Securing Pastoralism in East and West Africa:
Protecting and Promoting Livestock Mobility

Karamojong Cluster Desk Review:
Livestock mobility in northeast Uganda, northwest Kenya, southwest Ethiopia and southern Sudan

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A young herder in the Karamojong cluster (photo: Shadrack Omondi)

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INTRODUCTION

This is one of a series of desk reviews produced as part of the project ‘Securing Pastoralism in East and West Africa: Protecting and Promoting Livestock Mobility’. Its focus is livestock mobility amongst the herding groups of the Karamojong\(^1\) cluster (living in an area comprising northeast Uganda, northwest Kenya, southwest Ethiopia and southern Sudan).

The methodology involved a review of the literature, supplemented with brief interviews with key informants as well as small country studies in Kenya (Shadrack Omondi) and Uganda (Michael Wantsusi). The review, carried out over a period of a few days, was limited by the usual difficulties in accessing unpublished information.

The desk review was asked to focus on two issues:

- The context affecting livestock mobility.
- The work of key development and research actors involved in promoting livestock mobility.

The report has four sections:

1. A brief overview of the nature of pastoralism and livestock mobility within the Karamojong cluster.
2. An overview of the institutional context in the four countries where the groups of the Karamojong cluster can be found.
3. A summary of the main drivers of change in the patterns of livestock mobility within the Karamojong cluster.
4. An overview of the work of key development and research actors protecting or promoting livestock mobility, and an indication of the issues that still need attention.

The assistance of the SOS Sahel UK team, Izzy Birch, Jeremy Lind, and Michele Nori, and other people who shared documents and ideas is warmly acknowledged. Thanks also to Jess Barbier for her help in editing. Any faults or omissions, however, remain the responsibility of the authors.

\(^1\) Also Karamajong (Gulliver, 1952) and Karimojong (Dyson-Hudson, 1958 and 1966, Novelli, 1988). Karimojong was the 'official' spelling under the colonial administration (Wayland, 1931; Lawrance, 1952). Knighton (2005) uses 'Karimojong' to refer to the specific ethnic groups in Uganda (Matheniko, Bokora and Pian) and 'Karamojong' to refer to the cluster of peoples speaking Ngakaramojong.
1. PASTORAL PRODUCTION

The term 'Karamojong cluster' was introduced by the British colonial administration in order to define a set of distinct ethnic groups from a shared origin and with similar dialects, living in the territory that had been divided by the borders of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. Early surveys gather under this definition Dodoth, Jie, Karamojong and Turkana (Gulliver, 1952), and Teso (Lawrance, 1952). Although these groups used the land in different and complex ways, they all kept livestock as an important aspect of their economy.

The use of the term 'Karamojong cluster' is not without problems. In contemporary development literature the expression also refers, by extension, to the territory comprising northeast Uganda, northwest Kenya, southwest Ethiopia and southern Sudan. This use includes groups like the Pokot who, although key players in the region, are not Ngakaramojong speakers. In other words, the geographical and socio-linguistic use of the term do not entirely overlap. Further complication comes from the parallel introduction of the expression 'Karamoja cluster' to define both the peoples speaking the Ngakaramojong language in the Karamoja region (northeast Uganda) and the territory itself (as a group of administrative districts).

For the sake of clarity, this desk study holds onto the notion of 'Karamojong cluster' in its original meaning, that is referring to peoples, not to a territory. On the other hand, as the focus of the review is on pastoral mobility, we take a loose approach looking at all the pastoral groups in the transnational region used by the Karamojong cluster, therefore including the Pokot. Each group has a more or less fixed ‘home area’. The table below gives an overview of these groups based on their home areas. It is a highly heterogeneous collection, with deep political divisions, different production strategies and historical as well as recent conflicts. Nevertheless, all groups share an interest in keeping open the possibility to access areas normally controlled by some of the others, at times across national borders. Although census figures in these remote rural areas are typically only indicative, an estimated 1.4 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists can be classified as part of the Karamojong cluster (Akabawi and Ateyo, 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Kaabong district: Dototh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Turkana district: Turkana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Karaz Woreda, South Omo (SNNPR): Dassanetch Nyangatom (Toposa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Bari &amp; Kapoeta counties, Eastern Equatoria Region: Toposa (Toposa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1 A note of caution on complex dynamics

The transnational region used by the Karamojong cluster is characterised by a highly variable and unpredictable environment. Traditionally, administrative documents and development literature define a dry and a wet season, respectively from October to February-March and from March-April to September. In reality, these 'seasons' indicate no more than periods during which one can expect somehow lower and higher precipitation. As early as the 1950s, ecological studies in northeast Uganda pointed out that departures from this ideal seasonal pattern are the norm rather than the exception. Similarly, they emphasised that values for average precipitation had little significance against very high variations from year to year (up to 200%) and from place to place (Dyson-Hudson, 1958). The higher level of variability registered today, following global climate change, is to be read in this perspective. The ecology of the region belongs to the kind that is now commonly described as structurally unpredictable or driven by stochastic events (non-equilibrium or disequilibrium ecology). People's mobility and the dynamic differences in their use of the territory also get in the way of standard measurements of population density based on administrative areas.

Keeping in mind these limits, official records describe the climate in the region as characterised by two seasons, one short and wet and one long and dry. Records from Karamoja collected between 1939 and 1995 indicate differences in annual rainfall between 420mm and 1260mm, with precipitation decreasing further to the west and north of the area (Niamir-Fuller, 1999). On the other hand, most watercourses in Karamoja run westwards (Dyson-Hudson, 1958), thus the distribution of precipitation does not directly correspond to the aridity of the land. Ellis and Swift (1988) estimated that the Karamoja region in Uganda has a coefficient of variation (CV) of between 30 and 35. Regions with a CV higher than 30 are considered to be highly variable, and ‘non-equilibrium’ ecological systems (Ellis & Swift, 1988 cited in Niamir-Fuller, 1999: 153). Livestock mobility allows pastoralists to exploit climatic micro-environments to the full.

The various pastoral groups of the Karamojong cluster are classified as transhumant, nomadic, semi-nomadic, agro-pastoralists, mixed-farmers, and so on. To the extent to which these classifications are based on the ethnic group (as it is usually the case) they make little sense. Production strategies within the cluster are complex and highly dynamic. Degree, patterns and, above all, strategies of mobility can be as different within groups as between groups, and the same applies to strategies of productions. For example, some Turkana cross the border into Uganda every year, based on long-lasting and yet precarious alliances with groups of Karimojong (Matheniko). Others however, leave the Turkana district only in exceptional circumstances. Most Turkana keep cattle (together with camels, sheep, goats and donkeys), but some of them do not, specialising instead in small stock (McCabe, 2004). Even within the same pastoral group, some people engage in the cultivation of sorghum whilst others only take care of livestock. Occupations may change according to age, gender or family 'style', as well as more transient conditions such as location, wealth, a climatic trend or the restrictions in the production-strategy options face the availability of labour, herd composition or security.

To overimpose static models of classification and explanation in order to freeze this complex and changing reality, is terribly tempting. At times there are obvious benefits
in representing environment, resources and productions strategies by means of stable models, for example for administrative and organisational purposes. However, it is crucial not to lose sight of the circumstantial and ephemeral adequacy of such simplifications when applied to systems that are characterised by complex dynamics. The general overview of the pastoral production strategies within the Karamojong cluster, in the following section, is to be read in this light.

1.2 Pastoral mobility and its purpose

A general model of production and mobility can be gathered from the extended in-depth studies of the Karimojong and Jie (Dyson-Hudson, 1958, 1966; Gulliver, 1955; Novelli, 1988) and Turkana (Gulliver, 1951; Dyson-Hudson, 1985; Little et al., 1999; McCabe, 1984, 2004). A pattern that, with specific differences, can probably be attributed to all the pastoral communities in the Karamojong cluster is the organisation of production across three ideal ecological zones with increasing quality of pasture: a home area, a grazing area and a grazing reserve. Whilst the home area of a household tends to be relatively stable, the other two areas can vary greatly according to many factors, as we will see.

With the exception of the rare periods when there is sufficient pasture in the home area, most of the livestock is kept in the grazing area under the care of teams of men, boys and a few girls. These teams can move as often as every few weeks. They use local vegetation to build temporary camps (kraals).

About four fifths of the women and the youngest children live in semi-permanent villages (manyattas) in the home areas, with a few milking cows and some small stock. Today, these semi-permanent settlements have often a borehole (although this is not so true, for example, for the Turkana territory along the border with Uganda (McCabe, 2004). Depending on the season, kraals make use of ponds, boreholes or traditional wells dug in dry riverbeds. Natural water points are open to all group members, but outsiders have to ask elders for permission to use water. Man-made water features, such as hand-dug catchment basins, are the property of those that make them, but temporary access is usually granted when asked in the right way (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; also Niamir-Fuller, 1999).

When distances and security allow it, there are frequent exchanges of people and information between the two areas, with elders visiting and rotation in the teams of girls helping at the kraal. Beside home areas and grazing areas, some areas with the best pasture are to be kept unused, as a buffer against the ever-present possibility that a dry period stretches into a fully fledged drought.

As far as production is concerned, the main objective of the herders is to ensure that

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2 The adoption of the terms kraal and manyatta in this study follows the reasons nicely explained by Stites et al. (2007: 35): ‘The terms ‘manyatta’ and ‘kraal’ are widely used in English to refer to the settlements of the Karamojong, but are not local words. ‘Manyatta’ is originally a Maasai word, while ‘kraal’ has its roots in Afrikaans but has become widely used to describe cattle pens as well as fortified cattle enclosures. For the purpose of consistency, we use these two terms throughout this report. The correct Ngakaramojong terms are ere for manyatta (plural: ngirerio) and mec for kraal (plural: ngawain)’. 
the animals reproduce quickly and regularly. Under this respect the overarching strategy would be to organise the livestock so that the different species (but cattle usually take priority) are managed and moved around in order to be always kept on the best possible diet (including water). However, this goal and the corresponding strategy of mobility are balanced against several other factors. Writing about the Turkana, McCabe (2004) lists a few of them: the need to keep within reach of a grazing reserve in case of a prolonged drought; the patchiness of the forage resources; the perceived threat of raids; and the current location of friends and relatives. Both maximising resources and avoiding risk is of key importance to all pastoral systems, however, pastoral groups, sections and even relatively small aggregates of households can differ substantially in the ways they use and combine these two dimensions. Today, security is a major issue for most groups in the region and one that deeply affects people's decision making concerning mobility for pastoral production. As we will see in Section 3, however, mobility is affected also in several other ways.

Pian Karimojong elders (photo: Michael Wantsusi).
2. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The relationship between pastoralists and the state, in the region used by the Karamojong cluster, has been described as 'distant and often oppositional' (HSBA, 2007: 2). This section traces the institutional and legislative environment of pastoralists in the region. It begins with a brief look at the legacy of colonial policies, then considers the relationship between the four states that border the Cluster and finally gives an outline of the main legislative tools in each of the four states.

2.1 Colonial legacy

The area inhabited by people of the Karamojong cluster was originally divided up by the British colonial government and the Ethiopian Empire. The colonial governments of Uganda and Kenya occupied the dryland areas to the north, to act as a ‘buffer’ against what they considered as threatening nomadic groups further north. However, the international boundaries that were drawn up separated ethnic groups from their seasonal pastoral resources. The Kenya-Uganda border, for example, follows the Turkana Escarpment, which separates drier plains to the east and the wetter, elevated areas to the west, and hence cuts across the seasonal pattern of east-west migration (USAID 2002, cited in Birch, 2006).

A succession of Turkana and British expansions during the first three decades of 1900, pushed sections of the Pokot from Kenya well into a southern Karamoja still relatively ‘empty’ of livestock, due a slower recover from the rinderpest epidemics (Barber, 1968; Lampheear, 1992). At the same time, the Karimojong lost rights to fertile dry-season grazing areas in the Teso territory (Niamir-Fuller, 1999). After the sack of Moroto arsenal in 1979, the burst of raids by Karimojong and Turkana, armed with automatic weapons pushed large numbers of Ugandan Pokot across the border into Kenya. Soon the Pokot managed to arm themselves with the new technology starting new cycles of raids from the mid 1990s (Dietz, 1993; cf. also Bollig, 1990).

The most controversial colonial legacy in the area, however, is the disputed jurisdiction of the Ilemi Triangle, which is claimed in part by Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. The Ilemi (also Elemi) Triangle is an area of between 14,000 square kilometres and 10,320 square kilometres of disputed territorial claims between Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. The disagreement dates back to colonial times and has not been resolved by post-independence governments. A border set in 1902 – the straight Maud Line in the figure below – gave Sudan control of the entire Ilemi Triangle. In 1938, the British expanded Kenya’s territorial claims to include water points and higher grounds to the north of Turkana – the Red Line – and to create a buffer against the raids from groups in

"[T]he area extending from the Ilemi Triangle due south into Kenya’s Turkana and Pokot districts has become a battleground for nomadic tribes of no specific nationality. Due to the lack of governmental control, each tribe has its own armies of heavily armed bandits known as the Ngoroko that compete for the latest technology in small arms, particularly cheap ones from the former communist countries.” (Mburu, 1999: 98)
Sudan. This border was further extended north by the British in 1947 – the Blue Line (Mburu, 2003).

In absence of official agreements, after Independence, the Kenyan governments policed the 1938 border (Red Line). The Sudanese government, on its part, policed a newly defined border to the north, the Patrol Line. This transformed de facto the large territory between the two unofficial borders into no-man's land ignored by both governments and prone to serve as a safe-zone for illegal traffic (ibid.). Formal talks involving Ethiopia in the 1960s failed to reach a settlement. The Didninga communities of Uganda have traditionally used the Ilemi Triangle as dry season pasture, and the customary pastures of the Turkana also lie in the highland areas of the Ilemi Triangle.

**Figure 3: The Ilemi Triangle**

![Ilemi Triangle Map](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Ilemi_triangle_map.PNG)

**2.2 Bilateral and international agreements**

State borders can cut herders off from their seasonal pastures or can act as a shield from which bandits and other armed groups can launch raids, and behind which they can escape afterwards (Wantsusi, 2008). Border can also fuel instability and conflict, especially when states arm loyal groups along their borders to protect their interests.¹ The borders of the region are highly porous, and it is impossible for national governments to stop pastoralists and others crossing them. Informal, cross-border trade in cattle has been estimated to account for 26% of the beef consumed in Kenya (Birch, 2006). Despite this widespread trade operation, cross-border mobility of

¹ In the 1990s, the Ethiopian government armed the Dassanetch with AK47, allegedly to protect them from Turkana and Sudanese cattle thieves. In the fight against the SPLA, the Sudanese government is estimated to have passed more than 250,000 firearms to border communities in the southern territories, including 50,000 weapons given to the Toposa (Mburu, 2003).
livestock and livestock producers receives very little attention or support at institutional level.

In contrast to the ECOWAS\textsuperscript{4} ‘Certificates of Transhumance’ in West Africa, there are no international or bilateral agreements regulating cross-border mobility between Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan. The East African Community (EAC) created in 1999 has not so far engaged with issues of transboundary pastoral mobility, not even in the context of the 2006 \textit{EAC Protocol on Environment and Natural Resource Management}. The InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the other major regional organisation, has committed to local peace-building initiatives in the region (CEWARN\textsuperscript{5}) but has not produced any regional agreements specifically regarding pastoralism.

\subsection*{2.3 Current government policy towards pastoralism in Karimojong Cluster}

Pastoral groups are often governed by a diverse array of partially overlapping and frequently incompatible regulations relating to land use/land tenure, forestry, water management and customary law. A detailed survey of legislative and governmental structures in the four countries concerned with the Karimojong cluster falls beyond the scope of the present study. However, the structure of local governments and some of the most relevant legislative frameworks in each country are highlighted here. General problems shared by all four states concerned, is a lack of clear jurisdiction across the complexity of legal plurality (state, customary and religious laws), and a poor capacity for implementation (especially at local government level).

\subsubsection*{2.3.1 Uganda}

Uganda has a local government system of Districts, Counties and Sub-Counties with executive and legislative powers. These local governments are mandated by the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) and the Local Governments Amendment Act (1997). However, the management of natural resources is prerogative of the central government in Kampala, leaving local administrations with no decision-making power on the matter, and limited room for policy implementation. A Land Act (1998), designed to deal with the many land disputes across the country, offers some legal basis for pastoral land rights. On paper, the Land Act provides for the establishment of Communal Land Associations (CLAs) that would fit well into the social and economic relations of the Karimojong. However, implementation has so far been disappointing (Wantsusi, 2008; Aciro-Lakor, 2008).

\subsubsection*{2.3.2 Kenya}

Pastoral ethnic groups in Kenya fall under the jurisdiction of county councils. In addition, they are governed through the provincial administration structure, represented by the sub-chiefs at Sub-location level, the chiefs at Location level, and by district officers and district commissioners at District level. The power-sharing agreement following the 2008 election have opened up new possibilities for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{4} Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS).

\textsuperscript{5} Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).}
pastoralists in the north who have traditionally been economically and politically marginalised. A Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands has been established with the mandate to remedy the long-standing neglect of the region.

2.3.3 Sudan
The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), in Juba, set up by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, administers the southern border areas with Uganda and Kenya through ten decentralised states. The 1970 Unregistered Land Act allowed the government to convert large extensions of common land to mechanised agricultural schemes (De Wit, 2004; for a more recent overview see Pantuliano, 2007). Officially repealed, but not replaced at the national level, the Unregistered Land Act is still the basis of tribunal judgements. There is no national legal framework specifically addressing the matters of livestock mobility or land rights for pastoral groups. Another outcome of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are the Land Commissions being set up (in collaboration with the FAO) in order to draw different land/resource users to consensus with regard to the ownership and use of land. This process is proving extremely slow and difficult to implement. Since colonial times, local governance in Sudan has been in the hands of the so-called Native Administrations (NA), which represented both the 'sedentary' and the 'transhumant' populations. The powers of the NA were hollowed out in the 1970s through a series of laws enacted by the central government. Some of the original powers of the NA have now been returned, also as part of the overall process of decentralisation. Like many local governments in East Africa, however, the NAs tend to lack the institutional capacity for effective legislative action and enforcement.

2.3.4 Ethiopia
Since its rise to power in 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government has presided over a more inclusive attitude to pastoralism in the country. Notably the 1992 Ethiopian Constitution guarantees that pastoralists have the right to unclaimed land for grazing and cultivation, and the right not to be driven from their lands (Article 40(4))\(^6\). In addition, the government has recognised the value of pastoralism to the state through a 'National Day of Pastoralism'. Despite this general orientation, no legislation is in place to secure land and water rights of pastoralists in Ethiopia. On the contrary, the alienation of pastoralists from their land continues. The current policy encourages 'voluntary sedentarisation' of pastoralists and the expansion of agriculture on riverbanks. The 1997 Federal Land Act (Federal Proclamation No. 89/1997 on Rural Land Administration) stipulated that land-holding rights can be assigned to both 'peasants and nomads [pastoralists]' (Alden Wily, 2003: 62). However, the legal framework only allowed for individual or state rights to be granted, and not communal rights. The Constitution introduced ‘ethnic federalism’, with regional states, based on traditional ethnic areas, having a degree of autonomy from the central government in Addis Ababa. Under this system, the federal government produces a land policy, but delegates the responsibility for specific legislation on the conditions for land access and ownership to these fledgling regional states (Helland, 2006). These states lack both administrative capacity and financial autonomy.

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\(^6\) Article 40 (4): 'Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands. The implementation shall be specified by law' (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1992).
2.3.5 Grazing grounds
Very little information is available on the number and location of grazing grounds. A recent but not comprehensive mapping of grazing grounds in Moroto district (Uganda) indicates 14. These areas are dotted with water ponds that are largely in poor condition because of silting. Where there are boreholes, these are rarely in working conditions. Both the rangeland and the infrastructure are often in a state of abandon because of insecurity (Wantsusi, 2008). A table of grazing grounds and livestock corridors in Moroto District is in Annex 1.

2.3.6 International corridors
Information on cross-border mobility is not readily available and comes mostly from anecdotal evidence. Well known corridors cross the Kenya-Uganda border by Loyor and through the Matheniko game reserve; the Uganda-Sudan border by Langili, Makwaju (bordering Kidepo National Park) and the Kenya-Sudan border by Nadepali.

These international corridors, maintained through kinship-based relationships, are disappearing face to the escalation of armed conflicts and the promotion of land privatisation (threatening the existence of communal/pastoral land rights) (Odhiambo, 2000). Recent attempts by the governments of Uganda and Kenya to regulate cross-border mobility focus on arms traffic rather than pastoral production systems. A 2008 meeting between the governments of Uganda and Sudan focused on regulating cross-border mobility (Omondi, 2008).

Frequent cross-border mobility takes place between Moroto and Turkana districts. The Karimojong Matheniko have a long-standing grazing alliance with the Ngikamatak section of the Turkana (McCabe, 2004). The Turkana can move 40-50 km into the Matheniko Northern Livestock Corridor (Rupa sub-county). The Matheniko on the other hand, in order to enjoy more security can cross border and descend the escarpment south of the Loima Hills. Further cross-border mobility is frequent on the part of the Tepeth of the Katikekile sub-county (located on the slopes of Mt Moroto in Uganda) and the Pokot of Kenya. The Tepeth cross into Kenya with their livestock for protection against raids by the Matheniko.
3. CHANGES IN MOBILITY

On a level that is general enough to embrace all the groups in the Karamojong cluster, the mobility (of people and/or livestock) associated to routine pastoral production hinges on securing high quality feeding and on maintaining efficient channels of exchange between the manyatta and the kraal. Two other dimensions, although not directly involved in production, are also crucial: keeping both family and livestock under conditions of relative security, and reaching adequate pasture in case of prolonged drought. Although neither comprehensive nor group-specific, this section aims at sign-posting the key drivers of change affecting these fundamental dimensions of pastoral mobility and the way they combine with one another.

3.1 Herd size and general impoverishment

The literature consulted for this review seems prone to accept that in the course of the twentieth century there has been an overall decrease in the number of cattle per household. This seems also to be the impression of the people working with pastoralists on the ground. In Karamoja, head of cattle per household may have fallen from 100 (in 1900) to 50 (in 1950) to just 28 (in 1990) due to the increase in population (Niamir-Fuller, 1999). To the extent to which these average figures reflect a real decrease in herd size within the networks of producers as a whole (rather than just a change in distribution), this has a direct impact on their capacity to run the manyatta-kraal system of production. Herds below a certain size (keeping count of their actual composition) are difficult or impossible to split between manyatta and kraal, even if all the other requirements for production are met. The people working in the kraal depend heavily on the herd for their food supply. On the other hand, the labour necessary for the management of the herd does not decrease in proportion with its size. A small herd is simply not able to support the labour that is necessary to its management. This dramatically reduces the distance of the kraal from the manyatta and can lead to the collapse of the dual system altogether. Even when there is only a reduction of the distance, this has a significant impact on the quality of animal nutrition and, consequently, on production (Stites et al., 2007).

3.2 Insecurity

Insecurity in the region is originated chiefly from both endemic and exogenous cattle raiding, military conflicts and aggressive state interventions (e.g. the devastating disarmament campaigns in Karamoja over the last ten years). A considerable amount of academic studies and grey literature has been produced on conflict, raids and insecurity in the region exploited by the groups of the Karamojong cluster. Drawing on some of the most recent works (and by no means in a comprehensive way) this section tries to highlight key processes through which pastoral mobility is affected by insecurity:

- Loss of animals, leading to a reduction of the herd below the viable size (loss of mobility due to impoverishment). Even if the viable herd-size is itself a variable affected by many other factors (Devereux and Scoones, 2007), in a
given context households that suffer a severe reduction of the herd may be forced to abandon (if temporarily) the manyatta/kraal system of production. As far as mobility/production is concerned, the loss of livestock to raids can in part be balanced by: a) livestock received from friends and relatives; and b) counter raids. However, these practices are only partially effective. Today's large scale raids hit large numbers of households, leaving little margin for the working of moral economy as entire social networks suffer severe losses. On the other hand, the possibility of 'getting the livestock back' through counter raids is seriously jeopardised by the fact that raiding has ceased long time ago to be an endemic practice and most stolen livestock today is simply taken out of the pastoral economy to be sold on distant markets (cf. Krätli and Swift, 1999; Lind, 2006).

- Loss of labour/knowledge and disruption of the breeding network as people are killed in conflicts and more flee seeking refuge in other areas. Obviously, this is always a net loss to the production system. Over 1,200 people are thought to have been killed and approximately 300,000 cattle stolen in the latter half of the 1990s in Kenya alone (Human Rights Watch, cited in Birch, 2006; Nangiro, 2006).

Figure 4: Livestock losses due to cattle raiding


Table 2: Impact of pastoral violence in Ethiopia-Kenya-Uganda border regions (May-Aug 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of incidents</th>
<th>No. of deaths</th>
<th>% cross-border incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEWARN, adapted from Bevan (2007).
• Multiplication of no-go areas because of the risk of attacks. In the short term, this represents a net loss of access to often important resources. But there are also long term consequences. Grazeland left unused for even just a few years can suffer significant deterioration as a resource for pastoral production. Similarly, lack of use impacts negatively on existing infrastructures such as boreholes and water ponds.

• Stricter regulations and policing of state borders make standard and exceptional patterns of transboundary mobility both more difficult and more risky.

• Vicious circles of violence associated with repressive disarmament campaigns, as erratic and antagonistic state interventions increase the overall level of insecurity. Often, heavy-handed government disarmament schemes focus on just disarmament alone and leave the social reasons underlying the spread and continued use of small arms untouched. Little action is taken for mediation, conflict resolution or local development, resulting in a continued cycle of violence. There are well-reported violations of human rights during forceful disarmament (Nangiro, 2005; Akabawi and Ateyo, 2007; Bevan, 2007; Stites, 2007; McEvoy and Murry, 2008). The failure of government to provide adequate security on the regional level is one of the motivating factors behind the spread of small arms in the area (Human Rights Watch, cited in Birch, 2006). The reasons for intense cattle raiding and banditry are debated. It is clear, however, that the spread of arms is a consequence of the climate of fear in the region: 'By far the most effective protection against raiding is to have, and to show, as many guns and able-bodied men as possible' (Niamir-Fuller, 1999: 161).

• Problems with inter-district mobility and deterioration of existing patterns of co-operation and economic integration. Guerrilla groups have been active across the border between Sudan and Uganda since the 1980s, first the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and later, since the 1990s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Before the neighbouring regions broke into armed insurgency, the Karimojong herders used to move into the Teso, Lango and Acholi regions with relatively few hurdles. The contiguity with a war zone, following the insurgency, fuelled and exacerbated raiding practices involving all neighbouring communities. Now the Bokora find it difficult to cross to Teso (in the Amuria and Katakwi districts) for dry-period grazing. The Karimojong are accused of raiding the Teso communities during the PLA war, and the Acholi and Lango communities during the LRA war. These accusations tap into pre-existing inter-tribal rivalries and raise strong emotions even among local leaders and national politicians. Adding to the growing tension between the Karimojong and their neighbours is the view that the government appears to be protecting the interests of the neighbouring districts. Livestock raiding is

“Ngoroko banditry thrives in endemic poverty that springs from neglect by the existing state structure of Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia, where geographical distance from each country’s capital literally translates into distance from consideration of the people’s economic advancement and security.” (Mburo, 1999: 98)
simply being equated to livestock mobility. Since 2001, it has been increasingly difficult for the Karimojong herders to cross with their livestock into the neighbouring districts (Wantsusi, 2008; on the complexity of conflict and intratribal politics in Karamoja see Gray, 2000 and Odhiambo, 2003; for a regional perspective on the issue see Gray et al., 2003).

Figure 5: Routes and methods of arms trafficking – North Rift cross-border arms movement


3.3 Climate change

Climate change projections for African drylands over the coming decades provide at least two diverging scenarios. One suggests an increase of rainfall in the Sahel during the first half of the century, following a shift northwards of the Saharan climatic zone (Brooks, 2006). Another one suggests rapid drying of the Sahel with rainfall decreasing below the previous low of the 1980 drought (Held et al., 2005). Models looking specifically at East Africa are equally unclear (Christensen, 2007). All models however, assume a substantial increase of unpredictability in the onset, length and intensity of rainfall.

Herding communities in Karamoja emphasise that rains have become overall heavier
and shorter, with an increased frequency of prolonged droughts. Herders also highlight a diminished resistance to drought in their livestock, including camels (Oxfam, 2008). According to local sources, the Karimojong Matheniko no longer cross the Kenyan border into Turkana as the areas they used to go have become markedly drier since the late 1990s. In other parts of Karamoja, such as the Matheniko Southern Livestock Corridor (in the Nandoget sub-county), water sources – especially ponds – have disappeared. Water ponds have also disappeared in other places due to failed maintenance measures that would have prevented silting (Wantsusi, 2008).

It is difficult to pinpoint the causes of change. For example, the phenomenon of diminished resistance to drought in livestock could result from cumulative stress, with the animals struggling to recover from one prolonged drought to the next. However, there might also be different causes, including diminished mobility and the consequent diminished quality of animal nutrition; or erosion of the breeding networks and the consequent diminished competence/capacity of the herds to exploit the nutritional opportunities offered by mobile strategies (Kräti, 2008; Kaufmann, 2007).

3.4 Antagonistic development policies

With government policies that are pro-sedentarisation, agricultural production has been given the upper hand over pastoralism. Pastoralists have therefore been encouraged to settle, in exchange for the provision of certain services, like adequate health centres and schools. In areas where the governments have developed intervention mechanisms to assist the pastoralists, such interventions have paid little attention to the pastoral way of life and its mobility patterns (Catley et al., 2005). In the bid to make water accessible to the pastoralists, for instance, providers – including the government – have constructed water points in a haphazard manner, disrupting the established migratory routes, which has led to intensified rivalry between the pastoralist groups, and led to a kind of permanent settlement along the water points that is increasing environmental degradation (Odhiambo, n/d).

3.5 Large-scale conversion of pastoral land to other uses

Given the semi-arid nature of the region exploited by the producers in the Karamojong cluster, top-down large-scale use conversions in the past were mainly for the creation of wildlife reserves. Today, however, the rising demand for oil and minerals is generating new threats.

In Uganda, the creation of the Kidepo Valley National Park in the 1980s (on the border with Sudan and Kenya), which would have stopped pastoralists from using the territory, was somehow neutralised by a 1987 arrangement (following social unrest) that allowed 'Ugandan pastoralists' limited access to the grazeland within the boundaries of the park. Such arrangement is apparently still respected. The Toposa of Sudan, however, who cross into Uganda every year in the dry period, to access grazeland in the Kaabong district, have experienced a lot of difficulties following the
creation of the Park (Wantsusi, 2008). In the Kaabong district, the Dodoth herders used the Timu forest during the wet period, before the area was declared a Forest Reserve in 2000 and they were excluded (ibid.).

Another gazetted area is the Pian-Upe Game Reserve, on the border between Uganda and Kenya and concerning the movement of respectively Pian Karimojong and Pokot. The development of cross-border initiatives such a co-management framework pulling together the interests of both pastoralists and the governments, would be very useful.

In recent years, large-scale conversion of pastoral land has taken a new face, with a focus on emerging opportunities for the big capital and foreign investors interested in energy and mineral development (AllAfrica 2008; Kalua, 2008; ICBCD, 2006; MEMD, 2002; for an overview of the topic, cf. McGahey, 2008). In Uganda, the argument that a pacified Karamoja region would attract valuable foreign investments has been used to legitimise the spirit of urgency and dismissal of basic human-rights that has characterised the disarmament campaigns (Knighton, 2002). Concessions to international players are already under way in Karamoja, for the conversion of land from current pastoral uses to plantations of the biofuel feedstock Jatropha Curcas (Michael Ochieng Odhiambo, RECONCILE, personal communication, 2008).

3.6 War on terrorism

The global war on terrorism, with the new American interest in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, offers the governments in these regions new opportunities for military and financial assistance. However, the agenda of the war on terrorism focuses both attention and investments on an oversimplified explanatory framework. Under the new counter-terrorism commitment, governments can easily excuse themselves for choosing repressive measures over constructive ones, military action over negotiation and development, and exacerbating old and today untenable ideological positions – such as antagonising internal mobility and closing the frontiers – based on new rationalisations (Knighton, 2002; Stites, 2006).
4. KEY ACTORS (DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH)

This last section provides an overview of key development projects working with pastoralists in the region. Pastoralism is rarely the core concern of development projects, and most of the attention to pastoralists in the region has a specific focus on conflict resolution. Relatively up to date maps of ‘who is doing what’ in Karamoja, with a focus on humanitarian activities, are available on the IASC’s Clusters Approach website (http://www.ugandaclusters.ug/index.html).

4.1 Project and Contacts

1. Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative (PHCI) by AU-IBAR and Practical Action

Built on informal, cross-border interaction, the AU-IBAR (Inter-African Bureau of Animal Resources) with Practical Action (then ITDG) set up the Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative. The organisation first entered the region in an attempt to protect livestock health against rinderpest, and was drawn into conflict resolution and peace-building activities as a result of the interconnectedness of livestock health and community management (Minear, 2002). They organised a series of meetings – known as the Pastoral Community Harmonization Initiative (PCHI) – attended by up to 200 people, which brought together senior government officials, elders, chiefs, and community groups throughout 2001-2003. The meetings, which had the overall aim of strengthening the voices of pastoral communities, helped forging personal contacts between elders and government officials, which in turn has led to swifter dealing with episodes of cattle theft. At the meetings, participants discussed protecting herdsman who graze their animals across international borders, and joint activities such as road rehabilitation (Birch, 2006).

IBAR has also been supporting women’s choirs on ‘peace-crusades’ across the border. Local government officials in Kotido have been reported to find that if the current IBAR approach is addressing the most manifest dimension of conflict (‘fire-fighting’), it could engage more in tackling its deep causes (Mkutu, 2003: 35).

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7 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).
2. Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives (APEDI)

Peace-building between Turkana and Toposa (northwest Kenya and southern Sudan) is primarily handled by the Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives (APEDI). This civil society organisation promotes dialogue and conflict resolution at the local level, aiming at reinforcing traditional and modern governance structures and dissolve conflicts before they escalate. The APEDI works with municipal governments and civil society organisations in Narus, southern Sudan, to prevent raiding into Kenya.

Their first intervention was in February 2005. APEDI was instrumental in negotiating an 18-month cease-fire between sections of Turkana and Toposa, 'that, for the first time in decades, allowed Turkana and Toposa to walk safely with their livestock across the border'. The cease-fire ended in January 2007 when a group of Toposa launched a raid 50 km outside Lokichoggio. APEDI lent its mediation services to help damping the spin of retaliation (HSBA, 2007)

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3. CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism)

The governments of IGAD agreed to form the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2002. The first CEWARN Unit office opened in Addis Ababa in June 2003. The structure monitors and shares information on cross-border and pastoral conflict, reports are published on the CEWARN website (www.cewarn.org). It works in Karamoja and the Somali and Afar Issa area.

CEWARN has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on imported (alien) structures for conflict resolution rather than engaging with the traditional mechanisms already in place (Mkutu, 2003).

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3. KADP (Karamoja Agro-pastoral Development Programme)
Originally established as a Lutheran World Federation programme in response to the famine of 1979, KADP became an independent local NGO in December 2002.

KADP works with agricultures and herders in the Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts of Uganda. It has traditionally supported herders’ livelihoods through a network of livestock drug outlets and the training of Community Animal Health Workers. It also operates a Resource and Policy Centre.

More recently, with funding from DanChurch Aid-Denmark, KADP has begun to favour sedentarisation of pastoralists and encouraged them to adopt farming as an alternative livelihood alongside more traditional activities whilst maintaining their aim of reducing pastoral conflict. This clearly has an adverse effect on livestock mobility as discussed in this report.

In 2008 and 2009, KADP is implementing a new Uganda – Kenya Cross Border Drought Cycle Management Project, to contribute to alleviating the impact of drought cycles and conflicts on agro-pastoralists in Karamoja (Uganda) and North Pokot (Kenya) through the improvement of livestock health, water structures and early warning systems for livestock and herders.

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4.1.2 Other projects

Peace-building in the Kenya-Uganda area is promoted by US-AID through Development Alternatives Inc., Riam Riam (Kenya) and the Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN-Uganda). Mediation efforts were undertaken between sections of Dodoth and Turkana during an escalation of clashes in 2004. The absence of raids between the factions in 2005 is used in support of the argument for timely mediation.

OXFAM is believed to be active in the work of supporting livestock mobility in this area but when contacted by researchers for this desk review maintained that they had no documentation of this work.
4.2 New projects starting in 2008

1. Improved Community Response to Drought Project by VSF – Belgium

This 18-month project started in January 2008. The project works in three locations along the Kenyan border with, respectively, Uganda (Karamoja), Ethiopia and Somalia. The aim of the project is to secure communities' livelihood against natural disasters and conflict. There is a focus on developing community grazing agreements and alternative income generation opportunities. The project is committed to the introduction of ‘holistic rangeland management systems’ through the creation of pastoral field-schools.

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Funded by the Federal Republic of Germany, this project aims to support the works for the Draft Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa. The Protocol was agreed by the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (EAPCCO) and aims to increase public awareness of the problem, and improve the mechanisms to recover stolen cattle (Bevan, 2007). Working with Parliament and civil society groups in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan, the project is preparing a regional system of livestock branding and marking.

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3. Karamoja Livestock Development Programme (KLDP), VSF-Belgium

A two year project (2008-2010) implemented by VSF-Belgium and funded by the Belgium Government and the European Commission/ECHO. It is based in Matheniko County (Moroto District) and focuses on improving animal health, water, livestock marketing and peace-building. Activities include the rehabilitation of boreholes and construction of water troughs; the construction and desilting of water ponds and the training and equipping community animal health workers. There is attention to local knowledge.
Conclusion and summary of issues that need to be addressed

The limitations of this desk-based review in such a complex and changeable area are obvious. This report has shown how, by using a multiple cross-border region, the pastoralists of the Karamojong cluster face exceptional challenges. The specific role of conflict has been questioned, although no solutions could be firmly put forward. Development actors have recently given great attention to conflict resolution but results are mixed, perhaps due to a focus on symptoms (carrying small-arms, cattle rustling) rather than on causes (for example marginalisation, resource scarcity).

In the conditions under which the pastoralists of the Karamojong cluster are producing, mobility of people and livestock is key to production. If mobility is to be effectively protected and promoted, the following areas will need attention.

**Mapping of livestock routes**

No maps of livestock corridors were found during the research for this report, therefore the recommendation in this case is that field research should be carried out in order to establish existing corridor locations and mapping them; this will include mapping the length of the corridors as well as their routes and start/end points. With the corridors effectively mapped, greater consideration can be given to the land rights of pastoralists when planning future game reserves, national parks, and other large-scale land division uses.

**Strengthening Pastoralists’s Land Rights**

In addition, the fragile land rights of the pastoralists in the Karamojong cluster need to be strengthened. Access and right to land to graze cattle and other animals lies at the root of pastoral livelihoods. Thus, the passing and implementation of laws which facilitate the communal registration of pastoral rangelands (such as the Communal Land Associations as provided in the Uganda Land Act, 1998) is a recommendation of this review.

**Building local government capacity**

Another area for development is the legislative capacity of local governments in the four countries concerned with the Karamojong cluster. This could lead to effective advocacy for recognition of, support for, and investment into pastoralism and
livestock mobility.

*Promoting cross-border initiatives*

The Ugandan, Kenyan, Sudanese and Ethiopian Governments need to recognise the interrelation that exists between the groups of the Karamojong cluster, so as to develop more harmonised policies that could be applicable on both sides of a drawn border without hindrance. Existing cross-border initiatives are greatly underdeveloped.
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Wayland E.J. (1931) 'Preliminary Studies of the Tribes of Karamoja (The Labwor, the Wanderobo, the Dodotho and the Jie; with a note concerning the Karamojong), Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 61: 187-230.
## Annex 1: Grazing grounds and livestock corridors in Moroto District, Uganda:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of corridor or grazing ground</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description / status</th>
<th>Peoples</th>
<th>Time used</th>
<th>Estimated Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naminit grazing ground</td>
<td>Iriir sub-county, Moroto</td>
<td>Water ponds largely silted up</td>
<td>Ngitome, herders of Lotome and Lokopo sub-counties</td>
<td>Dry Period (October to April): grazing only; Wet Period (April to September): mainly obstructed by crop fields</td>
<td>Approx. 30-40 km long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachalekeny grazing ground</td>
<td>Iriir sub-county, Moroto</td>
<td>Water ponds largely silted up</td>
<td>Ngikopo, herders of Lotome and Lokopo sub-counties</td>
<td>Livestock grazing throughout the year</td>
<td>Approx. 30-40 km long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lokitelarengan grazing ground</td>
<td>Matany sub-county, Moroto</td>
<td>Stretches from Morulinga Hill to Louno and Korithae Hills</td>
<td>Ngimerimong herders of Matany</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 25-40 km long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakichumet grazing ground</td>
<td>Matany sub-county, Moroto</td>
<td>Two water dams largely silted up. Area affected by livestock raids from the Pian of the Nakapiripirit district, the Matheniko of Moroto, and the Jie of Kotido</td>
<td>Herders from Matany, Lokopo, Lopeei, Iriir and Lotome</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Up to 45 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakangolei grazing ground</td>
<td>Lopeei sub-county, Moroto district</td>
<td>Effected by inter-ethnic raids</td>
<td>Ngikopo, Ngipeei, Matany, the Matheniko from Moroto, and the Jie of the Kotido district</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Up to 45 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lochagar livestock corridor</td>
<td>Lopeei sub-county of the Moroto district</td>
<td>Water ponds are largely silted up</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Wet season: grazing. Dry season: livestock are moved to wetter areas, especially in the Iriir sub-county</td>
<td>30-40 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Matheniko Northern Livestock Corridor (grazing ground)</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>Rupa sub-county and</strong></td>
<td><strong>Borders Mt Moroto to the southeast, the Uganda-Kenya border to the east, the Kotido and Kaabong districts to the north and the Lopeei sub-county to the west</strong></td>
<td><strong>Matheniko and the Turkana from Kenya (also the the Jie from Kotido in times of peace)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dry period (October to April): used for livestock</strong></td>
<td><strong>45-50 km long</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Matheniko Southern Livestock Corridor** | **Nadunget sub-county** | **Borders Mt Moroto to the east, the Lorengdwat sub-county to the southeast, Ngoleriet sub-county to the west and the Lopeei and Rupa sub-counties to the north** | **Matheniko, Pian, Bokora and Jie peoples (when there is peace)** | **Mainly used in the wet season** | **No data** |

(Adapted from Wantsusi, 2008)