Wildlife and Development Series No 2

SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE?

EQUITY IN CAMPFIRE

Stephen
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IIED

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Group

Preface

The first eight papers in this series are a linked set which focus on Zimbabwe's *CAMPFIRE* programme. The views presented are those of the authors, not of IIED.

The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is an exploration of rural development and conservation in Africa. It seeks to restructure the control of Zimbabwe's countryside, giving people alternative ways of using their natural resources. A wholly African initiative, *CAMPFIRE* emerged in the mid-1980s with the recognition that, as long as wildlife remained the property of the state, no one would invest in it as a resource. Since 1975, Zimbabwe has allowed private property holders to claim ownership of wildlife on their land and to benefit from its use. Under *CAMPFIRE,* people living on Zimbabwe's impoverished communal lands, which represent 42% of the country, claim the same right of proprietorship. Conceptually, *CAMPFIRE* includes all natural resources, but its focus has been wildlife management in communal areas, particularly those adjacent to National Parks, where people and animals compete for scarce resources. Since its official inception in 1989, *CAMPFIRE* has engaged more than a quarter of a million people in the practice of managing wildlife and reaping the benefits of using wild lands.

Produced and Published by the International Institute for Environment and Development,
3 Endsleigh Street, London WC1H ODD, UK.
Sub editor: Dilys Roe
Design and Production: Eileen Higgins
Printed by Russell Press Ltd, Radford Mill, Norton Street, Nottingham NG7 3HN.
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ISSN 1361-8628

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Introduction

Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is widely regarded as an innovative approach to sustainable natural resource management. Conceptually, it acknowledges the fact that the state, nominal custodian of communal areas and their natural resources, is incapable of effective management. It is already evident in many of Zimbabwe's communal areas that exploitation under ostensible, ill-defined local management will acquire the characteristics of an open access system.

However, it is unlikely that rational human beings will deliberately undermine the environment upon which their livelihood depends. The present degradation is attributable to the fact that people living in the communal areas have rights of usufruct only, which entitle them to the use of land without clearly defined management rights. Without these clearly defined rights of proprietorship, which among other things include powers of access to and exclusion from resources, the future of many of Zimbabwe's natural resources is in jeopardy.

CAMPFIRE seeks to transfer proprietorship of these resources from the state to local communities and, hence, facilitate the conversion of open access to common property. The evidence to date shows such conversion is taking place.

At present, however, CAMPFIRE is something of a misnomer. It does not manage indigenous resources. It focuses on wildlife resources resident or transient in communal areas. The primary reason CAMPFIRE has concentrated on wildlife is the fact that it originated in Zimbabwe's Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management, a department within the Ministry of Environment and Tourism with no authority over resources other than wildlife.

There are other reasons why wildlife has been the main focus. The safari hunting industry in Zimbabwe has an international reputation and generates considerable foreign exchange. The potential to realise significant, and immediate, financial returns is an important factor in stimulating community organisation for the management of this resource.

Conversely, wildlife is capable of inflicting substantial costs. These costs may be tangible - for example physical damage to crops, livestock, property, and indeed, human life; or intangible, such as the anxiety induced by living in close proximity to dangerous wild animals. Generally, such costs are carried individually while the benefits from wildlife accrue communally. These costs can be considered to be "contributions" by individuals to the maintenance of the common property resource.

This begs a basic question of equity: do individuals get a reasonable and fair return on their contribution to a collective undertaking to regulate a common resource? The answer is central to the sustainability of a common property resource because equity and efficiency of resource use are closely related. If some individuals do not feel the benefits from wildlife outweigh the costs, there is every likelihood that any collective effort to manage the resource will collapse. Free-riding strategies will be adopted by those disadvantaged and the consequent inefficiency in resource use will result in the degradation of the resource.

Considerations of equity are complicated by the fugitive nature of wildlife. The potential for it to inflict costs within one community while benefits from its use accrue in another is very real. It is clear that wildlife as a resource affects, and is affected by, a variety of user groups. One or more may be small and reasonably homogeneous. Others, because of the nature of the resource, will be larger and more heterogeneous. These overlapping jurisdictions produce complex management problems which require innovative institutional arrangements.

In order to address the question of equity, a variety of approaches being advocated or adopted by the different stakeholders in CAMPFIRE should be examined.

Stakeholders

The CAMPFIRE concept arose out of the Parks and Wildlife Act [1975] which designated owners of private land or the lessees of state land [collectively termed alienated land] as the "appropriate authority" to manage their wildlife resources. A 1982 Amendment addressed the inherently discriminatory nature of the Act by extending the interpretation of the term "appropriate authority" to include District Councils, the administrative authority for the communal areas and the smallest, legally accountable body to which appropriate authority could be granted.

Instead of the Wild Life Department, it is those District Councils which have been granted appropriate authority status which are now, effectively, responsible for wildlife management in their communal areas. Hence, councils have the statutory authority and the responsibility which goes with it.

It is useful here to look briefly at the institutional framework which exists in Zimbabwe and the relationship between District Councils and local communities on the one hand, and District Councils and the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development on the other.

In 1984, the Prime Minister issued a directive to define the administrative structures at provincial and district level that could provide a basis for effective communication between all participants in the development process. The aim was to decentralise decision-making by involving local communities in the planning and development of their areas. Village Development Committees [VIDCOs] were identified as the fundamental planning units. Each VIDCO would represent 100 households containing approximately 1000 people. The committees would submit plans on an annual basis to the Ward Development Committees [WADCOs]. The WADCO, representing a ward [six villages, or approximately 6,000 people] would co-ordinate the plans from all VIDCOs in its jurisdiction. It would then submit this ward plan to the District Development Committee. The District Development Committee would incorporate ward plans into an integrated district plan for approval by the District Council.

District Councils were conceived as democratic organs created shortly after Independence in 1980. Although they comprise each of the elected WADCO chairpersons within the district, they have yet to become autonomous local government entities. Part of the problem is structural. Councils are expected to focus on policy, delegating administrative functions to their staff. District Administrators, who are the chief executive officers guiding council decision-making are appointed by the Ministry of Local Government. While they are expected to act in an advisory capacity to District Councils, District Administrators are accountable only to the ministry that appoints them.

VIDCO and WADCO boundaries were not necessarily aligned with the existing communal boundaries, thereby creating uncertainty over institutional jurisdiction. Moreover, a notable exclusion from this institutional structure was any representation by traditional leadership. The creation of District Councils undermined significantly the role of traditional leaders. Their powers to allocate land and to deal with other aspects of resource management were vested in the District Council. The imposition of VIDCO and WADCO structures led in many cases to their exclusion from the planning and decision-making process. Predictably, the transition from traditional and chiefly authority [local, hereditary, and long-standing] to elected and bureaucratic authority [transient and possibly immigrant] has been a source of conflict.

Different Perspectives

At the national level, the two major stakeholders in CAMPFIRE are the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, the parent ministry of the Wild Life Department, and the Ministry of Local Government. Initially, there was little in the way of liaison between these two ministries. However at the request of the Ministry of Local Government, the Wild Life Department produced a set of guidelines for District Councils. These guidelines embody a number of principles clearly written from the perspective of the department.

The first principle was that benefits should be returned to producer communities: *"Councils are required to return at least 50 per cent of the gross revenue from wildlife to the community which produced it [for example, where the animal was shot]."* This principle sought to forestall any impulse by councils to seek increased authority from levels above while declining to devolve power to levels below.

A second principle defined the size of the producer community: *"The ideal size for a producer community is 100 to 200 households because this is large enough for a wildlife programme, and small enough that all households can be involved in the programme and accountable to it."* This principle sought to qualify the unit of proprietorship. It is in accord with the view that the most effective conversion from open access to common property is where user groups are small, the users are reasonably homogeneous in important socio-economic characteristics, and the users reside close to the resource. An implicit assumption in quantifying the number of households which constitute a producer community is the spatial uniformity of settlement in the communal areas. However, such uniformity is currently exceptional. Similarly, identifying a producer community in this way disregards the fugitive nature of wildlife and the associated implications for equity in costs and benefits.

A third principle stipulated that: *"Producer communities must be given the full choice of how to spend their money, including both projects and cash payments. Where communities value cash above projects, they should be allowed cash."* This principle acknowledges the importance of livestock in the rural African economy. Livestock and wildlife both depend on communal property resources in communal areas - grass, browse, water - but livestock is privately owned and may be realised by the household in times of need. Wildlife is communally owned and, as pointed out elsewhere, unless revenues from wildlife are translated into disposable individual or household benefits, decisions on wildlife/livestock options will be skewed towards livestock options, even in situations where it is apparent that the wildlife option is collectively more productive.

Although these guidelines may appear too prescriptive, they serve to clarify CAMPFIRE's position in the face of conflicting opinions emanating from the Ministry of Local Government. In his opening address to the first AGM of the CAMPFIRE Association [an association of District Councils vested with "appropriate authority" status], the

Minister of Local Government stated: *"The producer communities [must] decide for themselves how to allocate these benefits. Here they must be allowed a full choice of options whose aim is to improve the well-being of the people by providing direct benefits, through improved social services like schools, clinics, infrastructural projects, like water, grinding mills etc., or by paying cash dividends where this is felt extremely necessary. Councils must assist the producer communities in identifying projects that address their felt needs so that this source of new wealth is not put to waste."*

More recently, in his opening address to a provincial seminar on CAMPFIRE, the provincial administrator for Matabeleland North Province, a senior official in the Ministry, made the following points: *"It has come to my notice that in some areas, moneys received are distributed to the people. It is needless for me to point out such management strategy does not make optimum use of the resources. Benefits should not be individual-based but community based. Having given an individual money there is nothing to show for it the very next day. However, upgrading the district through provision of infrastructure such as clinics, schools, play centres and community centres has long-term benefits. The giving of financial handouts does not necessarily uplift standards but on the contrary creates a dependency syndrome. May I also point out that the distribution of the benefits should be district-oriented and not area-based. Those areas that do not have animals or game need not be left outside."*

It would be difficult to find two more opposed perspectives. The one view, that of the Wild Life Department, considers equity is achieved only when the household receives its share of the revenues generated from within a limited parochial area - the microcosmic view. At the other extreme, the Ministry of Local Government considers equity is achieved when that same revenue is used communally to benefit a district-wide constituency - the macrocosmic view.

The microcosmic view claims that it satisfies the principle that those who carry the costs of living with wildlife should receive the benefits from its utilisation. Murphree has argued against a wider equity, suggesting that those *"communities which still possess good wildlife assets are those which subsist on lands marginal for cropping and which have largely been bypassed by the development process. This also is an historical cost to these communities and to argue on the grounds of equity that they should now share the benefits of the growing value of wildlife with their more affluent neighbours is highly tenuous."* (Murphree 1991).

Reference to specific communities may help to illustrate the nature of the problems faced.

Guruve District

Guruve District straddles the Zambezi escarpment in the Mashonaland Central Province of northern Zimbabwe and is of particular interest when considering questions of equity because of the agro-economic characteristics occasioned by the geographical features of the area. Below the Zambezi escarpment, eight wards constitute the Dande Communal Land which is bordered by Mozambique to the north, the Chewore Safari Area to the west, and the Rukowakoona Mountains [which make up the escarpment] to the south. The area falls wholly within Natural Region IV, a region which experiences fairly low total rainfall and is subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells even during the rainy season. The farming system of this region should be based on livestock production but the incidence of tsetse fly in the Zambezi Valley has precluded cattle as a viable livestock option.

Above the escarpment, a further twelve wards make up the Bakasa, Kachuta, and Guruve Communal Lands. Bakasa and Kachuta Communal Lands, comprising only three wards between them, fall in Natural Regions IIa and III. Guruve Communal Land, containing nine wards, is entirely within Natural Region IIa, a region which enjoys moderately high rainfall and normally enjoys reliable conditions, rarely experiencing severe dry spells in summer. The region is suitable for intensive systems of farming based on crops and/or livestock production.

A measure of the inequality of agricultural potential within the district may be found in the average size of the wards. Local government reorganisation in 1980 and the subsequent directive from the Prime Minister in 1984 sought to delineate wards in terms of the numbers of households within them. Each ward was expected to contain on average some 600 households. In the Dande Communal Land, the average area of each of the eight wards is 520 sq. km. This stands in stark contrast to the Guruve Communal Land which covers 572 sq. km and where the average area for each of the nine wards is only 63.5 sq. km.

At the time of the 1982 population census, it was estimated that some 40,000 people inhabited Guruve Communal Land, an average of seventy persons per sq. km. At the same time, only 18,000 people were living in Dande Communal Land, an average of four persons per sq. km.

The significance of these differences lies in the strong positive correlation between population density and potential economic well being. Based on the population figures quoted here, it is clear that people considered their livelihood security more assured in Guruve Communal Land than in the valley below, at least prior to the implementation of CAMPFIRE.

Guruve District is not unique in this respect. Other districts similarly cut across natural regions. However, whilst appropriate authority in CAMPFIRE is granted to District Councils, the programme is generally being implemented only in the most marginal areas within those districts. For example, CAMPFIRE in Guruve is being implemented only in the eight wards of Dande Communal Land. In these circumstances it is iniquitous to suggest that equity is more properly addressed when the benefits from wildlife resources are distributed evenly across the whole district.

The next case study examines two districts with relatively homogeneous characteristics. From the institutional perspective this proves interesting because it reveals that traditional relationships between communities often transcend jurisdictional boundaries.



Bulilima Mangwe and Tsholotsho Districts

Bulilima Mangwe District is situated in the south-west of Zimbabwe as part of Matabeleland South province. Some 70 percent of the district lies in Natural Region IV, whilst the southern 30 percent is in Natural District V which is even less suitable for livestock rearing. Bulilima Mangwe borders Tsholotsho District in the north and Botswana forms its western boundary. Tsholotsho district is in Matabeleland North Province, and has a common boundary in the north and west with Zimbabwe's Hwange National Park. The whole of Tsholotsho District is in Natural Region IV.

Both districts experience a short rainy season and a long dry season. Unlike the Zambezi Valley, this area is not affected by tsetse fly and as a consequence the rural economy has been based on extensive agro-pastoralism for many years with cattle predominant. It is the predominance of cattle which resulted in the development of a joint CAMPFIRE initiative between these two districts.

The origins of this initiative are based on the traditional movements of cattle and their access to winter grazing in the far west of Bulilima Mangwe where traditional grazing rights long predate the present ward and district boundaries. Both district councils realised that, in adopting CAMPFIRE, they would need to rationalise their land use in order to optimise benefits from both cattle and wildlife. They planned to establish a wildlife area in the western portions of each district, along the Hwange National Park and Botswana borders. The plan required an electric fence to be erected along the eastern border of the proposed wildlife area, traversing both districts. The fence would prevent cattle from moving into the wildlife area and provide some measure of protection from the predations of wild animals. It was quite clear that such a plan would require both districts to co-ordinate the grazing rights of their communities, and that CAMPFIRE would be feasible only as a joint project.

The traditional transhumance system of livestock management in these areas has an effect on wildlife movements in Bulilima Mangwe. The western wards in this district suffer significant elephant damage to their crops during the summer rainy season. The rainy season is not the most favoured season for hunters; the black-cotton soils make it difficult to move, even in four-wheel drive vehicles, and high humidity and mosquitoes make life particularly uncomfortable. The result is that most of the safari hunting is done in the dry season although wildlife in Bulilima Mangwe is increasingly disturbed by the movement of cattle into their winter grazing area. Hunters are, therefore, more inclined to favour Tsholotsho.

In 1980, eight of the nine elephants which formed the basis of the joint hunting quota were successfully hunted in Tsholotsho wards. Only one elephant was taken in Bulilima Mangwe. At the end of the year, the joint wildlife committee decided that revenues from five of the elephants should accrue to Tsholotsho with revenues from the other four going to Bulilima Mangwe. This apparent recognition of the costs carried by Bulilima Mangwe and the need for inter-community equity was, however, reached only after strong representation from the Wild Life Department. Interestingly, such a decision would contravene the guidelines later to be developed by the Wild Life Department itself.

The seven wards involved in the CAMPFIRE programme in Bulilima Mangwe agreed that the revenues should be divided equally among them. Their decision was based on the fact that rights of access to winter grazing were distributed widely and, as such rights were affected by the wildlife project, benefits from wildlife should be distributed among those wards with grazing rights. One might feel that no other decision could have been made as only one elephant was hunted in a 'producer community' as defined by the Wild Life Department's guidelines.

In a 1991 study of the variability of wildlife damage in Bulilima Mangwe District, inter- and intra-ward variability were found to be so great that a simple comparison of wildlife damage between wards obscured more meaningful differences. In an attempt to explore patterns of damage, the 41 VIDCOs within the wards were classified into zones; the first zone being adjacent to the wildlife area, the second zone only being reached by wildlife which had travelled through the first zone, and so on. Not surprisingly it was found that crop damage by elephants was heavily concentrated in the first zone. Similarly, livestock was much more at risk from predation by hyenas in this zone. It was therefore concluded that elephants are a serious problem only for the quarter of the households who live in the front-line area first zone. However, it was decided that the returns from safari hunting would go to the whole area covered by the seven wards. Aside from questions of fairness, it is asked whether this was enough return from elephants to give residents of the front-line the sense of proprietorship that the CAMPFIRE philosophy assumes must develop?

Tsholotsho District Council terminated the joint hunting concession with Bulilima Mangwe at the end of 1991. This is not surprising since, on balance, and in the terminology developed within CAMPFIRE, it is the major "producer" of the two districts. Elephants, though, will continue to be a serious problem for those front-line VIDCOs in Bulilima Mangwe.

This example emphasises the difficulty of determining guidelines which address the issue of equity satisfactorily. The term "producer community" would appear to define each of the 13 front-line VIDCOs in Bulilima Mangwe. They are providing what are referred to as "differential inputs" in tolerating the predations of these large mammals, without which the wider community would be unlikely to benefit as an end-user. Yet the first principle of CAMPFIRE's guidelines states categorically that councils are required to return at least 50 per cent of the gross revenue from wildlife to the community which produced it.

A number of principles have been proposed for consideration in discussing policy for viable common property regimes, one of which is that differential inputs must result in differential benefits. Wildlife assets are distributed unevenly in any national context, and equally the cost of sustaining and managing these assets is unevenly distributed. Policy must ensure, therefore, that benefit is directly related to input.

The final case study examines one way in which another District Council has attempted to address these complex equity issues. A fundamental failing of current policy in CAMPFIRE, in terms of the guidelines which promote it, is a perspective which equates the specific geographical area where a wildlife asset is realised with the area where it was "produced". The previous example has shown this is simply not the case for the majority of the high revenue earning species, such as elephant. Unless this fact is addressed, gross inequities are likely to continue in the name of CAMPFIRE.




Nyaminyami District
Zambia
Lake Kariba
Charara
Safari
Area
Matusadona
National Park
Nyaminyami District
International Boundary
Provincial Boundary
District Boundary
Ward Boundary
0
km
30

Nyaminyami District

Nyaminyami District Council was the first District Council to receive appropriate authority status in 1988. The district borders the southern shore of Lake Kariba and comprises three communal lands: Omay, Gatshe Gatshe, and Kanyati. Some 75 per cent of the district is in Natural Region V and, in concert with much of the Zambezi Valley, has suffered a history of tsetse fly infestation. In terms of wildlife resources, especially large mammals, Nyaminyami is probably the richest CAMPFIRE district in the country.

In order to administer and implement its wildlife management programme, Nyaminyami District Council decided to institute a trust, the Nyaminyami Wildlife Management Trust. The abundance of wildlife, whilst having the potential to provide significant benefits, was responsible for inflicting heavy costs on communities in terms of crop and livestock damage. A priority issue in the early days of the Trust was that of problem animal control. Unless local people could be assured that the costs they incurred from problem animals would be met in some tangible way, the programme was unlikely to be adopted. Accordingly, the Trust developed plans to improve the reporting of problem animals. A system for monitoring crop and livestock damage was introduced and compensation payments were made to those households suffering such damage. At the same time, the idea of an insurance scheme to cover loss of life was discussed.

These plans to compensate and insure against crop and livestock damage and loss of life were innovative. It is argued that such schemes more closely address issues of equity than any of the preceding case studies. They are designed to ensure that people who incur the costs of living with wildlife, and hence contribute either directly or indirectly to producing it, are not disadvantaged and, indeed, benefit from their inputs.

In 1989, the first year in which a crop compensation scheme operated, the Trust paid Z$26,000 to 160 families. The following year, the Trust received 666 problem animal reports, mostly involving elephant and buffalo. The records show that 90 per cent of these reports were investigated, with 14 elephant and seven buffalo killed as a consequence. Eventually, Z$42,000 was paid in compensation to 360 families but, as the following extract from the minutes of a board of management meeting indicates, the full extent of the claims for compensation were more than double that amount: *"Mr Nobula [wildlife manager] explained that Z$38,700 had been paid in compensation. Compensation still to be paid amounted to Z$48,000. In the budget there was only Z$40,000. This meant no more compensation could be paid. After this statement the meeting broke up in confusion."*

The potential for compensation payments to gradually absorb wildlife revenues was thus exposed. The Nyaminyami Wildlife Management Trust abandoned the scheme in 1991. This enabled a greater proportion of the revenues to be distributed to the wards as dividends, and placed ward committees in a better position to monitor crop damage and decide whether or not to compensate members accordingly.

The debate about compensation has continued at the ward level and the issue has not been satisfactorily resolved. In Mola Ward, the community felt it was up to them to decide how compensation could be effected, that is whether in cash or kind, after consulting the council and other organisations. Rates of compensation were set in relation to the loss of specific domestic animals, such as Z$30 for a goat and Z$120 for a donkey. In Negande A and Negande B Wards, on the other hand, communities expressed concern at being shouldered with responsibility for the compensation issue which they felt could lead to dishonesty among both leaders and ordinary people.

At first sight, compensation for crop and livestock damage using the revenues generated from wildlife would appear to provide an equitable solution to the problem of defining a producer community. In this way differential inputs receive differential benefits. However, as has been seen in this case study, the number of claims and the scale of damages may easily escalate. Such systems are also open to abuse. The level of monitoring and adjudication required may contribute to increasing overheads, so that compensation related costs are seen to be disproportionate in relation to the revenues available for distribution.

Conclusion

The foregoing has provided only a brief overview of equity concerns in CAMPFIRE, focusing on the opposing perspectives of the various stakeholders. On the one hand the Wild Life Department wants to see wildlife revenues distributed as household cash dividends in producer communities. On the other hand, the Ministry of Local Government wants these revenues invested in projects in the district.

The perspective of the Wild Life Department more closely resembles criteria which have been shown to be key elements in successful common property resource regimes elsewhere. The fugitive nature of wildlife resources, however, makes the concept of the producer community an anomaly. This is particularly so when the larger species, such as elephant, are considered. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the programme has been most successful where District Councils have followed the guidelines and returned revenues to producer communities.

The case studies have examined the relevance of these various perspectives and provided some insights into their relevance at a local level. The extreme view, that benefits from communal property resources should be distributed across the whole district, ignores the integrity of the unit of proprietorship. As has been pointed out, proprietorship cannot be separated from production, management and benefit and is a fundamental component in a communal resource regime. The Guruve case study has emphasised the inequality of resource distribution within a district and suggested that, for this reason alone, this view is inequitable.

The Bulilima Mangwe and Tsholotsho case study demonstrates how difficult it is to avoid contradictions when considering what is fair and equitable. In this case, the Wild Life Department played an influential role in the decision to distribute revenues more evenly between these two districts than would have been the case if their guidelines had been adhered to. The decisions made by the ward communities in Bulilima Mangwe to distribute revenues equally between them similarly ignored the concept of the producer community, either as defined by the Wild Life Department or, indeed, as more realistically defined in the detailed study which demonstrated the costs borne by "front-line" communities. Their decision was based on peoples' rights of access to winter grazing which surely emphasises the inter-relatedness of communal resources.

Finally, the Nyaminyami example shows how a District Council sought more closely to relate different input costs - crop and livestock damage - to different benefits through the medium of compensation. It remains to be seen whether the various wards in Nyaminyami will develop their own compensation schemes.

Clearly, the range of options for distributing wildlife benefits is wide. CAMPFIRE is a dynamic programme which demands that management be adaptive. Perspectives change. Recently, there has been evidence of a greater acceptance by the Ministry of Local Government of the need for devolution of authority below District Council level. In some districts cash has been distributed to wards, whilst in other districts ward communities have opened bank accounts. This dynamic requires that guidelines, incorporating sanctions and incentives, are not overly prescriptive. The risk is that such guidelines become interpreted religiously and leave little or no room for District Councils or communities to be flexible in their application.

It is, after all, local communities living with their common property resources who will decide whether, as individuals, they get a reasonable and fair return on their contribution to them.

Reference

*Murphree, M.W. (1991) **Communities as Institutions for Resource Management.** Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe: Harare*

Notes

The Wildlife and Development Series is produced by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) to highlight key topics in the field of sustainable wildlife use. The Series is aimed at policy makers, researchers, planners and extension workers in government and non-government organisations world-wide. This Series arises from two sources. First by invitation of IIED to others working in this field. Secondly from IIED's own work.

This is an invitation paper. It is one of a series that reviews a selected feature of contemporary importance from Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). It was arranged and edited by the Africa Resources Trust on behalf of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group supported by the Biodiversity Support Programme (a consortium of the World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy and the World Resources Institute) with funding by the United States Agency for International Development.

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Please note that:

- With the introduction of the Rural District Councils Act in 1988, all Rural Councils and District Councils in Zimbabwe were amalgamated to form Rural District Councils. The two terms are interchangeable in the CAMPFIRE papers.
- The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management has been referred to as the Wild Life Department in this series of papers.

1995

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