iied

International
Institute for
Environment and
Development

Drylands Programme

Pastoral Land Tenure Series No. 12

Market commerce as wildlife protector?

Commercial initiatives in community conservation in Tanzania's northern rangelands

Halvor Wøien and
Lewis Lama

1999

Market Commerce as Wildlife Protector?
Commercial Initiatives in Community Conservation in Tanzania's Northern Rangelands

Halvor Wøien & Lewis Lama

September 1999

Publication of the Pastoral Land Tenure series is funded by a generous grant from the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA)

CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES

Maps

Tables

Map 1: The Northern Rangelands. Wildlife areas



PREFACE

The two authors of this paper met for the first time by accident in the Tanzanian rangelands during their individual research projects in 1994. This joint production is the outcome of a common interest in the fields of rangeland management and community conservation. We would not have been able to complete this work without the help of the villagers, tour operators, government officers and NGOs who provided us with valuable information.

Dr Lewis Lama may be contacted at:

5563 Far Look Road
Spring Green
Wisconsin
USA
tel:+ 1 608 935 1322 email: lewlama@mhtc.net.

Halvor Wøien may be contacted at:

Kirkeveien 130
N-1370 Asker
Norway
tel: +47 66780270. email: hwoien@hotmail.com

1. INTRODUCTION

Natural resource tenure, land management and wildlife conservation in Tanzania have attracted increasing attention since democratisation, liberalisation of the economy and the introduction of structural adjustment programmes. The three areas that have received greatest scrutiny are: i) land law and policy; ii) the role of local governments vis-à-vis decentralisation; and iii) the character of popular participation. There is, however, a gap in the literature concerning the conditions in rural areas for achieving natural resource management and conservation objectives in the context of current laws and policies and contemporary political and economic realities.

This paper focuses on community conservation in multiple land-use rangelands in northern Tanzania where wildlife, agriculture, pastoralism, tourism and other economic activities interact and compete over increasingly scarce resources. A number of individual safari companies and professional hunters have begun to make contracts with villages concerning the utilisation of village lands. For the commercial operators these contracts have served to formalise relations and establish parameters within which their activities can take place. From the villagers point of view, commercial contracts provide income and/or assistance towards the development of infrastructure, job opportunities and links to other economic activities, and in some cases support for jurisdictional claims at the district or regional level. Although the arrangement can be mutually beneficial, some potential weaknesses are apparent. These range from the question of whether village councils have the necessary sophistication and resources to negotiate effectively with international companies, to uncertainties over the adequacy of market forces to bring about changes in village use of and interaction with wildlife (a necessary prerequisite of sustainable hunting and photo-tourism), and whether hunting and photo-tourism can co-exist.

In this case study we show that problems do occur. The nature of many contracts is extremely ambiguous, particularly in the areas of overlapping jurisdictions among government agencies and the character of village leadership. The study also shows that village leaders can be proficient negotiators with a deeper understanding of the implications of these contracts than their European counterparts, including long term residents.

Community involvement in conservation is not a new idea in eastern and southern Africa. Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania have all experienced wildlife conservation programmes that attempt to include villages adjacent to protected areas (national parks, game reserves etc.) or on communal and village land. What is new is the attempt by villages and private companies to administer the utilisation of local resources independently of any formal development or conservation programme.

Generally, the management of natural resources and the conservation of wildlife concern relations between individuals, communities and local institutions on the one hand, and formal administrative structures, national bureaucracies, and governmental institutions on the other. In the Tanzanian case, the contracts and operations must therefore conform to norms established by central government. But when the contracts have been developed, ie., negotiated and agreed by the principle parties, they are more likely to meet the needs of all the parties affected. A fundamental point then, is the issue of self-determination for local communities, and the facilitation of legal arrangements for communal access and control over local natural resources.

This paper highlights conservation as an integral element of local land management and economic activities; it is therefore presented as an alternative to the traditional conservation ideal which is based on demarcation and guarding of protected areas. By presenting empirical evidence of local initiatives in the conservation of wildlife and habitat we hope to demonstrate the market's new role in wildlife management and consider whether there are congruent interests between private companies and villagers. This leads us to the open question of whether or not privatisation is a viable strategy for sustaining biological diversity in developing countries.

Management regimes on the Tanzanian rangelands are characterised as variable multiple land-use systems. In Section 2 of this paper, we describe the 'use versus preservation' perspective; the land and wildlife administration system, and the potentials for wildlife utilisation in multiple land-use rangelands.

Section 3 describes the collaboration in resource management and conservation between a safari operator and one village, including the background to the negotiations and the manner in which they were carried out. Related to this case study is a table presenting a list of other collaborative initiatives in Tanzania demonstrating various models for such initiatives.

Based on the current administration of multiple land-use rangeland areas and the experience of this case study, Section 4 will discuss potentials and constraints for this type of commercial participation in wildlife management in more general terms, as well as the role of the state in wildlife conservation through the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas.

2. BACKGROUND

Use versus preservation

Sustainable development is a complex issue which concerns the relationship between the management and protection of nature on the one hand, and the prospect for lasting social and economic development on the other. A discussion on the antagonism between the use and the preservation of nature and landscapes is especially relevant for the current situation on the Tanzanian rangelands. The areas have one of the highest densities of large mammals in the world, contain some of the most endangered species, and are internationally famous for their scenic beauty which attracts tourists as well as conservationists. At the same time, these areas are settled by a whole range of subsistence agriculturists, agro-pastoralists and pastoralists who are living in an unreliable environment, and who have been increasingly marginalised due to - among other things - the establishment of wildlife protection areas.

African rangelands have proven to be resilient to environmental degradation, which, it is widely believed, is primarily caused by local people. The response to degradation has therefore largely been technocratic: deforestation is met with a ban on tree cutting and demarcation of forest reserves, soil erosion is combated with terraces, depletion of pastures require destocking, and endangered wildlife species need protected areas.

Since the arrival of colonial and post-independence governments, attempts at wildlife conservation in developing countries have been externally driven protection programmes based on the spatial demarcations of protected areas. However, from the 1970s new approaches have increasingly focused on the role of local people in nature conservation. These new perspectives are known variously as *community conservation and integrated conservation and development* (or conservation with development). In the wake of these new approaches, people's participation has become adopted in policy statements by nature conservationists and donor programmes alike.

Given the European/North American point of view of world conservation policy it may be difficult to eliminate the discrepancy between use and preservation perspectives. The demarcation of protected areas is still the dominant international strategy for the maintenance of biodiversity in developing countries. More recently, this approach has aimed to include the needs of local people, but the emphasis on protected areas helps to maintain state control over land and resources which are often essential to their economies, e.g. water sources and dry season pastures. Efforts to involve local people in conservation programmes have primarily been based on passive involvement rather than as a response to a local initiative. There are few examples of projects which have succeeded in integrating biodiversity protection with an improvement in the quality of life for local people. In order for the new strategies to succeed, however, basic questions concerning costs and benefits must be addressed: who defines the needs, who makes decisions, and who has control over the strategies for nature protection?

Various community conservation projects around the world have experienced difficulties as a result of ambiguous institutional responsibilities, unclear property rights, and the often conflicting relations between traditional cultural values and the new economy brought in by the projects. In Tanzania, there have been some scattered initiatives by donor organisations (in collaboration with governmental institutions) to involve local people in conservation,

especially through campaigns designed to increase awareness of the value of wildlife resources. Initiatives have been taken in areas adjacent to some protected areas, for instance, Tarangire, Serengeti, Selous Game Reserve and areas within the Greater Ruaha ecosystem.

However, the main objective of most of the community conservation projects has been the protection of wildlife rather than community development. This is not necessarily because local development is seen as unimportant, but essentially because the general political and legal framework is not yet prepared for local utilisation and community control over wildlife resources, and because pressure from international environmental organisations effectively hinders local wildlife management. Global environmentalism demands international influence over the future of rich wildlife areas in Tanzania as elsewhere.

This may be due to a mistrust of local communities and their ability to manage wildlife resources. But a more serious impediment is the attitudes of the international conservation community that indirectly sustain the power relations and the prevailing interests of bureaucracies to maintain the status quo in rural areas. Even though certain conservation issues clearly require national or even international control, most terrestrial wildlife species - notably in Africa - exist in relatively fixed habitats. In theory, therefore, their ownership can be fixed to specific entities such as groups of villages or communities.

The nation-state has sovereignty over national natural resources, although international conventions may provide specific directions for the conservation of biological diversity. Yet much of the cost associated with national and international conservation initiatives is borne by local people, while international and national tourist companies have considerable income from wildlife tourism in and around protected areas.

A fundamental condition for sustainable development is that local communities become aware of the long-term benefits from nature conservation, and that they are not only involved, but also initiate conservation and protection activities. Community use of local natural resources clearly occupies a central position in nature conservation, but their sound management demands a partnership between the various stakeholders, including central authorities, local communities, international environmental organisations and commercial interests.

Land administration and wildlife in Tanzania

Access to land and natural resources has often been a source of conflict on the African continent, especially at the boundary between traditional tenures and statutory law. Until recently, access to off-farm resources on the rangelands, such as forage, trees and water has been controlled by customary tenure systems. Most recently private ownership of land has been encouraged by multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and bilateral aid from USAID. In the context of the modern state the issue of access to resources involves legal matters such as ownership of specific resources, and more to the point, the question of self-determination by rural communities.

In the current debate over economic and environmental recovery in Africa, various prescriptions for enabling community-centred resource management regimes have been suggested. Although models promoting empowerment and co-management are frequently suggested, there are few examples of this approach being successfully implemented. Below we outline some of the recent discussions over community involvement in conservation within the context of natural resource control and management.

In Tanzania, the introduction of a multi-party system, liberalisation of the economy and structural adjustment programmes have re-vitalised the rhetoric of political decentralisation and popular participation. However, in spite of this, land tenure policy in Tanzania remains largely within the state domaine. The state and politicians want to maintain their influence over natural resource use as a means of exercising power, while development agents consider modern land tenure arrangements a crucial factor in economic efficiency. Against this stands the increasing demand for sustainable natural resource management systems. The report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters stated that the very basis of the legal and institutional framework with respect to land is in need of a drastic review (URT, 1992). However, the Government position which is expressed through the new land policy[1] states that the existing land tenure system is *"fundamentally sound"* (URT, 1995:9), and may therefore expect no radical changes. Major issues at stake are the possibilities for communities to manage village land, the jurisdiction of wildlife resources and existing and proposed management structures in the rangelands.

Theoretically villages in Tanzania control village lands, but they have no institutional or legal rights to manage or control wildlife. All wildlife in Tanzania are protected under the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974. Under the centrally controlled wildlife management system operating at present, local communities must apply to the Wildlife Department to utilise wildlife resources. This depends on the status of the wildlife area and ranges from non-consumptive use, such as game viewing, to consumptive use, such as hunting and live capture. Table 1 shows the various uses of wildlife resources by local communities. It demonstrates how crop protection is the only legal avenue for villages to benefit directly from wildlife under the present system. Indirect benefits to local communities from protected area revenues have had little positive impact on rural villages, and certainly do not off-set the direct costs imposed on villages living close to wildlife through crop damage and livestock losses due to predators and diseases.

1 The Land Bill was passed by the House of Law in February 1999.

Table 1: Forms of wildlife utilisation, their legal status, degree of benefit and mode of access to wildlife in local communities in Tanzania[2]

Form of utilisation	Legals Status	Benefit to local communities	Access
game viewing	legal	0-1	indirect
tourist hunting	legal	0-1	indirect
resident hunting	legal	0-1	indirect
cropping	legal	1	indirect
live captures	legal	1	indirect
trophy sales	legal	0	indirect
crop protection	legal	0	direct
trophy poaching	illegal	1	direct
meat poaching	illegal	2	direct

Source: Modified from UT (1994a:2)

Initiatives have been made by Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) to provide some benefits to villages near wildlife areas, thereby indirectly including them in wildlife conservation. Community conservation programmes have been developed for populations adjacent to protected areas, notably Tarangire, Serengeti and Ruaha National Parks, and the Selous Game Reserve (Krischke et al, 1994 and Hartley, 1994) and TANAPA now has a Community Conservation Service (CCS), overseen by park wardens. Most of TANAPA's initiatives involve sharing the cost of infrastructure and services with villages bordering parks (TANAPA, 1994). TANAPA also runs the Support for Community Initiated Projects Programme (SCIP) which aims to assist communities to develop their own income generating programmes. The primary goal of these programmes is to support those communities who see co-operation as essential for the future of national parks. These funds are intended partly to compensate for wildlife damage and implicitly to provide an incentive for communities to conserve wildlife.

One basic concern is that TANAPA is providing advice and services in areas where it has no legal jurisdiction. As there is no mechanism at present for national park authorities to operate in buffer zones, CCS and SCIP must work mainly through local government administrative structures. It is precisely this ambiguity of jurisdiction that demands the establishment of an overseeing administrative structure.

In the early 1980s a proposal was designed to create a multiple land-use authority[3] in the Tarangire/Lolkisale/Simanjiro wildlife area (Ecosystems Ltd., 1980; Borner, 1982). It included the administration of a 6,000 square kilometre reserve comprising both the existing Game Controlled Area and surrounding open areas in order to ensure the survival of wildlife for viewing and professional hunting, to generate revenue from wildlife and to provide an income for Tarangire National Park. The proposal also called for the banning of all

[2] The table indicates relations between local communities and wildlife. The first column shows potential forms of wildlife utilisation on a national level. Column two shows the legal status of these activities. The third column indicates benefits in the form of cash to local communities under the present legal and economic systems; 0 = not accountable; 1 = little; 2 = significant. The last column indicates how benefits from wildlife potentially reach local communities; indirect access is a provision of income from wildlife to local communities through the governmental system, while direct access is a community exploitation of wildlife resources.

[3] This model was similar to the existing management model in Ngorongoro Conservation Area.

agriculture and resident hunting from the zone. According to Borner, the National Parks authorities made the same proposal some years earlier, but were turned down by the livestock authorities (1982)[4].

Another proposed management unit, advocated by Prins (1987) was the Maasai Ecosystem. This comprised approximately 35,000 square kilometres, defined by the watershed boundaries of Lakes Manyara and Burunge, and the migratory zones of several large mammals i.e. wildebeest, zebra, and Thomson's and Grant's gazelles. This zone would serve as a functional unit where various land uses could be integrated with the ultimate objective of protecting natural habitat. Prins also called for restrictions on agriculture, reduced livestock numbers and stricter hunting regulations. In 1992, the Lake Manyara Basin was proposed as a management unit managed by the Lake Manyara Integrated Development Authority. As set out it would be self-sustaining and used for formulating policy for the area (Mwalyosi and Mohamed, 1992)[5].

The administrative structure in Tanzania, largely inherited from the British colonial administration, is organised in vertical sectoral ministries. The existing administrative system is typically 'top-down' in character, implementing projects that are essentially conceived at the national level. Although local administrative structures replicate those at national level, a plan developed at the regional level does not ensure integration any more than one developed at a higher level.

> *"The areas of air quality, water, soil, forest, wildlife and protected areas ... and land use and planning are all governed by some legal provision, in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner... the biggest challenge to Tanzania will be to promote cross-sectoral co-operation on environmental matters in the various ecological zones and administrative subdivisions"* (Butler Herrick, 1993:75)[6].

Multiple land-use management is by definition best conducted horizontally across sectors. Unfortunately, the present government structure is not conducive to this type of programme approach. This raises the question of the most appropriate unit of jurisdiction for managing multiple land-use areas and whether local communities, parastatal institutions or centralised government authorities are best suited to enforce regulations.

The villagisation and resettlement programmes that took place in the mid-1970s were implemented prior to a comprehensive assessment of resources. The present guidelines for village land use planning are detailed, but suffer from lack of funds and political commitment. The planning brief calls for the application of *"...modern/available technology when investigating the physical and socio-economic features of the planning area. The teams will have to utilise for example, aerial photos, SPOT satellite images.."* (URT, 1993:3). These plans are supposed to be prepared by multi-disciplinary teams, including agriculture, livestock, wildlife, fisheries, forestry, water, lands, and community development and planning sectors. They should be organised by the District Executive Officer at the

[4] This is a good example of how sectoral interests may disrupt integrated resource management planning.

[5] In 1986 IRA-UDSM initiated a research programme focusing on the conflicting land-use interests in the basin. The proposal is the outcome of a workshop ending phase 1 of the programme.

[6] The National Environmental Action Plan (URT 1994b) suggests that the current state of environmental degradation is a result of inadequate land management, lack of relevant data and information, inadequate capacity to deal with environmental concerns and to implement programmes, and inadequate involvement of major stakeholders (e.g. local communities, NGOs and the private sector).

district level. However, the reality is that there is only one officer responsible for land use planning (the District Agricultural Officer) and as such, few village land use plans have been developed. For example, Monduli District in the northern rangeland area has completed only two village land use plans to date and has no funds, plans or even requests from villages to undertake more planning.

Although there are many wildlife studies of the areas, resource inventories have largely ignored economic and human resources which are characteristic of the rangelands. The management plans described above were proposed by wildlife conservationists whose provisions clearly reflect their priorities. It might, therefore, be more effective to have a similar type of structure that would take into account the local human population and their needs, both in terms of economic development and the sustainable use of wildlife resources.[7] If the economics of resource utilisation in semi-arid environments should include the income from wildlife resources, there is an issue of whether the Tanzanian government can implement a multi-use policy that promotes rangeland use by both wildlife and livestock; and which gives local communities the right to deal directly with tourism and hunting companies. At present agricultural policy demands that *"the development programmes of all other sectors...must be co-ordinated with the development of agriculture"*, while livestock sector policy proposes that *"rapid change must be introduced in the traditional sector, involving the producers' attitudes and farming practices"* (URT, 1983:ii,9). Can these diverse goals be reconciled for the benefit of both the nation and local villages?

Wildlife utilisation and multiple land-use

Tanzania's rangeland resources have been used historically in diverse ways and by different groups within their culturally and ecologically defined territories and production systems. Newcomers and new production systems are creating tension between various groups, changing the nature of management responsibilities and inducing resource degradation. Tanzania is in a transitional period politically and economically, and there exists a range of different natural resource regimes including common property and customary rights in the pastoral grazing areas, individual user rights for small scale farmers; legal title for large commercial farms; and wildlife owned by the state with hunting administered by the Wildlife Division.

In the northern rangelands, these tenure regimes are in a state of flux due to changes both between and within political, social and economic spheres. Rangeland natural resources have economic potential, but are under-exploited under commercial tenure arrangements, particularly wildlife utilisation. Until recently, the predominant economic use of the rangelands has been grazing domestic livestock. Since the 1970s, there has been an increasing shortage of both pastures and arable land for use by local people. The reasons for this include the creation of national parks, increased population pressure and the acquisition of prime land for agricultural development schemes by the state and private corporations. Since the mid 1980s, economic liberalisation has encouraged capital intensive projects into

7 The Tanzanian rangelands could benefit from a systematic organisation of the known environmental and socio-economic information. Recently several research projects have been undertaken in the Maasai Steppe examining land use and human economic activity, but not within the context of providing the specific information required to administer particular programmes. At present the University of Milan, Italy, has a European Union funded group of researchers looking at land use in Simanjiro District, the Dutch development organisation SNV conducts various environmental and socio-economic studies for the Monduli Development Programme covering Monduli district, and the authors of this paper have spent considerable time in two villages in Monduli and Simanjiro districts studying economic activities of the resident peoples.

areas previously closed to them. These factors have led to more intense use of the rangelands by residents and the emergence of new stakeholders: immigrating landless farmers; profit seeking, large-scale mechanised farming contracted to non-African companies; charcoal producers who have found growing markets in the cities; safari outfitters largely run by Europeans and Americans who have created a new lucrative niche in the tourist market; and hunting companies who have moved in from other African countries where competition, regulation and/or warfare have made business in Tanzania more attractive.

Local villages utilise a wide range of resources found on the rangelands managed by complex systems of access to and distribution of products. Agriculture, livestock and wildlife are the three principal economic activities dominating the area. Wildlife in East Africa is intimately linked to zones outside protected areas and thus to the management of multiple land-use areas. Even though Tanzania has large and numerous protected areas, it is not realistic to expect these alone to conserve plant and animal diversity. Studies indicate that wildlife in Tanzania spend as much time outside of park boundaries as they do inside (TWCM, 1995), yet these areas are in the process of undergoing drastic land use changes due to human activity. Data from the Tarangire/Lolkisale/Simanjiro area indicate that in the wet season certain species are totally dependent on grazing areas outside of the Tarangire National Park (Ecosystems Ltd., 1980; TWCM, 1996; Peterson, 1978) (See Table 2). The dispersal routes in the northern part of the Simanjiro Game Controlled Area and the Lolkisale Game Controlled Area, however, are being seriously restricted by the spread of large scale commercial farms as well as by expanding subsistence farming in the last 15 to 20 years.

Even from a wildlife conservation view, it is time to look more thoroughly at the use of rangeland resources bordering the parks given the economic importance of wildlife tourism to the nation. Gross earnings from the wildlife industry in Tanzania based on tourism, hunting and export of live animals are estimated at about US$120 million per annum, of which US$50 million is illegal (World Bank, 1994). The total economic value of game viewing alone is estimated at US$20 million.[8]. Of that figure, US$2.57 million is earned by the Wildlife Division, US$3.5 million by TANAPA, and US$12.75 million by private companies (URT, 1994a). The period between 1990 and 1996 witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of safari companies and accommodation facilities operating both within and outside national parks on the lucrative northern circuit, including Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Tarangire, Manyara, Serengeti National Parks and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. (For an overview of the wildlife areas in the northern rangelands, see Map 1)[9].

[8] Tourism directly accounts for 7.5% of GDP and 25% of total foreign exchange earnings. 1995 earnings were expected to be in excess of US$205 million (The East African March 4-10 1996).

[9] The northern circuit accounts for 90% of the tourist dollars earned from wildlife viewing in Tanzania (figures collected by TANAPA presented at the Wildlife Department, Planning and Assessment for Wildlife Management Programme 1994).

Table 2: Wet season wildlife densities in Tarangire National Park and its adjacent village lands/Game Controlled Areas

Species	Tarangire NP	Lolkisale GCA (Village Lands)	Simanjiro GCA (Village Lands)
Zebra	0.0	1.1	4.7
Grant's Gazelle	0.6	0.6	0.3
Oryx	0.0	0.5	0.1
Hartebeeste	0.7	2.5	0.5
Buffalo	0.1	0.5	0.8
Giraffe	0.5	0.1	0.3
Eland	0.6	0.2	0.7
Impala	4.1	8.7	2.5
Warthog	0.6	0.3	0.1

Note: Figures indicate individuals per km^2.
Source: Compiled from Ecosystems Ltd. 1980.

Professional hunting provides an estimated annual US$13 million to the Tanzanian economy (URT. 1988). In 1992/93 there were 152 Hunting Blocks in Tanzania, roughly divided between wildlife areas with human settlement, and game reserves with no human residents. The wildlife species which are the major contributors to the earnings from hunting are also evenly divided between the two areas, as is the total income from game fees. There are certain significant differences between game viewing and professional hunting. While earnings from professional hunting are derived evenly throughout the country, income from game viewing comes largely from the northern rangelands. Because of the greater numbers involved, game viewing demands relatively more infrastructure than professional hunting and has many more economic multipliers. Hunting in Tanzania has become fairly controversial[10] and many experts are calling for a moratorium while the system is reorganised.

Considerable earnings are derived from the nation's wildlife estate. It would seem that wildlife utilisation has the potential to contribute to both conservation and development objectives if this income can be used for multiple-use management planning and administration. Today, the fees charged by wildlife and regional authorities, and the rates charged by lodges and safari hunting operators seldom reach local communities, even when those fees are specifically levied by local councils for the benefit of local communities. Although wildlife is a money earner at a national level, at the local level it yet to deliver substantial economic returns. This problem was recognised in 1992 when the government directed that a 25% share of the income generated by wildlife areas should be channelled to district councils for development purposes where wildlife caused problems for the local people. However, there is no perception on the part of village councils or villagers that money generated from game viewing or hunting was being used for their benefit. Interviews in Lolkisale village adjacent to Tarangire National Park indicate that 84% of the population have a negative view of wildlife. In and around six national parks and game reserves in Tanzania, over 71% of the local people report problems with wildlife (Newmark *et al.*, 1994).

[10] In part caused by the dubious allocation of hunting blocks such as the so called 'Loliondogate' scandal where individuals from the United Arab Emirates received a 10 year lease on a hunting block in Loliondo. It was reported that the lease holders "killed a lot of animals, maimed others, and airlifted a number of near-extinct species to the UAE (New African, 1993:30).

3. COMMUNITY CONSERVATION THROUGH TOURISM: A CASE STUDY FROM THE MAASAI STEPPE

Until recently, many wildlife companies used village land with minimal or no contact with the villagers or village authorities. However, farming activities in wildlife areas are beginning to pose serious problems for safari and hunting operators whose activities depend on a minimum of wilderness area. Companies have therefore begun to negotiate with village authorities to protect these areas, and there are now several and varying examples of collaboration between local communities and commercial tourist enterprises.

Private companies have different motives for getting involved in community conservation, but foremost is a concern for the mutual dependence of the ecological and economic management of wildlife areas. As the director of a safari company stated in a presentation of its activities:

> *"Developing a new tourist product and having a positive impact on conservation was a goal. We wanted to stay clear of developed areas and offer a wilderness experience to our clients and visitors. If game controlled and open areas continue to be used by hunting companies and photographic operators without village level financial gain, how can we expect these villages to conserve the very resource these operators are utilising?"* (Paul Oliver, Community Conservation Workshop February 8-11 1994, Dar es Salaam).

A central aspect of this new relationship is that villagers should benefit directly from living with wildlife. At the same workshop, a representative for a hunting company thus explained:

> *"We feel that a very important aspect of this help to villages must be that the people are made aware that the asset built from these funds is not merely a product of some aid scheme but that it has been realised as a direct result of their stewardship of their wildlife".*

Agreements between the companies and village authorities are usually based on specific conditions. From the companies' side, the requirements range from assistance in the form of tour guiding and security at their camps to land use restrictions in the areas used by the companies. Most operators pay for varying degrees of exclusivity and there have been examples where demarcation and land titling have been requested. On the other side, the village authorities demand (or are offered) payment in cash or investment in infrastructure such as schoolhouses, dams, pipelines and milling machines. The choice is determined primarily by the nature of commitment by the village.

The following case describing a contract between a safari operator, Oliver's Camp Ltd, and the village of Loiborsoit, is representative of this type of collaboration emerging in the Tanzanian rangelands. It clearly demonstrates the many considerations of the parties involved, and the possible implications of such arrangements. An account of the background to the negotiations and the manner in which they were carried out are included to highlight the difficulties that can arise. Overall, the process has taken some three years to complete, but the contract is now signed and the principal parties are waiting for input from the district, regional and national governments.

Map 2: Loiborsoit village. Land use zones



Oliver's Camp Limited and Loiborsoit Village

Loiborsoit village is located in Maasailand on the eastern boundary of Tarangire National Park in Tanzania's Simanjiro district (Map 2). Originally a part of Emboret village to the south, Loiborsoit split from Emboret in 1978 to become a separate political unit. Fourteen years later, Simanjiro district was created out of the northern part of Kiteto district. In the 1980s this part of Maasailand was surveyed by the central government so that villages could be registered and apply for title deeds to their land. At that time Loiborsoit began allocating land to individuals based on membership of the village and requests from outsiders[11].

[11] Some villages have not yet received title deed to the land as they are still negotiating borders with neighbouring villages. This situation has caused a certain amount of ambiguity over title deeds granted by the villages.

The Lolkisale Game Controlled Area is found on the eastern border of Tarangire National Park, within the villages of Lolkisale, Loiborsoit, Emboret, and Loibor Siret. All the land contained in this area was allocated by the central government to a man named Steyn in the period after independence. Steyn's ownership of this land became the focus of a national controversy in 1994 and, although Parliament has apparently voted against him retaining possession of the land, its disposition is still not settled (The Express, 1994). The villages that occupy land under Steyn's lease, however, firmly believe that they are the rightful and legal owners of this land. In the case of Loiborsoit the land contained in Steyn's lease is approximately half of the total area of the village. It is also the proposed site of Oliver's Camp, a luxury tented safari camp, and one of the two stakeholders in the case study[12].

Loiborsoit has been the target of several development initiatives over the years, beginning with a Catholic mission, and followed by the present Pentecostal mission. The Pentecosts have been heavily involved in improving the roads in and out of the village, building a primary school and homes for the teachers, building village offices, and establishing a health clinic. They have also assisted in setting up a water project funded by the World Runners Association which provides a borehole, an electric pump and a 36,000 litre tank on the main road, and two hand pumps outside of the village centre. In 1979, a borehole was provided to an individual herder in the village by foreign aid, but that is now out of operation. There have also been tree planting projects in the village, and a milling machine provided by the national Small Industries Development Organisation and a dam provided by the Arusha Diocese Development Organisation.

One result of all the outside interest in Loiborsoit by farmers, development organisations, and safari operators has been the drawing up of a village land use plan over and above the traditional land use pattern of Maasai herders[13]. Areas have been set aside by the Village Council for forest reserves, residential plots, small and large farms of 500 to 3,000 acres and grazing areas. A written description of the plan exists in the village office, but there is no map. Map 2 was compiled by the authors in conjunction with the Village Chairman and Executive Officer.

Oliver's Camp

In 1992, Oliver's Camp Limited approached Loiborsoit and Emboret villages with a proposal to set up a permanent tented camp straddling the boundary between the two villages. Its plan was to establish the camp on the eastern boundary of Tarangire National Park, thereby gaining access to the large undeveloped area to the east of the park for walking safaris[14] while still using the park for viewing game, particularly the large resident elephant herd. The project as proposed included a core area of four to five thousand acres from each village,

[12] It should be noted that Oliver's Camp is only one of several land users in the area under Steyn's Lease. There are at present: several large commercial farms that were given title to the land by the District but not the village; three hunting companies who have permission from the Game Department to operate on the land in the Lease as well as village land not included in the lease; another safari company taking clients on walking safaris with permission from the Game Department and under an agreement with one village; and finally there are Maasai herders and farmers using the area as pasture and for small farms, and Dorobo hunter-gatherers living on the land.

[13] For descriptions of Maasai traditional grazing systems, see for instance Jacobs (1975), Pasha (1983) and Potkanski (1994).

[14] At the time of writing no game viewing can take place outside of vehicles in Tarangire National Park although there are indications that TANAPA will allow it in the near future.

totalling between eight to ten thousand contiguous acres on the boundary of the villages and the park. Surrounding the core area would be a larger "use-area". The core area would be for the exclusive use of Oliver's Camp. The larger use area would be open to other operators at the discretion of the village and would allow grazing, wood cutting, subsistence hunting and food gathering by the villagers. Cultivation and charcoal making however, would be prohibited.

The villages, in return for reduced access over sections of village land, would receive 8% (4% to each village) of Oliver's Camp's income from bed nights in the camp. At present rates this amounts to US$12 for each person for each night in the camp. The camp planned to begin with 12 beds, amounting to US$36 to each village a night at 50% occupancy. Furthermore, the company pledged in writing to train and employ village members in all aspects of the photo-safari business.

The results of the first contact between the parties were mixed. Emboret responded favourably and several village meetings were held with Oliver's Camp management to explain the proposal. After lengthy negotiations, Oliver's camp was allowed to begin operations in the village. The contract with Emboret included a proviso that money from the project could only be withdrawn from the bank account in Arusha with six signatures from the Village Council.

Oliver's camp did not receive any feedback from Loiborsoit, however, and interpreted this as a rejection of the proposal. The managers had by now decided on a site for the camp and were assured by the Emboret village council that the site was within their village boundaries. In fact, the site and the area around fell within Loiborsoit[15]. A year later Loiborsoit village contacted Oliver's Camp and explained that the camp was on its land and not at Emboret. The manager did not know whom to believe. A meeting was arranged with the leaders from both villages which confirmed that the camp was indeed in Loiborsoit and that Emboret village had misled Oliver's Camp a year earlier. Negotiations on the original proposal were then re-opened with both villages.

Several further meetings were held with the leaders of both villages. Emboret continued to support the plan enthusiastically, but Loiborsoit had reservations for reasons that were not entirely clear. Emboret had already benefitted from several village projects funded either wholly or in part by a commercial safari operation, including an animal husbandry school, a hospital, cattle dip, milling machine, and borehole and pump. This had probably influenced their response. In addition Emboret had no large commercial farms owned by outsiders taking land out of the grazing reserve, as was the case in Loiborsoit.

However, Loiborsoit was compelled to reconsider because of the difficulties facing the village at the time. The village water project was falling apart for lack of funds; they had just suffered a three year drought forcing many families to eat only one meal every other day, the village had no veterinary clinic or hospital, and the primary school that had been started by the mission needed to be completed. All this took money and Oliver's Camp was offering

[15] Both Loiborsoit and Emboret agree that the site is in Loiborsoit. However no government agency recognises Loiborsoit's claim to the land at present. Lolkisale also maintain that they have claims to that part of the LGCA. According to Monduli District Officials the whole of the LGCA is located in Monduli District. If this turns out to be the case, which is doubtful, the whole of Oliver's Camp is located in Lolkisale village, Monduli District. Various maps issued by the Regional Surveyor differ considerably on this point, clearly illustrating that proper surveying is a prerequisite to any allocation of land.

just that. The villagers knew that in the first year of operation Emboret had received nearly $10,000 which had reportedly been used to build a cattle dip and school, and to buy maize during the worst period of the drought. Many formal and informal meetings were held throughout the village and in the end Loiborsoit agreed to accept Oliver's Camp proposal, but with some modifications to their contract.

Negotiations: present contract

During the period between the renewal of negotiations with Oliver's Camp and the presentation of the final contract to the village, three main views emerged. One group was wholeheartedly for signing the contract. They felt that it would put land *"in the bank for future generations"* and would enable the village to refuse requests to start farms in the grazing area. This would be available at the end of a 33 years lease for the young men of the village to use as they wished. Another segment of the village opposed the contract because they were not convinced that money from the camp would reach the village, but would stay in the pockets of the village leaders. A major question arising in this group was; *"How do individual village members benefit from the contract?"*. A third group was simply against giving land to any foreigners for any reason and felt that since they were herders they should keep as much grazing land for themselves as possible. Several members of the village who had been allocated land for farming near the camp area (in spite of it being a grazing reserve) were pushing very hard for the contract because they felt it increased the value of their allocations.

While the villagers were deciding amongst themselves whether they wanted the camp operating within their borders, Oliver's Camp's managers were approaching the ministries involved to obtain permission to view wildlife outside of the park. As early as April 1991, Oliver's Camp and Dorobo Safaris were given the support of the Department of Wildlife with a letter stating: *"We will be discussing the proposal with* [the hunting concessionaires] *so we are able to release the areas from hunting*[16]". However, no land was released and even with this letter of support, there was still no confirmation that the land in question was legally part of Loiborsoit. Oliver's Camp were confident that the village would win the dispute over ownership and decided to carry on negotiations with the village.

The village leaders had no doubt that the area was in their domain and in the end they were able to push through a 'yes' vote. After lengthy debate the Village Council and villagers agreed in principle that Oliver's Camp could operate on village lands, but they also felt that some terms in the contract should be changed. These included the following:

Extent of the core area

Oliver's Camp had requested 4,000 acres from each village as a core area. All village land transactions up to this point described area in terms of paces and natural features, while acres and maps were meaningless. The villagers needed to have the area demonstrated to them on the ground. Once it was described and surveyed it turned out that they were willing to part with over 5,000 acres, 1,000 acres more than had been requested.

[16] Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism; Reference No. PA/GWC/177.

Title Deed

The Village Council would not give a title deed for the core area. They believed that even though the deed would be for 33 years, the land would effectively be lost to the village forever once a title deed was granted.

However, the villagers wanted only five years. The company argued that they were investing a large amount of money in equipment, roads, publicity, legal costs, etc., and five years would not be sufficient to allow the company a return on their investment. After some discussion the village responded with an offer of 15 years.

Exclusion from core area

Although Oliver's Camp had agreed in the contract that in times of scarcity herders would be allowed into the core area, permission from the Camp Manager would be required. The villagers felt that this decision should not be left in the hands of an outsider who might not accurately appreciate their situation.

The camp agreed that water and pasture in the core area could be used in emergencies, with sufficient advance notification. The camp's management clearly believed that access to water and pasture could not be denied, but the villagers were very concerned about the managers' understanding of the needs of their livestock. This provision was not clarified any further.

Permanent structures

This was an issue which divided the villagers themselves. Some supported permanent buildings which they could then use if Oliver's Camp left the area; others objected arguing that the area should revert to its previous state. Oliver's Camp had committed itself to building no structure *"that cannot be knocked down in one week"*. (P. Oliver, pers. comm).

This process of negotiating back and forth between Oliver's Camp and the villages, as well as between the villages occurred over a period of 18 months from 25 February 1994 to 5 August 1995. There were numerous formal and informal meetings in Arusha, the villages and at the camp, during which all parties learned much about each other, their priorities and what was at stake.

Accountability

Another stumbling block in the contract was the issue of funds once they were received by the village. Many villagers opposed the Oliver's Camp proposal on the grounds that it presented another opportunity for village leaders to get rich. Other projects in Africa had been jeopardised by the same problem, for example, the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe (Murombedzi, 1991). Both the villagers and Oliver's Camp recognised the importance of ensuring that the money accruing from the enterprise would benefit the village as a whole and not just a few individuals. As with several other private operators (see Table 3), Oliver's Camp did not feel it was appropriate to interfere with internal village matters. On the other hand, if the project was perceived as a source of funds for a small group of officials only, it would reduce its chances of success. The solution agreed upon by the village leaders was a compromise between accepting interference from outside and taking control of their own affairs. The banking system was set up in such a way that money could only be withdrawn from the village account with six signatures from the Village Council. Furthermore, the camp was to produce a statement of all funds deposited and withdrawn

from the account on a quarterly basis and requested that the village leaders post it on the village office door.

Benefits and drawbacks

The village

The immediate benefits to the villages from this arrangement include:

- Capital: money from the company is already being used to support the existing water project (diesel, spare parts and salary for the operator), to buy maize for some of the poorer households in the village, to maintain and repair a dam that was constructed by ADDO in 1992, and to build new desks for the primary school[17].

- Employment: two members of the village are full time staff to the camp and others have been hired for temporary work such as guiding.

- Service: the company has assisted in delivering diesel to the village milling machine and borehole, and carrying individuals to hospital in Arusha.

In a larger sense, the village benefits by being encouraged to adopt its own land use plan. The grazing area cannot now be given out to individuals for farming without risking a loss of income to the village as a whole. The village benefits further through increased communications with the regional centre in Arusha. Interviews with the village leaders also indicate that the villagers are anxious to sign a contract with Oliver's Camp as they feel it will affirm their claim to the land[18]. They fear that either Tarangire National Park will expand its eastern border to include the Lolkisale Game Controlled Area or another project will be allocated the land by the district or central government. Finally, the contract provides a template for future negotiations with outsiders interested in starting projects in the village.

The contract does however, have some potential drawbacks. The village of Loiborsoit loses control of approximately 5,000 acres of land on its western border. Even with a 15 year lease and an agreement that pastures and water may be used as needed, occupation of the land by a permanent foreign presence may affect the village's ownership. Experience elsewhere in Tanzania has shown that once land is alienated in any way, it rarely returns to village control. Commercial farms on the northern boundary of the village do not appear in the village census, nor do the household heads participate in village meetings and are therefore effectively outside of village control.

---

[17] These are the uses for the money that have been outlined by the village. There is reason to believe that not all of money is being accounted for by village projects. This question of accountability has been a tremendous sticking point for many community based projects. The solutions presented and tried are varied but in the end most operators do not feel that it is beneficial to interfere in village matters and that as the villagers become more sophisticated in the use of funds they will oversee their own treasuries. This is already happening in Emboret where the whole village council was disbanded in April 1995 over mis-use of funds.

[18] There is no legal basis for this belief on the villager's part but given the ambiguity of land tenure at the moment and the overhaul of the land tenure system in Tanzania the idea of establishing any possible claim is not to be dismissed.

As the core area is developed, even with semi-permanent structures, there will be some detrimental effect on the land for herders. Roads will be cut and improved, and vehicle traffic will increase. Burning will be prohibited, encouraging bush encroachment and a potential increase in tsetse fly and tick infestation. And finally, one reliable water hole that provides water in even the longest droughts will be on camp property.

The permanent presence of the camp will probably serve to draw other land users into the area, i.e. hunters and other safari operators. Professional hunters are limited by their concessions, and under present law do not need village permission to operate within village boundaries. Photographic safari companies may enter some kind of arrangement with the villages whereby fees will be paid on a nightly basis for campers. The disadvantages are the same as for the core area: more traffic and people, more tracks cut in the land and the concomitant irritations of tourists and hunters in a herding area.

On a more abstract level, and one which the villagers so far do not recognise as a problem, is the interference of tourism in local people's lives[19].

The company

For Oliver's Camp, the primary advantage is a core area under its management. The presence of wildlife will be enhanced through a combination of managing the landscape to encourage valued species and eliminating poachers. Sites with particular attractions can be protected and used for the exclusive use of clients[20] By binding the larger area under contract, Oliver's Camp is able to guarantee that the quality of the landscape (in terms of wildlife viewing) experienced by its clients will be maintained. In establishing a close relationship with the village, Oliver's Camp is also reducing security problems for the camp. Villagers are more likely to help protect the camp when it is their main source of funds.

A major risk to Oliver's Camp is the return on their capital investment. It has already spent approximately US$250,000 in developing the Loiborsoit project. Given the rising operating costs and fees required to maintain a safari company in Tanzania, it is questionable whether 15 years will be sufficient for the company to recoup its investment. Also, as the contract stands, full control of the core area is compromised during times of environmental stress. By granting herders the right to enter the area during drought, the company risks having its luxury tented camp surrounded by goats, sheep and cows during its primary viewing seasons.

Another possible drawback is the potential conflict with hunting operators. Competition with hunters takes two forms. On the one hand, the presence of hunters severely hampers efforts to adapt animals to the presence of humans as in the national parks. In the second instance, there are times when hunters and tourists try to make use of the same herd or individual

[19] See Curry (1978) for a discussion of the disadvantages of tourism as an economic activity, specifically in Tanzania.

[20] Tarangire National Park also benefits from Oliver's Camp on its border. The presence of well-equipped guides acts as a deterrent to poachers. As Oliver's Camp pays park fees for all of its clients for every day that they are in the camp, the Park collects revenue from an operation with low environmental impact. Between October 1992 and February of 1995 Oliver's Camp paid Tarangire National Park a total of $39,570 in fees which included transport/transit fees for vehicles and staff, and client park fees. Furthermore, by paying the village not to give out the area to farms, the camp is maintaining a critical wildlife corridor and calving area, essential to the viability of Tarangire Park (see Borner 1985).

animal. This suggests the possibility of photographic tourists watching animals being shot by hunters.

Additional weaknesses in the arrangement concern ownership of the land, and the rights of the village to make contracts concerning wildlife. The land that Oliver's Camp has proposed for its base falls under the area contained in the Steyn lease. The status of the lease is in dispute and there is a possibility that the village will lose its claim to this land, thus rendering Oliver's Camp's contract null and void. The jurisdiction over wildlife is equally uncertain. The Game Department has final say over all issues concerning wildlife in Tanzania. Although Oliver's Camp has been encouraged in its development, the Department has recently made several decisions indicating that it favours consumptive use of wildlife (hunting) over non-consumptive use as a revenue producing operation (URT, 1994b). The possibility, therefore, exists that if a conflict develops between hunting and game viewing, hunting will prevail.

Table 3: Private-community conservation activities in northern Tanzania

	No of villages	Type of company	Activity	Agreement with village	Requirement of village	Requirement of company	Accountability of funds to the village	Village gain
A	2	luxury safari	walking	agreement	no charcoal production; exclusive use of a core area	use fee per bed night	village council	US$1.000 per month when camp is operating
B	1	luxury safari	walking	agreement	no*	use fee per year/bed night	no	US$3.000 (1994)
C	several	mid range safari	walking	contract with two villages	no*	use fee per year/bed night	village council	?
D	2	mid range safari	walking trekking	loose agreement	no *	'per use' decided by company	no money given directly	value of support ~ US$2.000 (1995)
E	1	mid range safari	walking	loose agreement	guarding, guiding and folklore	no	no money given directly	school equipment; water pipes
F	2	hunting safari ***	hunting	no (close relations to village leaders)	No	no, but assistance offered when needed	-	assistance
G	3	hunting safari ***	hunting	no	No	no, building offered	-	school and office buildings
H	2	hunting safari ***	hunting	no	No	no	-	dams
I	3	donor organisation	walking	no -should be self administered	No	facilitator only	funds should be spend on specific projects	project at initial stage
J	1	NGO initiated **	walking hunting	five year contract	no charcoal production; farming; burning; settlement; resident hunting within core area	use fee per year/bed night	NGO withdraws after 3-4 yrs. Then jointly run by the village and the companies	US$3.000 per year; US$10 per bed night; state fees from hunting

Note: The list is compiled opportunistically and is not necessarily a representative sample or exhaustive list of all the types of operations being carried out. Most of the information has been supplied by operators and not by villages.

* explain that farming, charcoal production, woodcutting etc. are not compatible with the presence of wildlife.

** joined by two luxury safari companies, one professional hunting company, one District Council and the Wildlife Department.

*** hunting companies are granted their concessions through the Game Department and are not required to receive permission from villages to operate within their borders.

Possible new directions

After three years from the first negotiations, Oliver's Camp and the village of Loiborsoit have signed a contract over the use of village resources. From the company's point of view, the process has been complicated by conflicts with professional hunters, ambiguities in land ownership and governmental jurisdictions and finally, at the village level, an agreement that gives an inordinate amount of control to powerful individuals. From the village's point of view the negotiations have been hindered mainly by government policies that separate them from the land and wildlife which they want to exploit. The village also suffers from a lack of technical expertise and available resources. While the company can mobilise lawyers, surveyors and consultants relatively quickly, the village does not have easy access to funds or individuals to fulfil these roles.

This negotiating process has been outlined as an example of one type of community conservation project in Tanzania. Table 3 presents a sample of a range of relationships between companies or organisations: five projects initiated by safari companies; one by an NGO; one by a donor; and three hunting companies with various relations to the villages on whose land they operate. Among the safari companies, three have a formal agreement while two have a loose agreement with the respective villages. The former give cash to the villages and argue that they do not want to interfere with internal village matters. Two other companies do not trust the village leadership concerning cash payments, and will only supply the villages with products or services. Half the companies pay standing fees, while all of them pay on a per use basis, i.e. bed-night fees. The hunting companies use village land, but have no formal obligations towards the villages, even if the authorities maintain that support to the villages is a major criteria for renewal of hunting licenses.

Below we suggest additional steps that may improve the value of contracts for the villages, the operators and the nation as a whole.

A co-ordinating agency for the area

There is a clear need for the presence of a co-ordinating agency to liaise between villages, parks, private operators, and research organisations. Villages could be informed of any interest in their areas, the benefits to be derived, and the implications of working with private operators. Parks, in conjunction with research organisations, could indicate critical areas within the villages to be zoned for wildlife/pasture use, and the use levels that could be supported. Private operators could use the agency as a clearing house to locate possible areas. The agency could also help establish schedules to avoid conflict between operators. The geographical area covered by the agency would necessarily be sufficiently large to encompass wildlife migration routes and calving areas which cross village and district borders. A major challenge would be to create an autonomous agency independent of the state bureaucracy and specific interests.

Guidelines for contract terms

Loiborsoit's experience demonstrates that villages can negotiate. However, it would be useful to establish standards in the form of government guidelines that would ensure both parties receive a fair deal.

Freedom in negotiating contracts.

The villages must be given the power to make their own deals, and not be constrained by external agencies with close connections to the district and region.

Delineation of a national wildlife policy

TANAPA and the Game Department should liaise with the Land Commission to agree a national wildlife policy. If wildlife tourism is to continue as a major foreign currency earner for the country, the resource must be adequately protected. Effectively this means that villages must be included in the process and have the power to negotiate with hunters and safari companies. Villages are capable of safeguarding wildlife when it is in their interest to do so. This will result in slightly reduced fees to central government, but income to the villages will increase dramatically[21].

[21] Between October of 1992 and April of 1995 Emboret village received $14,076 from Oliver's Camp in Wilderness Conservation Fees. Loiborsoit received $4,809 between September of 1993 and April of 1995. See also Table 3 for the amounts paid by other companies.

4. VILLAGES, THE MARKET AND THE STATE: CONGRUENT INTERESTS

This paper has outlined the involvement of commercial interests in wildlife management; and it is therefore relevant to ask if there are congruent interests among private companies and villages in managing rangeland resources. We have emphasised the multi-faceted characteristics of rangeland management in Tanzania and the challenge of cross-sectoral co-operation. These require a clear definition of responsibilities for the centralised state bureaucracy and those of local communities. There are major constraints in this process, including inadequate and outdated policies and fragmented regulations. Most significantly perhaps, is the mistrust in the devolution of responsibility from government to villagers and the lack of experience with integrated rangeland resource management at all levels in the bureaucracy.

The new forms of resource management that have developed in the rangelands should be viewed largely as a result of uncertainty fuelled both by the lack of revenues to local communities from wildlife protection, and lack of co-ordinated management of rangelands. For instance most of the rangeland areas proposed to date for the Manyara-Tarangire-Simanjiro wildlife zone, are based on typically conservationist interpretations of the problem, largely ignoring the contribution of local people and their dependence on a variety of local resources.

While most private projects are genuinely concerned with wildlife conservation, market principles continue to govern their activities to ensure maximum profits. Some of the companies have made substantial investments in establishing camps and collaborating with local people. They believe this investment will secure continuing operation in the area by protecting wildlife and maintaining their own foothold. It is difficult to see how long term involvement with local communities can be secured if financial and social ties of stakeholders are separate from the local community. Other companies maintain only loose ties and minimal investment with the communities where they operate so that they can withdraw quickly during times of financial or political insecurity.

To date, every company involved in these activities is owned and managed by foreigners. As the potential profit margin for luxury safaris is considerable, it seems obvious that many of the company owners will remain in Tanzania and expand their activities if the political and financial situation is favourable. Given this situation, local communities must be empowered to consult on equal terms in negotiation. Effectively, this means that villages must gain legal rights to own resources, failure of which has serious implications for power relations between villages and commercial interests. Another area of concern is the impact of a new management regime on the villages and the extent to which increased dependence on a new source of income will adversely influence social and economic relations. In this situation it is unclear how local communities may be able to respond to changes such as food crises and longer term transitions such as population increase.

If rangeland management, wildlife conservation and villages in Tanzania are to benefit in the long term from private companies involved in conservation, then the State will have to assume an active role, not as an organiser, but as a facilitator, in the new forms of rangeland management. One government strategy which aims to achieve this is the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) which, according to the Policy for Wildlife Conservation, will be *"an area of communal land that contains wildlife and the people have*

use rights and the mandate to protect wildlife and other natural resources contained therein, and from which they are allowed to retain a significant proportion of revenue [and which will have] *legal administrative boundaries and can include one or more villages. The area must be leased, entrusted or owned through customary or titled systems of land tenure by villages who form an Authorised Association"* (URT, 1996 3.2.1). The primary aim of establishing WMAs is to facilitate community-based conservation in Tanzania. The associations may negotiate directly with tour operators and hunting outfitters in collaboration with wildlife authorities, and derive direct benefits from the industry (*ibid.* 4.2.5, 4.3.3.). WMAS are presented with enthusiasm in policy documents, but at the same time they warn that it will take time to implement the new policy[22].

An example of a project based in a WMA has been initiated in an open area in the southern part of Arusha region. Inevitably, as a joint pilot project between the local communities, the Wildlife Division and safari and hunting companies, and co-ordinated by an NGO, it has experienced some difficulties due to the diverse social characteristics and economic interests of the collaborators. However, according to the co-ordinators, the process has so far been positive. There are also discussions concerning the establishment of WMAs in other parts of northern Tanzania. Even if empowerment and co-management are pre-requisites for management of rangeland resources, corruption may still constitute a major impediment to the process. There are indications that commercial interests are trying to position themselves as stakeholders in the management of future WMAs, using relations with high ranking officials as a strategy. The elimination of this problem is, however, a long term process which can only be initiated from above.

Community conservation in Tanzania is a major focus of government institutions, NGOs, the private sector, and increasingly also among local communities in the rangelands. Local villages offer the only real possibility of partnership on the ground when it comes to the management and conservation of rangeland resources. The opportunities for villages to initiate and control commercial wildlife projects depends on their genuine empowerment, which emphasises ownership and true power sharing with central authorities. An essential prerequisite for this is a legal framework to create a basis for self-determination for local communities. In addition, policies and regulations are needed to ensure effective co-ordination of the various economic sectors in the rangelands, including tourism, hunting and farming.

There is a long way to go before legal rights, institutions and management structures are firmly established in the rangelands. The establishment of these structures may reveal interesting information about the nature of intervention and development more generally. It seems likely that the potential new source of income to subsistence agricultural and pastoral economies will have a considerable impact on social relations in the villages, and will be a real test for democracy, unity and community strength in Tanzania's future.

[22] The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania was eventually passed by the Cabinet in 1998. The judicial aspects of WMAs are, however, still uncertain and ambiguous, especially regarding the issue of village land rights.

REFERENCES

Borner, M. 1982. *Recommendations for a multiple land use authority adjacent to Tarangire National Park, Arusha Region, Tanzania.* Frankfurt Zoological Society, Arusha.

Borner, M. 1985. The increasing isolation of Tarangire National Park. *Oryx* 19 (2): 91-96.

Butler Herrick, A. and Green, J. 1993. *Institutional analysis*. World Bank Mission on Environment, Tanzania, 14 April to 12 May 1993. Prepared on behalf of World Resources Institute for the World Bank Mission. 8 May 1993.

Curry, S. 1978. *Tourism and underdevelopment: the Tanzanian case.* Economic Research Bureau Paper 77.6. University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Ecosystems Ltd. 1980. *The status and utilisation of wildlife in the Arusha Region, Tanzania.* Nairobi.

Hartley, D. 1994. *Ruaha ecosystem wildlife management project: a case study*. REWMP Mimeo. Iringa. Presented at the Community Conservation Workshop February 8-11 1994 Dar es Salaam.

Jacobs, A. 1975. Maasai pastoralism in historical perspective. In T. Monod (ed): *Pastoralism in tropical Africa.* International African Institute, Oxford.

Krischke, H. 1994. *The development of community conservation around the Selous Game Reserve.* SCP Mimeo Dar es Salaam. Presented at the Community Conservation Workshop February 8-11 1994 Dar es Salaam.

Murombedzi, J. 1991. *Decentralising common property resources management - a case study of the Nyaminyami District Council of Zimbabwe's wildlife management programme.* Drylands Programme Issue Paper No. 30, IIED, London.

Mwalyosi, R.B. and Mohamed, S.A. (eds). 1992. *A resource management strategy for Lake Manyara catchment basin, Tanzania.* Proceedings of a workshop 5-6 March 1992, Arusha, Tanzania.

New African. July, 1993.

Newmark et. al. 1994. The conflict between wildlife and local people living adjacent to protected areas in Tanzania: human density as a predictor. *Conservation Biology,* 8 (1): 249-255.

Pasha, I. K. Ole. 1983. *Reserved grazing; a Maasai traditional concept.* ILCA, Nairobi.

Peterson, D.D. 1978. *Seasonal distributions and interactions of cattle and wild ungulates in Maasailand, Tanzania.* M.Sc. Thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia

Potkanski, T. 1994. *Property concepts, herding patterns and management of natural resources among the Ngorongoro and Salei Maasai of Tanzania.* Pastoral Land Tenure Series No. 6. IIED, London.

Prins, H. H. T. 1987. Nature conservation as an integral part of optimal land use in Eastern Africa: the case of the Masai ecosystem of Northern Tanzania. *Biological Conservation* 40: 141-161.

Tanzania Wildlife Conservation Monitoring (TWCM). 1995. *Aerial wildlife census of Tarangire National Park: wet and dry season 1994*. Frankfurt Zoological Society, Arusha.

The East African. March 4-10, 1996.

The Express. May 29 to June 1, 1994.

TWCM. 1996. *Tarangire total count 1995*. Frankfurt Zoological Society, Arusha.

United Republic of Tanzania (URT). 1983. *The agricultural policy of Tanzania*. Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania.

URT. 1988. *Wildlife utilisation in Tanzania*. Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism in collaboration with ITC /IUCN, Tanzania.

URT. 1992. *Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters. Vol 1: Land Policy and Land Tenure Structure*. URT, Tanzania.

URT. 1993. *Village land use planning and implementation guidelines for Tanzania*. Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development/National Land Use Planning Commission, Tanzania.

URT. 1994a. *Options for community conservation in Tanzania*. Paper presented by PAWM at the Community Conservation Workshop, Dar es Salaam, 8-11 February 1994. Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment; Wildlife Department.

URT. 1994b. *Village land use planning and implementation guidelines for Tanzania*. Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environment, Tanzania.

URT. 1995. *National land policy*. The Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Tanzania.

URT. 1996. *Policy for wildlife conservation. Revised final craft*. Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment. Department of Wildlife, Tanzania.

World Bank. 1994. *Tanzania. agriculture*. A World Bank Country Study. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

Pastoral Land Tenure Series

The PLT series is free to non-OECD countries Please contact the Drylands Programme about subscription or complete the form below. For OECD countries, papers 8 onwards are priced individually; 1-7 are £5 each , plus postage and packing (20% UK; 25% Europe,40% rest of world) from the Bookshop, IIED, 3 Endsleigh Street, London WC1H 0DD, UK Tel· +44 171 388 2117; fax + 44 171 388 2826; email:bookshop@iied.org Web address: http://www.iied.org

Backlist of PLT papers

No 12 *Market Commerce as Wildlife Protector? Commercial Initiatives in Community Conservation in Tanzania's Northern Rangelands. 1999.*
Halvor Woien and Lewis Lama. £7.50

No 11 *Pastoral Land Tenure and Community Conservation : a Case Study from North East Tanzania. 1999.*
Jim Igoe and Dan Brockington. £7.50

No 10 *Conflict Between Farmers and Herders in the SemiAarid Sahel and East A Review. 1998.*
Karim Hussein (ODG). £7.50

No 9 *Espace Pastoral et Dynamiques Foncières au Sénégal 1997*
Oussouby Touré. £5.

No 8 *Eviction of Pastoralists from the Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania: an Historical Review. 1997*
Kemal Mustafa. £7.50

No 7 *Working with Pastoralist NGOs and Land Conflicts in Tanzania: a Report on a Workshop held in Terrat, Tanzania. 11-15 December 1994.*
Mark Bradbury, Simon Fisher and Charles Lane (also available in Kiswahili)

No 6 *Property Concepts, herding Patterns and Management of Natural Resources among the Ngorongoro and Salei Maasai of Tanzania. 1994*
Tomasz Potkanski

No 5 *A Legal Quagmire: Tanzania's Regulation of Land Tenure (Establishment of Villages) Act, 1992. 1994*
Issa Shivji (photocopies only)

No 4 *Pastoralism in Peril: Pressures on Grazing Land in Senegal. 1993*
Mark and Karen Schoonmaker Feudenberger

No 3 *Who Should Own the Range? New Thinking on Pastoral Resource Tenure in Dryland Africa. 1994*
Charles Lane and Richard Moorehead

No 2 *Reclaiming the Commons. 1993*
The Ecologist (Photocopies only) (also available in French)

No 1 *Pastoral Land Rights in Tanzania: A Review. 1992*
Ringo Tenga (photocopies only)

ORDER FORM FOR PASTORAL LAND TENURE SERIES

Please send me PLT series Nos……/Please add my name to the mailing list for free subscription for non-OECD countries

Name:……

Job title……

Postal address……

……

Tel……..Fax……Email……

(for OECD countries) I enclose a cheque/PO/IMO payable to IIED for £…… or debit my Visa/Access/ Mastercard

Card No……

Expiry date……

Mailing address if different to above ……

……

iied

International
Institute for
Environment and
Development

Drylands Programme

The Drylands Programme at IIED was established in 1987 to promote sustainable rural development in Africa's arid and semi-arid regions. The Programme acts as a centre for research, information exchange and support to people and institutions working in dryland Africa.

The main fields of activity are:

- Networking between researchers, local organisations, development agents and policy makers. Networks help exchange ideas, information and techniques for longer term solutions for Africa's arid lands.
- Support to local organisations and researchers to encourage sharing of experience and ideas, capacity building and establishing collaborative links.
- Action-orientated research in the practice and policy of sustainable development in Africa's drylands, focusing on the variability of resources and incomes on which populations depend, development-orientated research methodologies, and natural resource management systems.

Pastoral Land Tenure Series
A programme for research support and institutional collaboration on pastoral land tenure in Africa was established in 1991.

The programme's goals are to:

- Influence the formulation of land use policy through the generation of research findings that support and inform the debate on common property resource management.
- Contribute to the resolution of conflicts over land.
- Clarify the policy options available to national planners and donor agency personnel.
- Provide the basis for more efficient land use in pastoral areas of dryland Africa.

A series of papers arising from this work is being published with a view to making relevant information available to policy-makers and development practitioners. IIED gratefully acknowledges financial support for this programme from the governments of Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

International Institute for Environment and Development
3 Endsleigh Street
London
WC1H 0DD
UK

Tel: (+44 0207) 388 2117
Fax: (+44 0207) 388 2826
E-mail: drylands@iied.org
Internet:http: //www.iied.org

ISSN 1357-9274