



The journey towards
collaborative forest
management in Africa:
Lessons learned and some
navigational aids.
An overview

Olivier Dubois and Janet Lowore

July 2000

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

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in Africa: Lessons Learned and some 'Navigational Aids'
An Overview**

Olivier Dubois and Janet Lowore

July 2000

International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	IV
LIST OF ACRONYMS	V
LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES	VI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	VIII
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II: WHAT ARE WE, AND SHOULD WE BE, TALKING ABOUT? CLARIFYING SOME CONCEPTS	5
II.1. Forest management	5
II.2. Sustainable forest management and sustainable development	5
II.3. Collaborative forest management	7
II.4. Participation - Community	9
II.5. Poverty reduction	15
II.6. Concluding remarks	17
CHAPTER III: WHY COLLABORATE? CONSTRAINTS ON AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLABORATION	19
III.1. The natural resources 'battlefield'	19
III.2. A brief overview of concepts and methods in collaborative management of natural resources	20
III.3. Some practical reasons for collaborating/not collaborating	24
CHAPTER IV: "MAKING SENSE" OF THE LOCAL CONTEXT: FACILITATING AND COMPLICATING FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL CNRM	27
IV.1. What features favour or hinder CNRM? A discussion on "facilitating" and "complicating" factors	27
IV.1.1. Re: Natural resources	29
IV.1.2. Re: the community	35
IV.1.3. Re: The State	41
IV.1.4. Some elements for comparison between Francophone and Anglophone Africa	50
IV.2. Possible combinations of local features to assess the feasibility of CNRM	52

CHAPTER V: GETTING THE '4RS' RIGHT IN COLLABORATIVE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	59
V.1. Introducing the '4Rs'	59
V.2. A brief analysis of the '4Rs' in some CNRM initiatives	60
V.2.1. Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie II Project in Niger	60
V.2.2. The Lukolongo case, Kafue District, Zambia	67
V.2.3. Chimaliro Forest Reserve, Malawi	70
V.2.4. Duru-Haitemba, Tanzania	75
V.3. Measuring Success: Get the '4Rs' right – Some generic lessons	78
V.3.1. Measuring success in CNRM	78
V.3.2. Community involved as benefit-sharers or as actors in natural resource management? Balancing the rights, responsibilities and revenues/returns	78
V.3.3. Assessing and improving relationships	81
CHAPTER VI: SCALING UP CNRM INITIATIVES:	85
VI.1 Enabling policy framework	85
VI.2 Enabling legal framework	86
VI.3 Decentralisation – power to the people or just passing the buck?	91
VI.4 The Role and capacity of the Forestry Department	94
VI.5 The role of the State	96
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	99
VII.1. General considerations	99
VII.2. Specific recommendations	100
VII.2.1. At national level	100
VII.2.2. At local level	101
VII.3. Concluding remarks	103
REFERENCES	II
ANNEX 1: A POSSIBLE AID TO NEGOTIATION IN CNRM: A SIMPLIFIED APPROACH TO MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS (MCA)	XIII
ANNEX 2: EXPERIENCES WITH LOCAL-LEVEL DIALOGUE IN FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA	XVII

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of IIED, FRIM, FAO or the World Bank.

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List of acronyms

4Rs	Rights, Responsibilities, Returns/Revenues and Relationships
BATNA	Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Plan for Indigenous Resources
CBFM	Community-Based Forest Management
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CPR	Common Property Resource
CFM	Collaborative Forest Management
CIFM	Community Involvement in Forest Management
CNRM	Collaborative Natural Resource Management
DFID	Department for International Development
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FOSA	FAO Forestry Outlook Paper of Africa
FD	Forest Department
FR	Forest Reserves
FRIM	Forest Research Institute of Malawi
GT	Gestion de Terroir
IC	Institutional Capacity
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
JFM	Joint Forest Management
LDF	Local Development Funds
LGU	Local Government Unit
LMS	Local Management Structure (RFM Project, Niger)
MCA	Multi Criteria Analysis
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NTFP	Non Timber Forest Product
PA	Protected Areas
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
RFM	Rural Fuelwood Markets, Niger
SA	Stakeholder Analysis
SFM	Sustainable Forest Management
TA	Traditional Authority
TC	Technical Capacity
TOR	Terms of Reference
VFA	Village Forest Area (Malawi)
VH	Village Headman (Malawi)
VNRC	Village Natural Resource Committees (Malawi)
VT	Village Trusts (Malawi)
WB	World Bank

List of Tables, Figures and Boxes

	Pages
Tables	
Table 1: A typology of participation	9
Table 2: Advantages and drawbacks of co-management of natural resources in the Sahel	26
Table 3: Design principles illustrated by long-enduring common-pool resource institutions	28
Table 4: Key features of natural resources, local communities, private operators and governments, and possible implications for CNRM	30
Table 5: "Modern" and "customary" perceptions of forest areas in Central Africa	45
Table 6: Some of the major differences between Anglophone and Francophone Africa in respect to natural resource management	51
Table 7: Examples of links between forests and livelihoods, and their possible influence on partnerships, poverty alleviation, governance and forest condition	55
Table 8: Different types of local conditions in Eastern and Southern Africa	56
Table 9: Implications of types defined in Table 8 on CNRM	58
Table 10: Rights, responsibilities and returns/revenues of the main stakeholders in the Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie II Project, Niger	63
Table 11: Mutual relationships between the main stakeholders in the Rural Fuelwood Markets Project, Niger, with an emphasis on dependence and formality/informality (in relation to RFMs)	64
Table 12: A summary of the main stakeholders' rights, responsibilities and returns/revenues in Lukolongo, Zambia	69
Table 13: Main stakeholders' relationships in Lukolongo, Zambia, with an emphasis on mutual dependence and formality/informality	69
Table 14: Stakeholders' '4Rs' in Chimaliro Forest Reserve, Malawi	74
Table 15: Summary of stakeholders' '4Rs' in Duru Haitemba, Tanzania	76
Table 16: Seven desirable principles and four suggested steps for achieving good forest policy making	86
Table 17: Possible forms of 'command' over land and natural resources	88
Boxes	
Box 1: Village Forest Areas in Malawi	13
Box 2: Some suggested "power-regulating" techniques	23
Box 3: The CAMPFIRE Programme in Zimbabwe	29
Box 4: How to confer legal status on villages in Malawi	35
Box 5: The case of corrupt leaders – opinions from Malawi	37
Box 6: The low effectiveness of government measures aimed at formalising benefit-sharing between logging companies and communities in Cameroon	41
Box 7: District Conciliation Courts in Burkina Faso	46
Box 8: Local forest management in the Duru Haitemba and Mgori <i>miombo</i> woodlands, Tanzania	47
Box 9: State actors: How do they get on?	50
Box 10: An example of how different options of CNRM could be applied in Malawi	80
Box 11: Expanding the use of traditional rules to regulate the use and management of natural resources in Madagascar	89
Box 12: Developing "local laws": An example from Malawi	90
Box 13: The LDF Programme of UNCDF	93
Box 14: Is FD up to the job of collaborative management and what partners should it seek to improve its supportive capacity? An example from Malawi	95
Box 15: Possible tasks of central government in relation to CNRM	97
Figures	
Figure 1: Continuum of forms of collaborative management, with an emphasis on community-government partnerships	8
Figure 2: Linking participation and power to the quality of outcome in CFM	12
Figure 3: Four possible associations between poverty and forests	16
Figure 4: The natural resources 'battlefield'	19
Figure 5: The dual-concern model in negotiation	20

Figure 6: The conflict management progress triangle	21
Figure 7: Interactions between power and relationships in negotiation strategies	22
Figure 8: Decision-making framework for natural resource management	54
Figure 9: The '4Rs' framework to define stakeholders' roles in forest management	59
Figure 10: Measuring "success" in CNRM	83

Executive summary

In the face of widespread failure of government-led attempts to manage forests in a sustained fashion and for the public benefit, community involvement in forest management has become a major topic of donor-funded initiatives in tropical forestry over the last 10-15 years. More recently community forestry has tended to broaden its partnership scope, i.e., from community-project staff towards collaboration with other local stakeholder groups, i.e., mainly government and private sector.

This paper on "community-government partnerships in the forestry sector in Africa" is therefore very timely. It has been requested by FAO and the World Bank (WB). Both agencies have an interest in the topic, FAO as a contribution to its Forestry Outlook Paper for Africa (FOSA), the World Bank as a priority theme for the reformulation of the Bank's regional strategy in the forestry sector (FAO, 2000). This paper is part of a group of four studies implemented as a joint FAO/WB undertaking. The other studies contemplate several governance themes in the forestry sector in Africa. These are (FAO, 2000): forestry institutions, administrative decentralisation, the privatisation of forest plantations and responses to corruption.

The objective of this paper is "to assess strategic options that the World Bank and FAO could support to promote larger scale and more effective community/government partnerships in the forestry sector in Africa" (FAO, 2000). This objective emphasises the conditions that enable expansion of community-government partnerships. We have interpreted this as conditions for spreading and deepening local partnerships that have succeeded. In that sense, prior to analysing the requirements for scaling up, there is a need to analyse the likely factors of success of local partnerships.

Although the TORs of this paper focus on community-government partnerships and forests, we think it is necessary include the private sector as a crucial partner and to move beyond forests, and consider forest management in a land use perspective. This explains our preference for the concept of *Collaborative Natural Resource Management (CNRM)* to other terms to refer to partnerships in forestry.

Collaborative Natural Resource Management (CNRM) is a "messy subject" due to its complexity, difficulties experienced in its implementation, and the fact that solutions are specific to local circumstances, which limits the value of any sweeping generalisation. We have taken these elements into consideration in the structuring of this paper, i.e.:

Chapter II: What are we and should we be talking about? Clarifying some concepts

Chapter III: Why Collaborate? Advantages and drawbacks of collaboration

Chapter IV: "Making sense" of the local context – facilitating and complicating factors for successful CNRM

Chapter V: Getting the '4Rs' right

Chapter VI: Scaling up

Chapter VII: Conclusions and recommendations

Our main conclusions and recommendations are summarised below

- Over the last two decades forest management has shifted

* From a timber and user-based focus, relying on technical expertise and dominated by governments, professionals and/or private operators

* To management with a multiple goods and services orientation, using more socio-economic skills and local knowledge where different and divergent interests can be reconciled.

The factors leading to this shift are many and complex. However, in short, it could be said that the former management approach was failing to provide the goods and services required of forests to the people who needed them, and at the same time forests were suffering severe degradation.

- This transition in forest management has led to primary stakeholders' roles - the State, the Private Sector and the Local Communities - being questioned and needing to be re-negotiated. We conclude that when the conditions are right and the correct roles can be negotiated, collaboration between stakeholders can prove to be an effective approach to forest management – yielding benefits for the main stakeholders concerned with the status and productivity of the resource in question.

Recommendation: Collaborative natural resource management (CNRM) should be promoted as a viable approach (in some situations) to progress towards sustainable forest management

- Collaboration in itself is a costly and complex undertaking and will only yield benefits if the conditions are right. However, it is argued that collaboration can lead to increased knowledge amongst stakeholders about other stakeholders, to freer information flows which can forestall many potential areas of conflict and ultimately lead to better quality of decisions. Collaboration works best when the go-it-alone alternative does not yield positive outcomes – even for the most powerful stakeholder.

- It is however almost impossible to prescribe which trees and forests should be managed by whom and where and with what structures in place. The facilitating and complicating factors already discussed in this document are the best indicators for what is likely to work and when.

Recommendation: It is not possible to make prescriptions for CNRM.

- Whilst we talk of collaborative forest management and stakeholders, the stakeholder group of particular focus are the local communities in that, to date, they have been marginalised and tend to bear the highest costs of environmental degradation and the negative impact of protected areas. Furthermore the same factors which led to the current situation are also preventing them from having the means to reverse the situation.

Recommendation: We recommend that CNRM is the best approach for giving local (usually poor) communities an opportunity to play a major role in determining how the forests on which they depend can be managed.

- Community-based forest management works best when the communities themselves see the need for a new approach and can initiate change, perhaps facilitated and

supported by extension agents. The circumstances which allow this are however few and far between. Even if the local people wish to initiate change, the final arrangement often still requires collaboration amongst several stakeholders. Cases where local people can initiate change to a situation whereby they can then become sole managers are rare.

- An alternative approach which is in fact more usual is that CNRM is promoted and facilitated by change agents such as the government (who is almost always a major stakeholder) or NGOs, and that the final solution is a collaborative management arrangement between several stakeholders. The exact nature of the arrangement may vary and is best envisaged as a continuum from more to less government involvement. Whilst NGOs can play pivotal roles, the government almost always remains a major facilitator, especially concerning issues of macro-policy and legislation.

Recommendation: We suggest that a whole range of equally-viable different CNRM arrangements can be effective, depending upon the local circumstances and capacities. Each arrangement should have some built in fluidity so that it can evolve with time.

- Given that CNRM is more often than not *initiated* by the government or donor-funded projects, a high degree of *participation* from other less powerful stakeholders is generally accepted as vital. Participation can best be ensured through recognising who are the key stakeholders early on, and developing negotiation processes that acknowledge the political dimension of CNRM – hence the importance of relationships power balance in the quality of the outcome of the negotiation.

- A high level of interactive stakeholder participation at the negotiation stage of the collaborative arrangement is vital to achieve a viable solution. Participation should not be limited to a communication exercise between communities and project staff.

- Be it self-initiated or initiated by change agents, a process approach must be followed whereby the collaborators are aware that each step is an experiment to be reviewed, monitored and re-negotiated. Each time a hurdle is faced the collaborators must prepare to overcome the problem and move on. Hurdles should be seen as learning opportunities and not setbacks. Bringing about CNRM requires an approach having the following characteristics:

- A. Continuous monitoring and negotiation
- B. Avoidance of "consensual consultative stagnation" and use of interim working agreements in order to proceed
- C. Opportunity for monitored experimentation
- D. Being flexible and iterative, following guidelines not blueprints
- E. A long time horizon (not short projects)

Recommendation: Instituting CNRM entails a learning process with the facilitators adopting an open mind. Experimentation, frequent review, monitoring and lots of time are the order of the day.

- Since 1995, IIED has been collaborating with partners in six African countries in the testing of the '4Rs' framework. This framework defines stakeholders' roles via the balance in their respective '4Rs' i.e., their Rights, Responsibilities, Returns/Revenues and their mutual Relationships. The use of the '4Rs' framework has helped in teasing

out issues and highlighting leverage points in relation to collaboration between stakeholders. An imbalance is not likely to lead to a stable collaborative arrangement and this tool can be used to highlight the key areas for change.

Recommendation: Use the 4Rs framework to analyse the situations and to identify key areas for change (see Box A).

Box A. What can be changed when the 4Rs are out of balance?

- Change government policy and government legislation if these are constraining access and rights – this can affect who can draw up rules and regulations concerning access to forest resources,
- Give greater responsibility to those who are getting more benefits e.g., timber contractors to pay for re-establishment of forest
- Add value of the resource through processing or by improved management
- Legally empower one stakeholder to monitor the activities of another
- Change harvesting policy in order to promote more equitable sharing of benefits
- Alter revenue distribution and criteria for allocation ...

• One of the biggest constraints is power disparity. Whilst our focus might be on the local communities (usually poor farmers or pastoralists), this group of people are relatively powerless in comparison to other stakeholders such as the state and private sector players. In situations such as this, negotiation is likely to result in unsustainable and inequitable agreements. Levelling off stakeholders' bargaining power is crucial to mitigate this, perhaps starting by negotiating the '4Rs' concerning a specific issue. However, this is easier said than done, CNRM might not be the way forward if power disparities are too important and entrenched.

Recommendation: Manage power disparities by assessing them via the '4Rs' and negotiating these for a particular issue, or by choosing non-collaborative forms of forest management.

• Local communities will be better able to negotiate their position and fulfil their role when organised. This not only empowers them but is also deemed as a key factor for poverty reduction. Whilst there is sometimes an undeclared understanding that communities act collectively by their very nature, this is not always the case. Previous government policies and approaches to rural development as well as socio-economic pressures have weakened community organisation; which needs to be re-established if communities are to determine their own agenda.

Recommendation: Facilitate the establishment of local-level institutions, or where they exist enhance their capacity or modify their role. This is key for local people to be able to achieve something in CNRM

• Change agents themselves must be equipped to do the job. Government extension workers in particular must give up their "we know best" and "command and control" attitude. The initial efforts to negotiate a collaborative agreement require commitment, negotiation skills and resources, and can be expensive.

Recommendation: Analyse who the crucial change agents are in any situation and assess their capacity. Enhance their skills and access to resources as needed.

- Capacity enhancement is vital but should come after or alongside role negotiation. Experience of capacity-building efforts to date shows that when undertaken in a vacuum and without focus, it does not lead to the desired results. CNRM initiatives can start without training, which can be developed as need arise. However, initiators and facilitators of change must know what they are doing.

- More often than not collaborative arrangements are location specific and they start in a policy vacuum. However, for CNRM to be sustained and expanded, it is usually important for local-level institutions to be "anchored" in institutional frameworks which provide channels of communication to higher level authorities. In some cases, where resources appear to fall under "multiple jurisdiction", the wider institutional framework is fundamental to maintaining the collaborative arrangement. In other cases links to higher authorities are important to provide for legal empowerment in cases of serious conflicts, advocacy in case of policy constraints as well as access to funds, training and markets.

Recommendation: Be aware of the institutional frameworks into which CNRM Initiatives can fit. Modify those frameworks if necessary.


- A successful collaborative arrangement is (stating the obvious) one that works. The '4Rs' are not set in stone. They evolve over time and hence so does their ideal mix. *Success in CNRM* lies therefore in *maintaining a cycle where the '4Rs' can be negotiated when deemed necessary by one major stakeholder, and that a mechanism to ensure this is available.* Whilst the ultimate goal might be sustainable forest management it is more realistic to set workable objectives and measure the impact of CNRM by these. Suggested workable objectives are:

- A. Occurrence of less unsustainable forest practices
- B. Improved well-being of rural populations
- C. Improved development or the "capacity of local stakeholders to adapt and change"

This is illustrated in Figure A.

Recommendation: Monitor the performance of collaborative arrangements and their impact on the stakeholders and the forest using practical objectives set through stakeholder negotiation. Allow for stakeholders to change what is not working.

Figure A: Measuring "success" in CNRM



Xiii

Success in CNRM is maintenance of the cycle.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the face of widespread failure of government-led attempts to manage forests in a sustained fashion and for the public benefit, community involvement in forest management has become a major topic of donor-funded initiatives in tropical forestry over the last 10-15 years. In a recent paper, Mahdvani (1999, cited in Brown, 1999) estimates that community forestry represents some 20 per cent of total forestry Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) expenditure. More recently community forestry has tended to broaden its partnership scope, i.e., from community-project staff towards collaboration with other local stakeholder groups, i.e., mainly government and private sector. This has been termed almost interchangeably Community Involvement in Forest Management (CIFM), Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM), Joint Forest Management (JFM, referring more specifically to India's experience) and Participatory Forest Management (PFM). Whatever the term used, the thrust of the approach lies in the assumption that collaboration between communities and other partners might lead to better management of forest resources while ensuring sustainable livelihoods for forest-dependent people. Almost ten years of enthusiasm (sometimes romanticism) and experimentation to test this assumption have more recently given way to disappointment (some would even say scepticism) in the face of the practical difficulties in implementing collaborative approaches. The time has therefore come to take stock of these experiments, and attempt to develop some practical guidelines to make sense of and operationalise partnerships involving communities in forest management.

For many years Asia and Latin America have been leading the way in respect to collaborative approaches in tropical forestry. Building partly on lessons from these experiments but also on *"sui generis"* features, Sub-Saharan Africa has recently developed very interesting initiatives regarding forms of collaboration in forest management; which might in turn provide some useful insights to other parts of the world. This paper on "community-government partnerships in the forestry sector in Africa" is therefore very timely. It stems from a study requested by FAO and the World Bank (WB) at the beginning of 2000. Both agencies had an interest in the topic, FAO as a contribution to its Forestry Outlook Paper for Africa (FOSA), the World Bank as a priority theme for the reformulation of the Bank's regional strategy in the forestry sector (FAO, 2000).

When discussing issues pertaining to community-government partnerships in forestry, there is a need to:

- *Include the private sector* as a partner in the assessment of collaborative forestry because private operators often:
 - * replace forestry services where these have inadequate means of operation (e.g., most parts of Central Africa);
 - * prefinance forest-related initiatives involving communities (e.g., safari-type eco-tourism in Southern Africa, some community forestry initiatives in Cameroon);
 - * constitute a privileged partner in community groups' informal relationships.¹

¹ This is particularly the case where the forest industry sector has significant clout over decisions related to forest resources, e.g. in Central Africa (Ekoko, 1998).

- *Move beyond forests* and consider forest management in a *landscape perspective*, where forests are only one amongst the possible uses of land by rural populations. This also conforms more to the frequently-held view of rural folks in Africa, i.e., that agriculture and forestry are not necessarily antagonistic. Rather, they are part of a land pattern that combines different conditions of both uses in space and time, thus including e.g., forest conversion and forest fallow/secondary forests. This will be developed further in the paper.
- Consider *sustainable forest management (SFM)* not as an end in itself but rather as a *means to achieve sustainable livelihoods*. This provides a useful link between forest resources and poverty alleviation.

The need to broaden the scope of the paper beyond forests explains our preference for the concept of *Collaborative Natural Resource Management (CNRM)* to other terms to refer to partnerships in forestry.

Collaborative Natural Resource Management (CNRM) is a "messy subject" due to its complexity, difficulties experienced in its implementation, and the fact that solutions are specific to local circumstances, which limits the value of any sweeping generalisation. We have taken these elements into consideration in the structuring of this paper, i.e.:

Chapter II: What are we, and should we be, talking about? Clarifying some concepts

Many of the concepts associated with CNRM – e.g., participation, poverty alleviation, SFM – often mean different things to the different "players" involved. The first step is therefore to clarify these notions.

Chapter III: Why Collaborate? Advantages and drawbacks of collaboration

Collaboration being a complicated matter, one can genuinely wonder if it is the best way forward to achieve better forest management and more sustainable livelihoods. It seems therefore useful to discuss the advantages and drawbacks of partnerships in forestry.

Chapter IV: "Making sense" of the local context – facilitating and complicating factors for successful CNRM

The pertinence of CNRM depends on the features of the local context, and understanding these more often than not resembles a "making sense" exercise on the part of outsiders. Yet this is an essential step to developing "best bets" as to what particular forms of collaboration have more chances of succeeding. Some typologies will be proposed as "navigational aids" for this type of exercise.

Chapter V: Getting the '4Rs' right

Once more clarity exists on what one is trying to achieve and on local circumstances, it becomes easier to understand the roles of the main stakeholder groups involved in the use and management of forest resources. These are usually regrouped in communities, private operators, state bodies and NGOs, but one should be aware that these groups are not homogeneous. Understanding stakeholders' roles, and, perhaps more importantly, the reasons behind these roles, provides useful indications as regards the potential for collaboration. In this paper, we propose to use an analytical framework called the '4Rs'² to

² The '4Rs' refer to stakeholders' Rights, Responsibilities, Returns/Revenues and Relationships (Dubois, 1999a and b). Chapter V discusses the use of this framework to assess CNRM initiatives.

tease out issues related to stakeholders' roles, thus as a way into the political (power) dimension of forest/natural resource management.

Chapter VI: Scaling up

To date there is still no consensus as to what makes CNRM work, due to the local character of success factors and the paucity of local initiatives that can be deemed sustainable, let alone replicable. Yet factors likely to ensure the expansion of locally successful initiatives are worth discussing. Expansion is understood as lateral spread and deepening of local experiments, and it will rely on the little available evidence on "scaling up" processes regarding CNRM in Africa.

Chapter VII: Conclusions and recommendations

Given the complexity of the topic and the difficulty in drawing generic conclusions on what makes CNRM work, this paper should not be seen as a handbook for partnerships that work in forestry. Rather, our main goal is to provide some "navigational aids" for the journey towards sustainable forms of CNRM. In doing so, we will have to generalise on a topic, which, almost by definition, is context specific. This bears the risk of oversimplifying. For every attempt to generalise, it is likely that one could find counter-examples. At the very least, *this paper should thus be deemed as a menu of examples and considerations to learn from and build on when confronted to realities of CNRM.* In that sense, we hope that the recommendations of this paper will also help to move beyond the "what to do" stage, and also provide some hints as to "how to do" in relation to better partnerships in forestry.

Chapter II: What are we, and should we be, talking about? Clarifying some Concepts

II.1. Forest management

Over the last two decades or so natural resource management – and forestry in particular – has shifted:

- from a timber and user-based focus to a *multiple goods and services orientation*;
- linked to the above, from the prevalence of technical and scientific expertise to the *inclusion of more socio-economic skills and local knowledge* in forest management;
- from domination by governments, professionals and/or private operators towards the *reconciliation of different and often divergent interests*.

While this partial paradigm shift is overwhelmingly acknowledged, the changes it entails still face implementation difficulties, especially at the resource level. This partially stems from different quarters placing emphasis on different dimensions of "modern" forestry, e.g., environmental groups on conservation, field foresters on technical aspects. To reduce the risk of antagonising positions, it seems therefore useful to specify what forest management in this paper means. We suggest the working definition proposed by Duer *et al* (1979, cited in Wiersum, 2000):

"Forest management concerns the process of making and implementing decisions about the use and maintenance of forest resources and the organisation of related activities."

This definition highlights both the technical, economic and social dimensions of "modern" forestry, which are encompassed under the concept of sustainable forest management (SFM - see below). It also emphasises the fact that forest management also contemplates the processing and trading of goods and services. All these aspects need to be considered in the assessment of CNRM.

II.2. Sustainable forest management and sustainable development

While everybody seems to agree that sustainable forest management (SFM) is the ultimate goal of forest practices, it is also increasingly recognised that its profitability, especially – in particular for smallholders – is, at best, difficult to achieve, e.g.

- As regards *timber production*, recent reviews confirm the paucity of evidence that SFM is a viable or economically attractive option in comparison with:
 - * alternative land uses (Davies and Richards, 1999); especially where forest resources are not a key component of smallholders' income, or;
 - * other forms of forest management (i.e., conventional/almost no management or sustainable yield management – see Pearce *et al*, 1999).

These reviews also suggest that payment for environmental services – via e.g., certification or carbon offset arrangements – might provide significant opportunities to

recover (partly) the currently prohibitive opportunity costs of timber production. However, the extent to which these payments will benefit poorer sections of the rural populations remains to be seen.³

- While the potential of *Non Timber Forest Products* (NTFPs) for the development of local economies is widely acknowledged, the benefits of NTFPs enterprises for those who collect and process them (i.e., the forest dwellers) are often lower than expected, especially on a per labour unit basis and in comparison to the profits made by the middlemen;⁴
- *Eco-tourism*, and in particular that depending on wildlife in East and Southern Africa – has proven profitable for rural communities and the environment. However, the precarious character of benefit-sharing agreements based solely on an activity highly dependent on tourism has been noted (Alden Wily, 2000). Moreover, in Africa, its potential for large-scale impact is limited to East and Southern Africa.

At any rate, the main conditions for success in managing the products and activities mentioned above relate to adequate and clear access rights, strong local institutions, market opportunities, sufficient capacities, and often, long-term donor financial support. Such a combination is seldom found in a given location,⁵ and therefore benefits and sustainability of forest-based enterprises require time to materialise. The difficulty in achieving SFM has led some specialists to compare SFM to the “Nirvana” stage of forestry (Lennart Ljungman, 1999, pers. com.). This suggests that, while SFM should remain the ultimate goal, perhaps more “down-to-earth” workable objectives should be sought. This might provide a way to move beyond (a) rhetoric in much of the current forestry discourse, (b) worries about the sustainability of current CNRM schemes, and (c) disappointment in the face of the slow progress of local initiatives. In that sense, we propose to analyse the success of CNRM against the objectives of achieving:

- *less unsustainable* forest practices;
- *improved well-being* of rural populations;
- improved development, where development should be seen “as local stakeholders⁶ capacity to adapt to and manage change” in the context of what Babin *et al* (1997) call “co-viability” between conservation and rural development.

What we are looking for is what Anderson *et al* (1998) call “sustainable scenarios” in relation to the objectives mentioned above. Experience over the last decade has shown that this requires a stepwise and iterative process. Moreover, the criteria to assess

³ See Thornber *et al* (1999) regarding equity issues related to certification, and Bass *et al* (1999) for a review of issues associated with the linkages between carbon offset mechanisms and rural livelihoods.

⁴ Illustration of this can be found for instance in Bathla (1999) for India and Ruiz Perez *et al* (1999) for Cameroon.

⁵ And if it is (bar donor support), it is very likely that no outside intervention is necessary for forest-based enterprises to flourish and be sustainable.

⁶ In the context of collaborative arrangements, it is worth pointing out that this concerns not only community members, but also government staff and private operators.

performance should be defined locally because local circumstances keep changing, thus making these objectives "moving targets".

II.3. Collaborative forest management⁷

Carter (1999) defines collaborative forest management as *'working partnerships between the key stakeholders in the management of a given forest'*. As usual with controversial issues, this definition has been given various interpretations by different quarters of the forestry arena. To illustrate this, suffice it to compare the official working definitions of collaborative forest management provided in Uganda and Malawi Forest Policy documents, i.e.

Malawi (concerning forest reserves): "Co-management is joint management by more than one party. The concept involves a variable degree of consultation by and with all parties, involvement in decision making by all parties and with obligations and responsibilities on all parties. Ideally, the co-management process should be embodied in a management plan, possibly contractually binding." (Department of Forestry, 1996, cited in Jere *et al*, 2000)

(Note: Partnerships between government agencies and communities on customary land are termed community-based forest management).


Uganda: "Collaborative forest management means that interested parties are genuinely involved in management of the forest resources through a negotiated process in which all share rights, roles, responsibilities and returns for the sustainable management of such forest resources."(CFMP, 1999)

The Malawi definition refers to various degrees of participation, i.e., consultation, involvement in decision making, but is not very clear on the depth of participation by local actors, and what is to be decided. On the other hand, the Ugandan definition refers more explicitly to negotiations on stakeholders' roles, responsibilities, rights and revenues. The differences between these two definitions lie at the heart of the current debate on CNRM, i.e., to what extent, and how, should the different partners – and in particular communities - be involved in decisions regarding forest resources? Should it be limited to benefit sharing or should it include decision making in management? This issue will permeate this paper and we will provide elements of response in Chapter V.

Partnerships are not set in stone. They keep evolving according to changes in local conditions and stakeholders' interests and power. Therefore collaborative forest management should be seen as forms of dynamic partnerships along a continuum, as illustrated in Figure 1.

⁷ For reasons explained earlier, we consider forest management in the broader perspective of natural resource management/land use. In this paper, the terms collaborative forest management (CFM), collaborative natural resource management (CNRM) and co-management will therefore be used interchangeably.

Figure 1: Continuum of forms of collaborative management, with an emphasis on community-government partnerships



Source: Hilhorst and Aaminik (1999) and Alden Wily (2000)

11.4. Participation - Community

Participation has become a *sine qua non* condition for NRM initiatives to receive foreign funding, based on the assumption that it is a key factor of success. Yet, it is increasingly acknowledged that the performance of participatory schemes on the ground often does not live up to expectations. This partly stems from the ambiguity surrounding the very notion of participation; which, in turn, lies both in:

- the various ways in which stakeholders – and especially local people – are involved in decision making, and;
- the frequent lack of clarity as to which stakeholders should be involved in what.

The diversity of involvement of local people under the concept of participation is illustrated by the typology developed by Pimbert and Pretty (IIED, 1994) and summarised in Table 1.

Table 1: A typology of participation

Typology	Components of each type
1. Passive participation	People participate by being told what is going to happen or has already happened. It is a unilateral announcement by an administration or project management without any listening to people's responses. The information being shared belongs only to external professionals.
2. Participation in information giving	People participate by giving answers to questions posed by extractive researchers and project managers using questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. People do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings, as the findings of the research or project design are neither shared nor checked for accuracy.
3. Participation by consultation	People participate by being consulted, and external agents listen to views. These external agents define both problems and solutions, and may modify these in light of people's responses. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision making and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people's views.
4. Participation for material incentives	People participate by providing resources, for example labour, in return for food, cash or other material incentives. It is very common to see this called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging activities when the incentives end.
5. Functional participation	People participate by forming groups to meet pre-determined objectives to the project, which can involve the development or promotion of externally initiated social organisation. Such involvement does not tend to be at early stages of projects, but rather after major decisions have been made.
6. Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans. It tends to involve interdisciplinary methods that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systematic and structured learning processes
7. Self-mobilisation/active participation	People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change systems. Such self-initiated mobilisation and collective action may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power.

Source: IIED, 1994

Note Different types of participation mentioned in Table 1 can be found in each segment of the collaborative management continuum presented in Figure 1, which excludes both ends of the continuum.

It is nowadays acknowledged that the management of natural resources has more chances of being sustainable with the types of participation situated at the bottom of Table 1. *Better results with interactive participation concern not only productive factors, but also replicability of project outcomes and social organisation.* However, it is also increasingly documented

that initiatives in so-called participatory natural resource management have frequently confined themselves to the first types of participation mentioned in the Table. In other words, *participation has been used more as a means for information/communication than for shared decision making*. This is because, in developing countries - and elsewhere where forest is key to livelihoods and power differences are strong - *participation is often limited to community participation*, therefore limiting the scope of influence of initiatives and preventing existing power structures to be questioned. This failure has been recognised for several years. What have then been the constraints to improve the performance of participation?

Heavy transaction costs and other practical difficulties (transportation, reaching a quorum, etc.).

Different ways to lessen transaction costs have been developed.

- One solution lies in the use of *stakeholder analysis (SA)*. SA can be used to select key stakeholders according to their importance in and potential influence on projects. This in turn allows project managers to select the level of participation suitable for each type of stakeholder. While SA has proven useful in operationalising participation, it has also shown limitations. In particular, SA is not well equipped to assess local disparities in power. Yet, stakeholders' power is a key factor in the outcome of participatory processes that will be discussed further in this paper (see section III.2);
- Another way to reduce transaction costs rests in the use of representatives of different groups when it comes to negotiating agreements. But difficulties in representing socially weaker sections of communities are exacerbated by the very fact that participatory methods tend to favour public meetings where mightier groups have more opportunities to express their views. Furthermore, a lack of democratic principles amongst many traditional societies often exacerbates this problem. Be that as it may, finding *means for adequate representation is a key factor for achieving durable settlements through active participation*.

Biased views on how participation should function.

Table 1 defines types of participation according to Western views, which may cause problems in situations where there is a strong social hierarchy. For instance, active participation in Northern Cameroon may be seen as the local Sheikh deciding on his own and villagers doing what they are told. While this might not guarantee equal opportunity to express ones' concerns, especially for socially weaker groups such as youth and women, it nevertheless constitutes a locally accepted decision-making system that guarantees social stability. The key issue is that the Sheikh's primary concern might be to maintain good relationships with his subjects, and therefore ensure fairness in his decisions. This might also lead to good quality participation.⁸ Box 1 is another illustration of this in the case of the early days of Village Forest Areas in Malawi. An outside and short-term intervention to modify an otherwise accepted decision-making system is therefore not always appropriate. It might also not be needed, so long as decisions do not compromise local livelihoods and bring about significant environmental damage. Top-down approaches, when implemented within the traditional institutions, can work but are difficult to replicate and there is a

⁸ We shall return to the issue of the mutual influence between stakeholders' relationships in Section III.2, however in the slightly different context of collaboration between different stakeholder groups rather than within one group.

tendency for the imposing authority to reap benefits at the expense of the community at large, rendering the system unstable in today's society. In short, while we agree with Ostrom's design principle for self-governing institutions that "Most individuals affected by the operations can participate in modifying them (Ostrom, 1990), it should not be seen as a *sine qua non* condition for achieving better forest management and improved rural livelihoods.

Externally-designed participatory methods

Following on the above, another bias relates to the participatory methods used. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) type methods are mostly designed in the North, and there is nowadays an agreement that they are more efficient if designed by local people themselves. The training provided by an (IIED/ARED) team in Senegal to local villagers in designing PRA exercises and conducting them in their own villages is but one illustration of this (Bara Guéye, pers. com.). In some cases, local decision-making systems do not allow for participation (e.g., the examples mentioned above), or PRA is not the most effective means to involve people in decisions. One of the authors (Olivier Dubois) has experienced that in the Philippines: in upland areas, where village decisions are taken in a monthly open assembly, it was more effective to strengthen weaker sections of the village and/or try to level off antagonistic views through one-to-one discussions before the monthly meetings than to carry out PRA.

Inappropriate definition of community

There is mounting evidence that the separation between "insiders" and "outsiders" (in relation to communities) suggested by conventional participatory approaches is over-simplistic. It masks the importance of several "hybrid" groups on the dynamics of local development, i.e.,

- Outside elites, i.e., "sons" of the village who have migrated to cities, and who often have a significant influence on local development, for good (e.g., infrastructure development through their connections) or for worse (e.g., reaping out benefits from forest resources through alliances with logging companies in Central Africa);
- Migrants from neighbouring cities or even countries playing the role of safety nets through remittances sent to their relatives in their native villages;⁹
- Occasional residents can make a significant proportion of a village population, e.g., 30 to 60 per cent in Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon (Karsenty et Joiris, 1999);
- Urban-based civil servants claiming forest plots in rural areas, e.g., 93 per cent of the total number of claims in non-reserve forest areas in the region of Agnéby in Côte d'Ivoire between 1994 and 1996 (N'guettia, 1998).

Perhaps a more realistic basis for differentiating "outsiders" and "insiders" would be the influence community-based rules exert on these actors. For instance, Muam Chi (1999) reports the case of co-management of the sacred forests in the Bafut Kingdom of North West Province of Cameroon. The strong and well-respected traditional leader of the Bafut Kingdom has managed to limit the issue of logging permits to "modern" elites by incorporating these into the "traditional" authority structures.

⁹ For instance, in Burkina Faso, remittances have a significant impact on poverty and inequality, and half of them come from Côte d'Ivoire (Lachaud, 1999).

The above considerations have led Umans (1998) to propose a shift from the conventional dualistic view of "outsiders" and "insiders" that has presided over participatory interventions. He suggests picturing the *local reality as a network of actors establishing relations by which they engage in processes and actions of different kinds*. This is also in line with the more operational concept of "functional communities" proposed by Milol (1998), i.e., *ad-hoc groups of individuals who strategically gather to cope with a given constraint or opportunity*.

Lack of trust


Active participation implies more multilateral/horizontal types of relationships between stakeholders. Obviously the quality of such interactions is *highly dependent on the mutual trust between stakeholders*. Unfortunately, more often than not, relationships between community groups and government staff are, at best, indifferent. This situation requires *time to build or restore confidence*, hence adding to transaction costs.

Apolitical character of participatory approaches

Finally, active participation implies shared decision making, thus a *redistribution of power*, and this is likely to be hard to achieve where disparities of power are high. For instance, although participation might be seen as of high quality (e.g., types 6 or 7 in Table 1) for a non-resident, in reality the village Chief might be taking all decisions and the local people simply doing what they are told. In such cases, the needs of marginal groups such as women and poor might not be adequately addressed. Some argue that situations where significant disparity in power strongly influences outcomes usually results in such outcomes being potentially more unstable than in situations where parity in power favours negotiation (Sidaway, 1997, Thomas *et al*, 1997). This is illustrated in Figure 2. However, this can be mitigated if the importance of maintaining good relationships prevails, as mentioned above and illustrated in Figure 7 (see Section III.2.)

Despite its importance, the assessment of power disparity is usually overlooked by participatory projects. It partly stems from the fact that power issues are often assessed *ex post*, i.e., as an outcome of a negotiation, because it is difficult to openly discuss them *ex ante*. Progress on this front can be achieved via proxy measures of power and we will discuss this in Section III.2.

Figure 2: Linking participation and power to the quality of outcome in CFM



Adapted from Sidaway, 1997

In short, it is increasingly agreed that participation should move:

- From a means of information gathering and communication between communities and project staff *to a negotiation process* which involves also state and private sector actors;
- by implication, *from an apolitical information exercise* to the recognition of the intrinsically political character of natural resource management involving different interest groups.

However, this is easier said than done. Methods to assess stakeholders' relationships and power, and grey areas of local governance, are crucially lacking while, at the same time, vital to consolidate and expand existing success initiatives in CNRM. By the same token, there is a paucity of approaches to analyse local forest management institutions, i.e., the nature and design of the institutions that will manage the power disparities and enable empowerment of marginal groups.

Some would argue that the good quality of participation is a criterion for success of CNRM initiatives. This implies that achieving good quality participation should be a key objective of CNRM initiatives. However, we see rather participation as a means to achieve CNRM than an end in itself. It should therefore not be used as a criterion to assess CNRM. The degree of participation can be defined as the level of involvement of all stakeholders in arriving at the end result which has been agreed, in our case a collaborative arrangement. However, involvement can sometimes be achieved through more autocratic AND socially acceptable decision-making systems. We have already mentioned Sultanates in Northern Cameroon and VFAs in Malawi (see Box 1).

Box 1: VILLAGE FOREST AREAS (VFAs) IN MALAWI

Historical background.

As early as 1926, concern over deforestation was mounting. A system of communal forests was devised – by the colonial forest service - and patches of woodland near to villages, on land considered unsuitable for agriculture, were set aside and referred to as Village Forest Areas (VFAs). The headmen had legal control and were responsible for protecting the area from fire, over-grazing and indiscriminate cutting. The size of the VFA was usually based on the number of huts/households in the village. Divisional and District Forest Officers carried out the selection and demarcation of suitable forest areas. Initially the scheme was limited to only a few areas but the response was encouraging and the initiative was expanded. By the end of 1934 the number of VFAs had reached 2,872.

Through protection from unauthorised cutting, grazing and fire (the majority of the headmen carried out early burning by means of communal labour) the areas which had been previously deforested regenerated through coppice and seedlings. The forestry staff demonstrated silvicultural treatments for the improvement of forest productivity and they would work alongside the headmen and villagers showing them which stems should be removed in a thinning operation.

Some headmen, particularly in the more populated areas, appreciated the fact that good tending of an area is a sign of ownership and affords security against unauthorised cutting by strangers. It was apparent that the results of good management proved a big factor in commending the scheme to other villages. Development of the scheme depended heavily upon the advisory and demonstrational work by the forestry staff. There existed a promising spirit of co-operation between the foresters and village headmen. Success of the scheme was attributed to:

- steady advocacy of the scheme by forestry staff.
- active demonstration of the results to be obtained from fire control
- control being given to the village headmen and their subsequent co-operation. This system gave the people a very direct interest and it facilitated control
- The District Council gave assurance to headmen of the security of tenure of the areas.

- The simplicity of the scheme and the rules which regulated it.. The basis was the protection of natural forest or woodland rather than elaborate planting or production schemes. Even a small measure of protection produced results.

There was a fear of over-cutting once the headmen had sole authority and questions were raised about the wisdom of exerting more state control. However, it was clear that the chances of success of a communal forest scheme would depend almost entirely upon a sense of ownership and freedom from legal restrictions. Any dangers of over-felling or neglect were to be counteracted by education and constant advocacy. During the early years there was indeed no tendency to over-cut and it was observed that the communities felt a strong sense of ownership.

Then what happened?

All was more or less well until 1964 when control over woodlands on customary land, including VFAs, was handed over to the District Councils. A decline in interest in maintaining VFAs began at about this time. The possible reasons for the decline in management and number of VFAs are as follows:

1. Change in "management responsibility" from Village Headmen to District Councils (later to Forest Department) reduced the interest from the community to care for a resource they no longer considered their own. The Councils had no mechanism to share the benefits from sales of forest produce with village headmen.
2. Conversely some people felt the VFAs were land claimed from them by the colonial government. Now it was theirs again and they could open gardens if they wished.
2. Breakdown in traditional authority in the village/ weak GVH (Group Village Headman) or VH.
3. Demand for wood products has intensified and more and more woodland is converted to permanent farmland.
4. The support and management advice previously provided by the Forest Department fell away at about this time.
5. Sometimes FD staff sold trees illegally, without consultations with the Village Headmen, (post 1985 when forest management had been taken over by the FD again).

And nowadays

Number of VFAs (Varela <i>et al.</i> 1995):	1984: 5,108
	1994: 1,182

Currently the VFAs that remain vary from place to place in their size, nature, management and importance to the local community. The systems, which are governing the maintenance of some of these, have been studied - see Valera *et al.* 1995. They are worthy of more attention still.

In most cases the Village Headman, Group Village Headmen and Traditional Authorities are responsible for protecting, managing and controlling the harvesting of forest produce. Very few Village Forest Committees have been set up to manage VFAs as these have only recently been introduced (Ndovi, 1994; Luhanga, 1994; Varela *et al.* 1995)

With hindsight

A distinction should be made between management by the local chiefs and the community at large. It would appear – from the remnants that remain – that the VFAs were managed by the Village Headmen as indicated right at the start in 1926. The traditional authority enjoyed by the VH in the past meant that the VFAs were respected. What is questionable is – did the VFA system ever constitute community management? Certainly the concept of community participation did not seem to be included. This may have "worked" in the past IF the community at large benefited from the resource – but again there are indications that some VHs preserved the woodland for their own personal use. This analysis is useful to show three things:

- 1) Some of the reasons for success of the scheme – in the first instance – are lessons that can be applied just as well today.
- 2) Participation amongst the resource users was not however a component of the resource management system.

Sources: Clements 1935, Ndovi, 1994, Luhanga 1994, Varela *et al.* 1995

II.5. Poverty reduction

There is nowadays a broad consensus about the multi-dimensional and dynamic character of poverty. Growth is therefore not the only route to poverty reduction, and aspects related to distribution of assets (e.g., land), vulnerability and human development are proving equally important. This is reflected in the definition of poverty given by Engberg-Pedersen (1999):

"The poor are those who cannot exploit opportunities due to lack of capacity and resources, due to social structures and due to dependency on others"

While the positive impacts on poverty reduction of social infrastructures in the areas of education and health are proven, the links between poverty reduction and productive activities that use natural resources are far from straightforward. In the case of agriculture, it might relate primarily to the distribution of income generated by increased production, and comparative advantages in decision making for those farmers having more initial wealth (Barham *et al*, 1999). It seems much more challenging to prove a causal link between sustainable forest management and poverty reduction via improved livelihood opportunities (Carter, 1999). This is a complex matter, i.e.:

On the negative side:

- The long rotation of forest trees entails low short-term profitability of SFM and tree-planting, compared to goods that produce faster returns, typically agricultural products (including livestock);¹⁰
- Timber production attracts powerful "outside" interests, and therefore requires sufficient bargaining power, which the poor often lack;
- Forests may provide more environmental services than agricultural land, but, to date, mechanisms to make these services competitive with other land uses for the poor are still lacking;
- The poor have often little comparative advantage when it comes to making sufficient income out of forest resources. While there are less and less doubts about the value of indigenous knowledge as regards the "tending" of natural resources, this knowledge seldom concerns the commercialisation of forest goods, and in particular timber. Moreover, the poorest of the poor are sometimes at a disadvantage due to a shortage of manpower to harvest forest products in such households compared to wealthier ones, e.g., in many areas in Mali (Kerkhof, 2000).

On the positive side:

- Forest often provides a safety net to the poor because the harvesting or hunting of its products does not require strong rights to the land, as opposed to agriculture. The

¹⁰ This is particularly the case where the forest asset itself has little monetary value, as in Sahel. For instance, Kerkhof (2000) reports cases in the Kelka and Bankass forests of Mali, where revenues from fuelwood sales account for at least 4 times less income than those from the trade of agricultural products. Market-oriented agriculture (including livestock) provides more income even in the case of the relatively successful Energie II/Rural Fuelwood Market World Bank Project in Niger (Kerkhof, 2000 – see also Section V.2.1. in Chapter V).

poorer households with sufficient manpower often sell forest products to wealthier families, e.g., in some villages in Mali (Kerkhof, 2000);

- Utilisation of some forest products (e.g., NTFPs) do not necessarily require heavy investments;
- Where sufficiently strong, traditional rules sometime contain poverty adjustments. For instance in the *Alamodiou* traditional ruling system that covers fifty villages in the Bankass district of Mali, villages known to be poor pay less taxes and fees in relation to access forest resources (Kerkhof, 2000);
- The relationships between people and forests often expand beyond commercial exploitation in that forest often has a strong cultural value to forest dwellers. However, the extent to which these values provide enough incentives for conservation and/or sound use depends on several factors, including the strength of traditional leadership and the pressure on the forest itself. Furthermore, where lacking or lost, it is often a daunting task for change agents to create/recreate such spiritual incentives. In such cases, such incentives do not constitute a useful entry point for bringing about change.

The above shows that there are no simple causal links between natural resource management and poverty. The four types of associations described by Mayers (1997) in the case of forests further illustrate this.

Figure 3: Four possible associations between poverty and forests

	'Poverty Increase'	'Poverty Reduction'
'Forest Reduction'	<p style="text-align: center;">A</p> <p>Poor do not benefit from unsustainable use of forest resources (e.g., some high impact industrial logging in Central Africa)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B</p> <p>Poverty is reduced by forest conversion (e.g., for extensive farming)</p>
'Forest Increase'	<p style="text-align: center;">C</p> <p>Poor are affected by reduced access to land and forest (e.g., through protected areas)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">D</p> <p>Less pressure on forest due to e.g., agriculture intensification, agroforestry, or employment opportunities outside forests or in environmentally-friendly forest enterprises</p>

Adapted from Mayers (1997)

This picture shows that:

- Only the environment-friendly enterprises can form forest-based CNRM likely to reduce poverty (i.e., situation D). The other situations are likely to actually enhance a separation between forests and people;
- However, context is all-important, and shifts between the situations described above can occur over time. For instance, a logging company might have different influences on poverty and forests according to its logging practices or employment policies (e.g., percentage of local versus outside workers); influence of agriculture as a source of income will affect the links differently depending on local farming practices, etc..

Linking active participation to poverty reduction might even prove more challenging when it comes to CNRM. Not only are the poor often those finding it most difficult to "self-mobilise", but once self empowered through CNRM, they might find it more rewarding to engage in non-forest activities. CNRM actions aimed at bringing or keeping forest dwellers close to the forest might actually end up reducing the relationship. Depending on the type of new livelihood chosen by these newly empowered rural people, pressure on the forest might be reduced (e.g., if they engage in off-farm work) or increased (e.g., if they increase their farming areas).

II.6. Concluding remarks


To sum up, while linking the objectives of improved forest condition and poverty reduction through truly participatory processes is very laudable, achieving it is another story. *This often implies locally negotiated trade-offs between forest and other land uses in the quest for improved livelihoods*, which concurs with the notion of "co-viability" mentioned earlier (see Section II.2.).

Chapter III: Why Collaborate? Constraints on and Opportunities for Collaboration

III.1. The natural resources 'battlefield'

Participatory approaches have sometimes been presented as a *panacea* that will allow harmonious and equitable negotiations on NRM to occur. This is not supported by experience. In practice, participation in NRM has usually been restricted to two types of stakeholders: community groups and development project staff. This has proved insufficient to develop sustainable initiatives, as it ignores the claims of other groups or antagonises them. For instance, community groups may wish to continue practising traditional shifting cultivation, but outside groups such as agri-businesses or environmental groups may be opposed to this, the former because shifting cultivation competes for land, the latter because they wish the forest to be left untouched. Such opposing goals often lead to a confusing battlefield for natural resource management (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: The natural resources battlefield




Source: Dubois (1998b)

Innovation is required to deal with negotiation on NRM. There is a need to develop and use methods that allow people to collaborate, coming together to discuss and negotiate competing claims and priorities. What are the constraints and possibilities here? We now briefly take up this issue, from both conceptual and practical perspectives.

III.2. A brief overview of concepts and methods in collaborative management of natural resources

To build a strategy for collaboration, it is important to assess the level of competition or collaboration that is likely to occur before any other activities start. Pruitt and Rubin (1986) contend that negotiation strategies depend on the way parties balance concerns for both themselves and other parties, as represented in Figure 5.

Figure 5: The dual-concern model in negotiation



Adapted from Pruitt and Rubin (1986)

This Figure shows that collaboration is not the only negotiation strategy that stakeholders can adopt. In situations where the accommodating and avoiding strategies prevail, conflicts are likely to subside, at least in the short term.

Many would argue that collaboration is best. For example, Mike Dombeck, Director of the US Forest Service (cited in Walker and Daniels 1997b) calls for collaborative stewardship of natural resources:

'More interaction between stakeholders, not only in the process (decisions and responsibilities) but also in the outcome of situations.'

Vodoz (1994) advocates collaboration on the grounds that:

- It *improves the commitment of* stakeholders, through joint involvement in problem-solving;
- Collaborative strategies are likely to *improve the overall quality of decisions*, not least through exploration of new options, with the potential for win-win settlements;
- In case they do not achieve a settlement, collaborative strategies can nevertheless *improve the quality of the failure*, because they foster discussion between stakeholders, hence improving knowledge of each other's interests and perceptions.

We would add:

- They *allow for a freer flow of information* between stakeholders. Information flows are vital. Conflict frequently emerges because adequate information was not freely available to key stakeholders early on in the planning process (or at all).

However, collaborative strategies also have their limitations:


- Negotiation is a voluntary and non-binding process and *stakeholders can pull out at any time*, with a risk of jeopardising the process and/or the agreement. Yet, the temptation to withdraw is often balanced by the risk of marginalisation, in particular if relationships and mutual trust have improved during the negotiation process;
- They incur high *transaction costs* - mainly the time and efforts of all parties involved in interactive participation. However, Bliss (1999) argues that many of the financial objections relate to an outmoded perception of the project cycle, which separates planning, and implementation in both theory and practice.

Several conditions are necessary for a successful negotiation (Huybens 1994, Buttoud and Samyn, 1999):

- None of the parties can solve the issue alone and stakeholders have some room for manoeuvre.
- The outcome from a joint decision is more enduring than the imposition of a unilateral solution, particularly given the complexity and uncertainty associated with natural resource situations, and the often divergent views on how to manage these.
- All positions are deemed legitimate in the eyes of the different stakeholders. In particular, this implies that collaboration will not be achieved if more extreme positions are not amenable to change or excluded from the negotiation.
- There is a fair balance of bargaining power between the parties. This is a crucial and tricky issue to which we now turn.

Walker and Daniels (1997b) consider three elements in what they call the *progress triangle* in conflict management illustrated in Figure 6, i.e., substance, procedures and relationships.

Figure 6: The conflict management progress triangle



Source Walker and Daniels, 1997b


Practitioners tend to agree that, although arguments are usually about substance and procedures, *progress towards durable settlements usually hinges on relationships*. However, changes in the quality of relationships are often influenced by interaction, e.g., through discussions on substance and procedures!

Stakeholders' relationships are important in collaborative management of natural resources. More particularly, their interactions with power exert significant influence on the outcome of negotiations. These interactions are complex. For example:

- In Senegal, charcoal traders have a monopoly of supply to Dakar, the capital city. They give priority to maintaining their overwhelming power even if this affects their relationships with both villagers and the State. Hence, they often threaten to strike, for instance, when the government wishes to increase the tax on charcoal products. This is a situation of competition or even domination.
- Despite having financial and political power over local villagers, a foreign logging company operating in Central Africa might give priority to maintaining good relationships with them, especially if it fears social unrest that could lead to the sabotaging of its equipment or the blocking of roads. It would, therefore, favour collaborative strategies.

Figure 7 attempts to picture the influence of such interactions on negotiating strategies.

Figure 7: Interactions between power and relationships in negotiation strategies



Source: Vodoz (1994)

Figure 7 shows *collaboration* is usually *not achievable* if *building or maintaining good relationships is less important than the stakes or keeping power*. Under such circumstances, negotiation should not be used to manage conflicts before bargaining powers are levelled off, as it might result in competition. *Time must therefore be given to address power differences*. Van Keulen and Walraven (1996) suggest some ways to deal with power differences (see Box 2).

Box 2: Some suggested "power-regulating" techniques

- Use a facilitator/mediator when power differences are too important. The facilitator/mediator must be strong in their own right and command respect.
- The powerless position should not be perceived as inherently powerless, but limited by the specific circumstances.
- Start with an aspect everyone agrees upon.
- Present alternatives.
- Weaker groups should seek coalition with similarly weak parties.
- Turn objections into conditions.
- Mildly threaten. This is particularly useful when the powerful parties fear losing reputation or market shares.
- Do not allow the powerful party to lower itself.

Source: van Keulen and Walraven (1996)

Prior to negotiations, it is thus important to assess the power of the parties. GTZ (1996) suggests that three key issues need to be addressed:

(i) *On what basis is power built?*

This relates usually to some type of *dependence* and many researchers argue that the power of the powerful is the dependence of the powerless: economic (e.g., financial dependence), social (e.g., hierarchical dependence, expertise) and emotional (e.g., personal dependence due to nepotism, cronyism, etc.).

(ii) *How does power affect the relationship?*

Power can affect the relationship physically, materially or in terms of social status. In many instances, the mere potential to exert power is sufficient to make relationships work.

(iii) *When and how do power relations change?*

Focus on tangible elements that allow for *indirect assessment*. Vodoz (1994) suggests using *stakeholders' roles*, and assessing when and how these change. Roles, in turn, can be assessed by answering questions such as:

- Who has the right to do what, and how?
- Who does what, and when?
- Who is committed and willing?
- Who pays?
- What is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, especially for the most powerful stakeholders?
- What are the parties' means and capacities?
- What is the procedure in case agreements are breached?

Based on these questions, recent work by IIED on developing capacity for sustainable forestry in Africa has provided a working definition of stakeholders' roles via the balance in their *Rights, Responsibilities, Returns/Revenues and Relationships* (summarised as the '4Rs'). Getting the '4Rs' right appears therefore crucial to achieve sustainable agreements in CNRM, and how to achieve this will be the focus of Chapter V.

III.3. Some practical reasons for collaborating/not collaborating

Figures 5 and 7 show that collaboration is not the only negotiation strategy governments and communities can adopt. Other options include competition, avoidance and accommodation. These strategies have been in use for a long time in forestry, e.g.,

- *accommodation* through informal agreements between villages in Sahel as to the protection of common forest resources;
- *competition* between forest people and logging companies concerning the exploitation of *Moabi* (*Baillonella Toxisperma*) in Cameroon, or between local communities and forestry services, either through coercive attitudes on the part of the latter, or, more recently, when communities set up their own management rules to overcome low performance of the local forestry service (e.g., many Sahelian countries);
- *de facto withdrawal* of the state where it lacks means to enforce its regulations, resulting in the prominence of informal rules (e.g., traditional systems where indigenous institutions are strong, ad-hoc arrangements between loggers and communities in Central Africa, the Lukolongo case in Zambia – see Section V.2.2. in Chapter V).

44. However, these options have proven inappropriate to satisfy the principles of modern forestry, and in particular the need to accommodate uncertainty and different views on the use of forest resources in “sustainable scenarios”. Collaborative approaches have therefore gained currency over the last decade. Experience shows that the main motivation for collaboration seems to lie in the existence of a serious pressure/threat which makes stakeholders realise that “go-for-it-alone” or other strategies on their part might affect their credibility, profits or survival in the short and medium term. The pressure may come from different quarters, i.e.

- As regards *national governments*, the pressure often comes from international circles to ensure global environmental services of forests, e.g., in West and Central Africa;
- As regards *local communities*, “outside forces” with respect to access to forest resources can come in different guises, including:
 - * Forest Departments when they plan to turn forests into protected areas;¹¹
 - * Urban dwellers claiming forest plots;¹²
 - * Members from neighbouring communities.¹³

¹¹ As in many cases of CNRM in Central Africa, including ITTO So'o Lala Forest Reserve and WWF/Birdlife International Mt Kitum projects in Cameroon (Muam Chi, 1999) and all the ECOFAC projects in the Congo Basin.

¹² This can be found near urban centres throughout Africa, such as the SIWAA and Walde Kelka cases of Mali (Hilhorst and Aaminck, 1999; Dème, 1998) and the forest zone of the Agnéby region of Côte d'Ivoire (N'Guetta, 1998).

¹³ The Chihota and Seke communal areas in Zimbabwe are one example of this (Katerere *et al*, 1999).

- As regards *private operators*, the motivation is often associated with the fear of acts of sabotage by local residents, or because some compensation to villagers is required by the legislation. However, in Central Africa, this frequently translates in one-off compensations rather than long-term collaboration.¹⁴ Transnational companies in particular might also feel some pressure from the demand side of the market to "green" their operations and make them more socially equitable. In the case of plantations, one obvious advantage of partnerships such as outgrower schemes lies in the fact that companies do not need to buy land, and they also enhance their social image by arguing that they provide a means of livelihood to local residents.

Based on the above, this paper assumes that *CNRM predominantly occurs when at least one group amongst governments, local communities and private operators feels "against the wall" and therefore seeks collaboration despite all the hurdles it entails.*¹⁵ This assumption has important implications as regards the functionality of CNRM, i.e.

- Given that stakeholders often feel "forced" to engage in partnerships, some of the key ingredients of successful partnerships are often inadequate at the onset of CNRM initiatives. These include:
 - * *sufficient trust*, an item often in short supply on the part of communities vis-à-vis government agencies;
 - * *a common vision* on the objectives of CNRM;¹⁶
 - * *the levelling of stakeholders bargaining power* before entering the negotiation phase, and;
 - * *sufficient capacities* to manage all the components of partnership agreements, including technical matters, financial aspects and control functions.
- Traditional rules over forest management are often limited when it comes to coping with outside pressures within a relatively short time span. This is exacerbated when donor-funded projects lack flexibility in terms of planning and time frame;
- Despite the intensity of the "pressure" fire fighting solutions have proven inefficient in achieving sustained results. It is now agreed that quick fix measures and botched up agreements do not work, because the *underlying causes of the pressure often lie in institutional blockages to constructive partnerships rather than technicalities*;

¹⁴ Ghana has recently attempted to partially formalise agreements between timber contractors and communities through Timber Utilisation Contracts (Kotey et al, 1998)

¹⁵ This explains the importance of assessing stakeholders BATNA (i.e. Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) in the evaluation of the potential of CNRM.

¹⁶ The SIWAA case (Mali) described by Hillhorst and Aarnink (1999) illustrates a frequent situation where villagers and forestry staff have different objectives: in one case, the forestry agent thought that the SIWAA convention would oblige villagers to help him enforce the forestry code. Conversely, villagers wanted a convention to gain more autonomy in the management of natural resources, including a reduced interference by the forestry staff.

- The above points to *the importance of the time factor* in managing CNRM. Time is needed to sort out relationships issues and enhance understanding¹⁷ and capacities within stakeholder groups (in particular within communities – relations between youth and elders, and local governments – e.g., relations between line agencies vis-à-vis elected bodies), and between stakeholders' groups.
- However, acknowledging the importance of time should not allow for unrealistic objectives. In particular, it is becoming more and more clear that CNRM does not require consensus amongst stakeholders, and "consensual consultative stagnation" should be avoided (ODA, 1996). What is needed are "*working agreements*" based on *commonly agreed objectives* (Carter, 1999).

Referring more specifically to the Sahel Region, some other reasons and constraints for collaboration in the Sahel were expressed during a workshop on co-management in 1998. They are presented in Table 2 because many of them might apply elsewhere in Africa (SOS-Sahel and IIED, 1998). This table shows that while many advantages relate to the quality of the agreements that result from collaborative management, several drawbacks have to do with implementation difficulties. The latter will therefore be the subject of the next section.

Table 2: Advantages and drawbacks of co-management of natural resources in the Sahel

Advantages	Drawbacks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less conflicts or, rather, improved approaches to conflict resolution • More equity and justice. Everybody wins from the partnership • Favours sustainability of production and NRM • Decisions regarding NRM are more legitimate • Local actors are made more responsible • Local leadership is improved • Better mobilisation of local means • Better consideration for the variety of local interests • Favours economic exchange between producers • Participatory decision-making • More security for long-term investments • Absence of 'kick-backs' • Optimal use of local knowledge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costly for projects and populations in terms of time, funds, efforts and training • Difficult to implement, in particular as regards stakeholder identification, trade off feeling, inherent complexity, in particular regarding institutional arrangements • Losses in the short term • Facilitation requirements • Absence of 'kick-backs' • Conflicts with indigenous rules • More difficult to reconcile divergent interest/potential for more conflicts

Source: SOS-Sahel and IIED (1998)

¹⁷ Several examples attest the frequent low level of understanding about the issues at stake at the onset of CNRM initiatives, and about the official mandates of the different stakeholders involved once CNRM projects are being implemented (Ibro et al, 1998, SOS-Sahel and IIED, 1999).

Chapter IV: "Making Sense" of the Local Context – Facilitating and Complicating Factors for Successful CNRM

Given the complexity of CNRM and accepting the risk of oversimplifying, in this chapter we suggest some hints for "making sense" of the local context, and for assessing the chances of success of CNRM in a given context. This is based on the authors' own field of experience and the distillation of a wealth of recent literature on the topic listed at the end of this paper.

This chapter starts with a tentative list of features to look at when envisaging CNRM initiatives (Table 4), followed by a discussion on "facilitating" and "complicating" factors in relation to CNRM. It then moves to examples on how these features might be combined to deepen the assessment of the potential for CNRM initiatives to succeed (section IV.2.).

IV.1. What features favour or hinder CNRM? A discussion on "facilitating" and "complicating" factors

For CNRM to work, it is essential that communities organise themselves, both locally and in the wider context. Being organised empowers local people and enables them to:

- Relate to and negotiate with other stakeholders be they in conflict, in partnership or, as in the case of the government, both advisers and enablers as well as interested parties;
- Institutionalise checks and balances which are important to stabilise power disparities;
- Gain a voice and enhance their negotiating power whether it is with the private sector over terms and conditions or with the government concerning policy issues;
- Gain a legal identity. Ideally the local users institutions should be legal entities and have the chance to make or influence local by-laws – this again enhances their power when dealing with other stakeholders who might otherwise monopolise and exploit;
- Fit in or link up with the wider institutional framework which must also be designed to allow communication, negotiation, checks and balances.

In a recent paper, Elinor Ostrom (1999) neatly summarises the growing consensus on the resource and users' attributes likely to enhance self-organisation in relation to common property resources (CPRs), i.e., local users are more likely to devise their own rules when:

- They use a forest that is starting to deteriorate but has still sufficient potential to justify organising;
- There is sufficient information about the global forest condition and the availability of forest products;
- Forest is sufficiently small that users can develop enough knowledge about it;
- Users are dependent on resources for a major portion of their livelihood;

- Users have a common understanding of the problem they face;
- Users have a low discount rate in relation to future benefits from using forest resources
- Users trust each other;
- Users have some autonomy to make their own rules;
- Users have prior organisational experience.

Ostrom follows on by proposing some design principles displayed by long-enduring common-pool institutions. These are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3: Design principles illustrated by long-enduring common-pool resource institutions

Principle	Explanation
1. Clearly defined boundaries	Individual or households with rights to withdraw resource units from the common-pool resource and the boundaries of the common-pool resource itself are clearly defined.
2. Congruence	a) The distribution of benefits from appropriation rules is roughly proportionate to the costs imposed by provision rules. b) Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions.
3. Collective-choice arrangements	Most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying operational rules.
4. Monitoring	Monitors, who actively audit common-pool resource conditions and use behaviour, are accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.
5. Graduated sanctions	Users who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both.
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms	Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflicts among users or between users and officials
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise	The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities
For common-pool resources that are part of larger systems	
8. Nested enterprises	Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

Source: Ostrom, 1999

The users who are the subject of Ostrom's work are local forest-dependent people. While the attributes and design principles presented in her work are very useful to understand what is likely to enhance community organisation, they need to be complemented by other features when it comes to assessing the likelihood of success of partnerships involving local people, private operators and government agencies. Some factors overlap those attributes presented in Ostrom's theory, others concern different aspects. In particular, there is a need to better understand how stakeholders' relationships and power disparities,

and market forces influence the outcome of CNRM agreements. This is the purpose of this and the next chapter of this paper.

Table 4 proposes a list of key features local natural resources, communities, private operators and governments, and how these might impact on CNRM. This Table shows that many features can either complicate or facilitate CNRM initiatives depending on the local circumstances. We briefly elaborate on some of these aspects in turn, as a complement to the content of Table 3. In doing so and whenever possible, we suggest some hints on how complicating features might be overcome. In this Chapter we deal with features that concern the local context, i.e., lowest administrative and village levels. Issues pertaining to the macro level, such as policy and legal framework, will be discussed in Chapter VI, which deals with the scaling up of CNRM initiatives.

IV.1.1. *Re: Natural resources*

(i) Commercial value of natural resources

The fact that in several countries CNRM concerns primarily degraded areas (e.g., India and Cameroon) raises some doubts about the potential of such schemes in alleviating poverty. A minimum level of "natural capital" is obviously necessary to provide sufficient financial incentives to both embark into CNRM and increase smallholders' income. A clear example of this concerns community-based wildlife management under the CAMPFIRE¹⁸ programme in Zimbabwe where the most successful initiatives, i.e., those with high revenue generation and timely distribution of revenue to households and projects, were also those with large amounts of wildlife, high species richness and low livestock and human populations. In this case, according to Campbell *et al.* (1996), a high ratio of wildlife density to human population density explains in great part the success of the management scheme. Following this line of argument, they suggest that collaborative forest management initiatives in Zimbabwe are less likely to be as successful as the CAMPFIRE project because the resource capital of the *miombo* forest is less marketable than wildlife.

Box 3: The CAMPFIRE Programme in Zimbabwe

Many programmes in Africa are promoting community wildlife management. One of the best known can be found in Zimbabwe, where the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is devolving power over wildlife and other resources to local people. Its success has been attributed to the tangible benefits from wildlife that now accrue to the local communities. These benefits have generated increased local support that has enabled the programme to embrace other communal resources such as grazing, water and woodlands. Despite the wide acclaim it has received, CAMPFIRE has not been without problems. It has to operate within a confusing institutional framework that has undermined traditional and clearly understood structures. An independent assessment found that impact on individual household income has fluctuated considerably but has, on average, been low and insufficient to compensate for damage done by wildlife (Plan Afric 1997). It also noted examples of financial abuse by some individual community leaders and found that very little infrastructure could be attributed to CAMPFIRE - and some of that which has resulted from CAMPFIRE was found to be poorly planned (e.g., silted-up dams). There has undoubtedly been an increase in capacity to plan and implement projects at the community level, but the rapid expansion of CAMPFIRE has meant that training resources have been thinly spread.

Source: Dalal-Clayton *et al.*, 1999.

¹⁸ CAMPFIRE: Communal Areas Management Plan for Indigenous Resources. See Box 3 for details.

Table 4: Key features of natural resources, local communities, private operators and governments, and possible implications for CNRM

Type of 'asset'	Features	Key Comments (+) Likely positive implications for CNRM (-) Likely negative implications for CNRM
1. Natural resources	1.1. Land tenure 1.1.1. Degree of individualisation of rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * The more individualised the rights, the less chances for collective action. E.g.: Chitoba and Seke Communal areas in Zimbabwe (Katerere <i>et al.</i>, 1999). * Also, villagers are likely to be more engaged in farming than forest activities when rights are more individualised (see also 1.2.2) * Land ownership by communities is not a prerequisite. What matters most is socially acknowledged security to land and ownership of forest resources. In many cases CNRM is developed on land that belongs to the state (e.g., all CNRM in Francophone Africa, communal areas in Zimbabwe, CNRM in the Gambia) * Practically speaking it is usually very difficult to manage indigenous woodland areas through privatisation
	1.1.2. State controlled land (e.g., protected areas) and land falling within customary jurisdiction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * The distinction is important if official policies distinguish different modalities of CNRM for different categories of land (e.g., in Malawi). * The distinction is normally not applicable in Francophone Africa where all land belongs to the State * However, the above points often matter less on the ground, when customary rules prevail and the presence of the state is weak (e.g., many parts of Central Africa, Lukolongo area in Zambia - see Section V.2.2.). But, due to tenurial insecurity local people will treat "unprotected" protected areas as open-access resources e.g., Tournousseni Forest Reserve, Burkina Faso or Kasungu National Park, Malawi. * Customary ownership does not necessarily lead to more sustainable management of forest resources (e.g., off-reserve areas in Ghana - Kotey <i>et al.</i>, 1999; customary land in Zambia - Makano <i>et al.</i>, 1997) * Whilst customary tenure (even if technically state land) might afford high feelings of tenurial security over the land, locals will not feel tenurial security over the trees if officially trees and forests are responsibility of the FD. In such cases local people have few incentives to undertake forest management (Malawi until new Forest Act 1997) * There are some cases where the state has a legitimate reason to retain significant control (+) It is less complicated to promote CNRM on land that is officially (or even unofficially) owned by the communities (where legislation and policies allow) because there is one less major stakeholder to contend with.
	1.2. Forest 1.2.1. Well endowed areas/Not well endowed area * In relation to possible "external" interests (This includes wildlife, timber and biodiversity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (+) of well endowed areas (e.g., Central Africa) * Significant potential for development from production of forest goods * Significant potential for donor support for the sake of global environmental concerns * In relation to the above, exporters might be pressured by "green" demand and thus forced into CNRM, or at least dialogue (e.g., the role of certification in the creation of forums for discussion in Central Africa) (-) of well endowed areas (e.g., Central Africa) * Significant attraction for "outsiders", who often have more political clout (and legitimate clout) than local communities (in Zimbabwe timber on communal lands is harvested by the District Councils with no remuneration to the locals) * More opportunities for mismanagement (embezzlement, corruption, etc.) * The above might explain why communities are often granted custodianship over forests mainly in degraded areas (e.g., JFM in India, community forests in Cameroon) (-) in situations of Multiple Jurisdiction it is more complicated to manage different interests and therefore expensive. It is difficult to design the unit of proprietorship so that it is also the unit of production, management and benefit (e.g., CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe). (+) of not well endowed areas (e.g., Sahel) * "Against the wall" feeling: stakeholders are motivated to conserve/use sparingly the scarce resources, and to collaborate with governments to achieve this (however pastoralists are often excluded from CNRM -SOS-Sahel-IED, 1998 and 1999). * Trade concerns only local and national levels; no foreign company's interference (e.g., wood-charcoal markets in Sahel). (-) not well endowed areas can offer less in the way of returns to the managers. Reaching a situation where the benefits are worth more than the costs is difficult (e.g., small Village Forest Areas in densely populated areas of Malawi)

	<p>1.2.2. Importance for local livelihoods – i.e., beyond subsistence and in comparison with non-forest land uses Note: should be always combined to 1.2.3.</p>	<p>Forests are a significant source of income for communities – especially compared to farming (+) Villagers are interested in conserving the forest asset (-) Most benefits go to elite group(s) (-) Risk of asset stripping by villagers/local contractors, with potential high impact if widespread (e.g., Off-reserve logging in Ghana before 1994 interim measures – Kotey <i>et al.</i>, 1998) Forests are of little importance in the generation of income for communities (+) Less pressure on the forest if a lot of villagers' income comes from non-farm activities, or if farmers intensify their practices (e.g., Machakos District in Kenya) (-) Communities not much interested in forest-related activities, let alone CNRM (-) Forest is often seen mainly as a source of subsistence goods and fertile land if farming is the main source of income (e.g., many parts of Gabon and Eastern-Cameroon) Note: The implications mentioned here actually concern more the forest condition than CNRM <i>per se</i> (+) It implies conservation because of an 'against the wall feeling' or prospects for monetary benefits from conservation – e.g., typically protection activities in Sahel (Bojang and Reeb, 1998 for Gambia, Kerkhof, 2000 for Sahel), wildlife-based eco tourism in Southern Africa (e.g., Namibia – Jones, 1999), some NTFPs (e.g., leaves in the Kwapanin case of Ghana – Agwemang, 1996) (+) Miombo woodlands are highly suitable for CNRM as the management regime necessary to yield a wide range of products (including timber, large and small poles and NTFPs) is compatible with heavy utilisation. The only requirement is that there is enough of it spared from permanent agriculture and fires are somehow kept in check. (-) If use implies partial/total destruction of the resources – e.g., typically timber exploitation, charcoal making and conversion for agriculture (+) Communities which are "cohesive", i.e., cohesive factors more than overcome the divisive factors, find it easier to engage in collective action. (+) Prior experience of other forms of local organisation will facilitate a community to engage successfully in CNRM (Ostrom 1999) (+) More homogeneous communities are a strengthening factor of CEO's and therefore favour the sustainability of CNRM Initiatives Strong customary authority (+) Less chance for free-riding once the customary authority has agreed on CNRM rules with other stakeholder groups. An effective forest management institution can be built with minimum intervention. (-) If the traditional authority is keener on non-forest uses of land, or on personal rather than community benefits. However, it depends on existing mechanisms to challenge customary authority (see also Box 3, section V.1.2)</p>
	<p>2.1. Community cohesion and organisational ability</p>	
	<p>2.2. Strength of customary authority</p>	
<p>2. Community</p>	<p>2.3. Degree of interaction with urban centres</p>	<p>Significant interaction with urban centres (+/-) Less pressure on forests if opportunities for employment exist in urban centres, but this also means likely less interest in CNRM on the part of communities (+) Opportunities to trade forest resources of interest to urban dwellers (e.g., Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie 11 Project in Niger – see Section V.2.1.) (+/-) Pressure on the forest from urban dwellers triggers community organisation and partnerships (e.g., SIWAA case in Mali – Hillhorst and Aarnink, 1989) but urban dwellers take over if communities lack bargaining power (e.g., in some areas of Côte d'Ivoire – N'Guettia, 1998) * Distrust is often the order of the day. This requires attitudinal changes; which typically take time. Need to create opportunities for interaction and for a stepwise process (i.e., start CNRM around a specific matter, allow for mutual testing of performance and building rapport, and gradually expand). Direct use (+) Communities have more know how * Provides more reasons for community involvement as actors in decision making than as mere benefit. Indirect use (-) Communities have less experience regarding the practicalities/technical requirements in relation to the use and management of forest resources – typically timber production and eco-tourism. Benefit sharing is often favoured. However, communities should be involved in decision-making regarding contracting out of forest use to outsiders. Incentives to convince them of that option are key here</p>

3. Private Sector	3.1. Foreign/national	<p>Foreign operators</p> <p>(+) May be pressured by "green" demand side of the market to enter into equitable partnerships with governments and communities – e.g., typically European logging companies in Central Africa</p> <p>(+) Often motivated to collaborate to increase their social acceptance, in order to protect their (sometimes-high) investments against local acts of sabotage, road blockages. However, collaboration often a one-off event</p> <p>(-) Given their clout, foreign companies are often seen as part of a coalition with governments (and sometimes-local elites) against communities. This is exacerbated when resource-strapped local forestry services use means of private companies to function – e.g., in Gabon and Eastern Cameroon</p> <p>National operators</p> <p>* Provides good opportunities for the development of local business, either directly (e.g., sub-contractors for silvicultural operations in Côte d'Ivoire), or by renting their concessions to foreign companies (e.g., in Cameroon)</p> <p>* Often under-staffed and under-funded and therefore more interested in thriving than meeting environmental standards. This is exacerbated when they deal with domestic markets which do not demand "green" products</p> <p>(+) If private entrepreneurs are socially related to communities (e.g., many pit-sawyers in Uganda)</p> <p>(-) If private entrepreneurs are not socially tied to communities (e.g., wood-charcoal industry in Senegal)</p> <p>Most comments made for 3.1. apply here if one associates foreign with large and national with small</p>
4. The State	4.1. Political will	<p>Small business</p> <p>(+/-) More amenable to informal arrangements with communities (e.g., charcoal makers clearing farmers' fields in the Chibwe Farming Block in the Central Province of Zambia (Makano <i>et al.</i>, 1997)</p> <p>(+/-) Political will by local governments to negotiate and "let initiatives go" is a requirement to progress along the learning curve concerning CNRM. E.g., the case of Duru Hailamba in Tanzania (Wily, 1997 – see Box 9, Section IV.1.3), Kwapanin, in Ghana (Agyemang, 1996), Namibia (Jones, 1999) and Gambia (Bojang and Reeb, 1998).</p> <p>(+) However, broader political will is essential when the State wishes to expand otherwise isolated CNRM initiatives and develop related policies</p> <p>* CNRM can occur and succeed even under coercive and centralised political regimes. This is often the case when the meaning of national democracy may be of little relevance at local level (often the case when the State is present <i>in absentia</i> at the resource level) - E.g., Rural Fuelwood Markets in Niger were launched in 1988, i.e., under a dictatorship (Babin <i>et al.</i>, 1997)</p> <p>* "Political opening" often occurs after significant change following "traumatising" times, e.g., independence from South Africa in Namibia (Jones, 1999), change to a democratic regime in Mali in 1991, overthrowing of Idi Amin Dada in Uganda in 1986. In South Africa it was new legislation which came with the new regime which allowed the Makuleke to claim back their land (Rifhey, undated).</p> <p>* An enabling policy is not a prerequisite to launch CNRM initiatives, so long as political will exists – especially at local level. Many CNRM initiatives have developed successfully prior to the development of a policy framework. In many instances policy making has actually learned from these experiments - E.g., Gambia (Bojang and Reeb, 1998), Niger - see Section V.2.1. - and Tanzania (Alden Wily, 2000).</p> <p>* Lack of effective support in implementing CNRM is a greater constraint than lack of enabling policies – See Section VI.2.4.</p> <p>(+) An enabling policy is necessary to scale up CNRM – E.g., Malawi (Jere <i>et al.</i>, 2000) and Tanzania (Alden Wily, 2000)</p>
	4.2. Enabling/non enabling policy	

4.3. Enabling/non-enabling legal framework	<p>(+) Likewise 4.2., an enabling legal framework is not a precondition to initiate CNRM activities. Most African countries with well-developed CNRM initiatives and even policies still lack supportive laws (Lindsay, 1998). An enabling legal framework is however required to sustain and expand these initiatives.</p> <p>(-) In many cases, village-based institutions lack legal recognition. This hampers communities' ability to control access to their resource by outsiders. The few exceptions to this include the Co-operatives and Village Committees in the Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie II project in Niger (Ibro <i>et al.</i>, 1998), the newly empowered Combat Groups monitoring charcoal trading from village lands in Malawi (Mutambeta pers. comm. 2000), and, at national level, Village Councils in Tanzania (Alden Wily, 2000).</p> <p>(-) In many African countries several ruling systems exist at the local level (i.e., formal laws - many Acts overlap with reference to natural resources, a complexity exacerbated by the occurrence of central and local government laws - customary and even sometimes project-based "laws"). This creates confusion, hence <i>de facto</i> open access to resources. However, this is mitigated within communities by the prevalence of customary rules where traditional authorities are strong. The confusion happens mainly when communities have to deal with "external" stakeholders (e.g., communities versus logging companies in Central Africa, urban versus rural dwellers in the SIWAA case, Mali).</p> <p>* The national legal framework should allow for the development of "local laws" (Le Roy <i>et al.</i>, 1996), to overcome the State's "non-functioning legality" (Onibon <i>et al.</i>, 1999). E.g., the SIWAA case in Mali (Hilhorst and Aarhnik, 1999)</p>
4.4. More centralised/decentralised government institutions	<p>(+) Decentralisation is a facilitating factor, not a precondition for successful CNRM. Many CNRM initiatives have succeeded in Africa, while successful genuine devolution of authority and means in relation to natural resource management remains to be seen.</p> <p>(-) Tools such as plans and permits are often used by central governments and local line agencies to retain decision-making power over resources - see also Section IV.1.3.(ii)</p> <p>(-) Stronger local governments might disempower customary authorities if the latter disagree with village representatives who are part of local councils. When this is the case, a key issue lies in the right forms of representation of broad community interests within elected local councils - see also Section IV.1.3.(iii).</p> <p>(-) Communities might be subject to both national and local regulations. Ministers may pre-empt local assembly by-laws that are in contravention of sectoral laws (comments by Trick (2000) concerning Malawi)</p>
4.5. Relationships between elected bodies and line agencies	<p>(-) There is often confusion of mandates and a turf fight between elected bodies and line agencies, e.g., the example of Box 9 in Section IV.1.3.(v). This might be exacerbated under a decentralised ruling administrative system.</p>

* *Direct* means that no middleman is engaged in the realisation of benefits and management is conducted by the people themselves. This typically includes products used for every day life, NTFP enterprises, beliefs and environmental services.
Indirect is when the management has to partly or totally rely on capital and skills from outside the community. This typically concerns timber and wildlife-based eco-tourism.

However, experience is increasingly demonstrating that forest resources of (too) high market value often constitute a complicating factor in CNRM. This is probably one of the major factors that explain the lack of progress on this matter in Central Africa, compared to the Sahel and East-Southern Africa. Commercialisation of resources puts pressures on common property resources because of the mix of local and outside interests it generates and the power relations involved. First, there is a risk that the most powerful - local elites or outsiders - will reap most of the benefits. High stakes attract outside speculators, as evidenced by the proportion of foreign interests involved in timber exploitation in Central Africa. This inevitably increases the external pressures on local stakeholders, and even sometimes governments, while reducing their ability to control the use of the resource involved.

It is difficult to reach agreement on collaborative management of highly valued resources (e.g., timber). In such situations, it might be best to focus first on trying to negotiate the sharing of benefits - and responsibilities and rights - for those resources in the area which have more medium-level commercial value (e.g., non-timber forest products). Once trust is established, and benefit sharing is seen to be working, it might be possible to build on this and talk about sharing the more valuable resources, but this is being optimistic.

A second important issue is that highly priced resources also influence national natural resource management strategies. For example, in most African countries, the State asserts ownership of the trees that produce high-quality timber. Experiences of collaborative forest management are more advanced in the Sahel and dry Eastern-Southern Africa (with deciduous/*miombo* type forests) than in Central Africa where the monetary value of forest is higher and more important to the national economy. In the Sahel, there have been genuine moves towards decentralisation of natural resource management (including forest) - though with mixed results so far - but in the Congo Basin, attempts to introduce such approaches have been cosmetic at best.

Foreign business interests in forests in Central Africa are very important and there are great opportunities for financial gain - at both government and individual levels. Covert forest policy, driven by foreign timber companies, has significant power and influence over planning and management strategies in rural areas in that region. By contrast, in the Sahel, interests in forest resources are confined within national borders. Although these can play a significant role in local development,¹⁹ governments themselves are not under foreign pressures and cannot generate substantial revenues from the resource base.

Some natural resource managers and academics argue that areas with poor natural capital endowment are protected from vested and powerful interests, and that this, in turn, is likely to lead to better governance and synergy between civil society and local governments. Examples of such situations have been documented mainly in Latin America where there has been a longer tradition of politically driven rural (decentralised) development than in Africa or Asia.²⁰

¹⁹ This role can often be negative to local development, when "external" stakeholders tend to reap most benefits of resource exploitation, as in the case of the powerful charcoal lobby in Senegal.

²⁰ See, for example, Tandler and Freedheim (1994) for north-east Brazil; Faguet (1997) for Bolivia; and Bebbington *et al.* (1997) for Colombia.

(ii) Commercial versus subsistence use of natural resources

The commercial value of resources further complicates the picture because, conversely to user rights (i.e., for self-consumption), usufruct rights (i.e., rights to commercialise) are associated with an array of official requirements, including management plans, permits, etc.. Empirical evidence shows that the commercialisation of natural resources is often non-sustainable (Enters and Anderson, 1999), and therefore requires more control than their use for consumption. However, the conventional instruments to exert such control, i.e., permits, maps/zoning and plans, are often used by governments to retain decision-making power over the fate of these same resources. We shall return to this issue in Section IV.1.2.(ii).

IV.1.2. Re: the community

(i) Legal status of community-based organisations (CBOs)

The literature reviewed by the authors for the purpose of this paper unanimously acknowledges that the widespread lack of legal recognition of community-based organisations is a major hindrance for the sustainability and expansion of CNRM initiatives. Legal authority usually stops at district level, even in the most advanced decentralisation programmes (Dubois, 1997). Notable exceptions include the Rural Markets Committees in the Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie II Project in Niger (Ibro *et al*, 1998 – see Section V.2.1), and, at a country scale, the Village Councils of Tanzania (Alden Wily, 2000). In the latter case, this might explain why Tanzania is the country leading the way in Africa in terms of spreading of CNRM.²¹ Box 4 illustrates the current move towards legal recognition of village authorities in Malawi.

Box 4: How to confer legal status on villages in Malawi.

In order to overcome the limitations of villages being unofficial and non-legal entities, the idea of Village Trusts was put forward by those who prepared the Nankumba Peninsular Strategic Plan. In order to form a link between the informal community ownership of resources and more formal legal structures, it was suggested that the best means available under existing Malawi law is for villages to legally form themselves as Village Trusts. Such a trust would provide a legal mechanism through which open access to resources can be converted to community access, a recognised precondition for sustainable resource use.

The principle of the Village Trust (VT) is as follows: Villages register their entire membership as the beneficiaries of the trust. They then select a board of trustees, develop a constitution to govern their affairs and register the trust under the Trustees Incorporation Act of 1968. This registration confers upon the trust a legal persona – giving it the right to enter contracts, operate business enterprises and own land and property under statutory law. The entire community through its trust would then assume the role of landlord over its resources.

In the process of drawing up the Strategic Plan a number of concerns were raised over the Village Trust approach.

- a) Would village trusts take away power from the Village Headman and the Traditional Authority?
- b) Would VTs control ALL the land and resources within the community boundaries?

In response to the first, Yes VTs do have the potential to marginalise a TA that does not enjoy respect, a consideration that is in fact quite healthy for civil governance. The response to the second concern is that the focus of the Trust would be on areas where there is communal tenure (i.e., not agricultural land).

To date no village trusts have been formed.

Source: Nankumba Peninsular Strategic Plan, May 1999, ULG Consultants Ltd.

²¹ Data regarding Tanzania collected by Alden Wily account for more than 1,500 units under community management, covering more than 300,000 hectares (Alden Wily, 2000).

Absence of legal personality is mainly problematic when it comes to controlling outsiders' acts because customary rules often prevail for intra-village matters, and in some cases, between neighbouring villages (e.g., the Waide Kelka and SIWAA cases in Mali – Dème, 1999 and Hilhorst and Aarnink, 1999). However, Lindsay (1999) warns against the possible use of village legal personality by local elites to their own benefits. This is where the State has a regulatory role to play, and we will discuss this matter in Chapter 6. It has also to do with the way village institutions are set and the roles traditional authorities play, a subject to which we turn now.

(ii) The role of village authorities

The role of traditional authorities in CNRM is contentious and the object of fierce debate. Poor performance of traditional authorities has often been blamed solely on the curtailing of their authority by colonial rulers. In independent Africa, this would mean that they are ready to resume their role as custodians and therefore ensure the sustainable management of natural resources. Unfortunately, the picture is not that simple. There is nowadays ample evidence that traditional authorities do not always:²²

- represent communities' interests. This tends to be exacerbated where the proportion of non-native population is significant (e.g., migrants from Sahel in Côte d'Ivoire, temporary residents in Central Africa), and where the "natural capital" attracts "external" interests;²³
- hold sufficient knowledge on forestry matters especially when it comes to the commercialisation of forest goods and where the resource base is under pressure. Furthermore, in many areas where forest is sparse, the chief's authority appears more justified to villagers on matters pertaining to land allocation than the use of forest resources (e.g., Sahel and Malawi). This is because trees and forests are seen as "put there by God"; they are not the product of man's work and thus cannot be "owned".

On the other hand, many would argue that, whenever traditional authorities are strong enough, there are compelling arguments that they constitute a facilitating factor in the implementation of CNRM initiatives.²⁴ Some would even argue that concepts such as equity and approaches such as participation should be "indigenised" (Babin *et al*, 1997).

Perhaps a realistic way to move forward in this debate is to simply agree with Brown (1999) that:

'What appears "traditional" at any one moment is a reflection of the balance of power in the society, and when the balance changes so do traditions evolve'

²² Arguments about the limitations of traditional authorities in ensuring sustainable management of forest resources and representing their constituencies' interests are synthesised in Leach (1999) and Ribot (1999b) for Francophone West Africa, and Brown (1999) and Karsenty and Joiris (1999) for West-Central Africa.

²³ Mechanisms to improve local representation are discussed further in this paper (see Section IV.1.2.(iii))

²⁴ See for instance Muam Chi (1999) for Cameroon, Hilhorst and Aarnink (1999) for Mali and Zambia and Katerere *et al* (1999) regarding Zimbabwe.

Another and related thorny issue concerns the case of corrupt village leaders. Again, opinions diverge on this complex issue. This is illustrated in Box 5, which synthesises some brief interviews carried out in by one the authors (Janet Lowore) for the purpose of this paper.

Box 5: The case of corrupt leaders – Opinions from Malawi

Authority over customary land is vested in the Traditional Chieftaincy institution. The Traditional Authority Leader (TA) presides over a large area within which are several Group Village Headmen (GVH), who in turn preside over several Village Headmen (VH). The village is the smallest operational unit.

- (a) The first informant said that Yes if a Village Headman does something out of step with his responsibilities e.g. sell off village land the villagers can complain to the Group Village Headman and even to the Traditional Authority Leader. The VH will then be given a reprimand by the chief above him (in the worst case he can be removed and replaced by another member of the same family).
- (b) Another said that VHs who sell land do so with the full complicity of the GVH or maybe even TA and they all get a slice of the action. Otherwise they would not dare do it.
- (c) In a certain village with a Village Forest Area the VH said, when asked, "No he could not help himself to forest produce without knowledge and consultation with whole community for fear of losing his Leadership"
- (d) A certain BCFP²⁵ committee sold some Eucalyptus poles and earned MK 12,000 but only MK 3000 made its way into the Village Bank Account. One member of the committee had embezzled the rest with the knowledge of the VH who also got his cut. Because the rest of the committee knew this they could not complain to the VH because he was also guilty. It transpired that the VH was bitter because the committee had gone for training whilst the VH had not. The Forestry Assistant concluded that the solution to the problem was to "motivate the VH with a training course" – whereupon he would prevent malpractice within the committee rather than allow it.
- (e) In another locality a bare hill was reforested by the Forestry Department who then handed the woodlot over to the village. When the TA realised that the Chairman of the committee (set up to manage the woodlot) whom he had selected was intending to share the benefits from the hill to the entire community the TA stepped in, replaced the chairman took up the post of Treasurer himself, sold all the poles and pocketed the lion's share of the proceeds for himself. The hill has since been turned over to maize gardens and the community forestry effort ceased to be.
- (f) Another said the answer to weak and corrupt leadership was "training for transformation" a kind of training using role plays which is supposed to transform people from what they are into something else – in the case of local leaders "into better leaders". This can be quite effective.
- (g) Along the same line, another said that "change agents" can be crucial to facilitate discussions between communities and their leaders in an attempt to "make them understand".
- (h) One informant said strong chiefs are "important for mobilising communities who are slacking" "a certain chief in the area is very influential and people will do what he tells them to do". Examples include a TA banning charcoal burning in his area and another banning slash and burn for millet cultivation.
- (i) Almost all Malawians agree that chiefs are very important to enable success and can cite excellent examples - but then struggle to identify what communities can do if they are lumbered with a weak and/or corrupt chief. They usually identify "training" and "civic education" and "sensitisation" as the answer. Others (including some Malawian-based ex-pats who do not instinctively respect and fear Chiefs) will however conclude that chiefs can hinder progress by trying to claw back power by diverting development agendas for their own personal gain.

The final conclusion seems to be that the Chiefs are there and rather than side-step them it is better to try to capitalise on what influence and leadership skills they do have. This might involve trying to introduce concepts such as equity and participation into their management styles. Perhaps the greatest argument against those who insist on electing leaders is that those who are elected – such as MPs – seem not to show any greater or lesser incidence of corruption and power-greediness than the hereditary chiefs.

Source: Series of brief interviews carried out by Janet Lowore during the week of March 20th, 2000

²⁵ BCFP: Blantyre City Fuelwood Project, Malawi.

Using the Radio can Help

In an example from Participatory Fisheries Management, Lake Malombe, Malawi, one Village Headman was harbouring several fishermen in his village who were using banned fishing gear (the mesh sizes were beneath the minimum size) – the fishermen had bought him a boat and some fishing gear in return.

The radio programme "Fishing Today" came to the village to interview the local Beach Village Committees and the VH. The interviewer asked him whether the stories he was hearing about bribery were indeed true. The VH was forced to admit that sometimes this can happen. Presumably following some kind of tip-off the TA then summoned the VH and told him to tell the fishermen with the illegal gear to leave and that he should not behave in this way again. This worked.

The story was provided to show one way of dealing with corrupt leaders.

Source: Dr. Scholz, Presentation at a meeting held by the Coordination Unit for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (CURE) on 24-3-2000.

Some interesting issues emerge from these interviews:

- One key aspect relates to the apparent opportunity of recourse to a third party that people have in case they are not happy with the behaviour of the village headman, illustrating an institutionalised mechanism to challenge the official village authority. Such possibility of recourse is of course only possible if the traditional authorities are not involved in the fishy business themselves. In fact, in Malawi, a Village Headman is very rarely removed but the mechanism is technically there. Be that as it may, the recourse mechanism itself is rather uncommon in many other African countries.
- Another interesting aspect lies in the allusion to training for transformation/civic education made by two informants. This suggests some partial societal changes, which, by definition, take time. In addition, it might be a chicken-and-egg issue, corrupt leaders are those in most need for such training, but they may not be motivated to attend them in the first place (unless allowances provide sufficient incentive). Meanwhile, what solutions for villagers stuck with a corrupt leader? In Malawi, theoretically, villagers can topple a Village Headman but in practice it is very rare indeed and he would have to do something really terrible. The reason why it is rare is a) it would take a very confident individual to challenge the VH because if he failed he would then be at the mercy of the VH; b) Culturally, people adopt the avoidance or the negotiation strategy to conflict rather than confrontation. This is where Babin *et al.*'s (1997) point of "indigenising" equity and participation become relevant. It might be what is being attempted in Malawi, hence the "training for transformation" for the Chiefs. The risk lies perhaps in expecting the Chiefs to play pivotal roles in CNRM – acting as mobilisers, supervisors, patrons etc. without giving them real power. What is their incentive? Traditionally they did not need an incentive – they had power! Today they do not have the same power.
- More broadly, this sample of opinions shows that the issue is complex and again, contextual. It boils down to the way CNRM is institutionalised within the village, and how villagers organise themselves to do a community effort.

The latter point relates to the key issue of the accountability of community-based organisations (CBOs). Means of accountability used in industrialised countries often bear little resemblance with those found – if any - in highly hierarchical rural societies, such as in Northern Cameroon. So long as the existing system ensures enough equity in the eyes of the local population, it seems very presumptuous - and risky - for outside interventions to attempt at changing deeply rooted social institutions in a short period of time. However, provision of training on functional literacy might provide an indirect means to increase

accountability of CBOs - if needed - by increasing access to information to a wider section of the population. We shall return to the issue of accountability in Section VI.2.3.

(iii) Money matters at community level

Money matters are crucial in two different ways at the community level, i.e., (a) how to financially sustain CNRM, and in particular management activities and CBOs, and (b) how to ensure a fair sharing of benefits from the exploitation of forest resources.

* Funds to run and sustain CNRM

The issue of compensation for work associated with CNRM is still the object of debate. Based on their experience in Gambia, Bojang and Reeb (1998) argue that community members should not receive compensation as this would be perceived as a salary paid for activities requested and supervised by "outsiders", thus reducing ownership of the process of developing CNRM, which they have agreed upon. However, other examples show that transaction costs of CNRM can over-burden the villagers involved in running it, and even when some compensation is planned, it may not be perceived as fair (e.g., the SIWAA case in Mali – Hilhorst and Aamink, 1999). The issue is often exacerbated by the time it takes to reach an agreement on CNRM, especially on the part of the forestry service (e.g., in the SIWAA case in Mali). Inadequate compensation might also favour free-riding in that some people might prefer to make money from the sale of forest resources than work for free for CNRM initiatives. Some villagers might also compensate themselves, like in the case of the Blantyre City Fuelwood Project in Malawi. This might be acceptable so long as it is done with the consensus of the community.

In several instances, CBOs have their own schemes to generate income to cover their recurrent costs. This can come in the form of fines for trespassing local rules (e.g., SIWAA case in Mali), from selling confiscated forest produce (e.g., Mwanza Project in Malawi), taxes on the exploitation of forest resources or entry fees in safari-type eco tourism. The former sources of income are normally not very sustainable, since good CNRM should imply less and less offenders over time.

Costs associated to technical operations to develop forest management plans are often a barrier to CNRM schemes and are discussed further in this paper (see section IV.1.3.(ii)).

* Benefit sharing

The success of CNRM projects often hinges on the perception that the benefits from the utilisation of natural resources are fairly shared within the community. Some generic lessons can be drawn on this issue, based on experience documented in recent literature i.e.,

- Despite the acknowledged key role of sufficient access to benefits in the success of CNRM, in some instances, the increase of control over access to natural resources has been a higher incentive than access to benefits (e.g., in Namibia, - Jones, 1999; The Gambia – Bojang and Reeb, 1998, and in the CAMPFIRE Project in Zimbabwe – Peter Frost, pers.com.);

- CNRM initiatives where community participation is mainly based on financial incentives face a sustainability challenge if they do not integrate institutional issues (e.g., CNRM initiatives in Central Africa – Nguingiri, 1998b);
- In relation to the above, fair benefit sharing largely depends on the interests and behaviour of the village authorities, and this was discussed above (Section IV.1.2.(ii));
- It seems also often more difficult to achieve when resource asset has a highly marketable value, an issue also discussed earlier in this paper (Section IV.1.1.(i));
- Murphree (1993) states that “differential inputs must result in differential benefits” i.e., those who most heavily bear the cost must benefit in proportion to those costs.
- In some countries, like Namibia, the use of benefits is left to communities (Jones, 1999). In many cases benefits are not reinvested in natural resource management, but rather in short-term operations:
 - * dividends to individual households’ income, which be used at their own discretion;
 - * community social infrastructure (e.g., health centres, schools) (Jere *et al*, 2000). While such investments have more chances to benefit all sections of the community than those in productive activities, they also increase the risk of free riding, in that some individuals might seek to benefit both from the social infrastructure and still exploit forest resources without following CNRM agreements (Nguingiri, 1998a);
 - * a combination of the above.
- Even when a proportion of the benefits from the utilisation of natural resources is earmarked for managing these resources, as in the case of CNRM in The Gambia,²⁶ the main purpose is often more linked to the use of the resources for livelihoods than to environmental preoccupations.
- In several instances, the middleman has the lion’s share of benefits from the exploitation of forest resources. However, some mechanisms have proven successful in mitigating this inequity, e.g.:
 - * producer price fixing for fuelwood in Burkina Faso (Ribot, 1995);
 - * providing direct access to urban markets to villagers, hence bypassing the middleman (e.g., the ILO-funded Kita project in Mali). However, this should be accompanied by measures to replace different services often provided by middlemen, e.g., credit systems, information from urban centres, sometimes transportation);
 - * improving villagers’ access to market information.
- The capacity of villagers to manage financial resources associated with the exploitation of natural resources is often far from rigorous. Some well-intentioned government

²⁶ In The Gambia, about 40 per cent of the proceeds from forest management activities should be reinvested in the forest (Bojang and Reeb, 1998).

measures do not help when not accompanied by supportive mechanisms to ensure effective spending of the benefits. This is illustrated in Box 6 for Cameroon. Again there is a need for a negotiation process here, with a referee role indispensable when it comes to financial relationships.²⁷

Box 6: The low effectiveness of government measures aimed at formalising benefit-sharing between logging companies and communities in Cameroon

In 1997, the Cameroonian government issued a regulation aimed at formalising the portion of benefits logging companies should pay to local communities, as a complement to the existing dialogue systems (*tenue de palabre*). Two measures were promulgated (Brown, 1999):

- An annual tax per hectare of the logging concessions (Unités Forestières d'Aménagement – UFA), which is annually revised by the Ministry of Finance.²⁸ The revenues incurred are supposed to be shared between the State (50 per cent), regional council (40 per cent) and communities (10 per cent). However, there is ample evidence that this regulation is widely not enforced (Bigombé Logo and Nkourm-Me-Tseny, 1998);
- 1,000 CFA/m³ from sales of standing volume (*ventes de coupe*) should go to neighbouring communities and used for the development of social infrastructure. Again, this is often not respected because loggers either count on the ignorance of villagers and do not pay, or pay an apparently large sum at the beginning of the operation, hoping that it will avoid them paying the full amount corresponding to the volumes exploited (Mendouga Mebenga, 1998).

More broadly, there are concerns on the capacity of local communities to expend such tax windfalls effectively. These relate not only to the balance between community and individual gains, but also to the frequent lack of management experience at village level. Moreover, these taxes might be seen as a simple right to share the profits from logging so long as the company is in the neighbourhood, and thus do not necessarily lead to better management of forest resources. There is already evidence that environmental concerns are far behind other more short-term needs that can be addressed by the revenues from these taxes (Mendouga Mebenga, 1998).

These taxes could become an entry point to structure partnerships between local actors, so long as the government favours the processes of negotiation and setting of agreements versus an automatic and often counter distribution of profits, which often proves counter effective to CNRM in the long run.

Source: Mendouga Mebenga, 1998, Brown, 1999 and Karsenty and Joiris, 1999

IV.1.3. Re: The State

(i) Political will at local level

For CNRM initiatives to be launched, at the very least there should be an acknowledgement on the part of local political and traditional leaders that negotiation is needed for local development. This is often not easy to achieve, especially where power disparities are significant, as it may undermine the power-base of the ruling elites. De Graaf (1996) proposes several mechanisms to mitigate this. These include the review of formal policies and their implementation, the "mapping out" of who does what and how, and the regular interaction with decision makers (e.g., through workshops, one-to-one contacts, high level steering groups, task forces, etc.). The '4Rs' tool introduced in Section III.2. (see point 42) and used in Chapter V, might provide a good framework for this type of interaction, starting with a local burning issue. The multi-criteria analysis approach

²⁷ This will be further discussed in Chapter V (see Section V.3.3).

²⁸ It amounted to 2,500 CFA/ha in 1997 and 1,500 CFA/ha in 1999 (Mendouga Mebenga, 1998 and Brown, 1999).

presented in Annex 1 might be another option or a complement to the '4Rs' framework, especially when dialogue between stakeholders is blocked.

(ii) Formal technical and administrative tools to regulate rights, power and authority to forest resources - Management plans, maps, permits and national interest.

Despite a widespread discourse on decentralisation, examples of real devolution of power, resources and authority beyond local governments are scant, if any. Permits are required all over Africa once a villager wants to make commercial use of forest products. In addition, forest management plans and a management organisation add other requirements where community-based land use and forestry initiatives are in place. Other instruments include quotas and management by the State for reasons of national interest. In practice, these requirements often strongly limit the amount of control over commercial decisions devolved to rural populations, i.e.:

- Quotas of exploitable resource and rules of cutting are usually determined by the forestry service. One notable exception is Mali, where the annual quota is decided by an *ad hoc* commission composed of two representatives of the local management organisation, one from local government and one member of the forestry service. However, even in this case, allocation of quotas rests in the hands of the Governor, hence a governmental body at the regional level, which is also in charge of solving conflicts on that topic.
- It is often the local elites, who have more access to the information and political leverage, that compose the management organisations;
- Management plans usually include a mix of technical and economic decisions. The need for a management plan is in itself laudable. However, it also bears some problems in terms of practicality, risks of discrimination, and unfair use to restrict access to forest resources by local users, i.e.:

* Is it really equitable to use formal management plans in a context of poorly educated and often illiterate people? Obviously, only a small fraction of the local population would really participate in the elaboration of such plans. Moreover, costs of operations associated with management plans are often prohibitive for communities,²⁹ and vulnerable to their appropriation by powerful local elites;

* Is it feasible - especially in terms of capacity needs and cost effectiveness - to expect every rural community to articulate a management plan when it wants to use forests for commercial purposes?

* Management plans can sometimes be used in an unfair mode to restrict access to the resource. For instance, in Senegal, according to the Forestry Code, a community forest management plan can be refused by the local forestry service, which can, in turn, accept the plan of whoever it wants.³⁰ A similar situation can be found in Mali, however

²⁹ Brown (1999) reports that the costs of inventory before exploitation alone can well amount to US\$ 75 per hectare or more in Cameroon.

³⁰ In theory, another law, i.e. the Law on the National Domain, requires that the agreement to exploit forest resources can only go to local citizens, on an individual or group basis. However, this provision is, more often than not, ignored (Capafic Stratégies, 1997).

with the difference that, under the new decentralisation programme, it is the forestry service that submits the management plan to the municipal body in charge for acceptance. It remains to be seen how the recent laws on decentralisation/ regionalisation and transfer of competence in these two countries will change this situation. In Cameroon, community forestry permits can be withdrawn from villages for reasons of national interest (*Utilité Publique* – Bigombé Logo and Nkoum-Me-Ntseny, 1998).

More broadly, one can wonder if formal plans that cover many years really make sense at community and farm level, given the need for flexibility to adapt to yearly changes in climatic and/or market conditions.³¹ Therefore, perhaps yearly programming rather than long-term planning is necessary, at least to inform the municipal level of the expected contribution from local government agencies. Long-term planning is more necessary at municipal level, as a component of higher administrative planning levels. In short:

- Planning *what to do* should not apply to the whole farm or community area, but rather to the municipal level.
- What is rather necessary at community level is planning *what not to do*, i.e., standards and norms that ensure environmental conservation even through productive use of natural resources. This is what actually happens with taboos and other restrictive rules regarding natural resources in indigenous societies.³² This and the frequent partitioning of land according to its different potential by rural communities can actually be seen as the predominant form of land use planning in rural areas of Africa.³³ Yet, it is not officially recognised because it is not in a written form. It thus seems a good basis for local planning and collaboration, but the key test often lies in its resilience under increased pressure on the resource asset (e.g., by population increase, outsiders claims, gazettelement, etc).

³⁰ Kerkhof (2000) provocatively argues that formal management plans are not necessary for actual management and do not necessarily constitute a form of progress. He gives the example of France, where barely 1 per cent of all forest estates has a written management plan; which does not imply that 99 per cent of the forest estates in the country are not managed. On the same line, Kaimowitz (2000), reviewing Sofia Hirakuri's recent study on "Enforcement of Forest Laws in Finland" points out the fact that Finnish law does not require forest owners to have forest management plans, although the government encourages them to use management plans to improve their operations. Plans are required, however, to qualify for loans or subsidies.

³¹ A comparison between local management of natural resources and a football game might be useful to further clarify the differences between what should and what should not be planned, i.e.

- in football, rules are set by the Federation in order to determine mainly what can not be done on the pitch;
- there are no official plans aimed at telling players what to do at every moment of the game
- overall tactics are the coaches' task.

The comparison with local management of natural resources holds if one compares the Federation to municipal councils that would include representatives from communities and farmers, coaches to local leaders and players to individual farmers.

³² Many researchers and practitioners have documented this, e.g. Kerkhof (2000) for Sahel, and Joiris (1996) for Central Africa.

The restrictions discussed above are often relaxed in several ways:

** The non-enforcement of formal regulations at local level*

In many rural areas of Africa, what prevails is a mixture of informal arrangements between villagers and local foresters and the reliance on customary rules to regulate daily activities. This situation is not always conducive to equity nor sustainable management of forest resources because:

- on the one hand, informal arrangements favour the more powerful individuals and/or groups as well as actions aiming at short term benefits;
- on the other hand, customary leadership tends to loose authority in many areas, especially under strong pressure on the resource from exogenous forces.

** Loss of authority by local forestry services due to changes in land managers*

This happens in several guises, e.g.

- Ngaïdo (1994, cited in Ribot, 1995) gives the example of a county, in Niger, where the new land managers increasingly shift from local citizens to dignitaries, civil servants, merchants, and almost sixty per cent of these new owners come from Niamey. In the wake of the government's objective to increase national self-sufficiency, agricultural production objectives prevailed over local self-sufficiency and a lot of forests were turned into farming fields. This physical change as well as the clout of the new land managers resulted in the loss of control of land use by the local forestry service.
- As "experimental laboratories", projects are often authorised to try innovative arrangements. In Francophone West Africa, this phenomenon is epitomised by the projects that used to promote the "Gestion de Terroir" approach (GT).³⁴ Indeed, it is mainly via projects that success stories on CNRM are known and reported beyond the local level. This does not mean that success stories only occur in the context of projects. In many instances, they happen without being noticed by outsiders. Nonetheless, projects often seem to play a catalyst role in good CNRM. Yet, this privilege may stem precisely from their artificial, non-political and limited (both in time and scope), hence non-threatening character vis-à-vis existing power structures in the "real" world.
- Decentralisation is aimed at reinforcing local decision making, but often results in mainly strengthening local elected bodies, often at the expense of traditional authorities, but also local forestry services. This issue is discussed further in this paper (see Section IV.1.3.(v)).

The use of maps is another cause for concern in the development of CNRM. The difficulties mainly stem from different rationales to represent and delineate forest areas between local communities and "modern"³⁵ entities. This is particularly the case in areas where forests still represent the most widespread ecosystem and are closely linked to rural people's way of life. The Congo Basin epitomises this situation in Africa, and differences of perceptions

³⁴ "Gestion de Terroir" refers to a village land management approach widespread in Francophone West Africa.

³⁵ "Modern" here refers to government official and experts.

have recently been documented by several authors.³⁶ Karsenty and Joiris (1999) have neatly synthesised them as in Table 5.

Table 5: "Modern" and "customary" perceptions of forest areas in Central Africa

	"Modern" representation	"Customary" representation
Structuring principle	Territory	Social exchanges linked to spaces
Basis for delineation	Geometric/zoning	Network of intertwined spaces
Knowledge basis	Limits	Locations
Allocation principle	Specialisation	Multiplicity of uses
Economic rationale	Profit maximisation	Risk reduction and minimisation of maximum profits
Judicial basis	Property	Heritage

Source: Karsenty and Joiris (1999)

One major consequence of these differences is that, while the State tends to exclude people according to well-delineated spaces (i.e., the purpose of zoning), forest dwellers' exclusion principles are more linked to different practices, and these evolve over time. Joiris (1996) and Vermeulen and Dethier (1998) have clearly shown the danger linked to the current legal prevalence of the State's logic in delineating CNRM areas: it often results in a considerable reduction in size of "customary" areas, hence entailing over-exploitation and/or encroachment by villagers. This and also cost-effectiveness considerations have led many specialists in CNRM to question the pertinence and feasibility of nation wide zoning programmes (Vermeulen, 1997, Kerkhof, 2000). Rather, they suggest that the delineation of community areas should be left to local governments, together with customary authorities and villagers. The way forward requires a negotiation based on the principle that both systems are legitimate, and that informal management does not necessarily equal poor management.

(iii) Representation of communities' interests at local level

Finding the right mode of representation of communities' interests is still the object of much debate and experimentation throughout Africa. This is a crucially important and problematic issue, both within village committees and within elected councils at local government level.

As regards representation within intra- and inter-village committees, a review of several recent experiences of village committees in Francophone West Africa shows that: (Bonnet, 1995; David, 1995, Hiihorst and Aarnink, 1999)

- The most effective bodies have started very informally and have shaped gradually, according to first lessons learned from their involvement in natural resource management. However, letting CBOs develop as the need arises – as opposed to creating new structures to answer administrative requirements – takes time, i.e., typically up to ten years;
- Technicians should not have the majority of seats in local decision-making bodies, in order to avoid technical matters dominating the debates;

³⁶ See in particular Joiris (1996) and Karsenty and Joiris (1999) for Central Africa, and Pénelon (1997), Vermeulen (1997) and Van den Berg (1998) more specifically for Cameroon.

- There is still a debate on the pros and cons of decisions being taken by committees, representing one or several villages, as compared to general assemblies, where everyone can listen and make their opinions known.

A few lessons can be drawn from recent experience as regards the representation of communities' interests within local councils, i.e.: (Dubois, 1997)

- Elected bodies are not necessarily representative of local stakeholders' interests, in particular in the absence of independent candidates to the polls;
- Likewise, local leaders are not a guarantee of good representation;
- What seems more important is *trustworthiness*, a key ingredient, e.g.:
 - * setting up of parallel structures to the formal ones, where important decisions are actually taken. These can be formal, like the Resistance Councils in Uganda, or informal and more culturally entrenched, as in Tanzania and many places in West Africa;
 - * working through traditional leadership structures, e.g., the reintroduction of traditional leaders and traditional leader boundaries in Zimbabwe;³⁷
 - * creating sub-committees in order to separate management from advisory functions, in some "Gestion de Terroir" projects;
 - * appointment of ordinary "honourable citizens" who command respect in local negotiation, e.g., District Conciliation Courts in Burkina Faso (see Box 7), Village Forest Committees in the Duru Haitemba and Mgori woodlands in Tanzania (see Box 8);
 - * allowing for the presence of independent candidates in elected bodies. This can go to the extreme position of refusing political militants to the polls, as in the case of Burkina Faso, Uganda and Ghana.

Box 7: District Conciliation Courts in Burkina Faso

District Conciliation Courts (DCC) have been created since 1993 to settle land disputes. They are chaired by Préfets (District Officers) and composed of four lay-assessors. Interestingly, these are neither customary chiefs, nor political militants, but rather "honourable citizens" from the community, e.g., retired school teachers, old members of the civil service and, to a lesser extent, younger high school graduates who usually play the role of secretaries. The blend of a central government representative and respected community members provides a rather good balance of state interests and community voice, hence a rather fair representation of interests.

However, the DCCs and the Préfets have been facing problems in applying rules, be they inspired by community norms or formal law. This is mainly due to the co-existence, at local level, of formal regulations and customary rules. In practice, it has resulted in:

- A dichotomy in which DCCs and the Préfets have either total or no control at all on the outcomes of land disputes. This usually stems from either rigorous application of state regulation, or a "laissez-faire" attitude, leaving decisions to local population groups, sometimes with tragic consequences;

³⁷ Under the new Traditional Leaders Act, Villages are now seen as the guardians of the land and natural resources. But the outstanding question is where does Zimbabwe find the financial resources to implement the Act and how can democratic and traditional leadership principles be balanced?

- In some instances, it is the invocation of possible use of coercive means by the state that leads to the settlement of conflicts over land.

In sum, the regulatory procedure concerning use of land and, by extension, of natural resources, seems to combine the logic of state law (aiming mainly at achieving order) and the substantial, although sometimes radical logic of local communities, thus often leading to new "local laws".

Source: Lund (1996)

Box 8: Local forest management in the Duru-Haitemba and Mgori *miombo* woodlands, Tanzania

Up to 1994, these woodlands were under government control and management. Their condition has been steadily degrading due to encroachment for farming, grazing, hunting and charcoal making by local people, and timber extraction mainly by outsiders.

In the case of Duru-Haitemba, plans to establish a forest reserve prompted local inhabitants from five villages to take as much as they could from the forest as fast as possible, undermining the conservation effort. Hence, local authorities informally agreed with project staff that gazetterment would be suspended, subject to demonstration that local communities could halt forest degradation. This implied that local communities would be responsible for daily management and control of the forest. This launched a very dynamic process by the villagers, including:

- Drawing-up simple but effective management plans, which mainly comprise rules concerning the use of the resources, and the modalities of fining offenders. Any use considered damaging was banned, even if it provided income to some local groups (e.g., charcoal burning, tree felling). Plans were refined and validated during village assemblies.
- Setting up of Village Forest Committees, as parallel decision-making bodies to the official village councils. The composition of the committees rapidly shifted from village leaders to ordinary villagers, as a response to previous mismanagement of funds and the consequent need for greater accountability.
- Selection of 100 Village Forest Guards to control abuses by both outsiders and insiders - government had previously employed only two forest rangers.
- Subsequently, village plans and rules have been re-written as by-laws, formally approved by the district authorities to provide the necessary legal back-up to informally derived regulatory instruments. This and the entitlement of village land have turned communities into legal owners and managers of their own forest reserves.
- Local foresters and outside advisers have provided only *ad hoc* assistance, e.g., advice on legal matters and resolving of inter-village boundary disputes.

Since the process began, degradation of the forest has reduced significantly, at no cost to the government. On the other hand, communities have gained power, through ownership, increased responsibility but also access to benefits from the resource. Finally, local foresters have been liberated from the coercive role, which failed to protect the forest, and are better able to provide technical assistance.

In 1995, a similar dynamic process was launched by local communities in the Mgori forest, with similar outcomes.

A major reason for the success to date of this lies in the fact that it was initiated locally, without outside pressures, nor the use of blueprint schemes. The important role of the government has been to let go of its powers.

Source: Wily (1997)

(iv) Absorption capacity and training

This is a controversial issue. In many developing countries, managerial and technical capacities are often weak, particularly in rural areas. However, other factors tend to foster and even, sometimes, create such weaknesses. For instance, lack of financial resources increases dependency on donors and hence on the views and priorities of outsiders. Several examples - mainly from Latin America - show that, when given the chance and the

appropriate conditions, local authorities show good skills in administering development initiatives and achieving their own objectives (e.g., see, e.g., Fizbein (1997) on Colombia, and Faguet (1997) on Bolivia). The perceived lack of capacity has been addressed by no end of capacity-development initiatives but these have failed, in the first place, to identify weaknesses and to assess needs. Often there are misunderstandings between the supporting (central or foreign) and recipient (decentralised) agencies. Frequently, these misunderstandings are caused by diverging objectives, unrealistic scale of initiatives, conditionalities attached to the use of funds, and institutional weaknesses.

There are also many meanings of *capacity* and donors have often ignored the political/power dimension - the capacity for good governance. Dia (1996) emphasises this in distinguishing between technical and institutional capacities.

- *Technical capacity* focuses on resources, i.e., the supply of skills and transfer of new technology, methods and systems. In this context, capacity development is essentially associated with training, education, and technical assistance that complement local supply. Technical capacity relates to the *supply-side* approach to capacity development. A major concern is the adequacy of resources: does the country (or department, community or other organisational unit) have enough qualified and experienced staff, money, infrastructure and equipment to do the job? If not, then the implication is that missing resources should be provided. The supply approach has dominated aid agencies' attempts to promote capacity development.
- *Institutional capacity* focuses on the ability of the country to make optimal use of the existing technical capacity and resources. The focus here is on capacity utilisation and absorptive capacity. It is more a *demand* approach, i.e., 'What are the features of this institutional environment that will encourage striving to do a good job, and make good use of the resources they have available?'. Here, the main issues are:
 - * Commitment of leadership;
 - * Local ownership;
 - * Legitimacy of institutions;
 - * Accountability to clients;
 - * Autonomy of organisations;
 - * Incentives to service and improvement of performance;
 - * Enforceability of rules.

Given the controversies over capacity issues (see section 4.4.1), and the usually disappointing performance of capacity-building programmes, a step-by-step approach may be the best way forward:

- Start by *agreeing on objectives* of development initiatives with local stakeholders;
- *Clarify/(re)negotiate roles* between the main stakeholders;
- The above two steps should serve as a basis for jointly *defining capacity needs*, as opposed to capacity building objectives being decided mainly by donors and/or national governments;
- Assess jointly with local stakeholders what can be achieved using the existing capacities, thus focusing on *capacity use* prior to capacity development;

- Assess where weaknesses lie and what types of local partnerships might overcome them;
- Encompass both technical and institutional capacities so as to address the key hidden institutional problems related to good governance;
- An initial build-up phase through a series of small-scale experimentation projects is often advisable.

From the above, it follows that a learning-by-doing philosophy should prevail in rural areas, at least in the early stages of capacity development.

Mayers and Kotey (1996), reviewing several community-based initiatives in Ghana, confirm that the provision of training is not necessarily a prerequisite for successful initiatives in local forest management. Assistance can be provided as needs arise and as part of a partnership process.

Training should concern not only technical but, also, managerial and planning matters. Materials relevant to training are best conveyed in the context of real issues and activities. This closely links training and the application of knowledge - a very effective way for trainees to gain tangible benefits from their newly acquired skills (Club du Sahel/OECD 1998).

Research Centres and private organisations such as NGOs or local consulting firms have a vital role to play in the provision of training to local communities (see, for example, Bonnet, 1995 and Hilhorst and Aarnink, 1999). NGOs in particular often also play a key part in "smoothing" the interface between government agencies and communities when distrust characterises the relationships between these two local actors. This is sometimes difficult, when NGOs are born out of resentment against governments, and are therefore not predisposed to ensure government involvement in community-based initiatives. Moreover, NGOs have often proven weaker in the process of scaling up community-based initiatives (Farrington and Boyd, 1997; Turton *et al.*, 1998).

(v) Relationships between elected bodies and line agencies

Decentralisation is on the agenda of many national policies in Africa. One major consequence of this might be the reduction of decision-making power for local forestry services. For instance, in Mali, the local council can ask for technical assistance from whatever body it deems more appropriate between the local forestry service, research centres, NGOs or consulting firms as regards the management of non-Reserve Forest Land (Dubois *et al.*, 1996). Reducing the clout and tasks of the Forestry Services might improve CNRM given their inadequate resources and also the bad image this service frequently has within communities. However, it remains to be seen if providing more authority to elected bodies will improve the situation. It all has to do with the representation of community interests, an issue discussed earlier in this paper (see section IV.1.3. (iii)). On the other hand, there is a real danger that relationships between elected bodies and line agencies might suffer from decentralisation, adding to the frequent confusion in stakeholders' roles in CNRM. Box 9 illustrates this in the case of the Mulanje Mountain Project in Malawi and, at country level, in Zambia.

Box 9: State Actors: How do they get on?

Mulanje Mountain, Malawi

"The issues surrounding encroachment of the reserve have become highly politicised. On the one hand with the coming of democracy, people think that they can do as they please. Some encroachers said that they had started clearing land because they had heard politicians saying that they were free to cultivate any land that was not being used, such as indigenous forest, or in between trees in plantations. From the reports made to the Forestry Department, and from what our informants told us, it was clear that many of the ringleaders were party chairmen. Several informants also claimed that they had been encouraged by the local MP. In fact it was reported that relatives of a local MP had closed the forestry road in order to farm without being hampered by forestry workers.

Despite the democratic dispensation, many people, including civil servants, are intimidated by politicians including the MPs and party functionaries. The Forestry Department, with the support of the ministry as well as from MMCT, needs to be firm in educating politicians to uphold the rule of law. In co-management politicians should not be given a bigger role than they deserve".

Source: De Gabriele, (1999)

Zambia

In order to work, this concept (CNRM) requires a lot of commitments from the political and Government agencies. The current situation concerning forests is that they are usually used as a popularity campaign.

IV.1.4. Some elements for comparison between Francophone and Anglophone Africa

Major differences in ways of governing and regulating between France and Britain have been transferred to Africa during colonial times and are still noticeable today. As regards natural resource management, some of the major differences are summarised in Table 6 (drawn from Buttoud, 1997; Le Roy, 1995, Parren, 1994 and Mortimore, 1996).

Facts reveal that, despite important differences in the way public authority has been implemented and in the concerns of foresters in Anglophone and Francophone Africa, deforestation has been occurring in both language blocks since colonial times. This might imply that

- State official control over land in Francophone Africa bears less impact than expected on the fate of the forest. This has to do with the prevalence of customary rules at the resource level whatever the official system is, and also the frequent situation where the State is present *in absentia* to enforce its rights to land;
- So far, *de facto* administrative decentralisation, even if more noticeable in Anglophone countries - does not seem to have necessarily fostered better management, let alone conservation of natural resources at local level. The explanation lies probably in the usually poor performance of decentralisation in terms of efficiency, accountability and participation, even where it has been in place for several years. Hence, even if Anglophone forms of public authority have a potential advantage in facilitating good local governance, it has yet to materialise because true devolution of powers, responsibilities and means is seldom present at local level.³⁶ One often-cited exception is the decentralisation process in Botswana. However, in this case, some authors would argue that one major explanation for the efficiency of the process lies in the dominance

³⁶ However, in Cameroon, the only African country where both Francophone and Anglophone types of governance can be found, informal experimentation on CNRM is more possible in the Anglophone than the Francophone areas (John Casey, 1997, pers. comm.).

of bureaucrats in the process, hence reducing people's participation in the decision-making process (De Valk, 1990). One should however note that unsuccessful administrative decentralisation has, however, not prevented interesting initiatives in CNRM to develop. This issue will be discussed in Chapter VI.

Table 6: Some of the major differences between Anglophone and Francophone Africa in respect to natural resource management

Anglophone Africa	Francophone Africa
<p>1. Public authority</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public authority is much less centralised, more emphasis being placed on private initiatives and local bodies. More recognition of the role of individuals Hence the influence on: <p><i>* Ruling during colonial times and after</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indirect rule, i.e., via the traditional authorities, leaving undisturbed several customary rights <p><i>* Land tenure</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land belongs to traditional authorities, but is managed by the state on their behalf <p><i>* Regulating instruments:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rather than codes and regulations, one speaks more of statements and frameworks Existence of commissions, composed of respected individuals, who advise governments. <p><i>* The approach to participation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Active participation is more a tradition than in Francophone Africa, although it sometimes means the sharing of benefits in plantations (employment for the landless; monetary benefits for the landlord). <p><i>* Law system</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Common Law, hence relying on precedents. More flexible and adaptive, but less securing and more cumbersome. <p><i>* Administrative decentralisation</i> Given the prevalence of local dimension in regulating public affairs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>de facto</i> decentralisation has been in place for a long time the process is much less politicised, with more power given to civic society³⁹. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public authority is much more centralised and a state matter. It is made of a set of institutions aimed at controlling the private sector and individual initiatives. Hence : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Direct ruling, formally nullifying customary rights <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land belongs to the state <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The need for codes and regulations; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participation is often seen more as a means to consult people and change their behaviour. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civic Law, with codes that contain explicit rules and regulations - Less flexible, but more securing. <p>Given the prevalence of state authority:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> decentralisation is starting and is often inspired by European models the process is very much politicised, with little counter power from civic society
<p>2. Forest policies and status (Source: Parren, 1994) Ghana</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During and since colonial times, conservation has 	<p>Côte d'Ivoire</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During colonial time and some years after

³⁹ In Ghana, no-partisan elections determine the composition of 2/3 of District Assemblies. The remaining 1/3 of municipal councillors is nominated by the government in consultation with local economic and social groups (for example teachers, ex-police or military personnel, chiefs and/or members of the clergy - Ayree, 1996, cited in Dubois, 1997), hence relatively independently from political parties. In Uganda, members of Resistance Councils must stand as individuals, not as militants of political parties (Brett, 1993, cited in Dubois, 1997).

<p>been a concern.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant deforestation, however with little direct intervention of the state. 	<p>independence, attention was focused on timber production.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant deforestation partially directed by the state through the development of large-scale operations (e.g., rubber and plantations)
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IV.2. Possible combinations of local features to assess the feasibility of CNRM

In Section IV.1. we have discussed the local circumstances that matter most in CNRM, and in some instances, suggested ways to overcome some of their complicating aspects. This section aims to provide some examples on how some of these features can be combined to assess the feasibility of CNRM and its potential to achieve the goals mentioned in the TORs, i.e., better forest management, poverty alleviation and improved participation. Three different "entry points" will be used to illustrate this:

- If conservation is the main purpose of CNRM, then the IUCN framework presented in Figure 8 might prove useful (IUCN, 1999);
- Table 7 illustrates how different linkages between livelihoods and forest resources might impact on participation, poverty alleviation, local governance and forest condition;
- Finally, Tables 8 and 9 start with the forest condition – as the less manipulatable factor of local contexts – and combines this with other factors to assess possible impacts on CNRM. It concerns situations likely to be found in Eastern and Southern Africa. In describing a type, we have used the following criteria:

- * commercial value;
 - * well/not well endowed area;
 - * extent of presence of resource users, together with importance of agriculture;
 - * State/customary/other tenure;
 - * clout of private sector in local economy and politics;
- The feature which most dominates in the management decision-making process determines the type.

Of course all the types presented in Table 7 can overlap, and there are many others. For instance, wildlife can be found in "types" 1-3, a watershed can be found in areas 1-4, etc.

It is also important to note that types 1 to 4 can change over time, e.g., state land can revert to customary land, degraded land can be "rehabilitated" and "open" areas can become settled farmland.

Superimposed on this are the characteristics of the local actors discussed in this Chapter. Like the resource, these characteristics are not static.

As noted before, State control in Francophone Africa has had less impact than expected on daily realities at the forest level. Therefore the discussion in Tables 8 and 9 is partly relevant to Central Africa. In fact the official division between State and Customary land is what many promoters of community forestry in Central Africa wish. In that sense, Tables 8 and 9 might also be seen as the illustration that even this does not necessarily lead to successful CNRM, as also attested by the reality in Anglophone

Africa. We tend to argue that the significant influence of large (foreign) logging companies might explain more the lack of progress as regards CNRM than the lack of land ownership by forest populations. A thorough discussion on the role of the private sectors is outside the scope of this paper. Tables 8 and 9 should therefore be seen as a simplified picture an ideal situation compared to the realities of Central Africa. Therefore, the discussion of these Tables bear some relevance to that Region

Few elements of Tables 8 and 9 might apply to more arid areas of Africa, such as the Sahel, due to the peculiarities of these areas as regards forest resources and its relation to rural folks, i.e.:

- * The local climatic conditions are very variable from one year to another, with rainfall in particular being very erratic;
- * As a result, forest land is usually composed of scattered trees, bushes and grass;
- * Forest areas are used to a large extent by pastoralist groups, who see forests mainly as a source of forage (tree leaves and grass);
- * A significant proportion of activities within CNRM initiatives aim at protecting the few resources available, not use these as a source of income;
- * If income is at stake, then forest resources attract mainly national interests.

Figure 8: Decision-making framework for natural resource management (IUCN - undated)




Table 7: Examples of links between forests and livelihoods, and possible influences on partnerships, poverty alleviation, governance and forest condition. (Adapted from Brown, 1999)

Examples of links between livelihoods and forest resources	Prospects for success in (+: positive; -: negative)				
	Government participation	Community participation	Poverty alleviation	Better governance	Forest condition
1. One/few resource user(s) and of CPRs					
Not well endowed area (e.g., Sahel)	(+) "against the wall" feeling	(+) "against the wall" feeling	(+) no foreign interest (-) not much "natural capital"	(+) few benefits to reap out	(+) mainly rehabilitation and protection activities
Well endowed area (e.g., Central Africa)	(-) (no means to access forests and people)	(-) not interested, i.e., either self-sufficient or mainly engaged in farming	(-) potential exists but a lot of other interests	(+) due to remoteness	(-) livelihoods strategies often involve forest conversion
2. Multiple user groups in rich forest (e.g., Central Africa)	(-) In Central Africa, rentier States* might not be motivated to participate	(+/-) will exist but not favoured by rentier states nor industry	(+/-) potential exists but a lot of other interests	(-) a lot of benefits to reap out	(+/-) competition with agriculture if pressure and zoning is used
3. More individualised land and forest resources concentrated on agricultural land (agroforestry/ trees on farm)	(+/-) (maybe against the wall if most resources are in farmers' hands - e.g., off-reserve areas in Ghana)	(-) often not a priority for farmers - more individualised land management more appropriate	(-) landless cannot benefit, but this may not be a big issue in Africa But maybe (+) (if local wealthier to poorer farmers - yet, no examples of this)	? No clear link Note: the trend here is tree planting on farms, which is better done by individuals than groups or communities	Can be (+) but depends on farming systems (e.g., agroforests in Indonesia, cacao under trees in Côte d'Ivoire or Ghana, Mackakos area in Kenya)
Forest products are a significant source of income and/or employment	(-) (local forestry staff often collaborate more with industry for means to operate)	(-) workers prefer to deal with the company than the government	(+) socially weaker can benefit - e.g., landless, women	? No clear trend	(+) if non destructive use of forests (-) if high impact logging followed by farming

* Rentier states are states that depend very heavily on external economic rent (Brown, 1999). They live mainly out of their ownership of internationally valued assets rather than the fruits of their own economic activity. According to Yates (1996, cited in Brown, 1999) development projects tend to fail in rentier states because governments don't need them to succeed. Typical examples for Africa include Gabon and, to a lesser extent, Cameroon.

Table 8: Different types of local conditions in Eastern and Southern Africa

No	Type	How can this type be managed	Some more details
1	Wildlife habitat of the tourist attraction. Local population does not need big game unless they can make money from them	For tourism?	<p>1a) National Parks</p> <p>1b) Customary land with some settlements (if much agriculture and settlement this would be Type 4 and if this were so there would be less wildlife) – e.g., areas where CAMPFIRE (Zimbabwe) and ADMADE (Zambia) work.</p> <p>1c) Open land (basically unsettled land and could have a whole range of tenurial arrangements) – many areas in Botswana.</p> <p>1a: Where there are populations living on the periphery they can pose a threat to the protected area and there have been a multitude of projects along the line of benefit sharing but not really power sharing.</p> <p>1b: This is the most obvious case for CNRM because this is where the people are and, unless wildlife can become beneficial for the people, game are too costly to maintain and often constitute a threat to crops and life.</p> <p>1c: This is an interesting case. On the one hand if there are not very many people CNRM becomes less appropriate and district and national interests become more important. But is this a reason for state control because isn't that how the problem started in the first place?</p>
2	Large and rich woodland resources, which are over and above what locals, are utilising. This includes less-populated woodland areas	Preservation for future settlement. Sustainably managed for timber, firewood and charcoal. Tourism.	<p>2a) Forest reserves – e.g., Urumwa, Tanzania</p> <p>2b) Customary land with some settlements (if much agriculture and settlement this would be Type 4 and if this were so there would be less rich forests)</p> <p>2c) Open land (also see 1c)</p> <p>2a: Where there are populations living on the periphery they can pose a threat to the protected area, which is why co-management is one way forward. Different from Type 3 because this type 2a is rich in timber resources.</p> <p>2b: This is the most obvious case for CNRM; this is where the people are AND proximity allows the people to manage the resources most satisfactorily especially if they benefit from it. This is not dissimilar to Type 4 only that there would be significantly more resources in Type 2b, i.e., over and above what the local people need to meet their daily needs.</p> <p>2c: Same as 1c.</p> <p>However, things often become more complicated if large logging companies or small operators (e.g., charcoal-makers) become interested in the forest asset.</p>

3	Woodland resources key to watershed protection – for all people living downstream	Preservation but can also be managed for almost any use except conversion to farmland – ideal candidate for adding value by developing NTFP enterprises.	<p>Forest Reserves. Watershed management is one of the most important land uses because obviously everyone needs clean water for healthy living. This is also characterised by yielding benefits far beyond the area of the immediate rural dwellers. A rural dweller is not particularly interested in conserving forests so the town people can have water. This is an area where the state is justified in using its authority to lay down non-negotiables such as not converting the land to farming. Usually watershed areas are not highly suitable for farming but where people are very poor and are desperate they might try to encroach. A co-management agreement could help and if not rich in timber (see Type 2) then such areas could equally well managed for NTFPs in order to increase their value to those living in proximity. Important watershed forests outside of Forest Reserves can be found in the other types. If amongst settled areas see Type 4.</p>
4	Woodland resources upon which local people are relying on, on a day to day basis – and this include woodlands and trees in the farming landscape.	Management for subsistence needs, environmental services, small enterprises etc. Integral with farmland.	<p>This land is usually customary or communal. No doubt there are examples of communities living within – as opposed to near – state gazetted areas, but these are special cases. The "settled areas" are those most intensively farmed and are characterised by an increase of individual ownership. Farmland is almost always managed by an individual and so soil conservation is in this case not a case for CNRM. It is the communally held forest, grazing and other non-arable land which is of interest here. Products and services could cover whole range but vast rich timber stands and significant wildlife are less likely to be found in this type. This is where CNRM comes into it's own.</p> <p>E.g., Dunu Haitemba, Tanzania and Village Forest Areas, Malawi</p>

Table 9: Implications of the types defined in Table 8 on CNRM

Type	Complicating and Facilitating Factors	
1a	<p>(-) The fact that this is a protected area is a complicating factor because in the absence of a) ownership and b) direct management relationship CNRM tends to be of the benefit-sharing rather than decision-sharing approach.</p> <p>(+) There is some precedent for returning rights to original claimants (e.g., Makuleke land claim in South Africa – see Rihoy)</p>	<p>(-) Complications of "multiple jurisdiction". District as well as National interests are at stake. Concerning 1b and 2b, whilst proximity to "manager" communities should place their rights higher than others, the wealth of the resource might mean higher authorities see the resource as an opportunity for more wide-reaching development, not to mention claims by private operators.</p> <p>(+) The returns on the investment made yield a return having a high impact on the livelihoods of the communities and the incentive to maintain the management investment is high.</p>
1b	<p>(+) The fact that the land is not gazetted by the state and that people are living there means that it is "easier" for rural people to argue their rights</p> <p>(-) Customary tenure arrangements might not be favourable (not legal)</p>	
1c	<p>(-) State might argue that these resources are there to be exploited by the state</p>	
2a	<p>As 1a</p> <p>(+) Probably easier for a community to develop capacity to become more heavily involved (take on decision-making role) in a commercial timber enterprise than the safari trade. This would imply doing the job itself because it would have little advantage in doing so.</p>	
2b	<p>(+) With lower populations, and less demand for farming land there is less of a risk of land conversion (even if fine hardwood timbers are removed at an unsustainable rate)</p> <p>(+) More isolated communities tend to rely more heavily on the community than the households. This facilitates community endeavours as they are more likely to share a common goal</p> <p>(+/-) If less pressure there might be less internal squabbling but this might be offset by the higher value resource tempting greedy people</p> <p>(-) Customary tenure arrangements might not be favourable</p>	
2c	<p>(-) State might argue these resources are there to be exploited by the state</p> <p>(-) Tenure arrangements may not be favourable for CNRM</p>	
3	<p>(-) In areas of very high food insecurity these forests would be under pressure from encroachers because food is a more immediate and tangible need than environmental stability. This is the reality of poverty.</p> <p>(-) If these forests are protected for the service they provide to people beyond the immediate dwellers then it is harder to engage the locals in management unless they can have access to benefits in proportion to the extra effort they are making over and above the distant beneficiaries. Compensation mechanisms such as TDRs (Tradable Development Rights) might be relevant here, but so far these have not been tried in Africa.</p> <p>(-) The fact that these are "owned" by the state can complicate matters – if the state lays down too many non-negotiables then locals may be less interested in co-management.</p> <p>(+/-) Absence of commercial value decreases opportunity for corruption and increases likelihood for state to relinquish more decision-making powers but the locals will in the end get less</p>	
4	<p>(+) The state is most likely to entertain the idea for people to be owner/managers in this type. The complexities of "multiple jurisdiction" can be minimised.</p> <p>(-) The competition with agriculture where high population can eventually eliminate all natural forests (see Southern Region Malawi)</p> <p>(+/-) It is in these areas where local people have established the strongest customary tenure – but in some cases this is still considered not strong enough and could be improved (legalised)</p> <p>(+) Direct management relationship whereby people are directly involved in utilisation of the products.</p> <p>(+/-) high pressure motivates interest to manage but if too high the scarcity of the resource might make management costs high</p> <p>(-) Pressure may be from within the community members – this has an effect of disuniting the community and is very costly to manage</p>	


Chapter V: Getting the '4Rs' right in Collaborative Natural Resource Management

V.1. Introducing the '4Rs'

In 1995, the Danish Co-operation Agency (DANIDA) requested the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) to design a project that would look at capacity needs to achieve SFM in Africa. This led to a reflection on how to deal with the rather vague and broad concept of capacity in the context of the current transition facing forest management, especially in less developed countries. This reflection has resulted in the definition of a few basic principles:

- (i) *Stakeholders' roles need to evolve*
This is because the current transition in forest management has led to primary stakeholders' roles - the State, the Private Sector and the Local Communities - being currently questioned and needing to be (re)negotiated. As a result;
- (ii) *Need to agree on roles before assessing capacity needs*
Questions such as who does what and how have to be addressed before being able to map out capacity needs.
- (iii) *Need to acknowledge the power dimension of capacity*
This in turn leads to the need to encompass both technical and institutional capacities, as discussed earlier in this paper (see Section IV.1.3.(iv)).
- (iv) *Need for proxy indicators of stakeholders' power*
As discussed earlier in this paper (see Sections II.4. and III.2.) power disparities are difficult to assess directly, and indirect means such as stakeholders' roles have proven useful as a proxy measure of power.
- (v) *Need to focus on tangible elements to define roles*
This stems from the need to overcome the relative inefficacy of learning processes and the existing confusion concerning the institutional setting and legal framework for natural management in Africa. It has led to the working definition of stakeholders' roles via the balance in their respective '4Rs' i.e., their Rights, Responsibilities, Returns/Revenues and their mutual Relationships. This framework is illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9: The '4Rs' framework to define stakeholders' roles in forest management



V.2. A brief analysis of the '4Rs' in some CNRM initiatives

Since 1995, IIED has been collaborating with partners in six African countries⁴⁰ in the testing of the '4Rs' framework. The use of the '4Rs' framework has helped in teasing out issues and highlighting leverage points in relation to collaboration between stakeholders, mainly in two ways (Dubois, 1998a):

- The relative (im)balance of rights, responsibilities, returns/revenues, both within and between stakeholders' groups;
- The mutual dependence between stakeholders, as a way to characterise their mutual relationships, and their relative power, in a more insightful manner than by merely assessing the formal/informal or good/moderate/fair character of these relationships.

We will therefore use this framework to draw some lessons regarding CNRM, on the basis of a few case studies. The choice of these cases has been determined by the availability of information, inclusion of cases where private operators have/do not have a significant role, "success"/"failure", a mix of cases from Francophone and Anglophone Africa, small/larger scale, and examples along the continuum presented in Figure 1 (in particular communities as benefit sharers only or communities as actors in decision making regarding management). The cases selected are:

- * The Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie II Project in Niger;
- * Lukolongo, area in the Kafue District of Zambia;
- * Chimalio Forest Reserve, Malawi;
- * Duru Haiitemba, Tanzania.

V.2.1. *Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie II Project in Niger (communities as official actors in decision making re: management)*⁴¹

Background

Niger's firewood marketing system in the 1980s, based on government control through permits, was anarchic, and mainly benefited merchant-transporters. Donors promoted reform under the Energie II project, which culminated in a new Law in 1992 that introduced radical changes, i.e.:

- The creation of Rural Fuelwood Markets (RFMs), subject to the existence of Local Management Structures (LMSs) composed only of representatives who have usufruct in the area. In practice LMSs are created at village level and represent different user groups (woodcutters, farmers, herders; but women have not been included). The Forestry Service chooses the villages according to production potential. LMSs manage the RFMs and supply them with fuelwood.

⁴⁰ Six countries were chosen, attempting to cover main biomes (Sahel, rainforest and dry/miombo forests), institutional settings and language blocks (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone): Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia and Mozambique (later replaced by Côte d'Ivoire). Since 1999, Burkina Faso for Africa, and Indonesia for Asia, have become countries where the '4Rs' framework has been used.

⁴¹ This Section draws on Ibro *et al* (1998), Babin *et al* (1997) and other various authors cited in Dubois (1997).

- Three types of markets have been created:
 - * *Controlled* markets, supplied by delineated and managed production zones;
 - * *Oriented* markets, supplied by delineated but non-managed areas;
 - * *Uncontrolled* markets, tolerated during a transition period.
- Taxes are now based on volume of wood transported to the cities. Firewood from RFMs is charged less than that from other areas as an incentive for traders to purchase where production is organised by villagers. Tax revenues are to be divided between (Ibro *et al.*, 1998):

- * the Public Treasury (about 50 per cent, of which some 30 per cent are earmarked for the Forestry Fund);
- * the LMS (some 30 per cent), and;
- * the local municipality (about 20 per cent).

The more controlled the market, the more revenues are allocated to the LMS. Part of the taxes accrued to villagers has to be reinvested in the management of forest resources (i.e., 60 per cent for oriented markets and 40 per cent for controlled markets – Ibro *et al.*, 1998). Tax recovery within RFMs has been almost 100 per cent.

- Committees comprising one representative of the LMS, two Forestry Service officers and one municipality staff determine annual quotas.

Between 1992 and 1995, 85 RFMs were created covering an area of about 352,000 hectares. In 1995, they supplied 15% of the needs of Niamey (the capital city). The creation of new RFMs has been steadily increasing – mostly in the oriented markets.

A national information campaign aimed at rural populations, merchant-transporters and urban consumers was seen as a prerequisite to the launching of activities, to reduce rural people's distrust of the official dialogue promoted by the 1992 Law.

In 1994, the cost of RFMs was estimated at US\$10/ha, which has proven the cheapest way to manage local forests, compared to the cost of rural forestry (US\$50-100/ha) and contracted out reforestation (US\$500-1,000) (Madon, 1994, cited in Babin *et al.*, 1997)

Since 1996, for the sake of efficiency, the overall responsibility for the creation of new RFMs has been handed over to the purposely-created national NGO GTA/CR.

Despite its achievements, the project has faced some problems and several criticisms have been made concerning:

- The overemphasis on fuelwood, at the expense of other categories of forest resources;
- A concentration of benefits in the hands of village-based wood-cutters;
- The exclusion of women from the LMS;
- The slowness of the process of registration of LMS and RFMs. Actually, the process is being privatised, with consulting firms and NGOs assisting the local forestry service in the follow-up process;
- The merchant-transporters lobby putting pressure on the government to overturn the 1992 law and resume the old uncontrolled trade in fuelwood. This has been resisted by the government;
- Its dependence on cities as important market outlets, which limits its scope.

(ii) Enabling/non-enabling conditions

* Those already in place

Government was not a democracy and was very centralised when the RFM Project was launched in 1989. However, there were a lot of strong "local informal agreements"/informality as regards use of natural resources. This was particularly the case for pastoralists. Moreover, traditional authorities are officially recognised in Niger, and exert a strong political influence at both local and national levels.

Fuelwood was informally exploited by wood-cutters-transporters from outside villages. This allowed a lot of underhand dealings between them and the local Forestry Service, with few benefits for the local population.

The Forestry Service was in charge of managing forest resources but lacked means to fulfil its obligations. Moreover, its relations with local people were more based on coercion than collaboration.

Villagers had only use rights to forest resources.

Forest degradation and the lack of sustainability of fuelwood exploitation was acknowledged. It became clear that "something had to be done", and "change agents" emerged within the Forestry Department, both at national and local levels.

* Those brought about with change (i.e., the RFM/Energie II Project)

Local management structures (LMSs) are legally recognised, and can therefore sue and be sued.

Basis for taxation shifted from production to transportation, easing control. It also favours production from managed sites.

(iii) What does the '4Rs' analysis tell us?⁴²

106. The '4Rs' of the main stakeholders involved in the Project are summarised in Tables 10 and 11 and discussed below.

⁴² This draws mainly on Ibro *et al.*, 1998.

Table 10: Rights, responsibilities and returns/revenues of the main stakeholders in the Rural Fuelwood Markets/Energie II Project, Niger

	Rights	Responsibilities	Revenues/Returns
Village (via LMS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use rights Exclusive usufruct rights to fuelwood Management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resource management (including protection and regeneration) Financial management (including tax collection) Use part of the taxes to reinvest in forest management (at least 40%) To pay a percentage of the sales proceeds to the village fund 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Income from sale of fuelwood to traders (20% of sales proceeds) Part of the taxes from sales (including some money for the manager of the LMS)
Wood-cutters (must be from villages)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To cut trees according to technical rules and quotas To sell fuelwood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inform villagers about their use of forest and land resources for their own use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Income from sale of fuelwood (80% of sales proceeds)
Pastoralists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use rights to forest resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inform villagers about their use of forest and land resources for their own use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Returns from use rights to forest resources No revenues from sale of fuelwood
Merchant-transporters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To transport and trade fuelwood No right to cut fuelwood in the village territory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Payment for fuelwood, which they never did before 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Income from sale of fuelwood to urban retailers and consumers
Forestry Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ownership of the land and forest resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delineation of RFM areas for each RFM Provision of technical assistance Co-responsibility in setting annual quotas Control of amount of fuelwood entering the urban centres 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seemingly less monetary returns than before Better relationships with villagers Better forest condition
Local government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To receive part of the taxes collected by the LMSs 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Taxes from sales of fuelwood

Table 11:

Mutual relationships between the main stakeholders in the Rural Fuelwood Markets (RFM) Project, Niger, with an emphasis on dependence and formality/informality* (in relation to RFMs)

Between → And ↓	Village (through LMS)	Wood-cutters	Pastoralists	Merchant-transporters	Forestry Service	Local government
Village (through LMS)						
Wood-cutters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social ▪ Financial/Business ▪ Informal/Formal 					
Pastoralists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Related to access to land and forest resources ▪ Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Related to use of forest resources ▪ Informal 				
Merchant-transporters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Financial/Business ▪ Formal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Business/financial ▪ Formal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not much ▪ Informal 			
Forestry Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Technical ▪ Regulatory ▪ Informal/Formal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Technical ▪ Regulatory ▪ Formal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not much within village territory ▪ Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regulatory (control) ▪ Formal but can include informal 		
Local government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regulatory ▪ Business ▪ Informal/Formal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not much ▪ Informal/Formal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not much within village territory ▪ Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Not much except social if related to members of local council ▪ Formal/informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Technical ▪ Formal 	

* *Formal* means regulated by State rules

Informal means relations based on non-official rules. These can be of customary or *ad hoc*/covert nature

* Rights

Usufruct rights were given to villagers, provided they would organise themselves in Rural Fuelwood Markets.

State still retains ownership of the land and the forest resources.

Villagers tend to mix up usufruct and ownership rights; they think that they actually own the land and forest resources. This actually matters little because customary rules have always prevailed. However, it often entails more exclusive rights towards pastoralists than before on the part of villager.

* Responsibilities

Responsibilities for forest management and marketing of fuelwood have been handed over to local communities.

Villagers are more aware of their financial and control responsibilities than of those related to environmental concerns (i.e., rehabilitation and protection of natural resources)

Woodcutters have the responsibility to follow technical specifications and quotas in the exploitation of forest resources.

The Forest Service (FS) has to provide training on tree cutting to woodcutters.

Representatives of communities, the local FS and local government share the responsibility of determining annual exploitation quotas.

* Revenues/Returns

Revenues and returns have significantly increased for

- (village-based) wood-cutters, the biggest beneficiaries of monetary returns from the sale of fuelwood;⁴³
- LMS' managers;⁴⁴
- villages as a whole, via a share of the taxes on fuelwood sales used for collective infrastructures, and likely "trickle down" impacts of wood-cutters' and LMS' managers increase in income. This has mitigated the significant concentration of individual benefits in the hands of wood-cutters and LMS managers;
- local governments.

⁴³ For instance, in 1996, woodcutters earned, on average, CFA 80,000/year/capita, with some earning up to CFA 300,000/year. This is to be compared with the average income of rural households, worth CFA 50,000/year (Ibro *et al*, 1998).

⁴⁴ Those managing the largest RFMs made between CFA 400 and 500,000 in 1996 (Ibro *et al*, 1998).

The losers in terms of monetary returns are:

- Likely the Forestry Service. However, before the RFM Project, revenues for the Forestry Service might not have accrued so much from taxes, which had to be paid to Central Treasury, but from bribing by merchant-transporters);
- The merchant-transporters, who nowadays have to pay for fuelwood.

On the other hand, the Forestry Service can now concentrate on its technical assistance mandate, and this has improved its relationships with villagers. One could therefore envisage topping up the salary of the FS staff via premiums paid by villagers according to performance.

* Relationships

Relationships between stakeholders as regards fuelwood production and trade have become more formal/contractual. This is particularly the case for those between villagers and merchant-transporters;

The concentration of income in the hands of woodcutters and LMS managers is sometimes the source of resentment by other villagers.

Pastoralists' relationships are mainly of an informal nature; this was not changed by the advent of RFMs. They may have become tenser with villagers due to the frequent more exclusive attitude to forest resources on the part of the latter.

Communities' relationships with the staff and the national NGO GTA/CR seem less formal than those with local government and the Forestry Service.

(iv) Indicators of success (according to TORs)

Sustainable forest management	<p>Pressure on the forest has lessened due to a more village-based control of the exploitation of fuelwood. However, villagers are not very keen on actions related to environmental concerns Moreover, lack of attention to non-forest land uses might become a threat</p> <p>Summary: For FS: good For villagers: good but not much concern about people's point of view: good For merchant-transporters: bad</p>
Degree of participation	<p>Village: mainly wood-cutters and members of LMSs re: fuelwood; probably more participation in village developments funded by taxes on fuelwood sale FS: participation is more based on technical assistance than "command and control". Might not be as financially rewarding but improves relationships</p> <p>Summary By villagers: "good" By FS: Moderate</p>
Impact on poverty alleviation	<p>There has definitely been an improvement both for some individuals (wood-cutters and LMS managers) and for the villages as a whole</p> <p>Summary Positive impacts</p>

V.2.2. *The Lukolongo case, Kafue District, Zambia (communities almost not involved in any form of formal collaboration)*⁴⁵

(i) Background

The Lukolongo area, situated Northeast of Kafue town, covers approximately 200 Km². It is covered by the dry *miombo* in its hilly landscape. About 6,000 inhabitants, who, until recently, have been full-time charcoal producers, inhabit this area. During the last five years, following the depletion of suitable charcoal producing tree species, it has been observed that approximately more than half the population in Lukolongo has switched from charcoal to agricultural production. Maize is the main crop being grown. Other activities include pit sawing and curio making. Charcoal production, however, still generates a substantial part of household income.

This being a peri-urban area, occupied mostly by non-indigenous settlers to the area, the traditional authority system is not particularly strong, nor well defined. However, village headmen still command some respect, especially when it comes to settling disputes.

Lukolongo farmers are subsistence and emergent, the latter being those who are abandoning full-time charcoal production to take up farming. However progress in this regard is being hindered by the high cost of agricultural inputs which most farmers are unable to afford.

Given the proximity of the area to Kafue and Lusaka, and the secure market for charcoal, a number of employees retrenched from various urban-based companies, simply moved to Lukolongo and joined in charcoal production. This has increased pressure on the already dwindling forest resources. Given the limited forest resource to sustain this activity, a good number of charcoal producers have now refocused their attention on farming,

Curio-makers are a prominent group in Lukolongo. This group is normally very selective on the type of tree species used for this purpose. Pitsawyers operating in the area are closely associated with curio-makers. They use hand held tools to produce timber and logs for making curios. Both curio making and pitsawing are being carried out on a very small scale, given the depleted state of the forest resource. Thus they do not seem to pose any significant threat on the forest resource in general, except for the possibility of depleting specific tree species.

Until the recent introduction of the ECAZ project in the area, there has not been any programme to address forest resource management issues. The ECAZ programme is

⁴⁵ This section draws on Makano *et al* (1997) and Dubois (1998a).

encouraging local communities to expand their agricultural activities and tree growing in order to provide a sustainable subsistence livelihood.

Government, like in many areas of rural Zambia, is seen as an absentee landlord. Its influence on the Lukolongo is virtually non-existent. However, following the introduction of ECAZ projects in the area, the Forestry Department and, to a lesser extent, the Department of Agriculture, have joined hands with ECAZ to create public awareness on sustainable agriculture and forest resource utilisation.

(ii) Enabling/non-enabling conditions

* Those already in place

Government is present *in absentia*. Thus local *ad hoc* arrangements prevail, based on informal rules concerning land use and natural management.

Local traditional chiefdom has not been very strong. Combined with the above, this has meant *de facto* open access to natural resources. However, growing awareness of the degradation of the natural resource asset has led local settlers to institute tougher control over access to these resources. This is informal, given the weak presence of the State.

Little technical assistance to land and forest resource users have exacerbated the degradation of natural resources caused by the above.

* Those brought about by the change (i.e., the support by ECAZ):

ECAZ arrival has provided more technical assistance to land and natural resource users.

It has collaborated with the local agricultural and forestry services, thus enhancing the presence of these agencies on the ground.

However, this programme cannot impact on the whole district of Kafue.

(iii) What does the '4Rs' analysis tell us?

Stakeholders' '4Rs' are summarised in Tables 12 and 13 and discussed below.

Table 12: A summary of the main stakeholders' rights, responsibilities and revenues/returns in Lukolongo, Zambia

Stakeholders	Responsibility	Rights	Revenues
Farmers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Custodians to land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use rights to forest resources Cultivation of the land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Income from agricultural products
Charcoal producers and traders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wood harvesting and trading 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Income from forest products
Curio-makers/Pitsawyers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wood harvesting and trading 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Income from forest products
Forestry Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forest management Forest law enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collection of revenue from forest taxes (low) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revenue from forest taxes (low)
ECAZ (an NGO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitator of development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To facilitate local development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indirectly, creation of employment

(Adapted from Makano *et al*, 1997)

Table 13: Main stakeholders' relationships in Lukolongo, Zambia, with an emphasis on mutual dependence and formality/informality

Between → And ↓	Farmers	Charcoal producers and traders	Curio-Makers/Pitsawyers	Forestry Service	ECAZ
Farmers					
Charcoal Producers and traders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not much Informal 				
Curio-makers/Pitsawyers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not much Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not much Informal 			
Forestry Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not much Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulatory but in effect not much Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulatory but in effect not much Informal 		
ECAZ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical Informal/Formal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not much Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not much Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical and Business Formal/Informal 	

(Adapted from Makano *et al*, 1997)

*** (Im)balance in Rights, Responsibilities and Revenues**

The main fact that emerges from Table 11 is the *de facto* absence of responsibilities in natural resources by private operators such as curio-makers, pitsawyers and charcoal makers/traders, although they have *de facto* rights to make an income out of these same resources. Even if one would wish to correct this, the difficulty here lies in the virtual absence of formal presence of the State, making any formal regulation inoperative.

The access rules laid out by local traditional authorities are an encouraging sign. However their informal character hampers their effectiveness against "external" interests.

ECAZ does not have the mandate to redress the current imbalance in stakeholders '3Rs' (Rights, Responsibilities and Returns/Revenues).

* Relationships

The striking feature of Table 12 is the prevalence of informal relationships between the local stakeholders. While informal rules can be very effective in regulating access to and ensuring sustainable use of natural resources, they usually lose a lot of such efficiency when powerful "external" interests come into the picture, as discussed in Section IV.1.2. (i). Moreover, informal relationships lead more easily to mismanagement, especially when the commercial value of the natural resource at stake is high.⁴⁶

The relationships between stakeholders are generally good because of the general "laissez-faire" character of natural resource use in the area. However, this example illustrates the fact that good relationships *by default* usually do not lead to sustainable forest management.

(iv) Indicators of "success" (according to TORs)

Sustainable forest management	Low pressure by curio-makers and pitsawyers More pressure by charcoal-makers, but lessening due to resource shortage Local rules might reduce access to remaining resource to some extent ECAZ focus on agriculture might further reduce the pressure on the remaining forest if agriculture attracts charcoal-makers by interest rather than by exhaustion of the forest asset. This might be complemented by their rehabilitation activities
	Summary Forest asset already severely degraded Potential to reduce mining of remaining resource
Degree of participation	Farmers: Those in ECAZ programme participate Private operators almost do not participate Forestry and agriculture services: participate more since ECAZ arrival but lack means for large scale efficiency in implementation
	Summary ECAZ and farmers in their programme: good; otherwise insufficient
Poverty alleviation	No information if ECAZ programme has already impacted on poverty status
	Summary If any, the impact will take some years before materialising

V.2.3. Chimaliro Forest Reserve, Malawi (Community as benefit sharer)⁴⁷

(i) Background

The Forestry Research Institute of Malawi (within the Department of Forestry) initiated a research project in 1992 looking at management of miombo woodland by local people. One of the catalysts for the research was the disappointing results of the World Bank Wood Energy project of the 1980s which planted thousands hectares of exotics sometimes on land cleared of miombo woodland before planting. Tree growth and the mean annual increments for the planted eucalyptus were in some cases below those of regenerating miombo woodlands. The exotic plantations were beset by problems of weed competition (in

⁴⁶ This is neatly described for Cameroon in Ekoko (1998).

⁴⁷ This section draws on Chitila (1999) and Lowore and Lowore (1999)

establishment phase) termites, fire and drought. Mitigating these indigenous forest hazards required intensive management, which was simply not available.

Chimaliro Forest Reserve in north Kasungu was chosen as the first paper site. This miombo woodland was gazetted in 1926 and covers 160 km². Silvicultural systems trials were established in the reserve in 1992, community consultations and studies of existing forest usage patterns were initiated at the same time. In 1995 the local people were given formal permission to collect NTFPs free from the reserve but not firewood which still could only be collected for a fee. This initiative did not however come with any increased responsibilities on the part of the locals except being trusted not to cut trees whilst collecting NTFPs. In 1997 a team of facilitators provided guidance to three communities (each community a group of three neighbouring villages) who, by means of a consultative process, were each allocated forest reserve blocks to co-manage in partnership with the Forestry Department (total area of all three blocks is less than 400 ha). District Forestry Staff worked alongside FRIM researchers and specialists in participatory approaches. Actual boundaries were defined through a participatory planning process and were based on ancestral boundaries. Three co-management plans were produced and these included the rules and regulations which were to be the basis of local by-laws which would provide the communities with legal backing for co-management. The management plans included details of products to be collected such as dead wood, thatch grass, mushrooms, reeds, bamboo, caterpillars, cattle grazing and wild fruits. The cutting of poles even as thinnings and selective cutting for timber is however still banned – this was a Forestry Department directive. To date the local people are managing the blocks through fire break maintenance, early burning and self-regulation of forest produce collection. They still have no official co-management agreement and by-laws.

In Chimaliro when the local people were first exposed to the idea of co-management they said it could not work. Now the indications are that the majority are in favour of co-management despite the slow progress.

On the whole there are just two main stakeholders concerning Chimaliro Forest Reserve - the adjacent villagers and the Forestry Department (FD). The FD is currently a centralised government body, all staff accountable to the Director. This might change with decentralisation.

One community in particular seem more committed to the co-management initiative than the other two. Interestingly these villagers (from the three villages of Mnyamazi, Mphandukira and Thom) were at one time forcibly removed from their land to make way for a tobacco estate (in the 1970s, during Banda era). All the trees were removed from their land to make way for the tobacco so when the villagers eventually got back their own land (after multi-party elections in 1994 they moved back by force), they found a treeless landscape. This means the nearby Forest Reserve is their only source of forest products making them highly dependent on the forest for subsistence use (they also sell a few NTFPs). They have a high interest in forest management – “Chimaliro is their super-store for a multitude of wood and non-wood requirements” (Chitila 1999). The rest of this case paper refers particularly to this one community.

(ii) The enabling / non-enabling conditions

* Those that were already in place

The villagers enjoy community cohesion and good leadership under the Village Headman (the Traditional Authority plays no active role but is aware of the initiative).

It is straightforward to identify the members of the community (villages in Malawi are clearly defined in terms of membership and are an effective operational unit for land and resource management). It was straightforward to demarcate the boundaries of a village block within the Forest Reserve (FR).

The collaborative arrangement is not complicated by a multitude of stakeholders.

The relocation and fighting-back-for-their-land episode may have united the village – pulling them together for a common cause.

* Those that were brought about with change

Rights: The New Forest Policy places emphasis on forest management for the people rather than preservation and exclusion. The New Act includes a provision enabling co-management in Forest Reserves. The communities have been given increased rights of access and utilisation (but still within limits posed by FD, e.g. no farming, no tree felling).

Responsibilities: The communities have been given increased responsibilities. They in turn feel that having invested some labour in the forest the forest is gradually becoming more "theirs". Traditionally investment of labour brings about ownership.

Revenues: The increased access allows villagers to collect produce without paying (mainly firewood) and this will have had an impact on how they can prioritise their use of scarce cash.

Relationships: There have been some improvements in the relationship between the FD and the villagers but not as much as one would have liked to see.

(iii) What does the 4Rs analysis tell us

Stakeholders' '4Rs' are summarised in Table 14 and discussed below.

* Rights

The community still has no established legal rights to utilise the reserve even though it has fulfilled its obligations for the past two years. This is causing problems as the newly posted Forest Guard is confusing the issue by insisting the villagers tell him each time they go into the forest (a lengthy walk to the Forest Camp). This is having a negative impact on the progress of last few years

* Responsibilities

The government is not obliged to enter into co-management! But one could argue that by asking the villagers to undertake management and then not ratify the by-laws, the FD has not fulfilled its obligations. Certainly it is not pushing hard the Policy commitment to "Empower rural communities to manage forest resources, foster ownership and rights to

trees and ensure that such trees are utilised sustainably for the benefit of both present and future generations”.

*** Revenues**

Firewood which is the main product collected is running out in the blocks. The existing benefits are unlikely to be enough to sustain the interest of the communities this fact compounding the lack of formal rights (which in themselves would have been an incentive). The blocks are too small and the people cannot cut trees. On the one hand given the small size of the blocks it would be difficult to fell much on a sustainable basis – however if the blocks were bigger this would be much easier.

*** Relationships**

Better but still not very good.

In short, the Rs are out of balance the FD have retained the rights and some of the benefits (because the block is too small, can't fell trees) whilst responsibility is passed to the community.

(iv) Indicators of Success

Sustainable forest management	<p>The forest is still being “protected” and not actively managed at all. Some of the trees are mature and of sizes not in demand by the local people (too big). The species are not really suitable for timber. The forest does yield NTFPs but firewood and poles are what the people really want. Management under a moderate coppice regime (with fire control, which is already in place) would be better. Conservation objectives would still be achieved under a coppice regime – the only real anti-conservation action would be removal of forest for cultivation.</p> <p>Summary: From FD point of view - Good From villagers point of view - not good enough</p>
Degree of Participation	<p>The villagers actively participate but are constrained by the nature of the collaborative agreement. There have been some “spin-offs” in that the villagers are becoming eager to re-establish some Village Forest Areas on their own customary land.</p> <p>Summary: What is the point of participation (in the process) without empowerment?</p>
Impact on poverty alleviation	<p>Very little but this is not a disincentive in itself. The disincentives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • no formal rights • blocks too small so deadwood finished quickly • cannot cut trees to make the forest more user-friendly <p>Summary: Impact on poverty alleviation is not a key indicator here (see Chapter II, II.5). It is only an incentive but there are other more important incentives being realised (or not).</p>

(v) Prognosis

130. Not enough change has occurred. The incentives for the locals to proceed are not enough. The future of the co-management will depend on whether the FD can be more flexible in it's approach and modify the co-management agreement as and when the limitations become apparent. The process involved in modifying the agreement is at the moment long and cumbersome which is also a constraint.

Table 14: Stakeholders' '4Rs' in Chimaliro Forest Reserve, Malawi

	Village Community	FD
Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Officially only use rights. Villagers can collect some NTFPs for free otherwise all collection must be done through the purchase of a permit. <p><u>Unofficial rights</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to a demarcated block of woodland. To be used in accordance with the management plan made jointly with FD staff (although with some FD non-negotiables). These rights are granted by the FD and will not be official until the Village Natural Resource Management Council (VNRMC) by-laws are sanctioned by the Director. Rights to collect revenue from within these blocks to be used at community level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ownership of the land. Can terminate the rights of the community at any time. According to the Forest Act, FD staff has the right to charge for all produce but FD has waived these rights up to present.
Responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management of the block (firebreak maintenance, early burning and patrolling) Self-regulation VNRMC to be accountable to the rest of the community members and to the FD. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Responsibility to the nation to ensure that the forest remains as forest – for the purposes of biodiversity, water catchment and land conservation. Implementation of the Forest Policy, i.e. "Empower rural communities to manage forest resources, foster ownership and rights to trees and ensure that such trees are utilised sustainably for the benefit of both present and future generations". (Forest Act: It's stated purpose in Part I, Section 3) "to promote community involvement in the conservation...in forest reserves." "to empower VNRMCs". The FD can also provide backstopping in case of conflict unmanageable at village level. No financial returns. Conserved forest.
Returns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subsistence products – thatch grass, deadwood, mushrooms etc. Sale of some NTFPs (honey and thatch) money goes to community (have a post office account). 	
Relationships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Villagers – Forestry Research Institute of Malawi – mutual trust and respect (just) Villagers with FD as a whole – frustration because the Director has not sanctioned the by-laws. FD as a whole with villagers – still very cautious and still expects disaster. Do not trust each other. 	

V.2.4. Duru-Haitemba, Tanzania (community as an actor in forest management)⁴⁸

(i) Background (Please see Box 8, Section IV.1.3.(i))

(ii) The enabling conditions

* Those that were already in place

Villages in Tanzania possess the capacity to be registered as the most local level of "government" within the decentralised system. Community can secure statutory ownership of all their land area.

The forest is a large area able to produce (Wily, 1997) "a multitude of wood it provided to local households and the support it gave their farming and domestic environment" BUT "close review of the condition of the forest suggested that Duru-Haitemba was not in any event a necessarily commercially useful forest for the Government".

The villagers – prior to the early 80s (when a Forest Guard was posted) were accustomed to thinking that the forest was theirs and (Wily, 1997) "due to the distance involved each community has tended to use, and over time, be seen to 'own' those patches closest to its own hamlet"

Furthermore traditional practice (or rules) relating to the use of the community forestry resources were incorporated into modern village management practice after the local process of Villagisation in 1975.

* Those that were brought about with change

The following elements were added to the existing conditions during the Duru Haitemba CNRM initiative:

- Willingness of the District Forestry Officials to give up designs of gazetting the forest and to enter into the experiment of "locals to be managers";
- Approval of by-laws and awarding of Title Deeds;
- Bringing decision making closer to the household (Wily, 1997).

(iii) What does the '4Rs' analysis tell us?

Stakeholders' '4Rs' are summarised in Table 15 and discussed below.

Table 16 shows that the '4Rs' appear well balanced in the case of Duru Haitemba, i.e.

- Rights: They are in favour of the owner-manager, thus providing sufficient "compensation" for its responsibilities;
- Responsibilities: They are held by those beneficiaries i.e., the owner managers

⁴⁸ This Section draws mainly on Wily (1997) and Alden Wily (2000).

- **Revenues:** Benefits are all to owner managers, but not for commercial use. Feeling that “this is ours” seems an adequate incentive in itself.

As a result of the above, relationships between the main stakeholders have significantly improved over the last years.

(iv) Indicators of Success (according to TORs)

Sustainable forest management	Encroachment, pitsawing, charcoal burning and a range of lesser destructive activities have largely ceased. Visible improvement in the condition of the forest. In summary Good.
Degree of Participation	The process began in each and every sub-village of the wider village – the majority of households were involved at one point or another and particularly in final meetings where a formal assembly met to refine and approve the plan. As the months pass, more, rather than fewer villagers are practically involved in the commitment to conserve and manage their forest. The villagers have been much empowered by the process and the villagers have been turning their attention to natural resource management issues elsewhere in their villages e.g., water resources within and outside the forest have been rehabilitated and grazing in their vicinity forbidden. An enormous upsurge in the confidence of the village and its government to take control over such matters. Sub-village chairmen are especially more active, as are elders, who have tended to be excluded from modern village government in recent years. In summary: Participation lead to empowerment
Impact on poverty alleviation	Not mentioned Not known

(v) Prognosis

Cautionary note (Wily, 1997): “it may be corrupted it has not been uncommon at some point or another for one or two powerful individuals to attempt to reconstruct control of the forest to their own ends. In the event villagers themselves have shown themselves able to deal with these problems. The need for forest managing villages to construct systems for accountability at the most local and democratic level within the village is one of the many early lessons of the initiatives described”. There is however every reason to be optimistic in this case.

Table 15: Summary of stakeholders' '4Rs' in Duru Haitemba, Tanzania

	Community	FD	District Council
Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal owner - Village Title Deed. • Each village is the legal, authority and manager according to by-laws which were formally approved under the District Authorities Act by the full District Council • However, reliance on the goodwill of current officers has on at least two occasions proved illusory security. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring of forest condition and community's performance in managing forest resources 	
Responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Day-to-day management responsibility, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * issuing a limited number of permits for sustainable use of forest resources; * record keeping; * financial accounting; * forest management bank accounts. • Rules (quite conservative) were drawn up for how each village that could use the forest. The forest was zoned into use/protection areas. Each village appointed guards to protect its areas against non-villagers and offenders. Patrolling teams are excused from other community activities, and get some percentage of fines • Village Forest Committee • Their composition has shifted from village leaders to ordinary villagers. • All to the community. • But mainly for subsistence needs – no trading: firewood, NTFPs, building poles, medicine, thatch, grazing etc. • Foresters enjoy a new-found respect and find themselves at the forefront of rural development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Active support • Provide technical help. • Let community get on with it. • Increasingly less needed. • Mediating role in some disputes and problems. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Active support • Approved the Village by-laws.
Returns		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitated forest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitated forest
Relationships			

V.3. Measuring Success: Get the '4Rs' right – Some generic lessons

V.3.1 *Measuring success in CNRM*

The four cases briefly reviewed in this Chapter indicate that getting the '4Rs' right is key for achieving success in CNRM. This means reaching the right balance of stakeholders' rights, responsibilities and revenues, which in turn should improve stakeholders' relationships. However, this in itself depends on the type of relationships stakeholders have between themselves and *vis-à-vis* forest resources. If these are fair, one way to improve them is to negotiate the three other 'R' regarding a specific and burning local issue.

However the '4Rs' are not set in stone. They evolve over time and hence so does their ideal mix. *Success in CNRM* lies therefore in *maintaining a cycle where the '4Rs' can be negotiated when deemed necessary by one major stakeholder, and that a mechanism to ensure this is available*. This implies that one has to deal with the political dimension of NRM, including power issues discussed in Chapter III and the complicating/facilitating factors discussed in Chapter IV. Figure 10 attempts at illustrating this in relation to the working objectives for CNRM suggested in Chapter II (see Section II.2), the ultimate goal of sustainable forest management and a realistic time frame.

V.3.2. *Community involved as benefit-sharers or as actors in natural resource management? Balancing the rights, responsibilities and revenues/returns*

The right mix of rights, responsibilities and returns/revenues should be decided through a negotiation process by local stakeholders, i.e., those involved in "functional communities" as defined in Chapter II (see Section II.4, point 22). Outsiders to such communities should play a facilitative, not a decision-making role in that process. Consequently, the above question should be answered by local actors, through the process leading to working agreements in CNRM. In particular, one should ask the communities themselves what they wish. This is likely to be very context-specific. At best we can suggest some hints:

- Rural people are likely to be more interested in only sharing benefits from forest exploitation if forest resources do not play a key role in their livelihoods nor present a significant potential in increasing their income. In particular, they would probably not wish to be involved in forest management in protected areas or if farming, pastoralism or urban activities are their primary livelihood strategy.
- However, the case of Duru Haitemba challenges the above. This suggests that, in some cases, more control on forest resources might provide sufficient an incentive for villagers to spend energy and time on their management, even if they not bring monetary returns.
- Evidence suggests that the stronger the tenurial security the greater the incentive to invest in management – the argument being that investments are made by those who are sure they will benefit from that investment. The longer the time between investment and benefit the greater the level of tenurial security required. If benefits come quickly the long term considerations are slightly less important. It would also appear that tenurial security can be achieved *without* formal ownership although some will argue that the latter does provide extra security in the face of certain threats.

- Benefit sharing is a type of collaborative arrangement usually associated with protected areas. In cases such as these rural people are likely to be interested if forest resources play a key role in their livelihoods or present a significant potential in increasing incomes. There is a risk that if the state retains the decision-making role and the benefits to the people from forest management are merely moderate the local people will perceive the collaborative arrangement as one by which they are being expected to manage a forest for the government (i.e. do their job for them) in return for little benefit.

"in which control and ownership is retained by the state yet local people – mysteriously expected to do so for no pay – do most of the management because of their needs from the forest" (Shepherd 1992)

- Co-management of public lands can be *more* than benefit sharing. If the government so decides it may hand over management responsibility to the local partners who can also reap the majority of the benefits – even whilst the formal ownership remains with the state. This could be called power sharing.
- However if local people are in the position of adopting an owning and managing type role this in itself provides a greater incentive for investing in management. The locals motivated by the feeling that "this is ours" can make most or all of the decisions without interference (but with some advice where needed) and this in itself is an incentive. Furthermore rural people are willing to invest in the future as they know that they and their children will be the ones to gain. In cases such as these a secure supply of forest goods and services for subsistence use can be adequate benefits i.e. an economic value but not a monetary one.
- Villagers might not be inclined to manage forest resources concerning products about which their knowledge is limited – typically timber. Communities are often at a disadvantage when they carry out the exploitation of timber, let alone its processing and trading. However, some would argue that, even in these cases, communities should be involved in forest management. They do not have to carry out the operations themselves, but involving them in management decisions would ensure that they have a say in decisions in the way these operations are carried out, including on the way benefits should be shared (Liz Alden Wily, pers. com.)

Any but the two extreme stages of co-management displayed in the continuum of Figure 1 (see Section 11.3.) are acceptable, and their viability will depend on local circumstances. Box 10 illustrates a scenario where different options could be applied in Malawi.

Box 10: An example of how different options of CNRM could be applied in Malawi

For Malawi, the easiest way to apply the different co-management options is that for some *Public Land Forests* **benefit sharing** should be promoted and for *Customary Land Forests* **community as managers** should be promoted. Further still for some *Public Land Forests* **state management but with more thought for local needs** should be promoted. As the government has no intention to degazette any forest reserves⁴⁹ and the New Forest Policy allows communities to take full responsibility for managing forests on customary land this should be quite straightforward. In the past the FD had responsibility for managing customary land forests even though the land and forests "belonged" to the community. Of course it is not quite so straightforward as very few people in Malawi can actually understand the New Forest Act - as it appears to be somewhat contradictory in places.

** Benefit sharing in Forest Reserves (Public Land)*

Under a benefit sharing agreement for a Forest Reserve the divisions of responsibility and revenue etc. could vary considerably depending upon the circumstances. The best case scenario (for low value *miombo* where local people are more or less only meeting subsistence needs) would be: the FD could simply be an advisor and back-stopper in conflicts which cannot be handled locally. The FD benefits because the forest remains as forest and objectives such as biodiversity conservation, soil and water conservation etc. are met. They need collect no monetary revenue.

Under a benefit sharing agreement the locals must accept certain non-negotiables i.e., no clearing for agriculture.

However the FD does have some responsibilities to the nation and to communities downstream benefiting from watershed protection. Sometimes it is impossible for Sustainable Forest Management to offer adequate incentives to the locals to manage forests rather than clearing for maize. In some parts of Malawi the rational thing for a farmer to do to support his livelihood system is to clear forest and plant maize – even if the land is hilly and marginal. From his point of view he has no choice – and access to free firewood (not much because demand already exceeds supply) and a few baskets of mushrooms are not going to convince him otherwise. Introduce a non-negotiable like no farming and the picture looks different.

** Communities as managers on Customary Land*

The FD would provide advice and support as and when needed. In cases where "local elites reap most of the benefits", there is "little interest in forest management", "marginal groups are sidelined" etc., the FD can assist and advise but in the end it will be the community who decides whether to persevere or not. The FD would have no way of preventing the locals from turning their forest into agricultural land (apart from convincing them how they would benefit if they did not do this) or have no way of forcing the Chief to adopt a more democratic management institution. If the Chief did anything too terrible the community could complain to the Traditional Authority Leader but they would only do this if they felt very strongly – and they might not feel so strongly about forests (compared to other things). Moreover, whether they felt strongly about it or not would depend on their understanding of their rights to the forests and trees within the village – see next point.

The FD would however have an obligation to make Forest Policy known to the communities and have an obligation to assist the communities to set up institutions for forest management where needed.

** State management of Public Land but with more attention paid to the needs of the locals*

Timber exploitation. Mulanje Cedar on Mulanje Mountain, Malawi. The valuable timber is being managed in such a way that the FD gains (but not as much as it should because selling the timber too cheap and money goes to the treasury anyway) and the businessmen gain, but the locals only gain some casual labour in plank carrying. The communities can make little contribution to management because the forests are far and inaccessible⁵⁰ and in the case of "timber exploitation". The 4Rs could however be re-balanced so that the end result would be improved management and improved benefits for the locals. Changes could involve:

- Enabling small local operators to harvest the timber as opposed to (as well as) large-scale commercial

⁴⁹ But this doesn't mean they are right not to and in countries where state forests are vast and not particularly different from any other forests – there might be an argument for degazettement.

⁵⁰ And they do not go there everyday to collect their basic needs anyway. They do not perceive that the cedar forests belong to any community in particular because they are far (although the locals will lay greater claim to them than outsiders - hence some frustration).

- operations;
- More of the revenue to be re-invested locally a) to enable the FD to have some operating funds and b) to invest in local development;
- Making the commercial harvesters more responsible

These changes alone could have positive impact e.g., contribute to local economy, alleviate poverty, improve relations with FD (fewer sabotage fires).

V.3.3. *Assessing and improving relationships*

This paper emphasises the importance of stakeholders' relationships in achieving working agreements (see in particular Section III.2.). However approaches to assess such relationships are in short supply. We believe that using three types of criteria provides insightful hints in that respect, i.e.

- *good/moderate/fair* allows for a quick "health check" of the status of stakeholders' relationships;
- *informal/formal character* provides information on the potential for outside intervention to modify these relationships over a short span of time (i.e., more informal relationships have less chances to be changed quickly);
- *stakeholders mutual dependency*, and in particular:

financial/business-type dependency will usually require a "referee" to make sure parties with less bargaining power are not cheated;

In the face of widespread, poorly-enforced forest regulations, regulatory dependency needs to be accompanied by incentives to be effective;

technical dependency often requires attitudinal changes as training is often fraught by the "teacher-student" attitude to villagers on the part of forestry staff;

social dependency is perhaps the one that is most difficult and time-consuming to change within the context of outside interventions. If such dependency exerts negative effects on partnerships, perhaps one way forward would be to negotiate the three other 'Rs' around a very specific and relevant issue for local stakeholders.

It is nowadays acknowledged that *space for dialogue*⁵¹ and *confidence building* are two key ingredients for improving relationships, hence CNRM. These two further prerequisites of collaboration require relational proximity between the stakeholders, i.e., to '*institutionalise interaction*' (Plan Afric, 1999). In operational terms (Hurditch, 1996):

- *Directness*, through face-to-face dialogue rather than third-party association or remote communication. However, a mediator might be useful at some stage in the case of considerable power differences;
- *Continuity*, through repeated encounters between stakeholders over time rather than a one-off negotiation;
- *Multiplicity*, through the involvement in a range of issues rather than a single matter;
- *Parity*, with participants being afforded equal opportunity for input and consideration;


⁵¹ Annex 4 presents some lessons regarding dialogue in Francophone West Africa.

➤ *Commonality*, through a mutually desirable objective in collaboration.

Discussion of micro-projects and stakeholders' roles in these activities has proved a useful way to begin constructive dialogue. Other ways to encourage interaction between stakeholders include task forces, joint training and workshops.

Mediation is another technique that might assist in reconciling divergent points of views and improving strained relationships. Mediation is a negotiating technique that brings in a third, neutral party in order to obtain agreement between the parties concerned; it is an approach in which each party's views on the issue or problem are translated to the others (Babin *et al*, 1997). To our knowledge, Madagascar is the only country where a Law has been passed that formalises the function of environmental mediator. There, mediators have the task of helping local communities in drafting the management contracts they must enter into with the local government and the State (Babin *et al*, 1997)

Figure 10: Measuring "success" in CNRM



Success in CNRM is maintenance of the cycle.

Chapter VI: Scaling up CNRM Initiatives:

The challenges posed by CNRM have to be addressed at three levels

- A. community level
- B. government level
- C. interface between the above

The previous Chapters of this paper have dealt with A, and the paper itself is all about C. In this Chapter we will dwell more particularly on B.

VI.1 Enabling policy framework

More often than not collaborative arrangements are location specific and they start in a policy vacuum. However, for CNRM to be sustained and expanded, it is usually important for local-level institutions to be "anchored" in institutional frameworks which provide channels of communication to higher level authorities. In some cases, where resources appear to fall under "multiple jurisdiction", the wider institutional framework is fundamental in maintaining the collaborative arrangement. In other cases links to higher authorities are important to provide for legal empowerment in cases of serious conflicts, advocacy in case of policy constraints as well as access to funds, training and markets.

Experience throughout Africa shows that an enabling policy is not a precondition for CNRM initiatives to be launched, so long as political will at local level exists (see Section IV.1.3.(i)). However, it is required once governments and the donor community wish to expand CNRM "islands of success". Perhaps the most promising countries to date in terms of large-scale implementation of CNRM in Africa – i.e., The Gambia and Tanzania – illustrate this.

- In The Gambia, the process began in 1987, with a proposal to introduce community forestry. It was approved in 1990, allowing the first experiment to be undertaken and to provide lessons to the present date. In parallel, the Forestry Department carried out a revision of its Forest Policy between 1992 and 1995. The New Forest Policy clearly provides space for community forestry and has taken stock of the early experiments on that matter (Bojang and Reeb, 1998).
- In Tanzania also working cases preceded policy formulation, with the first experiments starting in 1994 and the New Forestry Policy being finalised in 1998. Likewise in Gambia, local experiments were instrumental in orienting the new policy (Alden Wily, 2000).

These two examples comply with at least one of the four steps suggested by Mayers and Bass (1999) to achieve seven desirable processes for good policy-making in forestry. The are presented in Table 16.

Table 16: Seven desirable principles and four suggested steps for achieving good forest policy making

Good policy-making process in forestry	
Seven desirable principles	Four suggested steps to achieve the desired principles
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A forum and participation process; ▪ National definition of, and goals for, sustainable forest management; • Agreement on ways to set priorities; • Engagement with extra-sectoral influences on forestry; • Better monitoring and strategic information on forest assets, demand and use; • Devolution of decision-making power to where potential contribution for sustainability is greatest; • Democracy of knowledge and access to resource-conserving technology. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Step one: Recognise multiple valid perspectives and the political nature of the game; ▪ Step two: Get people to the negotiating table; • Step three: Make space to disagree and experiment; • Step four: Learn from experience, get organised and fire up policy.

Source: Mayers and Bass (1999)

The principles and steps laid out in Table 16 should also serve as guidance in the scaling up of CNRM. Two ideas underpinning these principles and steps are particularly relevant to CNRM.

- *Flexibility*, in that the subsidiarity principle⁵² should acknowledge that the right level of devolution depends on the resource at stake and should be negotiated with local stakeholders. For instance, in Namibia, the national legislation does not define a "community" but leave this to local residents themselves (Jones, 1999). Nor does the national policy prescribe who should represent the "community" on the CNRM committee. This is further discussed in Section VI.2.3.
- *Learn form experimentation*, as a key mechanism to bridge the gap between policy and reality and reduce the misinterpretation of policies and laws.

VI.2. Enabling legal framework

In their review of recent experience in Africa, the authors of this paper have not found a single country where enabling Laws coexist with CNRM initiatives. Mali has recently modified its Forestry Code, thus providing some opening for CNRM. However, this experience shows that enabling legislation prior to experimentation complicates implementation because laws can be interpreted in different ways at local level. Therefore application of the law requires space for policy dialogue. Tanzania is perhaps most advanced in the other approach, i.e., developing a legal framework once CNRM is formally acknowledged as a viable forest management option and lessons from experimentation start to emerge. In Tanzania, enabling Laws are likely to be enacted in 2000 (Alden Wily, 2000).

⁵² The subsidiarity principle is the devolution of powers to the lowest most local level of government that can effectively discharge these powers (Dalal-Clayton *et al*, 1999).

Enabling national laws are not a prerequisite for CNRM to be tested. However, they become key when the government and donors wish to scale up CNRM. Lindsay (1999) provides a list of desired elements for an enabling framework, which he contends should be based on two principles: *security* (instilling confidence that rights cannot be taken away arbitrarily) and *flexibility* (allowing legal space to make choices adapted to local situations).

In the case of Africa, given the frequent legal pluralism of rules which often leads to *de facto* open access to land and forests, the above principles mean reconciling customary and formal rules. Below we describe different examples of achieving this.

(i) Formalising/codifying customary rules

Formalisation of traditional rules has sometimes been promoted as a means to allow for their recognition. However, experiences in that respect have been fraught with difficulties, i.e.: (Dubois, 1997)

- It is a daunting and expensive task, given the complexity and diversity of customary rules;
- Customary rules evolve with circumstances. This implies a need for frequent recodification, which would result in more confusion and could be seen as an absence of codification;
- Codification of customary rules can in fact truncate "the long standing capacity of traditional or locally derived authority to expand or alter rules to meet changing demands" (Wily, 1988, cited in Campbell, 1996);
- The complexity and flexibility of customary law would almost certainly be overlooked in the process of their formalisation.

(ii) Developing an analytical framework to assess tenure regimes

Based on work mainly in Francophone Africa, Le Roy *et al* (1996) have developed a framework to determine forms of 'command' (*maîtrises*) over natural resources by combining different modes of access and control. This combination of rights and control is key in understanding local realities as it encompasses the political dimension of access to land and natural resources. Moreover, this framework allows for the combination of formal and customary rules. It is known as *maîtrises foncières* in Francophone countries and is illustrated in Table 17.

Table 17: Possible forms of 'command' over land and natural resources

Types of rights	Access	Access Extraction	Access Extraction Management	Access Extraction Management Exclusion Alienation
Modes of control	F	C	C	F
Public: by all users F	e.g., access to salty deposits in the Sahel	e.g., access to wells in Sahel	e.g., access to wells owned by groups in the Sahel	e.g., logging concessions
External: by several groups C	e.g., corridors for cattle in Burkina Faso	e.g., some hunting rules in Cameroon	e.g., shared use of pastoral land	
External-internal: by two groups C			e.g., community forestry; combination of pasture and agricultural uses within a community	e.g., pastoral areas for specific groups in Central African Republic
Internal: by one group C			e.g., shifting cultivation	
Private: by one individual F		e.g., hunting permits		e.g., landowners in Solomon Islands

(F refers to formal rules; C refers to customary rules)

Adapted from Le Roy *et al.*, 1996.

(iii) *Building on customary rules*

Such an approach has been tried with some success in Madagascar and is synthesised in Box 11.

Box 11: Expanding the use of traditional rules to regulate the use and management of natural resources in Madagascar

In Madagascar, *Dina* are community-inspired by-laws which local decision-making bodies use for the benefit of the community. They date back to at least the 19th century. They concern family issues but also territorial and security matters, such as cattle rustling, bush fires, and use of certain trees.

Dina are always embedded in local values and beliefs, and once they are agreed upon by the traditional authorities, deterrents against their infringements can take various forms: fines, ritual sacrifices, and, in extreme cases, expulsion from the community.

Traditional *Dina* normally ignore formal law, as do also most local dwellers.

Recently, there have been tentative moves to expand the use of local *Dina*:

- In some instances, local *Dina* that have proven operational are being expanded to district, provincial, or even regional level. This process is cumbersome, since it requires the approval of all traditional leaders concerned, and in some cases the restoration of their authority via newly-built institutions;
- In other cases, the state and some NGOs (e.g., WWF) use the *Dina* principles to create new ones that suit their purposes. Traditional leaders are used as conduits to promote and enact such *Dina*. Thus far, such mechanisms have been notably used to regulate tree cutting, bush fires and shifting cultivation.
- More recently, *Dina* have been officially incorporated in the new government's strategy regarding the management of natural resources, which devolves many responsibilities and rights to local communities.

The use of *Dina* has proved a very good tool to:

- *Inform and train* natural resource users at the local level, as the acceptance of a *Dina* involves thorough debates on the pros and cons of different practices, environmental values, etc.;
- *Improve communication* between the State and local communities;
- *Control* the use of natural resources, being based on local values and initiated by local dwellers.

Source: Raharimalala, 1996 and Razanaka, 1996.

(iv) *Registering customary and 'modern' tenure rights and land uses (IIED, 1999)*

This approach has been tried since 1988 in Côte d'Ivoire with the Rural Land Plans (*Plan Foncier Rural*), as basis for future rural land codes. The Plan gives official recognition to customary rights, and provides access to modern law for those who wish. It comprises a locally available register, which includes maps, demographic information, a list of right holders, a land tenure register and reports of official proceedings. At county level (*sous-préfecture*), village land committees are required to register land, mediate disputes and ensure the maintenance of the register. In this sense, the Plan allows land users to agree on the definition of local land rights, including the registration of disputes. As of January 1998, the Plan had covered 671,000 hectares, and a new phase aims at extending this pilot area to 3 million hectares by 2002. A similar Plan has been recently launched in Benin.

Attempts have also been made to register both customary and formal tenure rights at collective level, e.g. in Mozambique and Tanzania. Compared to the registration of individual rights, advantages include relative ease and speed, together with a reduction of costs (Toumin and Quan, 2000). It relates also to the subsidiarity principle, which we briefly discuss in turn.

(v) Applying the subsidiarity principle by limiting the role of the State

Based on emerging evidence from Pakistan, Nepal and the Philippines, Lynch (1992) has suggested *limiting state intervention to the formal delineation of perimeters of community-based tenure systems, leaving the regulation of individual property rights to the communities themselves.*

In Africa, one example comes from the Imamba-Ivaka project in Madagascar and is described by Karsenty (1996). The project obtained permission from the local administration to simplify the procedure associated with registration of communal land based on aerial photographs. The customary communal territory was then delineated and demarcated on the ground. The registration "title" with legal value was then given to the traditional leader, who could, in turn deliver "internal titles" (without formal value) to user groups or individuals. This has resulted in a gradual reforestation of the area.

The efficiency of such an approach relates to both its responsiveness to local actors' specific needs, and the combination of formal tools and locally tailored rules. However, this approach does not discard the role of state officers as providers of advice in the management of land and natural resources. In such cases it is also important to establish mechanisms to guarantee the legitimacy of local decision-making bodies. Finally, this approach can also be combined with land registration, but in this case at community level.

(vi) Allowing for the development of "local laws"

The SIWAA case in southern Mali illustrates this. There, a group of six villages has developed a set of rules and sanctions to achieve more sustainable natural resource use in the context of an action-research programme called SIWAA. This "local convention" is a type of co-management agreement; which was made possible by the New Forestry Law (Hilhorst and Aarnink, 1999).

The development of "local laws" or "by-laws" has also been the approach adopted in Malawi. One example of this is given in Box 12.

Box 12: Developing "local laws": An example from Malawi.

"Community sets three road blocks.

Mwanza East community has set up three road blocks to confiscate illegal forest products emanating from the district. The road blocks have been mounted in line with the Mwanza East community by-laws for the sustainable management of indigenous forests approved by the Environment Minister" (The Nation 5th April, 2000)

This extract from one of Malawi's national newspapers describes how villagers in Mwanza have been legally empowered to take control of the management of their own natural resources. Examples of the by-laws include:

- Charcoal burning is not allowed in all areas
- Any person who cuts down protected or indigenous trees without prior permission from the forestry committee shall be fined one goat for each tree illegally cut.
- Any Group Village Headman or Village Headman who breaks the laws shall be fined two goats for every tree that he/she has illegally cut down
- If the culprit fails to comply with the order he or she shall serve to work or assist in the village forest area for a period of one year without pay
- Etc.

(Nation 2000; Mwanza East Community By-laws, 1999)

VI.3. Decentralisation – power to the people or just passing the buck?

Decentralisation is again one of these buzzwords that mean different things to different people. Governments often see decentralisation as *deconcentration* of activities of line ministries to lower administrative levels, whilst NGOs believe that it should imply *devolution* of power to other stakeholders than the State, and in particular local communities. Nowadays, devolution in some form is being promoted as a cure-for-all-ills of rural development and natural resource management as a reaction to the failures of both centralised and deconcentration strategies.

In the past, decentralisation in Africa - and in many countries elsewhere - has rarely lived up to expectations,⁵³ maybe because it involved deconcentration, rather than devolution, but also because it has not addressed what Richards *et al.* (1996) call the *invisible institutions problem* (e.g., rent seeking, patronage, personal power struggles, negative attitudes to negotiation and participation, etc). The problem is further complicated in the case of natural resources management because, conversely to social infrastructures, it requires that politically sensitive issues be addressed (e.g., land tenure, control over resources, in short, the '4Rs') and this can be threatening to local elites.

True and functional devolution strategies regarding natural resource management remains to be seen in Africa. Yet, this paper provides enough evidence that this has not prevented successful CNRM initiatives from being implemented. Therefore, *whilst decentralisation might have a facilitative role in local management, it is not a prerequisite, nor a guarantee of good local management.*

To be effective, decentralised systems (including local governments and village institutions) must have (Dalal-Clayton *et al.*, 1999):

- Sufficient power to exercise substantial influence over political affairs and over development activities;
- Sufficient financial resources to accomplish important tasks;
- Adequate capacity (both technical and institutional)⁵⁴ to accomplish those tasks;
- Adequate stakeholder representation in local councils, and in particular on the part of villagers;
- Reliable accountability mechanisms.

Two factors seem key in designing support programmes to meet these requirements:

- They should be tailored to the local context rather than desired outcomes and imported principles;

⁵³ A recent review of promises and realities of decentralisation can be found in Dalal-Clayton *et al.* (1999).

⁵⁴ See section IV.1.2.(iv) for definitions of technical and institutional capacities.

- They need to acknowledge the highly political dimension of local development, and thus place special emphasis on means to address the *invisible institutions problem* in a pragmatic and non-antagonistic fashion.

The issue of village representation has been addressed earlier in this paper (see Section IV.1.3.(iii)). We shall briefly discuss the crucial issue of accountability and adequate financial resources in turn.

(i) Improving the accountability of local institutions

Accountability mechanisms are a crucial element in successful decentralisation and CNRM. Kullenberg *et al.* (1997) identify three types of accountability: accountability of civil servants to local leaders;⁵⁵ accountability of local leaders to local citizenry; accountability within decision-making bodies.

Accountability of civil servants to local leaders

This has been difficult to ensure, mainly because of the incomplete devolution of authority from central to local authorities. Improvement will come only if the structure of incentives to perform well is reversed, and if high level authorities support lower level ones to achieve this.

Accountability of local leaders to local citizenry

This might be improved through devolution due to the role of elections. However, low accountability to citizens often stems from their lack of representation, and elections do not guarantee representation of marginal groups. Based on experience in Africa, Anyang' Nyong' (1997) warns against the 'fallacy of electoralism'. He argues that democracy needs not only free elections but also a wide variety of other mechanisms to represent civil society and guarantee checks and balances in government. Other ways to increase accountability to citizens include:

- *Improvement of citizens' access to information*, thus enabling more informed participation in public debates;
- *Mechanisms to control daily operations which are based on shared responsibility*, e.g., the need for several signatures to approve financial expenditure in Districts of Uganda;
- *Transparency* in review and authorisation of contracts and verifying expenditures;
- *Formal procedures of redress* against elected officials. This is essential for the mobilisation of local initiatives in the long term. But such mechanisms, where they exist, are often deliberately designed to be cumbersome so as to limit their use by local people. They can also be a potential threat for those who use them, and culturally unusual, as discussed earlier (see point 62 in Section IV.1.2.(ii)).
- *Better representation of local interests.*

⁵⁵ Given the shortcomings of elections in many developing countries, we prefer to use the term local leaders rather than elected officials.

Accountability within decision-making bodies

Two types of entities are considered here: government line agencies and civil society associations.

Accountability within line agencies is particularly important with respect to financial transfers from central level. It also concerns the need for local authorities to comply with higher level strategies. Lack of accountability to higher levels often leads to contradiction between local and national rules. Accountability to higher administrative levels is a necessary mechanism to moderate excessive administrative autonomy.

Lack of accountability within village-based associations and NGOs is often overlooked and leads to all sorts of abuses. Development initiatives can provide opportunities for 'local feudalisms' leading, in particular, to the unfair distribution of benefits and the exacerbation of existing power disparities. Ways to mitigate this have been discussed in Chapter IV (see Section IV.1.2.)

(ii) Adequate autonomy to undertake local management

Local governments require this autonomy in order to secure support from local political leaders and local public interest. To achieve this, locally elected bodies also need sufficient resources (notably financial) to govern. In a transitional phase, such resources can be provided from higher levels, as long as mechanisms are introduced to progressively enable self-financing. There is the usual risk that local elites will use increased autonomy to further their own interests. Olowu (1990) suggests that this risk can be reduced by *providing autonomy in an incremental fashion, linking it to performance.*

The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) has developed a pilot programme on Local Development Funds (LDFs) to provide financial autonomy to local authorities (Box 13).

Box 13: The LDF Programme of UNCDF

Over the last seven years, the Local Development Fund (LDF) component of UNCDF has developed programmes that provide ceiling capital budgets and technical support to local governments and decentralised state authorities in various less developed countries. These projects average \$3 to 9 million over 3-5 years, typically corresponding to \$1-5 per capita. The LDF aims to promote decentralised planning, financing or rural development and institutional strengthening at the local level. A key aspect is participatory planning and building capacity at local government level to develop viable development activities. Important features of LDF projects include:

- In contrast to most other types of programmes supporting local financial autonomy, allocation of LDF funds is not demand-driven, as this often results in funding wish lists. Rather, ceiling funds are allocated to match existing transfers from central level.
- The funds are fixed to force local authorities to prioritise actions. Participatory planning is used as a tool to facilitate prioritisation.
- An up-front entitlement is provided to promote the mobilisation of local funds.
- LDF projects focus on local governments because they are assumed to have a comparative advantage over NGOs in delivering a range of infrastructure and economic development that have a broader and more sustainable impact.

LDF projects typically face three key challenges:

- Ensuring the transparent allocation of resources;

- Making planning participatory. The planning process is entrusted to a body that must be representative both of local government and civil society. Moreover, some planned activities may be beyond the scope of LDF and local authorities, e.g., private income-generating activities or common-pool degraded natural resources.
- Linking activities to natural resource management. Given the focus on local governments, LDF activities tend to be biased towards small-scale and social infrastructure.

Source: Kullenberg *et al* (1997) and Romeo (1998)

Decentralisation often provides the opportunity to revisit the role of the Forestry department, a subject to which we now turn.

VI.4. The Role and capacity of the Forestry Department

Devolution programmes are often perceived as a threat to its authority by the Forestry Department (FD) – especially at local level. Yet its services have a very proactive role to play in the implementation of decentralised strategies regarding natural resource management, such as CNRM. This, as already discussed, might range from owning the land and designing local-friendly management systems (e.g., benefit-sharing of a FD managed Forest Reserve) to enabling village-level organisation to acquire the autonomy to be self-governing e.g., Duru-Haitemba, Tanzania (see Box 9, Section IV.1.3.(iii)), and providing some advice and possibly training as required. Development planners spend considerable effort analysing the characteristics of the resource and the community in question to determine their suitability for collaborative forest management but what of the FD? Does the FD have the capacity to undertake collaborative forest management? What win-win partnerships can it form to provide better support to CNRM initiatives? Box 14 presents the characteristics of the FD which enable it to fully implement and support collaborative forest management, and compares these to the realities of Malawi, which epitomises a situation frequently found in Africa.

Better than any analysis, Box 14 shows that the FD is often already stretched when it comes to supporting isolated co-management initiatives. This is likely to be exacerbated once CNRM expands. Alden Wily (pers. com.) argues that this is a major argument in favour of involving communities as actors rather than mere benefit sharers in CNRM. There is certainly some truth in this argument, as the Duru-Haitemba case of Tanzania clearly illustrates (see Box 9, Section IV.1.3.(iii)). However, as argued in Chapter IV (see Section V.3.1.), this might not always be the best way forward, even for the communities. Transferring part of the FD mandate to other supporting bodies is another and in some instances complementary way of lessening the workload of the FD, particularly at local level. Such bodies include:

- Private organisations such as NGOs (numerous examples, including Chimaliro in Malawi – see Section V.2.3. and SIWAA case in Mali for local level partnerships, and the Rural Fuelwood Markets Programme for an NGO taking over national responsibilities);
- Local elected bodies, such as local councils in Mali. In this case, local councils are in charge of Non-Reserve Forest land, and they can request technical assistance from whichever body they deem appropriate besides the local FD agency (e.g., NGOs, Private consulting firms, research centres, etc). Although this system is still largely untested, it provides an interesting avenue to explore.

Box 14: Is FD up to the job of collaborative management and what partners should it seek to improve its supportive capacity? An example from Malawi	
The ideal characteristics	The realities
Willingness and knowledge to formulate the appropriate Forest Policy and Forest Act.	In Malawi a Forest policy reform process was initiated in the 1990s and culminated in 1997 with the formulation of the Forest Policy 1996 and Forest Act 1997. In summary: Good
The production of a useful, comprehensive policy and legislation which is understood by all stakeholders.	The policy supports community involvement in forest management. There are however some shortcomings. Although the Act clearly endorses community involvement, there is a persistent theme that the government will issue the rules, approvals, plans and licenses that will govern all community-based management. Insistence on government oversight and control may dampen initiative, enthusiasm and participation. Furthermore the Act is complicated and confusing and appears to contain some ambiguities. In addition many stakeholders are still not aware of or understand it. Nevertheless the policy and legislation do set the scene and are a major step in the right direction. In summary: Going in the right direction, but a number of hurdles
A conviction in the principles of CFM – i.e., that locals must have an incentive to take responsibility for the forest resources on which they depend; which usually consists of a combination of tenurial security, decision-making opportunities and benefits and without these incentives the status quo will prevail. Emanating from this same characteristic the FD must have the determination to implement CFM, a determination which must enable them to overcome the initial inevitable hurdles and setbacks in pursuit of the goal – and not fall at the first hurdle retreating back into “government control” mode.	This conviction must be held by those in high office and their subordinates. Conviction amongst the latter without the former is however wasted as junior staff can only do as directed from above. Some on-the-ground staff who are in daily contact with rural people seem more inclined to believe in CFM – possibly because they are more aware of the practical realities and more convinced that government control is simply not the way forward. Likewise they see the indicators which show commitment from the ground to CFM. Lack of conviction is evidenced by a 1999 FD publication which declares that 70% of Forest Reserve revenue under a co-management agreement with the FD should go to the FD (probably considerably more than at present if illegal collection is taken into account). Furthermore, 20% of revenue collected from Village forest Areas (VFAs) on customary land under a management agreement with the FD (even though for forests not declared a VFA the FD is no longer collecting any revenue). Local Forestry staff often claim that co-management in Forest Reserves is like “opening flood gates”, seemingly unaware that the flood gate syndrome is already well underway. There is evidence to suggest that the higher offices are not exhibiting the appropriate determination and are inclined to see the first hurdle as an indication of that CFM is a non-starter. Having said that, the FD appears willing to co-operate with CFM initiatives introduced by NGOs and donors on customary land, and by-laws for some communities involved in CFM on customary land have been approved where facilitated by donor/NGOs. In summary: Poor/mixed
The appropriate attitude towards village peoples i.e., that they have the right to make choices about their own development, that they have skills and abilities to employ in CFM (even though some of these abilities are in evidence, but overlooked whilst others are submerged following years of government control and dependency syndrome). The appropriate attitude is that the FD does not necessarily know best.	This is an attitude which is alien to the Forestry Department as of old. There are however indications that this is slowly changing. In summary: Slowly changing

<p>Skills – in addition to the right attitude FD staff need skills. These are required at all levels but for those members of staff who interact with rural people on a day to day basis, these include: the ability to liaise and negotiate with village people, the ability to see problems from their point of view, the knowledge of how to approach CNRM, the principles on which CNRM is based, the nitty-gritty such as setting up committees (good ones), how to handle recalcitrant chiefs, how to build on the interest and commitment of the locals, making by-laws, etc..</p>	<p>There have been many training courses and workshops for FD staff. The principal recipients are higher level officers down to District Forestry Officer level. Some training has gone on recently at technical grades. However in the absence of on-the-ground implementation and guidance some of the training has gone on in a vacuum. This might be seen as a chicken and egg situation. CNRM cannot be implemented without training, training is wasted if undertaken in a vacuum of non-implementation. However, there are examples which show that, in many instances CNRM can start without training, and programmes can be devised as needs arise (e.g., in Ghana - Mayers and Kotey, 1996).</p>
<p>Capacity – this covers such things as the right number of extension workers, in the right places and with enough operational budget and the right attitudes to villagers.</p>	<p>The Forestry Department is lacking high calibre middle management staff (District Forest Officers - DFOs) and extension workers. Operational funds at the lowest levels are almost non-existent, extension workers where they exist (as few as 3 per district) have no transport. Almost all training is donor-supported.</p> <p>Funds: Until recently all funds generated entered treasury. The new Forestry Act provides for a Forestry Fund which allows the FD to retain 80% of its revenue. This would have more impact still if Forestry Funds were decentralised.</p> <p>There is a possibility for the establishment of District Forestry Funds under the in-progress decentralisation process.</p>
<p>Demonstrate transparency, respect and be able to forge relationships based on mutual trust with rural people.</p>	<p>The relationship between the rural people and FD is not good. FD staff are blamed for selling off riverine and other timber trees on customary land while they held the managerial responsibility for customary land forests.</p> <p>Malawians do however respect authority and traditionally manage their affairs through compromise. They understand the important role the FD plays. If a) the FD carried out their job with integrity b) they took more heed of the needs of the locals, a positive working relationship could easily be fostered as evidenced by some localised successes.</p>
<p>Ability to link-up with donors and NGOs where appropriate. Optimise win-win partnerships.</p>	<p>The FD has traditionally been slow to form partnerships with NGOs. The FD accuse the NGOs of doing things "on their own" in a cavalier and amateurish way. The NGOs in their turn accuse forest department staff of being lazy and only interested in getting allowances. As far as donors are concerned the relationship is sometimes equally fraught. Some donors tend to "bulldoze" in order to get their agenda through and the FD might accuse them of being heavy-handed and over-demanding. The FD tends however to welcome donors whatever their interest, unwilling to turn away any potential sources of cash. The donors tend not to co-operate and co-ordinate amongst themselves and might have quite different fundamental approaches. The donors complain that the FD has no strategy, is slow to make decisions and the staff is always chasing allowances. The on-going National Forestry Programme is designed to instil a strategic approach in the FD and could enhance the FD's ability to capitalise on what NGOs and donors have to offer.</p>
	<p>In summary: Going in the right direction, but hurdles due to poor relationships</p>

VI.5. The role of the State

Government policies on natural resources have a poor track record and it is nowadays increasingly accepted that local communities have some comparative advantages in this respect. Given these advantages of local control, the State would do well to let go of power to local initiatives in resource management, even if they do not comply with any extant formal rules. This does not mean that the State has no part to play in the management of natural resources. Local communities are usually well aware of that. They do not ask the State to withdraw but to support their resource-management initiatives through the provision of advice and mediation to enforce local CNRM agreements when needed.

In addition to facilitating local initiatives in CNRM, central government must play other important roles. For example, it should provide an overall vision for development. In the case of Zimbabwe, Plan Afric (1999) argue that such a vision at national level should be complemented by others at provincial and district levels and recommend the creation of a national think tank to help in this process. Box 15 suggests some other roles of central government that apply to CNRM.

Box 15: Possible tasks of central government in relation to CNRM

Assistance and guidance because it can more efficiently monitor the external effects of forest use. Main areas concerned include:

- * Perceiving environmental changes;
- * Convincing local groups that there are remedies to environmental stress;
- * Disseminating information on environmentally sound techniques, and sharing information both between the State and local groups and between groups.

Provision of economic incentives for conservation-oriented practices, especially where communities struggle to meet their basic needs and/or are at the mercy of powerful outside interests;

Clarification of group territorial rights and provision of a legal framework which enables user groups and their rights and benefits to be officially recognised;

Protection against broad-scale external pressures (e.g., pollution) and/or other economic sectors which central government is better able to respond to;

Provision and maintenance of basic infrastructure to support CNRM product development and marketing;

Provision of formal rules for conflict-resolution whenever locally-derived rules are insufficient, especially in the case of conflicts between different communities and/or with broader-based stakeholders;

Financial assistance to complement the mobilisation of local resources

Provision of incentives and removal of disincentives to sustainable scenarios in CNRM, and

A framework to link different decision-making levels.

Make and enforce regulations (giving heed to local needs) in those situations where local activity has an impact on a wider community and locally-derived approaches will not secure the interests of the more distant communities. The state can provide the link. An example is watershed management.

Source: Mainly Baland and Platteau (1996) and du Toit *et al.* (1998)

Chapter VII Conclusions and Recommendations

VII.1. General considerations

The involvement of local communities in forest management is now an important principle of tropical forest policy and practice, and a major component of international forestry aid programmes in Africa and elsewhere. The initial enthusiasm for this development is beginning to be tempered by experience and giving way to realism as to the challenges it faces. In particular there is a realisation that:

- The issues underlying co-management of forest resources are often political and institutional, and that participatory principles alone do not address these adequately;
- Context is all-important in the determination of the right mix of ingredients that has more chances to result in successful and robust co-management initiatives. No one recipe can be applied indiscriminately regardless of the context;
- However, specificity cannot be reduced to the community level because:
 - * rural populations are often composed of a blend of groups, making the border between "outsiders" and "insider" vis-à-vis the so-called "community" often artificial;
 - * within a small homogeneous community different people use forests in different ways e.g. men want access for grazing cattle whilst women want to collect thatch grass, poorer members collect and sell firewood, the richer members buy it.
 - * actors external to rural people's groups play a significant role on the local rules of forest use and management.
- More specifically regarding Africa, natural resource management is undergoing institutional transition, somewhere between (often) weakened traditional rules, increasing privatisation and non-enforceable formal rules (Dubois, 1998b).

A multiple strategy is therefore required, combining:


- National guidelines which clearly recognise the key role of forest-related people in achieving better forest management and rural livelihoods;
- Continuous possibility for negotiations of the terms and conditions of the CNRM agreement
- Experimentation and monitoring of performance in initiatives involving rural people in forest management, as a key factor for progress along the learning curve of CNRM;
- By implication, development of mechanisms that allow lessons from experimentation to feed into the process of policy making;
- Long-term and demand-driven donor support to help in financing the transaction costs of this learning process;
- A flexible and iterative approach, following guidelines not blueprints

- But also decision makers and practitioners should not forget that there are other ways of managing natural resources – collaborative management will not be the answer in every case (see Chapter 3).

The principles to achieve this revolve around some key words, including:

- *Realism/pragmatism*, embracing the complexity, uncertainty and political dimension of CNRM;
- *Patience/time* as CNRM often require attitudes and local power balance to evolve, i.e., almost societal changes, and this takes time and a lot of “trial and error”;
- *Flexibility*, because the right mix for success and sustainability of co-management changes according to variations of local circumstances.

Based on the above, we suggest a stepwise process in the achievement of CNRM objectives. While sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation should remain the ultimate goals of CNRM, as an interim stage, we propose more workable objectives, i.e.



VII.2. Specific recommendations

VII.2.1. At national level

- Clearly recognise the key role of “communities” in achieving better management of land and forest resources. This would lead to;
- Developing policy and legal framework that would legitimise local experimentation on CNRM (but experimentation *can* proceed without the necessary policy and legal framework if the will is there);
- Governments might consider a contractual approach with local communities, whereby mutual obligations concerning the use and management of natural resources are negotiated.

This would lead to a gradual shift from (Karsenty, 1996)

Laws/institutions → tools → project → participation

Towards

General legal principles → negotiation → definition of long term objectives → common choice of instruments and setting up of local institutions → evolution and adaptation to changes in local circumstances.

- Once the potential of CNRM is officially recognised, willingness and means to supporting its implementation become key. This is often a cause for concern for expanding CNRM, even when the policy is in place and sufficient lessons from experimentation have been drawn. This relates in particular to the capacities of State agencies in supporting the expansion of CNRM. In that respect governments might consider using the '4Rs' framework to determine the mandates of local governments and line agencies at local level. Although still in its infancy, we think that the innovative approach developed in Mali is worth testing, i.e., local governments are in charge of non-reserve forests and the local forestry service is in charge of forest reserves. This sharing of mandates is internal to the State, and should not curtail the negotiation process with other partners, and communities in particular. Assistance by NGOs has often proven key to expand CNRM initiatives in some cases (e.g., the Rural Fuelwood Markets Programme in Niger – see Section V.2.1.);
- Policy making should learn from experimentation on CNRM;
- Law making should recognise the legitimacy of both formal and customary rules, so long as these have proven their value as regards the objectives suggested above (see Section VII.1);
- The national legal framework should allow for the development of "local laws" that would be monitored based on the same criteria as above.

VII.2.2. At local level

- A *learning-by-doing* approach should prevail, at least in the early stages of CNRM initiatives;
- Local governments and line agencies should *"let CNRM initiatives go"* on a pilot basis. They should *monitor* their *performance* before moving to the step where the '4Rs' are negotiated on a longer term basis;
- *Get the '4RS' right and monitor them.* This could start with a very specific and burning local issue. By all means, the right balance of the '3Rs' (rights, responsibilities and returns/revenues) should be locally decided, with national and international assistance playing a facilitative role;
- Achieving the above will require *"making sense" of the local context*, and in particular of the facilitating and complicating features discussed in Chapter IV of this paper. Therefore, interventions to mitigate complicating factors are likely to be required prior to negotiating the '3Rs' (e.g., (re)building trust, levelling off bargaining powers);

- Good-quality relationships are usually the essential lubricant to achieve and maintain successful CNRM initiatives. Thus, there is a need for mechanisms that *ensure regular interaction between the major stakeholders*. Some means to assess relationships and ensure regular dialogue have been suggested in Chapter V (Section V.3.3);
- Since local conditions evolve over time, there is a need to develop *mechanisms that allow for a (re)negotiation of the '4Rs'* when the agreed balance of the '3Rs' (becomes unfair to a major stakeholder and non-conducive to the objectives suggested above (see Section VII.1.).
- Decision-making structures, be they formal or informal, should be accepted and legitimised so long as *they achieve good results* in sustainable local development and conservation;
- Effective mechanisms *linking the lowest administrative level to interest groups* at forest level should be installed;
- Mechanisms allowing for *local generation of funds* should be accepted and even promoted by governments, in order to increase local financial autonomy, hence local economic resilience;
- However, the foregoing requires the creation of *local and user-friendly checks and balance mechanisms* in order to avoid the creation of "new feudalisms", whereby CNRM would benefit mainly local elites (e.g., one mechanism is the creation of several mechanisms of recourse for citizens);
- All the above will require that local people *become more organised*, both locally and in a wider context.⁵⁶ Local people must be organised at the user-level – this may be village level, or a small group of villages or based on interest groups (e.g., Leaf Gatherers of Kwapanin – Agyemang, 1996)) who may be drawn from one or more villages. Being organised has the advantage of enabling a group of people to be more powerful, and is often deemed as a key factor for development interventions to reach the poorest of the poor. Indeed, it enables users of natural resources to:

* Relate to and negotiate with other stakeholders be they in conflict, in partnership or, as in the case of the government, both advisers and enablers as well as interested parties.

* Institutionalise checks and balances which are important to stabilise power disparities;

* Gain a voice and enhance their negotiating power whether it is with the private sector over terms and conditions or with the government concerning policy issues;

* Gain a legal identity. Ideally the local users institutions should be legal entities and have the chance to make or influence local by-laws – this again enhances their power when dealing with other stakeholders who might otherwise monopolise and exploit;

⁵⁶ The National Smallholder Farmers' Association of Malawi have as their motto "the future belongs to the organised".

* Fit in or link up with the wider institutional framework which must also be designed to allow communication, negotiation, checks and balances.

- Given the challenge which CNRM presents there is need for committed and capable *change agents*, be they government or NGO. These change agents must have the capacity to facilitate, educate and motivate the relevant stakeholders. The complexity that some change agents will also be stakeholders should be dealt with through the development of appropriate institutions.
- Time should be given for (a) trust to be built or restored; (b) for local people to get organised; (c) develop the capacities and allow for attitudinal changes of change agents, (d) experiments to provide lessons. As a Malian proverb says: "The matter is important, so let's take our time to solve it".

VII.3. Concluding remarks

The current transition in natural resource management requires the integration of science and politics. This is nowhere more relevant than in the area of co-management of forest resources. Working on these matters can be compared to embarking on an adventurous journey: *one knows the general direction, but several twists and turns make it impossible to predict the itinerary in advance.* We therefore agree with Lee (1993) that some "*navigational aids*" are needed to help us on our way. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the provision of such aids.



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Annex 1: A possible aid to negotiation in CNRM: A simplified approach to Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA)

Introduction

The assumption that an optimum solution to a problem exists requires the simultaneous occurrence of three criteria, i.e.: (Scharlig, 1994)

globality: all the possible solutions are mutually exclusive;

stability: the solutions are clearly defined and fixed over a long period of time;

perfect comparability: the solutions envisaged could clearly be ranged.

Natural resources management is clearly a case where many use and management options are available, and also where these three criteria are seldom met. This is why Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA) seems particularly appropriate for multi-stakeholder negotiation regarding natural resource use and management. Indeed, rather than seeking to define the *optimal solution to a problem*, MCA rather attempts to determine the most acceptable amongst a range of possible options for all the stakeholders involved in the negotiation. Its main appeal might reside in that it can help move forward with a more "objective" tool than judgements when dialogue between stakeholders is in a deadlock. By gradually eliminating the less acceptable options to most stakeholders, MCA also simplifies the complexity of the negotiation through a stepwise selection process.

How does it work?

There are many possible methods to carry out MCA. In this paper our goal is simply to provide an example of a simplified approach to MCA, in order to illustrate its possible use in CNRM. It is part of a group of MCA methods known under the global term ELECTRE (Scharlig, 1994).

Five steps characterise the ELECTRE family of MCA approaches:

- A. Scoping the possible options to address an issue or solve a problem. All the options mentioned by the stakeholders should be considered valid at the outset of the negotiation;
- B. Define the criteria and importance ("weight") of these criteria in relation to the options envisaged, and the scale used in the assessment;
- C. Assess the performance of the different options according to the criteria defined in step C. Combined with the previous steps, this should result in a performance/judgement matrix;
- D. Assess the extent of stakeholders' agreement ("concordance") and disagreement ("discordance") regarding assumptions on the relative value of the different options;
- E. Finally, gradually select the more acceptable solutions for the majority of stakeholders.

The overall idea is to make some assumptions regarding the relative performance of the different options (i.e., option X outweighs option B) and to compare these assumptions to the figures provided in the performance/judgement matrix. Decisions regarding steps A and

E should be made in a group discussion. Ideally, steps should also be decided collectively. However, more often than not, strong initial divergence of opinion results in each stakeholder deciding on steps B, C and D separately. A second phase then tries to reconcile the separate assessments to reach step E.

One example: Deciding on the use of a patch of forest on Customary Land somewhere in Central Africa

One can think of a situation involving different stakeholder regarding the fate of a patch of forest in Central Africa. The stakeholders could be the local Forestry Service, local farmers, an environmental NGO and a logging company.

Possible options could include (a) conversion to agricultural land; (b) logging concession; (c) a Forest Reserve, and (d) an agroforestry scheme involving farmers planting trees for the sawmill of the logging company in an outgrower scheme.

To simplify the analysis, we will envisage only a few criteria such as: environmental condition, economic returns for the logging company, improvement of farmers' livelihoods, increase in export taxes

The factors mentioned above could result in the performance/judgement matrix shown below.

Criteria →	Environmental condition	Economic return for the logging company	Improvement in farmers' livelihoods	Increase in export taxes
Options ↓				
Weights (1: "lighter"); 3: "heavier");	2	3	3	1
Scales (1: worst, 5: best)	1-5	1-5	2-4	2-4
Conversion to farm land (annual crops)	2	1	4	1
Logging concession	2	4	2	3
Forest Reserve	4	1	1	1
Agroforestry/outgrower scheme	3	2	4	2

Obviously the different stakeholder groups are likely to draw a different matrix. It is then up to the "mediator" to try to reconcile the different points of view. The next steps might help in that respect.

The next step is about assessing the degree of agreement ("concordance") and disagreement ("discordance") regarding the assumptions made on relative performance of the different options (see Tables below). This is achieved by drawing concordance and discordance Tables as follows:


Degree of Concordance: $\frac{\text{number of occurrences where one option "outweighs" another option}}{\sum \text{weights (in our case 9)}}$

Note that the computation of the concordance degree does not use directly the performance values. Rather it uses them indirectly, i.e., to test assumptions

Degree of Discordance: Highest difference between two options where "outweighing" assumption is not verified
Wider scale value (in our case 4)


Concordance is an expression of the preferences of the "majority" of stakeholders; while discordance relies on the actual divergence in performance, hence somewhat expressing the opinion of the "minority".

Concordance Table

"Outweighs" 	Conversion to farm land (annual crops)	Logging concession	Forest Reserve	Agroforestry/outgrower scheme
Conversion to farm land (annual crops)		2/9 = 0.33	1/9 = 0.11	3/9 = 0.33
Logging concession	1/9 = 0.11		1/9 = 0.11	2/9 = 0.22
Forest Reserve	1/9 = 0.11	3/9 = 0.33		3/9 = 0.33
Agroforestry/outgrower scheme	0/9 = 0	2/9 = 0.22	1/9 = 0.11	

* The option in the column outweighs the option in the rank

Discordance table

"Outweighs" 	Conversion to farm land (annual crops)	Logging concession	Forest Reserve	Agroforestry/outgrower scheme
Conversion to farm land (annual crops)		2/4 = 0.5	3/4 = 0.75	0/4 = 0
Logging concession	3/4 = 0.75		3/4 = 0.75	2/4 = 0.5
Forest Reserve	2/4 = 0.50	2/4 = 0.5		1/4 = 0.25
Agroforestry/outgrower scheme	2/4 = 0.50	2/4 = 0.5	3/4 = 0.75	

Testing the assumptions


The next step starts with the agreement on threshold values for both degrees of concordance and discordance. For instance one could choose 0.3 for concordance and 0.5 for discordance. This means that the assumptions made will only be valid if both their degree of concordance exceeds or equals 0.3 and their degree of discordance is inferior or equal to 0.5. The testing of assumptions is carried out on that basis and translates into the following Table and Diagram.

A striking feature of the above Table is the fact that discordance values are higher than concordance values for most assumptions, pointing to the controversial character of the options at stake.

Assumptions (\geq means equals or "outweighs")	Concordance values	Discordance values
Farmland \geq logging concession	0.11	0.75
<i>Logging concession \geq farmland</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.5</i>
Farmland \geq Forest Reserve	0.11	0.5
Forest Reserve \geq Farmland	0.11	0.75
Farmland $>$ Agroforestry	0	0.5
<i>Agroforestry \geq Farmland</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Logging concession \geq Forest Reserve</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.5</i>
Forest Reserve \geq Logging concession	0.11	0.75
Logging concession \geq agroforestry	0.22	0.5
<i>Agroforestry \geq logging concession</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.5</i>
Forest Reserve \geq Agroforestry	0.11	0.75
<i>Agroforestry \geq Forest Reserve</i>	<i>0.33</i>	<i>0.25</i>

Note: Validated assumptions are in italics

The following Diagram, which uses only the validated assumptions, leads to the final stage of the negotiation, i.e., the choice of the most acceptable option or combination of options:



The Diagram clearly shows that the agroforestry/outgrower scheme outweighs all the other options, seemingly making it the most acceptable fate of the forest patch under discussion. However, since the tree component of that scheme comprises only fast-growing trees for the sawmill of the logging company, it might not fulfil the needs of the concession manager in terms of export quality timber. Perhaps the most acceptable solution for all parties might then be a combination of a logging concession and agroforestry/outgrower scheme. Be that as it may, the options Forest Reserve and Farmland for annual crops only can reasonably be eliminated, making the discussion about the final agreement less complicated.

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Annex 2: Experiences with Local-Level Dialogue in Francophone West Africa⁵⁷

This Appendix looks at lessons stemming from the functioning of two types of co-ordinating bodies in Francophone West Africa, i.e., bodies embedded in national administrative frameworks (we shall call them administrative committees) and bodies which exist in the context of donor-supported projects (referred to as project committees in this document).

1. Administrative committees

Two types of state-based co-ordination committees exist in rural areas of Francophone West Africa, i.e., those aimed at facilitating dialogue between communities and government, and those aimed at linking line agencies, NGOs and donor-funded initiatives. We shall discuss them in turn.

(i) Dialogue forums

Boxes 7 (see Section IV.1.3.(iii) in Chapter IV) and A below illustrate the types of problems encountered by such bodies, based on two examples: the District Conciliation Courts (*Tribunaux Départementaux de Conciliation*) in Burkina Faso, and the Land Tenure Commissions (*Commissions Foncières*) in Niger.

These examples show that inadequate representation of people's interests, and possible means to overcome this, are often central issues in such dialogue forums. In addition, lack of funding often affects their functionality, a problem also encountered in the second type of administrative forum that we briefly discuss below.

Box A: Land Tenure Commissions in Niger

Land Tenure Commissions (LTCs) were introduced under the new Rural Code of Niger, enacted in 1993 (Edict 93-015) (Yacouba, 1996). They are chaired by the "sous-préfets" (more or less equivalent to county officers) and comprise non-elected persons: the local officer responsible for the rural code, the heads of technical services related to natural resources, representatives of community groups (farmers, herders, women, youth), and, when relevant, customary authorities, representatives of other technical services and any other person deemed necessary.

LTCs have both a consultative and decision-making role, i.e.: (Yacouba, 1996):

- a consultative role on use of land, drawing up of land-use management plans at municipal level, acquisition of ownership rights;
- a decision-making role regarding the recognition and establishment of land rights, the transformation of rural use rights into ownership rights, determination of levels of compensation, if relevant; and, finally, the keeping of Land Registers.

⁵⁷ This appendix draws mainly on Dubois *et al* (1996)

Fifty-seven LTCs are planned. In a pilot phase, 3 have been operating since 1994 and 7 were due to start working in 1997 with the support from donor agencies. Several limitations of the LTCs are already apparent, including (Gado, 1996):

- LTCs have often been criticised for the over-representation of technical staff in comparison with community groups.
- Unclear definition of the LTCs' role and organic links and other services. LTCs should co-operate with other administrative units, but, at the same time, maintain their independence from political, administrative and legal authorities.
- Lack of clarity about LTCs' roles and lack of independence - especially *vis-à-vis* political parties - has led to disappointment among the rural population: they expected LTCs to issue ownership certificates (which they cannot do); and they thought they would have the authority to issue ownership certificates and, most importantly, independently from political influences and other types of favouritism. Public dismay is exacerbated by the fact that individuals serving on LTCs also work in other official capacities, and there is already great distrust of public authorities as a result of unhappiness with past performance.
- Lack of sensitivity to cultural factors, i.e., no mention to the Koranic oath, customarily used by the traditional chiefs to settle land disputes, and the traditional logic that "if the land already belongs to us, why should we register it?", which makes formal registration obsolete in the eyes of the local people.
- The supporting regulations aimed at making the rural code operational have not been developed, which compounds confusion over the roles of LTCs.

Source: Gado (1996) and Yacouba (1996)

(ii) *Inter-agency committees*

Their lack of operationality usually relates to the following factors

* Lack of decision-making power

These structures allow for discussions, but each participant also has to respect the priorities and ways of working of its own organisation. The absence of decision-making power often leads to disinterest and formalisation of such meetings (i.e., meeting for the sake of meeting).

* Lack of funds to operate these committees

When they exist, local government planning units too often lack financial resources to cover the expenses related to meetings, especially when, 'traditionally', these imply *per diems* and other costs. It is also sometimes difficult to agree on the sharing of costs between the bodies involved in such committees; but sometimes solutions are found, especially in the absence of donor-funded projects.

* Lack of support from central levels

This is linked to the above factors

* Diversity of motivations to participate

Given the lack of decision-making power of these committees, one can wonder what motivates participants to attend them: intellectual, financial, professional reasons? This diversity is compounded by the diversity of organisations represented, i.e., from government to NGOs and donor-funded projects.

* Lack of participation of traditional leaders

This causes problems in particular when formal and indigenous rules co-exist.

2. Project committees

Given the difficulties faced by administrative committees, in many instances, donors have developed their own co-ordination committees in the context of their rural development projects. Two types of committees are found:

(i) *Inter-village committees*

These type of committees are typically found at advanced stages of Gestion de Terroir projects that encompass several villages. Villagers usually dominate these committees. A key weakness of such bodies lies in their lack of legitimacy outside the projects that create them.

(ii) *Local government committees*

These committees actually represent reduced versions of administrative committees. These bodies usually function mainly thanks to project funds. Box B provides an example of such committees in Mali.

Box B: One example of project committees in Mali

Within this GTZ-funded GRN-GT Project, Local Development Committees (LDCs) involve all local concerned line agencies and are chaired by the District Officer. Only one expatriate staff assists these committees. Using only PRA techniques, the LDCs develop technical plans and submit them to the national direction of the project, which, in turn, is responsible for identifying the weaknesses of field operations and for developing a policy dialogue with both the LDCs and concerned Departments at central level. Village committees have some control over the means allocated to line agencies, through the monitoring of LDCs. The project is currently trying different means to increase the involvement of villagers in the control of daily operations (e.g., fuel posts for project vehicles based in villages).

This type of mechanism encourages more transparency in project management, together with more involvement of both Local Government Units (LGUs) and local communities. However, this administrative structure currently faces some challenges:

- Participation by line agencies in LDCs is often mainly linked to financial advantages;
- Linked to the above project managers are regularly confronted with requests for funds concerning *per diems*, training, paper tours, etc., at the expense of other areas of management;
- Also linked to the above, different level of motivation and efficacy of the LDCs.

Source: Grosjean *et al.* (1998)

In some cases, these committees only exist on paper. The local project leader prefers direct contacts with each agency separately and on a case-to-case basis, for the sake of efficiency. However, this strategy bears the risk of reduced communication between the different agencies involved in the project, with the project leader being the only person aware of who does what.

In regions popular among donors, one frequently finds (too) many project committees. Although this situation creates some confusion for the local administration, one can wonder to what extent this is not purposely maintained, as lack of co-ordination among donors also means more opportunities to bring funds to the area!

Suggestions aimed at improving cost effectiveness of co-ordination committees include (Dubois *et al*, 1996):

(i) Ownership by perennial structures

Ideally, co-ordination committees should be created at the initiative of LGUs rather than being imposed by central Departments or donor-funded projects. Following a pragmatic and stepwise approach, such bodies could start with only a few agencies, and involve more partners as needs rise and lessons on the functioning of the committee are learned. Another way for increasing ownership – and accountability – lies in increasing the role of line agencies in project design and implementation.

(ii) Different committees for different tasks

One could for instance imagine, on the one hand, operations committees that would meet as needs arise; and advisory committees, who would meet less regularly to discuss overall strategies, etc..

(iii) Reduction in the number of committees

Donors involved in local development should agree that one committee is a must, and the local district officer would have to take the lead on ensuring that.

(iv) Really concerted planning

This often depends a lot on the motivation of the chairman and the local players in local development. But there are some examples, such as in the Saint-Louis Region in Senegal, where a concerted planning exercise has resulted in feasible sets of activities, with roles clearly specified.

(v) Flexible funding approaches

The objective should be to gradually reduce the dependency on donor initiatives to finance the functioning of co-ordinating committees. Options include:

- contribution of the different entities according to criteria decided by the committee. This seems to work better in the absence of donor-funded initiatives, since these are not supposed to fund the entirety of the expenses;
- support from central level, based on the legitimacy of such committees whenever possible. However, support could be commensurate to performance.

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The journey towards collaborative forest management in Africa: Lessons learned and some navigational aids. An overview

Based on a comprehensive literature review and the authors' own experience throughout sub-Saharan Africa, this paper offers no short cuts to better partnerships in forest management because each situation requires its own recipe. Nevertheless, the authors dare suggest some hints. Firstly, they argue that, while sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation should remain the overall goals of co-management, more workable objectives in the short term should be set, such as achieving less unsustainable practices, improved well-being of rural populations and improved local capacities to cope with changing circumstances. Secondly, the authors suggest that success in collaborative forest management might be measured by the maintenance of a cycle allowing for the monitoring and, if need be, negotiation of local stakeholders' '4Rs'. The '4Rs' refer to the right balance of stakeholders' rights, responsibilities and returns/revenues ('3Rs'), and good quality relationships between these same groups (the 4th 'R'). A range of local 'facilitating' and 'complicating' factors at local level and scaling up issues are also discussed.

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