central and

district governments will become core REDD+ agents in Tanzania. The MJUMITA strategy may then need to change so that it becomes a spokesperson/power broker for the local communities in that process.

Turning to the overall assessment of the programme, we conclude that the Kilosa case also resembles the types 4–6 under Pretty's typology of participation as far as the villages involved are concerned. The element of interactive participation (6) may seem somewhat higher than in the Brazilian case as the programme in Kilosa was more open to local influence, particularly in the inception phase. On the other hand, our impression is that the culture in the Tanzanian setting is characterised as having less willingness to deliberate or oppose leaders and external actors. It is also notable that the endorsement of the programme by the district may have influenced villagers' stated views on it. One may at least ask how free the decision really was given this fact. At the same time, we observe that one village has said 'no' to participating. We also note that having the opportunity to decide themselves on the distribution between individual payments and collective uses of the money may be quite fundamental to strengthening local 'ownership' of the project. Finally, it is very important to note that the pastoralists in the area were not involved in the process of establishing REDD+, even though the programme will have an impact on their future livelihoods.

TFCG/MJUMITA seem to have put much effort into the information phase. While noting the power asymmetries, the process must be characterised as quite transparent. Only about a quarter of the adult population participated in introductory meetings, despite TFCG/MJUMITA taking measures to increase villagers' participation. We note that there were meetings both at sub-village and village level, while each meeting was rather short – only 2 to 3 hours. However, we did not observe any instances where people complained that decisions were not taken in the open.

Was the establishment of REDD+ in Kilosa based on free, prior and informed consent? We note again that pastoralists were not consulted. We conclude that in the case of the settled villagers it was prior and fairly well informed. We say 'fairly', referring to an observed tendency to emphasise benefits over costs while informing the villagers. We also note that at the time the decision was taken, it was difficult to know what the consequences would really be. The restrictions on forest use would become clear after the PFM process was concluded. Payment levels could not be defined at that time. Moreover, the carbon markets are anyway uncertain. There were some evident risks in this case, while rules defined for forest use were negotiated throughout the PFM process and the final payment depended on the level of protection. Hence, risks could be somewhat adapted to.

Also in this case there were some issues concerning how free people felt they were to adopt their own position regarding participation in REDD. At least some individuals noted issues here both regarding inception and payment phases. The fact that the programme resulted in the relocation of people and strong restrictions on charcoal making indicates that there were some substantial stakes involved. We also note that the programme was introduced by external actors with substantial resources and capacities – both NGOs and district representatives. Certainly, the success for TFCG/MJUMITA may depend on high enrolment rates. We have seen, however, no indication that leaders or the people more generally were pressurised to take a certain position by these NGOs.

Meetings were open to inputs from villagers. The general impression is that they were active, mostly in asking questions, but also in making proposals. Although a few were against the introduction of REDD+, the main discussions among the villagers seemed to have been more about how it should be organised.

The issue of accountability is somewhat parallel to the Brazilian case since the main actors are NGOs, in this case accountable formally to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore the issues regarding the relationships with the existing political system within the country are similar. We moreover note some distrust among villagers in their own political institutions. The fact that the Norwegian government somewhat bypassed the Tanzanian government when establishing the pilots may reflect the expectation that NGOs could deliver REDD+ better than the state authorities could. However, this does not mean there are no challenges regarding issues of accountability that seem to follow NGO-based REDD+ engagements. In the Tanzanian case, TFCG and MJUMITA engage in local empowerment. However, the strategy of building MJUMITA's capacity to act as an intermediary between villagers and international carbon markets implies a strategy where accountability to local and national political bodies is shortcut. While logical from the point of view that carbon is turned into a commodity, it raises issues regarding the political dimensions of land use and land-use planning.

Looking finally at the principles of compensating for losses, we observe that in this case, as in Brazil, the principle of covering opportunity costs is not followed – at least not the whole way through. The situation is, however, a bit different from the Brazilian project as payments are based on (expected) reductions in deforestation/carbon emissions and the price equals the market price. Hence, the strategy is to try to follow the idea of REDD+ being performance and opportunity-cost based in the aggregate.[28] On the other hand, internal distribution is founded on a different type of logic. Here, payments are made per individual, independent of the actual changes in forest use they have made. Again there is a strong egalitarian dimension to the system chosen. We note that local norms emphasise that forests are a common resource and that a few people getting disproportionally 'rich' because of their high levels of forest use is seen as wrong among most villagers. Given this, TFCG found it impossible to propose a system based on the opportunity cost rule.

28. Note that we here refer to the structure of the system set up, not the level of actual payments in the trial round.

A comparison of the cases

We will now turn to the final part of our analysis focusing on the similarities and differences between the pilots regarding changes in governance structures, the processes facilitating change, and the way structures and processes are evaluated. We will also try to see how far it is possible to explain important differences.

Concerning similarities we note the following:

- Both pilots were established by NGOs in the form of an external intervention. In both cases there were organisational and institutional changes related to decision-making bodies and land use. Regulations were established implying reduced access to forest resources. Both programmes offered compensation.
- Comprehensive information programmes were introduced and meetings between the NGOs and villagers seem to have been open and quite interactive. Both NGOs had some support from public bodies in establishing the pilots, although this was more pronounced in the Tanzanian case.
- In both cases, there were some levels of disagreement or conflict related to (perceived) lost access to forest resources and perceived low compensation levels. This affected villagers differently as their previous forest use varied across households.
- Most respondents in both pilot areas stated that people were free to adopt their own position on whether or not to introduce the REDD+ pilot projects. There is, however, evidence that there was some pressure applied in both cases, seemingly somewhat higher in the Brazilian project. Here, village presidents seem to have been the source of this. No similar clear picture regarding the source of pressure exists in the Tanzanian case. We note, however, some distrust in local leaders in both cases.
- There was a combination of individual payments and resources set aside for community projects in both Brazil and Tanzania. There were no links between payments and individual opportunity costs in either of the cases.
- We observed rather low knowledge about rules, while insights about the overall aims of the projects were fairly good.
- In both cases there was some scepticism about the NGOs at the outset. This was reduced as villagers saw that they delivered on their promises.

While the above list also includes some differences, there were others that came out as quite distinct. Looking first at evaluation and participation we note:

- The implication of the two programmes regarding consequences with respect to forest incomes is quite distinct. Given the law and the existence of the RDS rules, it is hard to see how the Bolsa Floresta Programme (BFP) has resulted in so much extra loss to the communities. Rather, help to establish management plans should open up avenues for providing increased incomes. In the Tanzanian case, the REDD+ project implied more substantial losses from forest incomes. Payments/financial support seem clearly much higher in the Brazilian case – e.g. roughly evaluated to US$600 per household per year compared to US$58 in Tanzania.

Credit: Cecilie Dyngeland

A national forest reserve near Nyali, one of the villages in the REDD+ area in Kilosa.

- In Tanzania the overall focus was on 'selling protected forests'. It was explicitly performance based with an emphasis on payments relative to reduced deforestation/emissions. A necessary element of this was defining village borders, land for different uses/protection and management rules. Community ownership was a core output. The Brazilian programme had a stronger development focus. Also in the latter case there was strong focus on forest management and protection, but compensations were fixed and measuring changes in carbon stocks was not emphasised. Due to the above, developing local monitoring and especially penalty systems seemed better developed in the Tanzanian case.
- The Brazilian programme was the result of an initiative by the State of Amazonas and established independently of international REDD+ initiatives. The Tanzanian counterpart was directly contracted as a REDD+ programme by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- In the Tanzanian case, the decision about joining REDD+ was collectively made at village level, while it was an individual/household-level decision in Brazil. The participation rate in the inception meetings was much higher in the latter than in the former case.[29] In the Tanzanian case, special issues regarding pastoralists exist.
- In the Brazilian case the programme that was introduced to RDS Rio Negro was mainly predefined, while it evolved more in the Tanzanian setting. While also in the latter case

29. The data presented indicate almost 4:1. We note, however, that the Tanzanian figure is based on the per cent of adult people participating, while in the Brazilian case the data are on how many families participated.

an existing system – PFM – was used, it may be viewed as something that the villagers considered 'theirs' as it was a) part of public policy since the late 1990s and b) a way for them to gain titles to 'their' land. The structure of the payment system was decided by the villagers themselves in the Tanzanian case. A separate organisation was moreover established to handle payments at the village level. This function was retained by the initiating organisation (FAS) in Brazil.

- Villagers in the Tanzanian pilot appeared happier with the project than their Brazilian counterparts. While it is difficult to compare results based on a five-point scale – e.g. different traditions regarding concepts like 'very good' and 'very bad' – the difference is quite consistent across the indicators used. Not only were ratings of different elements systematically different – e.g. overall evaluations of the programme, meetings, information and the involved NGOs – but also qualitative information offered in FGDs and by local resource persons supported the findings.
- A somewhat higher acceptance of conservation as a main goal was found in the Tanzanian case.

Some of the above differences can be explained by different histories and existing institutions. We specifically note the differences in decision making where there seems to be a stronger tradition for collective decision making in the Tanzanian case. This may have created a feeling of collective responsibility for forest resources in Tanzania with a less implicit focus on individual interests. In the Brazilian case, we seem to encounter a higher level of individuality although FAS have invited the communities to participate in a process of strengthening common decision making.

The main difference we observed regards the evaluation of the programme compared to the implied net consequences. The impacts on livelihoods were higher in the Tanzanian context, although they were happier with the introduction of REDD+. We have already emphasised that one explanation is a 'misunderstanding' in the Brazilian case. Restrictions on access to forest resources are mainly linked to the law/RDS regulations, not to BFP. This is certainly part of the explanation, and it may be that if the legal regulations had been enforced and/or FAS had introduced the BFP later, some of the negative reactions could have been avoided. Nevertheless, RDS/forest management rules seem not to be tougher than the bylaws for the REDD+ forest in Kilosa. Moreover, payments are on the aggregate higher per household in the Brazilian case. Finally, it is only in the Tanzanian case that we observed instances of physical relocation. Given our data, we are unable to offer any firm explanation. Nevertheless, there are some factors that stand out:

- In the Tanzanian case the issue of village ownership seems more important than in the Brazilian case. As noted, Tanzanian villagers are historically more used to making common decisions and local regulations on forest use. In the Brazilian case we seem to encounter a more individualistic culture.
- Forest abundance is much higher in the Brazilian case. We note also that the population density is much lower – 2 people per km^2 in RDS Rio Negro, while in the order of 15 people per km^2 in the case of the Tanzanian villages. 'Selling' the vision that 'trees are better standing than cut' may be a demanding one in a context where trees are seen 'everywhere'. In Tanzania, we observed some pressure on forest resources, while the amount of wood per ha is also much lower. This may in itself explain some of the above – the need for regulations was perceived as very low in RDS Rio Negro compared to the Kilosa case.
- Parallel to this, we observed a higher 'conservationist ethos' in Kilosa. This was particularly apparent given the reasons why people endorsed the programme. Here, the most important reason given was forest conservation, while income-generating activities and payments came next. In RDS Rio Negro, we observed the opposite ordering of motivations. We also note that

people in Kilosa regarded those with high earnings from charcoal making with suspicion, while we observed no negative reactions towards local people engaged in logging in the Brazilian context. Whether this reflects the differences in forest abundance or that forests are seen more as a common resource in the Tanzanian case is not possible to say.

- Income levels are clearly higher in the Brazilian case. This could imply that payments are subjectively seen as particularly low in this case. On the other hand, if you are very poor, no loss is really acceptable. We note though that those losing the most from instituting REDD+ in Kilosa are the 'least poor'.
- The NGOs engaged strongly with the communities, although the BFP offered fewer opportunities for local adaptation. It is not possible to infer what would have happened if FAS had done as TFCG did and let people themselves decide on the distribution of resources. The data does, however, point towards an allocation with higher emphasis on individual payments and given the expressed preferences, it could have resulted in less dissatisfaction.

While FAS may be right that BFR and BFS is a more strategic or better use of resources for development, the inhabitants may not see it like this or they may think differently about development. It is notable that while FAS see payments as 'help', inhabitants see them more as a (too low) compensation. It is also notable that the local people do not see the BFR or BFS as compensation in the same way. This seems to be different in the Tanzanian case and could reflect the choice of payment system – i.e. formulated as an individual payment, of which a proportion is kept by the village. We note finally that the debate over cash payments versus investments in education and income-generating opportunities is an ongoing issue in the Brazilian case.

Conclusion

In this report we have looked at the introduction of REDD+ at two localities – the RDS Rio Negro in Brazil and Kilosa District, Tanzania. We have examined changes in governance structures and how the engaged actors – the people living within the areas and the responsible NGOs – evaluate the processes and changes. We have also tried to assess these against more general norms of legitimacy. Finally, we have aimed at specifying important similarities and differences across the pilots, trying also to explain some of the most significant differences.

Regarding the established governance structures, we observe organisational changes in both cases. In the Brazilian situation, the main issue was the establishment of a reserve-wide association. In the Tanzanian case, a village natural resource committee and a REDD+ revenue-sharing committee was set up. Allocation of parts of the payments in the Brazilian case demanded an RDS-level organisation, while it also helped to empower villagers. In the Tanzanian case, village councils and general assemblies already existed, and were able to make the necessary collective decisions. Here, new organisations were established to handle core functions required as a result of introducing REDD – i.e. land titling, land-use planning and payments.

Regarding institutional changes, we observed in both cases changes in rules regulating access to forest resources. The NGOs that organised the Tanzanian pilot aimed to establish systems which made trading of carbon possible. Village and forest boundaries and necessary bylaws were defined following the existing arrangement for participatory forest management. Similarly, a system of payments aimed at obtaining emission reductions was established – presently in trial form. Payments per village are made relative to reduced emissions.

In the Brazilian case the project was introduced in an already-existing conservation unit – a 'sustainable development reserve' (RDS) – with defined restrictions regarding forest use. The Bolsa Floresta Programme did not introduce many extra restrictions in that respect. It is notable that as a development programme, the aim is not directly to provide compensation for lost income, but to support forms of community development that do not destroy forests. Hence, 'compensations' are not 'performance based'.

In both cases there was a distinction between individual payments and collective funds. In the Brazilian case, the distributions between these were defined as common to all Bolsa Floresta projects. In the Tanzanian context the distribution between individual payments and community funds was decided by each village general assembly. It was generally defined as an individual payment where villages decided who were eligible and what percentage was to be 'held back' for community purposes.

In relation to this, we note that both projects aim for a transformation in the way people relate to the resources and their everyday practices. These changes in habits and the profoundness of e.g. abandoning shifting agriculture go far beyond paying for lost livelihoods. We therefore observe that the organisations responsible for the REDD+ projects studied here put emphasis on education and training. It is too early yet to say how deeply the changes will be, but, in the end, for REDD+ to be effective this aspect seems key.

We observe that both projects were initiated from the outside. Using Pretty's (1995) classifications of participation formats, we found that none of the cases fit just one category. Rather they both included elements of 'participation by consultation', 'participation for material incentives' and 'functional participation'. Local inhabitants/local communities were offered the opportunity to say 'yes' or 'no' to the programmes. We note that in both cases, rather extensive information packages were used. Information meetings were organised at village level prior to decisions being made about participating. As the villages were much larger in the Tanzanian case, there were also meetings at sub-village levels. We conclude that decisions stand up quite well to the demands of free, prior and informed consent. Transparency seems to have been quite good in both cases. We note that it seemed to have been somewhat easier to inform people about the consequences of REDD+ in the Brazilian as opposed to the Tanzanian case as the programme was more fixed. In the latter pilot, both the rules and levels of payments were clarified more 'along the way'. This, however, also gave stronger direct influence to local communities regarding systems for protection and payment.

A large majority of the interviewed villagers evaluated that 'everybody felt free to take whatever position' regarding participating in the projects. We observed, however, that some inhabitants in both cases noted the opposite. In the Brazilian case we learnt about pressure from some village presidents, while the reference in the Tanzanian case was more about minority interests not being taken into account. It should also be mentioned that in Kilosa, not all people using forest resources were included in the process – e.g. the pastoralists. We observed that the decision to join was collective in Kilosa, while it was family-based in the RDS Rio Negro. We also note that the structure of the Bolsa Floresta Programme meant that the more households who enrolled, the higher the payment would be to communities, a fact that could explain the pressure exerted by the community presidents. The more general message is that external actors with 'good' intentions need to be aware of internal power games and issues of distrust – especially how the characteristics of the programme may provoke reactions emanating from internal conflicts.

Meetings seemed to be open and characterised by two-way communication. Because the NGOs came as outsiders to introduce a project, a lot of uni-directional transmission of knowledge, rules and expectations was necessary. At the same time, we observed ample levels of questioning and debate at both introductory and later meetings. In the Brazilian case, influence and hence opportunities for deliberation increased from the inception to running phases. As the programme got underway, resources became available for communities' investments and village- and RDS-level associations were given discretion in allocating these funds.

It is hard to compare levels of deliberation across the pilots. It seems that the level of debate was higher in the Tanzanian case in the inception phase, while not increasing over time as observed in Brazil. We also note that the participation rate in the Brazilian case was much higher, partly dependent on the fact that individual participation was a requirement to take part in the programme/receive payments. Also in Tanzania, turn-outs were high at meetings where individual payments were distributed.

We observed some distrust towards local leaders in both cases. We have already recognised some issues at the phase of inception in the RDS Rio Negro. Allegations also surfaced regarding decisions over the use of common funds. It was claimed that some were taken outside of community meetings. The latter contention is not confirmed, and it could just reflect general suspicion. Anyway, it reflects distrust that needs to be acknowledged regarding the future working of the programme. Similar observations were found in Kilosa, where some villages decided to establish small collective funds or put their funds 'on hold' until the village elected bodies were considered 'able' to manage them.

It is significant that in both cases payments to the individual villagers were not in any way related to their opportunity costs. Payments were equal across households, and it is notable that at the individual level it was the rules for protecting the forest and not the payments that protected the carbon. However, the payments could help to increase the internal legitimacy of forest protection and in this way also encourage people to abide by the rules.

In the Brazilian case, the main argument for equal pay seemed to relate to the development and equity aspect. In Tanzania it reflected the fact that those using forest resources the most – i.e. those with the highest opportunity costs – were not considered 'the best people' by local communities. We understand this to reflect a feeling of common ownership and a negative reaction towards some becoming better-off (less poor) than others by (over-) utilising common resources. We note also that in both cases the chosen solution reduced transaction costs quite substantially.

While we observed that the RDS Rio Negro project seemed to offer better benefits than that of their Kilosa counterparts, we note that the inhabitants of Kilosa were more positive in their evaluation of the REDD+ project. We note that the Bolsa Floresta Programme did not imply much change in the rules compared to those already in place as an effect of the law/the RDS status. Payments were 10 times greater in the Brazilian case as in the Tanzanian. Finally, the option for creating legal harvests of hardwood in the Brazilian RDS could create income far beyond what is possible as a livelihood expansion in the Tanzanian case.

So why were the Tanzanians interviewed happier with the project? Trying to explain this rather confusing result, we mention first that the data in the Tanzanian case come from villages that actively decided to be involved in REDD+. As we have seen, one village did not want to engage. Pastoralists were moreover never invited into the process. Hence, we have captured the views of the 'more positive' while these villages are at the same time also forming a large majority.

One explanation is the fact that the Brazilian villagers seem unable to distinguish clearly between the RDS/the general law and Bolsa Floresta. As a consequence, the Bolsa Floresta Programme was seen by many as the cause of the regulations that were in place before it was established. At the same time, we observed a seemingly stronger sense of community and common ownership of forest resources in the Tanzanian case. There seems also to be a higher environmental awareness which can be explained by higher levels of deforestation/ less abundance of forest resources. Finally, existing income levels – while generally low – are nevertheless clearly higher in the Brazilian case.

We note, however, that also in the Tanzanian case people expressed disappointment with low levels of compensation, and this is a challenge for future sustainability in both cases. Despite there being less disappointment in Kilosa, we evaluate the future challenges to be largest there, both because future funding is more uncertain and because the long-term effect of legalising 'sustainable' timber harvests in Rio Negro could offer a basis for some expansion in incomes.

As a closing remark, we would like to emphasise a few observations of a more general kind. First, we note that both cases offer a series of insights regarding issues relevant to how one organises REDD+ at the local level. Both seem to have been fairly successful. At the same time, they have covered situations where the impact of REDD+ resulting in the loss of income may not be very severe. Nevertheless, we noticed some significant challenges. Certainly, one could argue that the future looks brighter as carbon prices – i.e. compensation levels – are expected to increase once a more comprehensive international climate protocol is negotiated and ratified. There is, however, uncertainty as to whether such an agreement will be reached. Moreover, our findings clearly point out that the higher the potential additionality is, the more conflicting it may become to institute REDD+. Noting the levels of conflict observed in the two cases studied

here, it is uncertain how well REDD+ can deliver where the stakes are really high. It is in these cases that additionality is large. So we surmise that the more promising REDD+ looks with regards to its effectiveness in halting emissions, the more conflict-ridden it may also become.

Choosing NGOs to organise REDD+ at the local level also raises issues regarding the relations to standard democratic processes and bodies. We note first that the NGOs involved in our two cases seem to operate transparently and in a good manner given the kind of actors they are and the mandates they have. The question regards what this route implies for political accountability in the longer run. In Brazil it was a deliberate choice by the State of Amazonas itself to establish FAS to avoid bureaucratic inefficiencies and to be able to attract private funding. In the Tanzanian case, the choice was made by the donor – the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In evaluating the future direction of REDD+, we advise also having discussions within the local organisation of REDD+ within the wider frame of what the overall national system for the governance of REDD+ should be. As political accountability is of great importance for legitimacy, one may think of REDD+ as a way to strengthen the relationship between the people and their elected leaders, rather than to sideline the initiative from the standard political system. That may, however, demand strong emphasis on developing the competence, efficiency, transparency and democratic procedures of these bodies – not least those at the local level.

The experiences from these pilots point also towards some dilemmas regarding the North-South dimension of REDD+. The Tanzanian case is the most 'clean' REDD+ project, with a focus on performance-based payments – at least at village level. We have observed that it may take years from the time a village endorses REDD+ until the necessary institutions are effectively functioning and changes in deforestation rates can really be observed so that compensation can be offered. Hence, the decision to enrol in a REDD+ programme must very much be based on faith, which places a great deal of responsibility on those trying to motivate villagers to participate. A volatile carbon price/market would add to this challenge. In the cases studied here, it is the implementing NGOs that are directly faced with this challenge, but the fundamental responsibility regarding this should fall upon the actors in the North that have pushed for this solution.

REDD+ was initiated partly because it was believed to be cheap and partly because it was believed to offer quick solutions. The idea grew out of the concept of 'ecosystem services'. Our experience is that defining the service – creating a 'commodity' to sell – is very demanding. It takes not only time. It is institutionally profound and even changes human relationships, which our cases illustrate. It is only the Tanzanian case that comes even close to trying to 'sell a service'. However, the trade even in this case takes on a very special form since the communities do not accept 'markets' to disrupt local distributive norms.

The North's emphasis on cost efficiency implicit in REDD+ is in conflict with the South's emphasis on the need for compensatory justice in climate change policies (Ikeme 2003). In relation to this, we note that cost efficiency is not a neutral measure of costs as it is heavily influenced by the initial distribution. This implies that making payments according to such costs is not at all innocent in equity terms. While REDD+ also includes an aspect of poverty reduction, the focus on cost-efficiency could result in maintaining global inequalities. Hence, the equity dimension warrants separate attention by the REDD+ community. While we think protecting forests in the South is very important, we note that the process of finding legitimate ways of doing so has only just begun. The two cases studied here offer a series of insights that will be helpful in this process.

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