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Pastoral land tenure and community conservation: a case study from North-East Tanzania

Jim Igoe and
Dan Brockington

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Pastoral Land Tenure and Community Conservation: a Case Study from North-East Tanzania

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".. one of the tendencies which has gathered considerable momentum during this period (of economic liberalisation since the mid 1980s) is the alienation and allocation of rural and village lands to outsiders - individuals, local and foreign companies, etc. involving thousands of acres of land...the Commission received considerable evidence showing that many of these allocations have become a veritable source of complaints and land disputes in that, either the customary land rights have been disregarded, or the present and future land requirements of village communities have not been considered, or both."

- Report of the Land Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters. 1991 Vol.1, pp.137-8

"..Tanzania is a country of the smallholder (the peasant and the herdsman). .. Tanzania must feed itself, which means first and foremost, the peasantry must feed itself and secondly, feed the country... The investor from outside the village community, whether foreign or local, has little interest in investing in food production for the domestic market. His interest lies in high rates of profits in the first place, rapid returns in the second place and accumulation of his profits in a 'safe' haven outside in the third place. Such an investor is unlikely to produce food, and even if he does, he will produce it for the temperate export markets regardless of the need at home. Moreover his access to land has more often than not been at the expense of the food growing local peasantry or livestock holding pastoralists who consequently find themselves without food."

- ibid. p.22

"The Land Commission received overwhelming evidence showing large-scale encroachment of customary individual land and village lands by parastatals, District Development Corporations (and) state organs such as the army, prisons, national service, parks and reserves. The story is varied, details are different but the theme is the same. Village and rural folks holding land under customary tenure have no security. Their lands are under constant threat of alienation by state organs ostensibly for 'national projects' or in the 'public interest' but very often in favour of high and middle echelons of the bureaucracy or well-connected 'outsiders'."

- Shivji, 1995: 10-11

" ..conservationists with their eurocentric conservation philosophy are haunted by the fears of the unknown and embrace non-consumptive dogma in an attempt to avert their fears. They are .. alien to Africa and its culture of natural resource use and management. The eurocentric conservation philosophy suppresses local people's alternative approaches, ignores alternative attitudes and replaces traditionally adaptive and flexible resource management by belief in dicta and dogma. This rigid philosophy generates resource use conflicts and places dilemma in wildlife conservation in Tanzania and other African countries."

- Gamassa, 1993: 4

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND NOTE ON TERMS USED

AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
CAWM	College of African Wildlife Management
GAWPT	George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
MCF	Malignant catarrhal fever
NAFCO	National Agriculture and Food Corporation
NCA	Ngorongoro Crater Area
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PANET	Pastoralist Network of Tanzania
SCAPD	Simanjiro Conservation Area Project Document
SCIP	Support for Community Initiated Projects
TANAPA	Tanzania National Parks Authority
TAWICO	Tanzania Wildlife Corporation
TF/GAAWPT	Tony Fitzjohn/George Adamson African Wildlife Preservation Trust
TNA	Tanzania National Archives
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
WMA	Wildlife Management Areas
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

Explanatory notes

Mkomazi Game Reserve is referred to in the text as 'Mkomazi' or 'the Reserve'. This is not the same as Mkomazi village, which is a small settlement in between the Pare and Usambara mountains. This place is called 'Mkomazi village' in the text.

Tanzania has a strong system of local government. The country is split into regions, and these into districts, then divisions, wards, villages, sub-villages and finally 10-cell (household) groups. Until recently final authority rested at regional headquarters with the Regional Commissioner. Much of the business of local government is carried out in the districts by the District Commissioner and District Executive Director. Districts collect taxes and use these to fund some of their activities. The District Commissioner is a political officer, the representative of the President in the district, and is senior to the District Executive Director. The District Executive Director is the head of local government and is responsible for administration of the district, the collection of tax and implementation of national development programmes such as immunisation.

In accordance with the Land Commission's work, we have used the term 'peasant' for both agricultural smallholders and pastoralists.

Kitongoji (singular), *Vitongoji* (plural): 'sub-village'.

ndigana: a generic Swahili term for two cattle diseases: *Anaplasmosis* and East Coast Fever.

murrani (singular) *moran, murran* (plural): Maasai warrior

1. INTRODUCTION

Natural resources of the rangelands of north-east Tanzania are subject to three competing claims:

- conservation of wildlife and wilderness;
- development to generate revenue for the state; and
- use for local production.

The contest between these claims results in conflicts over how land and resources are used and who benefits from that use. This paper seeks to elucidate the compatibility and contradictions of these three objectives by examining these conflicts over a large area and by exploring the links within it.

The paper results from the authors' observations that land loss by pastoralists is harming their food security and reducing the flexibility of the resource use systems for coping with their semi-arid environments. Observable processes in our separate research areas closely resembled each other. We found that similar groups of people were being affected in similar ways. This led us to investigate the links between our study sites and consider the implications of these connections.

Recent major development and conservation initiatives in the study area have alienated large amounts of land from rural people. We argue that the effects of these initiatives work at cross purposes and are detrimental to rural production systems. We suggest that these problems are cause for concern for conservationists and development planners alike.

In Simanjiro district, major development initiatives have alienated large amounts of land for large-scale farms. The farms confound conservation objectives as they do not use land in a manner compatible with wildlife needs. This is especially important near to protected areas as wildlife use resources outside protected area boundaries. Eviction of people from the Mkomazi Game Reserve has obstructed development as it contributes little to the national or local purse. Local economies have been damaged as a result of eviction and revenues generated for the state, for example by local cattle markets, have fallen. Alienation for commercial agriculture or conservation has proven detrimental to rural livelihoods as it removes land and resources from local production. It reduces the options available to people and makes them more vulnerable to misfortune and less able to prosper.

We argue that there are strong similarities in the intentions of legislation that enables land alienation for development and for conservation. There are also close parallels in the bureaucratic cultures and policy environments behind it. We also note that advocates of development and of conservation are separately voicing similar arguments against land alienation. Some people urge that, in countries like Tanzania, development is better advanced by giving rural people control over local resources. Many conservationists argue that natural resources will only be used sustainably if rural people have control over them.

In Tanzania, the development argument has been powerfully voiced by the Land Commission of Enquiry into Land Matters (hereafter Land Commission). The Commission observes that the vast majority of the Tanzanian population relies directly on local resources for its food needs and for agricultural products which it sells on the domestic market, and notes that this state of

affairs will continue for some time. It argues that large-scale alienation of land is detrimental not only to livelihoods in the locality of the eviction, but also to national prosperity. The result is a poorer rural population and increased dependence on expensive food imports. It urges that development is better enhanced by supporting local food production. It found that a prime need of rural populations was to have secure tenure over their land (URT 1991).[1]

Likewise, many conservationists are increasingly concerned for the viability of protected areas. They observe that a protected area surrounded by impoverished local people has little long term security. They hold that the prime need facing conservation is to promote sustainable natural resource management outside protected areas. They wish to ensure that communities benefit from natural resources, especially wildlife found on their land, and they actively desire to conserve it:

> *"... the biggest conservation challenge of all [is] how to deal with the vast areas of the earth's surface where there are no parks and where the interests of local communities prevail."* (Western and Wright 1994:7)

Some conservationists argue that there are two prerequisites for sustainable use. First, rural populations must benefit and prosper from wildlife. The wildlife must become so valuable to local communities that they desire their continued existence (Murphree 1996; Child 1995; Western and Wright 1994; Ghimire and Pimbert 1997). Second, rural people must have clearly defined and well supported control over these wildlife resources:

> *"Secure tenure over resources, or clear rights to their use, is a crucial prerequisite for rural people to sustainably manage (sic) their resources"* (Barrow 1996:3)

These ideas have led to a growing number of initiatives which seek to promote conservation by giving rural groups power over wildlife on their land, and which try to ensure that their use meets communities' needs. These initiatives are grouped under the banner of 'community-based conservation'. Closely tied to the growth of community-based conservation are benefit-sharing schemes (also called Integrated Conservation with Development c.f. Brandon, Wells and Hannah 1992). These provide people living near protected areas with goods and services which are paid for by the protected area.

Benefit-sharing differs from community-based conservation in that with the former people do not control the protected resources or decide how they are used. Both approaches seek to unite the needs of conservation and rural people. Both are grouped here under the term 'community conservation'.

By examining the impacts of current land use and by reviewing the recommendations of those concerned with conservation and local people's development, we hope to provide details of common ground between local development and community conservation. We do not wish to promote a marriage between the two goals as a panacea for the problems described. These concerns have different histories and values; they are not always compatible. Resolution of contradictions and differences between goals will have different place-specific solutions. Nevertheless, there are strong similarities in their recommendations about resource management and tenure. These are what we explore in this paper.

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1 The Land Commission was quite explicit that secure tenure did not mean private individual land holdings.

Previous research on these topics in this part of Tanzania has tended to be geographically limited, and focused on a particular protected area or community's land. Likewise, community conservation programmes in this region tend to be localised and concentrated around protected areas and less concerned with resource use not under community or protected area control (e.g. large-scale commercial farms).

These studies risk overlooking regional interactions and synergistic consequences. Impacts of land use and land use change are not localised. The ecology of the area and livelihood strategies of many residents are such that they affect each other and are felt across a wider region.

In this paper we use a regional approach to examine the problems of a particular sub-section of the population. We concentrate on the pastoral and agro-pastoral populations of Simanjiro, Mwanga, Same, and Lushoto districts. We examine the links that unite the plains' populations of the region historically, socially, politically, economically and ecologically. We describe significant land loss that has been experienced by these people as a direct consequence of conservation policies and development activities. We consider recommendations that have been made by academics, conservationists and government groups concerned with pastoralists. We pay particular attention to the analysis and recommendations of the Land Commission (URT 1991 and 1993).

This paper is divided into four parts:

1. A description of the area, the problems examined, and the people within it.

2. The history of land loss within the region.

3. An account of how loss of land and resources has affected livelihoods and conservation.

4. A discussion of the tenure recommendations suggested by those concerned with rural people's livelihoods and sustainable resource management. We outline the common ground of the tenure arrangements advocated by both interests and we consider the implications of applying this thinking to the area studied.

2. PEOPLES, PROBLEMS AND THE STUDY AREA

Study area

The area studied covers Simanjiro, Same, Mwanga and Lushoto districts of Tanzania. Together they cover a large region of the country (see Map 1) and encompass an extremely broad range of habitats, peoples and land uses. In this paper we focus on the plains and their pastoral inhabitants.

Plains make up the majority of the land area and are generally semi-arid rangelands with some areas classified as sub-humid. They range from 350m to 1200m above sea level in altitude and receive around 500-800mm rainfall a year. Rainfall is not reliable and the area is drought-prone. Its vegetation varies from *Acacia - Commiphora* bushland north of the Pare and Usambara mountains to *Acacia* Savanna grassland on the Maasai steppe in Simanjiro district.

These plains are sparsely populated due to low levels of rainfall which limit primary productivity. The most extensive form of land use is pastoralism, with irrigated agriculture occurring around permanent water sources and swamps. Recently, smallholder rain-fed agriculture has been expanding following the immigration of agriculturalists from overcrowded areas elsewhere and as a consequence of changing livelihoods as pastoralists become more agro-pastoral in their economic activities.

A large number of ethnic groups live in the area. The pastoral peoples are mostly Maa speakers (Maasai, Arusha, and Parakuyo) with some livestock-keeping Pare, Kamba and Chagga. There are numerous agricultural and agro-pastoral groups, most notably the Pare, Sambaa, Mbugu, and Chagga whose population is centred on the more mountainous areas. Dorobo hunter-gatherers and Kamba farmers are another significant minority on the plains. Rivers and lakes have also attracted ethnically diverse fisher people.

This list is not exclusive and omits numerous smaller groups and variations as well as overlapping between these 'tribes' and their various economic activities. Membership of ethnic groups and access to resources that they control are usually negotiated and altered by individuals and communities according to mutual needs (c.f. Illife, 1979; Sobania, 1988; Waller, 1993).

Relations and differences between and within all of these groups fluctuate over time, and according to resource needs. For example, Maasai herders settled with neighbouring hunting and agricultural groups during times of drought, famine or war (Waller, 1976, 1984, 1985, 1988; Berntsen, 1979a; Anderson, 1988; Johnston and Anderson, 1988). Some returned to their former areas once the crisis period abated; others settled permanently and married into their host community. Likewise, members of various agricultural and agro-pastoral groups have become Maasai society members over the years.

In the light of this social and economic fluidity, there is danger in over-emphasising a specific ethnic group/production system when discussing conservation or development policy. While our data mainly concern pastoral resource use, we emphasise that the problems we describe are not exclusively pastoral in nature. Small-scale peasant agriculturalists, hunter-gatherers, and fisher people have also found their production systems affected by development and conservation objectives. Displacement of people by commercial agriculture or from protected areas often results in competition between different indigenous production systems. This conflict can manifest itself as inter-ethnic tension and occasionally in bloodshed.

In this paper, we try to bring in data on non-pastoral indigenous production systems. This is important to gain a wider view of the problems we are describing. However, we do give particular emphasis to pastoral systems. We hope, therefore, that this will be taken as a single case study on the impacts of development and conservation on local production, which needs to be considered in conjunction with similar studies of other peoples and livelihoods in similar areas.

Continuities and connections

The area discussed in this paper is neither socially nor economically discrete. The social, economic, and political links of its population extend far beyond the boundaries of the study area. These boundaries are simply defined by our research projects. The area, however, is large enough to provide an adequate understanding of how land loss affects livelihoods which traditionally utilise vast territories (Map 2).

Over the past two hundred years, the area has been the scene of the growth, decline and resurgence of Maa-speaking pastoralists. The Simanjiro plains have long been a centre of pastoralism. The eastern part of this study area is more peripheral to pastoralist activity; however, there are many records which suggest that this area was also the domain of pastoral movements.

Kimambo (1991, 1969) records that Maa-speaking pastoralists were east of the Ruvu valley and trading with the Pare in the eighteenth century. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the Maa-speaking group known as the 'Kwavi', moved further east into what is now the border area with Kenya (Fosbrooke 1953). These people were also known as the 'Baraguyu' or 'Mbaravui', amongst other names; in this area their descendants are called the Parakuyo.

In the last century, Thompson (1968) and New (1873) recorded the Kwavi domain as being between the mountain blocks of Kilimanjaro and Pare to the west and Usambara and Taita to the east. Krapf (1860) described the area north of the Usambara and Pare mountains as a 'Kwafi' wilderness and noted that the Kwavi had plans to occupy the Kisagau hill, some 40 kilometres north of the present Mkomazi area, in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Conflicts between Maa-speaking peoples in the nineteenth century, known as the *Iloikop* wars, resulted in large-scale migrations of the Kwavi east across the Ruvu and south beyond the study area to Handeni. In the east of the study area the wars led to the emigration of the occupants of the 'Wakwafi wilderness', to the north and to the south, where they took refuge with other groups (Waller, 1979: Map 6).

In the west of the study area the Kwavi lost control of the Simanjiro plains and fled east to the Pare and Usambara mountains and to what is now Bagamoyo and Handeni districts. Jacobs (1965) records that many 'Wakwavi' migrated to the Pare plains following the disturbances. Fosbrooke dates the exclusion of the Kwavi from Naberera by the Maasai to the 1820s. Beidelman (1960) reports that Merker dated the loss of Sogonoi (Losogonoi) by the Kwavi to the Maasai at about the same time. Finally, Hurskainen (1984) records the same events, and tells how those living at Olkesumet were driven eastwards and southwards by the Maasai in the nineteenth century.

Further east, the Kwavi who fled south from the 'Wakwavi wilderness' took refuge in the Pangani river valley and along the southern edge of the Usambara mountains alongside cultivators and other refugee pastoralists expelled from the Simanjaro plains (Waller, 1979; Baumann, 1891; Galaty, 1993). Waller reports that Erhardt described the plains between the Pare and Usambara mountains and between the Mkomazi and Pangani rivers as an area where "*all Kwafi, Zigua and Maasai battles are decided*" (Erhardt diary entry No. 5. October 1853. Cited in Waller, 1979: 57).

These conflicts reduced the populations of the plains. After 1890, the recovering populations were further hit by the effects of rinderpest and German occupation. These problems combined to severely diminish pastoral populations, particularly in the east of the area examined here. The explorers Johnston and Le Roy both met large groups of Maa-speaking pastoralists east of the South Pare Mountains in 1884 and 1890 respectively (Johnston 1886; Le Roy no date). Smith travelling the same route as Le Roy a year later met no one and marked the area on his map as a wilderness (Smith, 1894). He also saw no buffalo and very little game and suspected the recent rinderpest was responsible for their absence.

The rinderpest epizootic first hit East Africa in the early 1890s and decimated wildlife and domestic animal populations. It struck herds in the Pangani river valley in February 1891 shortly after Le Roy's trip and a little before Smith's (Waller, 1988). It is quite likely that the disease forced pastoralists to flee the eastern part of the study area and could account for the difference in their impressions.

The early 1890s also saw the start of German attempts to keep Maasai pastoralists south of the Arusha-Moshi road and west of the Pangani River. Their actions combined with the effects of rinderpest to keep the Maasai away from the Mkomazi plains. In 1891, following Maasai harassment of trading caravans and a declaration of war on the Germans at Masinde by the local Maasai, German troops attacked homesteads on the east of the Ruvu river and expelled them all to the west bank (Berntsen, 1979b; Ekemode, 1973). They undertook further expeditions to clear the Maasai from what Ekemode terms 'the Pare plains' after caravans were again harassed in 1892 and 1894, and after Arusha and Maasai raids on the North Pare mountains. The Germans also strengthened their garrisons in towns on both sides of the mountains at Kisiwani, Kihurio and Masinde (Ekemode, 1973).

In 1905, a Maasai Reserve was declared that lay south of the Arusha-Moshi road, west of the Pangani river and east of the Great North Road (Iliffe, 1969: 59). Controls were strict. The area north of the road contained valuable grazing for the Maasai who were now cut off from Maa speakers in Kenya; relations there between the Maasai and Europeans were far from peaceful (Iliffe, 1969: 60). The Germans also threatened to shoot on sight Maasai whom they found west of the river (Waller, pers. comm. March 1998).

It is not certain how effective the German policy was, nor for how long it was applied. Fosbrooke suggests that Maasai were resident in the Toloha area throughout the German occupation (TNA File 11/5 - October 1951, report entitled 'The Maasai in Same District with particular reference to the Toloha Maasai'. Page 3-4.). The period after the expulsion of the Germans, and before the establishment of British control after World War One, saw tremendous migration of displaced Maa-speaking families (Waller, pers. comm.).

When the British took control of Tanganyika they encountered pastoral populations hit hard by disease and wars of the previous century and displaced from their former grazing lands. There were few Maasai east of the Ruvu valley and relations between the Maasai and Parakuyo were often hostile. The British tried to keep the Maasai west of the Ruvu river in the Reserve, and tried to move those they found 'out' of the Reserve back into it. Parakuyo pastoralists east of river and based at Hedaru, Mombo and north of the Usambara mountains were not required to move.

The British plan, however, did not fit well with the history of pastoralism in the area nor the current pastoral needs (Hodgson, 1995). Increasingly, the divisions between the Maasai and Parakuyo lessened and the populations and herds of both recovered from past depredations. The result was the expansion of herders east of Simanjiro and across the Ruvu valley. This coincided with the growth of herding on the plains by Pare, Sambaa and Kamba pastoralists (Maghimbi, 1994).

The resource use patterns that emerged from these processes in this century consisted of several interlinked transhumant territories (c.f. Ndagala, 1994). In the middle of the region, herders east and west of the Ruvu river came together in the dry season around the river. They would disperse to the higher grazing grounds, which the Maasai call *Alalilai*, during the wet season. Those on the western side would graze their animals on the Simanjiro plains, those on the east on the western side of the Pare mountains and in Mkomazi.

Beyond reach of the river, pastoralists based their transhumance on wells, swamps and smaller perennial streams. Pastoralists in western Simanjiro used the Tarangire and Loibor Serrit rivers and the Silalo swamps. Those on the central Simanjiro plains used wells. Pastoralists at Mkomazi also had reliable wells, artificial water points and rivers draining the Pare and Usambara mountains. They were in regular contact with pastoralists in the Ruvu valley when they all dispersed during the wet season.

The overlapping territories were further knitted together by movements to avoid drought, which were less regular but no less important for integrating resource use in this region. Drought-avoidance movement exceeds the 'normal' limits of transhumant movement and stretches across the region. Drought was, and remains, one of the major constraints upon pastoralism in these ecosystems. To survive it, pastoralists have to be able to travel to places where their animals can survive. There are numerous records in the archives and local livestock department files which testify to continued long range movement by pastoralists across and within the area.

The basis of this interlinked and interdependent geography of resource use is an extensive social web of relationships and affiliations that extended throughout the area and beyond. Families over the region are linked by marriage between and within ethnic groups. Family, stock friendships and other ties bind pastoralists together across the whole area. Pastoralists continually develop the links they need to have access to resources, across an area large enough to mitigate the effects of drought. These relationships and ties facilitate the negotiation of stock

movements and resource use (see Potkanski, 1997 for a detailed example amongst the Ngorongoro and Salei Maasai). Furthermore, it is through visiting relatives and friends that knowledge of the area is acquired.

Maasai pastoralists are further united by clan and age-set links which stretch across the whole of Maasailand, uniting these pastoralists in the study area as part of a broader polity. Although the Maasai are divided into different 'sections' (*Oloshon*) with control over different areas, in this area they consist of mainly one section: the 'Kisongo'. Movement is therefore not restricted by sectional boundaries (c.f. Galaty, 1980). The end result has been social and economic cohesion over and beyond the study area.

In the late 1980s people in the study area began organising themselves to counter land losses to commercial agriculture in central Simanjiro, and eviction from the Reserve at Mkomazi. In 1991 a group of people in Simanjiro established an NGO called *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei* (registered in 1993), whose main activity was land tenure advocacy for the Maasai of Simanjiro district. In 1993, the founders joined forces with Maasai and Parakuyo pastoralists at Mkomazi to form a Mkomazi Branch. *Ilaramatak* is assisting with court cases contesting the evictions from the Mkomazi Game Reserve as well as against the commercial farms in central Simanjiro district.

The existence of *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei* has created new social and political links for pastoralists in the study area. Its annual meetings bring together leaders from villages throughout Simanjiro and Mkomazi, raising awareness of land loss throughout the region. Interactions within pastoral societies, and between pastoralists and other groups, have resulted in the coherent use of resources and extensive social networks that extend across and beyond the area of study. The development of *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei* reflects and reinforces the links across the area.

The problems

In the past decade, pastoralists in the study area have suffered several incidents of abrupt and large-scale land loss. In Simanjiro district, land has been alienated to individual and corporate farmers. In Same and Lushoto districts, pastoralists have been evicted from the Mkomazi Game Reserve. In both cases pastoralists have responded actively and vigorously, legally contesting the losses and countering their impacts using practical means. Locally, each loss has threatened livelihoods and disrupted interconnected pastoral systems. Additionally, it has worked to the detriment of other rural production systems. The coincidence of losses in a short period of time, and within one region, intensifies the difficulties experienced by these resource users.

3. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CURRENT LAND LOSSES

Similarity of origins and practice

Recent land losses in the study area follow a long history of similar losses in pastoral areas of both Kenya and Tanzania. The losses result primarily from the same two processes of establishing protected areas for wildlife conservation and the alienation of land for large-scale agriculture (Homewood, 1995; Enghoff, 1990). The former has occurred principally on pastoral lands where large concentrations of wildlife were found. The latter has a dual impact: pastures are lost as grazing ground is taken over, and pressure on resources increases as peasant agriculturalists move into pastoral areas.

The colonial roots of both processes in Tanzania are similar. There are particularly close parallels between the histories of land law and conservation law. Both sets of laws originated in European perceptions of the best way to use and conserve natural resources. Both were drafted to facilitate the alienation of land and resources from local users. Both have bred cultures in management and administration that make overruling the peasantry easy and acceptable. Both have resulted in centralised control of resources. These laws were retained with little modification at independence, and the bureaucratic cultures they fostered have also been inherited.

The most comprehensive work on the origins and development of Tanzanian land law is found in the report of the Land Commission (URT, 1991, 1993). Indeed this report is one of the best researched and argued documents of its kind. Sundet notes that:

> *"Two renowned international land specialists who reviewed the Report for the World Bank each stated that "(it) is the best report of its kind on land issues that I have had the opportunity to read (Bruce 1994) and "(t)here is not a more thorough and thoughtful official consideration of land tenure issues from Africa" (Hoben, 1994)."* (Sundet ,1997: 129)

The report argues that early laws and policy were motivated primarily by the colonial regime's interest in exploiting the country's raw materials. To control these resources the colonial governments needed to control land. To do this, Germany declared that all lands were owned by the state.

When Britain took control of Tanganyika, it faced conflicting demands. It had to administer the country as a mandated territory for the League of Nations and was specifically required to do so in the interests of the indigenous populations. The day-to-day practice of colonial rule was generally based on promoting surplus extraction from peasant production (Havenik, 1993). However, the administration still needed to exploit the territory's resources, it also wanted to be able to develop a plantation sector, and so had to be able to alienate land easily from its original users.

The Land Ordinance of 1923, and its subsequent amendments achieved these goals by maintaining the Crown's ownership of land, while at the same time recognising customary owners' title to their lands. All lands were declared public lands under the direct control of the Governor to dispose of in the interests of the Territory; the Governor was given the power to grant rights of occupancy in the form of 99 year leases to investors. Customary rights of

'native communities' were recognised in a 1928 amendment which recognised the deemed right of occupancy of customary users of land.

This arrangement suited British needs as recognition of customary rights did not secure them in law. Customary holders' rights against the state were not adequately defined nor adequately protected by law. Indigenous lands were still public lands that could be disposed of by the Governor. The 'rights' of customary occupiers were called 'permissive rights', in that the Governor consented to the continuous occupation of the land by the indigenous occupants. However, when the British wished to alienate land they could do so almost at will. The Governor's permission for peasants to occupy their land could simply be withdrawn. Alienation of land was an administrative procedure performed by the state bureaucracy to whom the Governor delegated his powers. The Land Commission notes that this law:

> *"ingeniously expressed the two-fold character of the British colonial state - internationally as a 'trustee' and internally as a 'conqueror'."* (URT, 1991: 12)

Land legislation gave the Governor a free hand, but the actual policy that was followed, varied. Chidzero argues that between the wars, policy was protective of perceived African interests and "only cautiously permissive of alienation" (1961: 228). After 1945 this policy changed. The Government took a more positive view of land alienation, arguing that it would be in the interest of all communities for it to be used for development purposes.

This did not result in large-scale land alienations. By the time of independence, only 1.5% of the country's land had been alienated (URT, 1991). However, it did lead, for example, to the Meru land case, where the Meru people challenged the universality of the benefits of alienation (Spear, 1997; Luanda, 1986; Chidzero, 1961).

Legislation and policy accompanying it affected more than just the amount of land alienated. It also altered the way in which claims to land came to be seen. The Land Commission argues that the logic and enforcement of the land laws created a policy environment where customary tenure has come to be seen as inferior to statutory tenure. In practice, it is now understood to mean a moving away from customary to statutory tenure. Statutory tenure is nearly always favoured over customary tenure in the Tanzanian courts. Lack of security in customary tenure derives from its weak legal status and institutionalised attitudes towards it, rather than from any weakness inherent in customary tenure itself.

The Land Commission found that Tanzania inherited a system of land law that reflected the values of British colonists and that was designed to facilitate the alienation of land. The cultural attitudes that made overruling the peasantry acceptable also continues:

> *"The approach of colonial regimes to vest land in the state as the ultimate landlord is fundamental for it runs like a red thread throughout the history of land tenure in the country and was inherited virtually unmodified from the colonial government."* (URT, 1991: 9)

Land alienation by the state also continued to disrupt customary land use after independence:

> *"The (Land) Commission received overwhelming evidence showing large-scale encroachment of customary individual and village lands by parastatals, District Development Corporations, (and by) state organs such as the army, prisons, national service, parks and reserves. Villagers and rural folk holding land under customary tenure have no security. Their lands are under constant threat of alienation by state organs ostensibly for 'national projects' or in 'public interest' but very often in favour of high and middle echelons of bureaucracy or well connected 'outsiders'."* (Shivji, 1995: 10-11.)

The pressures to alienate land have become particularly strong since the mid-1980s when liberalisation outside investors were encouraged to apply for land in Tanzania. It is especially problematic given the confusion recorded by the Land Commission over the land alienation procedures and the difficulties in ensuring that such procedures were correctly followed and suitably transparent to those involved.

There are two important similarities between conservation laws (governing the use of wildlife and the preservation of wilderness) and land laws. First, such laws were motivated by a desire to generate revenue and to develop the land's resources and economy as the government saw fit (Mekacha ,1996; Chidzero ,1961). Second, the state had control over the licenses and could revoke them. This constituted permissive use, equivalent to the use allowed under the 1923 Land Ordinance.

Early conservation laws took control of natural resources out of African hands and placed them in colonial care. In 1896, Governor Von Wissmann set fees for licences that were cheap for Europeans, but unrelated to the ability to pay. Africans had to pay more for hunting than they did in taxes all year. Later hunting with nets was prohibited. Kopenen (1994) states that the ban was so strictly imposed in the south-east of the country that it contributed to the outbreak of the MajiMaji rebellion.

The subsequent evolution of colonial attitudes and legislation for conservation has been traced by Collett (1987) and Neumann (1991, 1995; see also Brockington and Homewood, 1996). A mix of European and American values that sought natural landscapes unspoiled by people motivated the desire to set up protected areas (Anderson and Grove, 1987). At the same time there was also pressure to set aside areas and establish laws that would guarantee good sport for hunters. These ideas were not endorsed by all officials, but remained the thrust of the policy throughout the colonial period.

Gamassa (1993b, 1996) notes that these objectives denied African valuation of wildlife and uninhabited areas as resources to be used and managed, not set aside and looked at or kept for trophy hunting. He complains that at independence Tanzania failed to redefine its conservation laws to suit an African context but:

> *"accepted wholesale the imported conservation philosophy which more often than not sought to alienate local people from wildlife resource without alternatives."* (Gamassa, 1993b: 4)

Neumann (1995) records that this acceptance of external conservation agendas resulted from the pressure brought by international conservation organisations. These organisations, which still operate in Tanzania, take the mandate for their activities from the Arusha Manifesto of

1961.[2] In his speech, President Nyerere promised to pursue western conservation strategies including the preservation of protected areas. The contents of the speech were drafted by the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (Bonner, 1993).

As with land law, conservation policy and practice in Tanzania has also fostered negative attitudes towards customary land tenure systems, which have been institutionalised in state/parastatal conservation organisations. People living near to protected areas have been treated as hostile to conservation and the rights of customary tenure systems are frequently ignored.

Large-scale agriculture and displaced peasants

Alienation of rangeland in East Africa began with the colonial German farms set up around Mt. Meru. In colonial Kenya in 1904 and 1911 large numbers of Maasai were moved to make way for settler farmers in the famous 'Maasai moves'. However, not all the land lost was pastoral rangeland. The Kikuyu also lost heavily, and some later moved south into the areas designated as Maasai Reserves (Campbell, 1984). These agriculturalists were evicted from pastoral areas during the emergency of 1952 (Campbell, 1986). However, they were not excluded for long. After independence Kikuyu immigration into pastoral areas in the south started afresh, and settlement of agriculturalists in pastoral areas was promoted by President Kenyatta.

Land pressures in Kenya Maasailand, combined with Western notions of range management, led to the establishment of both individual and group ranches in the 1960s. None of the group ranches were viable ecological or social units (Galaty, 1980; Grandin *et al.*, 1989). Even so many have now been sub-divided into individual plots.

Like Kenya, Tanzania also experienced large-scale land alienation during the colonial period in highland areas such as the slopes of Mt. Meru and Mt. Kilimanjaro. These evictions were traumatic and disruptive to those involved. Individual cases, such as the Meru Land Case when several thousand acres were taken to provide a new 'white highlands', attracted international attention and concern.[3] Alienation of Meru land caused overcrowding and displacement as early as the 1930s and saw the large movement of peasants away from the mountain into more pastoral zones (Luanda, 1986; Spear, 1997). This was the foundation of the overcrowding in Arumeru District. In general, however, the amount of land alienated in Tanzania was less than in Kenya.

In Tanzania, alienation of land for large-scale farms continued after independence, but at a much slower rate. The beneficiaries were the parastatal farming and ranching corporations. In the late 1960s, tens of thousands of acres in what is now Hanang district were alienated by a newly formed parastatal, the National Agriculture and Food Corporation (NAFCO). This land was taken for large-scale wheat schemes. Private alienation in Tanzania gained momentum again following economic liberalisation in the 1980s. During this period large farms were handed over to individuals and companies, many of them expatriate, and many for export cash-crop production.

As the better lands of Meru and Kilimanjaro became scarce, large-scale farmers began to join migrating peasants in the search for suitable agricultural land in neighbouring semi-arid areas.

[2] Not to be confused with the Arusha Declaration which proclaimed Tanzania's adoption of Socialism.
[3] Meru leaders who led the opposition to the alienation spoke in the General Assembly of the United Nations to appeal against the loss. (Luanda 1986; Neumann, 1991; Spear, 1997).

The influx of commercial and peasant agriculture into pastoral areas, and adoption of agriculture by pastoralists themselves has resulted in negative impacts on wildlife conservation. According to Borner (1985) the south-westward movement of large and small-scale agriculture from highland areas has impinged on the borders of Tarangire National Park and constricted wildlife seasonal migration routes. The continued expansion of agriculture could severely reduce the capacity of the Tarangire/Simanjiro ecosystem to support its wildlife population. In Simanjiro, contradictions are emerging between development and conservation objectives.

Alienation of land for large-scale agriculture in Simanjiro district

The spread of displaced peasants from highland areas, combined with commercial farmers seeking land for export production, has made major inroads in Simanjiro district. As a result, thousands of hectares of high quality, better watered rangelands have been removed from pastoral use.

Two types of land alienation occur. First, villages which have not registered their land can have it taken from them by the government. The government can also alienate registered village land if it can demonstrate is not being used. Second, registered land is being leased by corrupt village officials.

When a village registers its land, the title deeds are held in trust for the whole village by the Village Chairman and Council.[4] The individuals who constitute the village leadership have frequently proved untrustworthy and have used their powers to sell off large areas of land to private interests (URT, 1991).

The Land Commission observed the consequences of this type of corruption in Lolkisale village, Monduli district. Immigration to this village has been dominated by rich outsiders. According to the Commission (URT 1993), almost all the people who have obtained land in Lolkisale since the mid-1980s are wealthy individuals from Arumeru and Kilimanjaro districts. The Land Commission explains:

> *"The confusion is caused by pressures from above, disregarding the relevant procedures on land matters vis-à-vis village land rights. (In this case) rich people from places like Arusha and Kilimanjaro simply used their financial power to get the needed land. The result of all (this) is that the whole land is now occupied by big shots. The ordinary Mwananchi (citizen) has nothing."* (URT, 1993)

As in Monduli district, land alienation in Simanjiro has been rapid and much of it has taken place illegally[5]. Records of illegal alienations are not available in land registry offices. It is, therefore, impossible to obtain accurate figures about the scale of the loss. The figures

[4] When a village registers its land its boundaries are surveyed, agreed with neighbouring villages and demarcated. Registration is a prerequisite to obtaining a village title. A village title is given by the Ministry of Land to the village council, an elected body, in the form of a 999-year lease. The council can then sub-lease the land to others. The village council currently has the power to give out and sell such leases without the approval of the Village Assembly (a meeting of all adult village members). Legally villages can only give away up to 10 acres of land to an individual in this fashion. In practice this law is universally ignored (Fimbo, 1992).

[5] Illegality takes two forms: (i) land is simply taken over and used without a title being sought, or land with a title is expanded beyond the specifications of the title; (ii) titles are obtained illegally. More land is obtained than the 10 acres permitted in law and/or titles are received on the basis of forged Village Council minutes or signatures (URT 1991).

available are several years old and are also based on land registrations and Village Council minutes. They will be smaller than the actual area concerned on the ground.

In 1991 the Land Commission recorded that pending or proposed large-scale land alienations in Monduli and Kiteto districts (which then included Simanjiro District[6]) were in the range of 200-300,000 acres (URT 1991). Galaty observed:

> *"In 1993 long-term leaseholds were being made of up to 1,500 acres in Loibor Soit and Orkesumet villages and up to 2,000 acres in Naberera (Kiteto District Minutes of May 31 1992). It was also reported that one parliamentarian received 6,000 acres and several others 2,000 each, a local transporter 2,000 acres, an Arusha business man 4,000 acres and a prominent church official 2,000 acres."* (Galaty 1994b: 201, n.4)

Muir (1994), quoting Mkamal (1993), says that in 1993 43,000 hectares of land were lost to the District in 72 small-scale farms, representing 2.5% of the 18,343 km^2 of the District land area. She further states (pp. 32 and 34) that 16,000 hectares of grazing land in Naberera have been taken over by the District Council, and 12,000 hectares in Emboret have been allocated to Village Councillors. It is not clear how many of these 28,000 hectares are included in the 43,000 hectares mentioned previously.

Ole Kuney (1994) estimates land lost in Naberera village alone to be 50,000 acres (20,000 hectares) which puts it in a similar league as the loss suffered by pastoralists in Hanang district as a result of the NAFCO wheat scheme. It is possible that these figures are also underestimated.

Occupation of land by agricultural smallholders

Displaced peasants from the Meru and Kilimanjaro highlands initially tended to concentrate in specific places in neighbouring districts, and to move outwards as these areas became overcrowded. This process has continued for several decades, but there are still large numbers of landless peasants. The Land Commission reports that in 1992-3:

> *"Arumeru District authorities had been directed to settle landless people (about 18,000 in number) in other Districts, particularly Kiteto and Monduli Districts."* (URT 1993:9)

Resettlement did not occur as authorities in the targeted Districts were unwilling to receive such a large influx of outsiders.

There is some overlap between these migration patterns and the spread of large-scale agriculture, but primarily the peasants tended to concentrate in areas nearest to Arumeru and expand gradually from there. Commercial agriculture, on the other hand, was able to spread more rapidly and to distant areas that were not as accessible to peasants.

The area most accessible to Arumeru peasants is Monduli district, which received the earliest and largest influx. The early expansion of Meru and Arusha peasants from Mt. Meru to surrounding pastoral areas is described in detail in *Mountain Farmers* by Thomas Spear.

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[6] At that time Naberera was still part of Kiteto district. Kiteto district split into the newly formed Simanjiro district and a smaller Kiteto district in 1994. Naberera is now in Simanjiro district

According to his account, the possibility of expanding below the mountains was greatly constrained by an 'iron ring' of European farms. Eventually, however, overcrowding on the upper slopes forced resident peasants onto the neighboring plains (Spear, 1997). Ole Kuney describes the latest and most intensive migration of this long-standing process. In his recent study of the developments in Monduli district, he states:

> *"It is estimated that over the last three decades 60% of the land that used to be suitable for grazing due to permanent water sources and reliable rains has been put under intensive agricultural production."* (Ole Kuney, 1993:101)

In Simanjiro district, the first areas settled by Arusha peasants were the villages immediately south of Arumeru district: Lokii, Oljoro, Namba Tano, Losunyai and Shamburai Sokoni. From these villages they spread south and west to Loswaki and Loiboir Soit. The most recent migrations have been to the central parts of Simanjiro district; Naberera and Landenai. The influx of peasants as a consequence of land hunger creates hardship for both peasant farmers and pastoralists with whom they come into competition.

Land lost to conservation

Pastoral territories coincide with savanna ecosystems which are frequently home to abundant wildlife populations. Consequently, pastoralists have borne the brunt of the alienation of land for conservation purposes (See Table 1).

Table 1: Protected areas on pastoral lands in Kenya and Tanzania in and around the study area

Kenya[a]			Tanzania[b]		
park/reserve	**date created**	**area/km²**	**park/reserve**	**date created**	**area/km²**
Tsavo	1948	21,180	Serengeti	1951	14,763
Amboseli	1974	388	Lake Manyara	1960	325
Masai Mara	1961	1,368	Tarangire	1968	2,600
Nairobi	1946	114	Mkomazi	1951 gazetted 1988/9 people evicted	3,234

[a] Lusigi 1978: 63
[b] Wildlife Sector Review Task Force, 1995

In Kenya Maasailand all protected areas were gazetted between 1946 (Nairobi National Park) and 1974 (Amboseli National Park). By independence in 1964, the Kenya Maasai had already lost over 20,000 km² of grazing land to gazetted protected areas. This exacerbated the effect of the large-scale migrations of Kikuyu and Kamba agriculturalists into the Maasai districts of Kajiado and Narok.

Unlike Kenya, the establishment of protected areas in Tanzania Maasailand has continued since independence under the separate auspices of the Department of Wildlife and Tanzania National Parks Authority (see Box 1, page 16). The two protected areas that directly affect natural resource users in the study area are the Mkomazi Game Reserve (gazetted in 1952) and the

Tarangire National Park (gazetted as Tarangire Game Reserve in 1957 and converted to a National Park in 1968).

Box 1: The institutions managing wildlife in Tanzania

The two main institutions managing wildlife in Tanzania are the Department of Wildlife and the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA). The latter only controls the national parks of the country. It is a parastatal, and can retain a large proportion of gate receipts. Use of national park resources by local people or by foreign hunters is forbidden by law.

The Department of Wildlife returns 75% of its funds to the Treasury and 25% goes to the Tanzanian Wildlife Protection Fund (Hartley, 1997). Little money is returned to the Department and its work is carried out on a skeletal budget. The Department is responsible for game outside national parks. There is a dual structure to the Department's work: some game reserves are managed as National Projects with the manager being responsible to the Director of the Department of Wildlife; other protected areas and Game Controlled Areas are run by District and Regional Game Offices. Hunting is legally possible on all lands outside national parks and many game reserves are divided into hunting blocks with licenses sold to hunting companies. Indeed the laws governing game reserves allow for all kinds of use of reserve resources, as the Department sees fit. Mkomazi Game Reserve was run by Regional Game Offices until the time of the evictions. After the Reserve was cleared it was declared a National Project.

The impact of the evictions from Tarangire shortly after its creation was not felt immediately. Large-scale commercial agriculture in the region was still fifteen years off, and the evicted people (mostly pastoral Maasai) were able to develop alternative, if less optimal, subsistence strategies. The effects were visible more than twenty years later during the drought of 1993/4. By this time some of the best wet season pastures in Simanjiro District had been lost to large-scale commercial agriculture. This situation forced more livestock on to dry season grazing grounds earlier on, depleting the season's grass growth sooner. There was also pressure from small-scale agriculture, which is now widely practised both by the Maasai themselves and by Arusha peasant farmers who migrated into the area from Arumeru district.

During the drought of 1993/4, the Maasai of Simanjiro found previous drought-coping strategies precluded by loss of access to drought reserve areas which had been enclosed inside the Tarangire National Park, and by land taken up by large-scale commercial farms. More distant drought refuge areas were simultaneously under pressure from pastoralists and agriculturalists from neighbouring districts. Many pastoralists feel that their livestock losses in the drought were augmented by the unavailability of these drought refuge areas.

Recent evictions from Mkomazi Game Reserve

In the late 1980s, the Mkomazi Game Reserve was cleared of all its resident pastoralists, and further use of the area by local people was forbidden (Mustafa, 1997). The operation to clear the Reserve was undertaken because it was thought that the pastoralists caused widespread degradation, and their presence in the Reserve made it more difficult to prevent poaching (Mangubuli, 1992). The Department of Wildlife also held that the 1974 Wildlife Conservation Act conferred the right to prohibit their use of the Reserve.[7]

[7] This view has been challenged by the Legal Aid Committee of Dar es Salaam (Juma and Mchome, 1994).

The dislocation and disruption caused by the evictions were considerable. The livestock population of the Reserve was around 120,000, over half of which were cattle (District livestock census data). Since the evictions, an estimated twenty-five percent of these animals have been restricted to a narrow and insufficient grazing area between the Reserve and the mountains bordering it to the south. Others have moved away from the Reserve onto the increasingly crowded rangelands that are the subject of this paper. Many animals died or had to be sold as a result of the combined effects of drought, disease and exclusion.

Pastoralists evicted from Mkomazi faced a different set of circumstances from those evicted from Tarangire. Mkomazi is directly adjacent to agricultural highlands in the Pare and Usambara mountains. The availability of pasture and land for small-scale agriculture in these areas is minimal. This meant that the evicted pastoralists came into direct conflict with Pare, Sambaa, and Kamba farmers in the areas on the southern border of the Reserve.

The final Mkomazi evictions also occurred three years after implementation of the policy for economic liberalisation and the proliferation of large-scale commercial agriculture in north-eastern Tanzania. Consequently, options for long-distance migration were greatly reduced. Potential destination points such as Handeni, Morogoro, Simanjiro, and Monduli had been transformed by large and small-scale agriculture (Mitzlaff, 1996; Ole Kuney, 1994).

In addition to the stock losses, many livestock and people have been permanently displaced. The scale of land alienation at Mkomazi was substantial. The land lost by pastoralists amounts to 3,234 km^2, or over 808,000 acres. Pastoralism and the livestock sector in Tanzania have not suffered a single loss of such scale for decades. The severity of the loss is only mitigated by the fact that illegal use of the Reserve continues, in spite of heavy fines and livestock confiscation (Mustafa, 1997; Homewood *et al*,. 1997). Estimates of the amount of rangeland lost by Barabaig pastoralists to the NAFCO wheat scheme range from '70,000 acres' (URT 1993) to 'over 100,000 acres' (Lane and Moorehead, 1995).[8] The disruption suffered by the Barabaig was devastating and is well documented (Lane, 1991b; URT 1993), yet the amount of land involved at Mkomazi is substantially larger.

Summary

The history of this region is characterised by considerable loss of land for pastoralists. The evictions from Mkomazi and the growth of pressure on land following economic liberalisation have resulted in a convergence of difficulties for pastoralists.

It is a central argument of this paper that the problems facing pastoralists are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. The impacts on people depend on their proximity to forage resources and opportunities for migration elsewhere. This dynamic requires examination over a wide area. At the same time, general statements about 'increased pressure' have little meaning unless they are backed up by detailed case studies. The various circumstances result in resource users making diverse responses in resource-use and livelihood strategies in different locations.

The following section contains several case studies that provide information on the study area (See Map 3). In Simanjiro District repeated alienation of farmland is causing problems to herders; in Simanjiro and Mkomazi conservation initiatives present obstacles to community conservation. In Simanjiro District an attempt to form a conservation area along the lines of

[8] The NAFCO wheat scheme had a knock-on effect of attracting agriculturalists from neighbouring areas.

the Ngorongoro Conservation Area has bred distrust. At Mkomazi the history of evictions, the impact of exclusion and the involvement of private conservation interests have resulted in tension and resistance.

The data come from different surveys employing a variety of methods. Each study provides basic information on the methods used, plus an account of how local resource use has changed. Different methods, different researchers and different areas do not produce exactly commensurable results. However, it is possible to extract the central issues characterising the nature of the pastoral resource losses in the area considered.

4. THE IMPACT OF LAND LOSS

Framework for understanding the effects of land loss

Rangelands are heterogeneous, with great variety in the quality, quantity and timing of resource availability (Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Ellis *et al*,. 1993; Westoby and Noy-Meir, 1989). While the absolute amount of land lost is a useful indicator of the problems faced by pastoralists, it is insufficient to explain the problems caused.

Lane (1991), documenting the effect of land loss on the Barabaig of Hanang District, demonstrates that such losses can only be understood through detailed knowledge of resource management systems. Likewise, the cases detailed below need to be understood in the context of pastoral resource use and the nature of resource ownership.

Similar patterns of pastoral resource use and disruption in their respective areas are found in both areas studied. Pastoral resource use has been well described by Ndelelya (1994).[9] Similar accounts are available in Potkanski (1997); Lane (1997) and Ibrahim & Ibrahim (1995). Although Ndelelya describes pastoral resource use for Maasai herders, the principles may also be applied, for example, to Pare herders in Mkomazi. He writes as follows (see Diagram 4.1, page 21):

> *"In principle the Masai pastoral system is a rotational grazing system based on the rainy and dry seasons. The dry season lasts for 6 months (June - November) and is the most critical. Access to water during this period determines settlement patterns and grazing rules. At the beginning of the season, the community meets and agrees on a schedule to use water points including man-made wells owned and named after clans, natural water points like streams and lakes and Government constructed dams and wells.*
>
> *"Dry season June - November.*
> *Grazing and settlement is organised in concentric circles around watering points...Immediately surrounding the water source is the cattle holding ground, with drinking troughs. Cattle are brought here from the stalls called* bomas*...either in the morning or the afternoon depending on the watering schedule. Cattle would drink water in the morning of day one...and graze for the rest of the afternoon in the inner cycle grazing area...and come back to the bomas in the evening...and thus day one is done. The next day, this group of cattle would be taken out to graze in the distant outer circle grazing area and come back to the stalls in the evening, and thus day two is done. Animals therefore drink water on alternating days. This system is designed to enable animals to drink adequate water on the first day, and eat enough grass on the second day. It also reduces congestion of animals at the watering points. At the same time, in order to avoid overgrazing of any one area, the herds (usually composed of several households in a* boma*) shift either clockwise or anti-clockwise as they graze in the course of the season...*

[9] Saruni Ndelelya was born and raised in Orkesumet, Simanjiro. His model is based on *boma*-to-*boma* research he conducted himself. The resulting report was produced for the District Commissioner of Kiteto in order to document and report on land conflict within the District.

"Wet season December - May.
...To allow for sufficient regeneration of grass and accumulation of water reserves to last the next dry season, the land use pattern in a 'village' is such that land grazed during the dry season in settlements is not grazed at all during the wet season. Animals and their calves are therefore moved out of this area during the wet season to distant communal grazing lands and natural swamps. Only a few animals are left behind to provide some milk for women and children. The rest are taken to distant grazing fields, taking into consideration factors like: availability of good quality and highly nutritive value grass species; salt licks to provide critical minerals; and abundance of good quality grass and water for purposes of animal fattening.

While the movement of animals during the wet season in the outer fields is random and herds from different villages may mix, the movement of animals during the critical dry season is regulated and controlled. Access to watering points is communal in the sense that new members may in principle be allowed to water their animals provided: 1) there is sufficient water to go round; 2) the individual observes the rules for land use described above; and 3) he does not bring in sick animals. Cattle from certain areas are believed to be diseased and are barred from joining the village herd. Although in principle there is no discrimination against outsiders joining a community, it is very difficult to meet the three conditions necessary for a newcomer, and for this reason in the heart of Maasailand (Simanjiro) communities have managed to remain homogeneous in this regard."[10] (Ndelelya, 1994:1-2)

A key feature of this system is that it is not limited by village boundaries. While dispersing to wet season pastures animals can be sent long distances and far beyond these boundaries. The broad extent of pastoral resource use demonstrates the importance of supra-village movement and so of supra-village society and economy. Long distance movement is particularly important in drought years or extended dry seasons when pastoralists may send animals to places where the effects of drought are more easily avoided. As drought is an ever-present threat, drought refuge areas are vital (cf. Scoones, 1995). Long-term survival entails surviving droughts, and this depends upon access to rangelands across a wide area in order that herds may avoid the effects of drought (cf. Grandin *et al,* 1989).

[10] It is particularly difficult for non-Maasai to gain access to pasture in Maasai areas. While such arrangements are not unheard of, they involve long-term alliances, based on intermarriage between specific households. The type of emergency use which is enjoyed by Maasai from other areas, is generally not extended to other ethnic groups. Most recently Pare pastoralists who attempt to resettle in Maasai areas following their eviction from Mkomazi were told to settle elsewhere.

Diagram 4.1: Schematic diagram of the Transhumant Pastoral Model (after Ndelelya 1994)



Key: Resource use within each ring.

1. Permanent dry season water source, usually a dam, river, well or borehole. Queuing and holding area for livestock waiting to drink.
2. Location of dry season *bomas* and pasture reserved for sick and immature animals and smallstock.
3. Dry season pasture, where livestock are taken to graze on days they are not watered.
4. Wet season dispersal and seasonal water sources.

In both wet and dry years inter-village movement is necessary for long term survival and prosperity. The existence of resource use patterns which transcend village boundaries has important implications for legislating and administering pastoral land tenure. Customary access to resources in other villages is carefully regulated. Although all need to move, anyone cannot move anywhere. Use of village pastures is restricted to certain people and places. Access is negotiated between friends and relatives and those with a history of using the area. Those with weak links to a place or who fail to meet other criteria will be less welcome.

Interestingly, people in receiving areas would declare that all those seeking grazing would be welcome on their pastures. In part the universal welcome is a normative statement, a declaration of adherence to a set of values.[11] In practise much more negotiation may be involved. In part it also reflects the fact that the prime 'constraint' governing access is not generally the controllers of the resource.[12] Rather, it resides in the minds of those requesting access. People do not want to be refused access to graze an area. Those with weak links to a place may not ask rather than be refused.

It is a sign of stress if people who are 'marginal' to a resource approach those who are likely to refuse them, or if they just move in and invoke the complaints of the residents. There is a mutual understanding of when and from whom it is proper to ask for access to resources. Reciprocal rights of access are predicated upon reciprocal understanding of decent behaviour. In pastoral culture the need to negotiate access to resources is reflected in broad social networks over a vast geographical area.

Within villages access to certain pastures is restricted. The most important of these are the dry season calf pastures which provide grazing for calves near to water points so that they do not have to walk too far to graze (De Souza and de Leeuw, 1984; Potkanski, 1997; Peacock, 1987; Grandin, 1988). There are usually two types of calf pastures: some are privately operated by one herder or one *boma* - in Same and Lushoto these are fenced with thorn bushes; others are communally managed calf pastures which are used and policed by the whole village or sections of it. These are unfenced and protected by village by-laws and elders' decrees and sanctions. The dry and wet season grazing areas used by adult cattle are similarly communally owned and managed.

Access to some water sources may also be restricted to certain people. Lakes, rivers and dams, for which no labour is required, are 'God's water' (*Engare Engai*) and are public property and an open-access resource. Privately developed wells and springs, where the amount of water available is limited, are privately owned. Their use is restricted to certain families or clans. Temporary use may, in theory, be negotiated by anyone (cf. Potkanski, 1997; Rogers *et al.*, forthcoming).

All public and private property rights are effectively agreed communally within *vitongoji* (sub-villages, *kitongoji* sing.) and occasionally endorsed at the village level. Villages may pass by-laws restricting the use of calf pastures, but these areas are still vulnerable to alienation by the state or by unscrupulous and powerful individuals within the village.

[11] Waller pers. comm.
[12] We are indebted to E.B.O'Malley for this insight into resource control.

Types of land loss experienced

Five types of resources/land can be identified as important for pastoralists:

1. Water sources, both permanent and seasonal;
2. Dry season grazing and browsing resources;
3. Wet season pastures;
4. Drought refuge areas, and
5. Migration routes between pastures.

The loss of each of these resources poses a specific problem and each demands a different response.

There are four main types of land loss that affect pastoral resource management in different ways. These are:

(i) Loss of access to dry season water sources. If access is not denied, it may be reduced, or the numbers of users increased by displaced users from elsewhere.

(ii) Loss of wet season pasture. Dry season pasture must not be grazed in the wet season, or there will be no grass for dry season fodder. Use of wet season pasture in the rains ensures the availability of dry season pasture.

(iii) Loss of drought refuge areas. Many of the places on which the pastoralists used to rely during drought are no longer available to them.

(iv) Loss of mobility due to agriculture. Large-scale agriculture not only removes areas from pastoral use, it also obstructs migration routes (cf Spear 1997). One of the detrimental effects of large farms is to block access to wet season pastures. Topography and disease restrictions may combine with farmland to create artificial, man-made barriers.

The impacts of land alienation in Simanjiro District - Jim Igoe

Method

I conducted my research in Simanjiro between 1993 and 1997. During the first phase I familiarised myself with the villages in the region, developed rapport with local people and made an extensive survey of district livestock markets. During the second phase I conducted an extensive survey of natural resource loss in four villages (Loibor Serrit, Naberera, Sukuro and Loibor Soit (Moipo)), changes in resource-use practices, traditional and modern leadership, and relationships with officials from TANAPA's Community Conservation Service. Villages were selected on the basis of important differences in the loss of natural resources. Loibor Serrit was selected because of its proximity to the Tarangire National Park; Naberera because of large-scale land alienation for commercial agriculture; Sukuro because, though not directly affected by either of these, it was squeezed between areas that were; and Loibor Soit (Moipo) because of its connections to both Mkomazi and the Simanjiro plains.

In the course of this survey, I obtained data through the use of a lengthy questionnaire. I found that respondents, especially women, were most comfortable answering questions in groups. This method often sparked debates more readily than individual interviews, as groups were generally more enthusiastic and detailed in their answers.

At the end of each village survey, I conducted follow up enquiries on issues unique to that particular village and/or to resolve discrepancies in my data. These generally involved informal discussions with key informants, including influential elders, village officials, leaders of women's groups and educated members of local Maasai NGOs. Additional information was also obtained from informal discussions with European farmers, and in village meetings with officials of the Tarangire Community Conservation Service.

History of Simanjiro District

Simanjiro District is the newest District in Arusha Region. It was created in July 1994 when the Regional government divided Kiteto District into Kiteto and Simanjiro Districts. The two Districts are the southernmost reaches of Maasai-dominated plains and are home to the Kisongo section. The population of Simanjiro was estimated to be approximately 62,000 in 1994 (Muir, 1994), much of it concentrated in the northern part where there is more farming and mining. Ecologically, the District is split into two areas; the western part is upland plateau on the Simanjiro plain, and the eastern area has more low-lying land with lower rainfall and fine soils. The District is bordered on the west by the Tarangire National Park, the north by Arumeru District, the east by the Ruvu river and the south by the Kitwai plains of Kiteto District (see Map 4).

The pastoral populations that dominate Simanjiro District came under pressure in 1970 when people were evicted from the Tarangire National Park. Following economic liberalisation in 1985 its fertile areas have been the target of large-scale agricultural enterprises. The District is also affected by the migrations of displaced peasants from highland areas to the north.

Simanjiro District has an unusually large number of titled villages (c.f. footnote 4) resulting from resource pressure caused by the events of the past decade and interaction with conservation interests surrounding the Tarangire National Park. The following case studies illustrate these pressures, and how they are felt in different villages.

Loibor Serrit village

Geography and origins

Loibor Serrit is situated in south-west Simanjiro (see Map 5, appendix). Its trading centre is 10 km east of Tarangire National Park. Muir (1994) gives its population as 2,693 in 1988. It has probably increased substantially since then, because of the growth of the mining settlement at Kangala. Until the late 1960s Loibor Serrit was considered one of the better areas for pastoralism in Tanzania. A number of informants indicated that they had moved there from areas as far away as Ngorongoro, Monduli and Kiteto in the 1950s and early 1960s. They attributed Loibor Serrit's reputation to the abundance of wet season grazing resources and its drought refuges. Since then most of these have been enclosed in the Tarangire National Park, or lost to agriculture.

Constraints on pastoralism

The suitability of Loibor Serrit for herding has declined over the past 25 years for three reasons:

i) Tarangire National Park

Because of its location on the eastern border of the Park, Loibor Serrit is more affected by it than any other village in the survey. Before the Park was gazetted in 1970 many of the Maasai

in Loibor Serrit lived near or in what is now the Park.[13] Their removal and the (illegally) enforced buffer zone (Box 2), has added to the populations outside the Park.

The Park contains the features that earned the village its reputation as particularly favourable for pastoralism. The feature mentioned most frequently by informants was the Silalo swamp, lying about 30 km north-west of the village centre and an important drought reserve area for the whole of the Simanjiro plains and as far south as Kitwai and Kibaya. Silalo has water all the year round, and abundant pasture even during the dry season. This is where the Maasai of Loibor Serrit took their livestock during the drought of 1960/61; they attribute the good post-drought recovery of their animals to their ability to gain access to the swamp.

Other parts of what is now the Tarangire National Park were an important wet season dispersal area for the Maasai of the Simanjiro plains. There are many seasonal water sources inside the Park and also parts of the Park, especially to the south and west of Oldonye Sambu, get rain relatively early in the year. Early rains are especially valuable to stock stressed by the travails of the dry season (c.f. Homewood and Rodgers 1991).

Box 2: The Tarangire National Park buffer zone

There is no legal basis for extending the authority of national parks beyond their boundaries in order to create buffer zones. However, herders in Loibor Serrit complain that there is a *de facto* buffer zone around the eastern border of Tarangire National Park. They report that they have been harassed by rangers far from the park, simply because their livestock were pointed in that general direction. *Bomas* on the western side of the village are in a grey area *vis-à-vis* the buffer zone. Women in these areas reported difficulties in obtaining firewood and timber for construction, and traditional medicines. They said that they were afraid to go west of the *boma* because of the danger of being stopped, harassed, and occasionally sexually molested by Tarangire Rangers.

In a discussion with one Community Conservation Service Officer I asked the following questions about the Tarangire Buffer Zone: i) does it exist?; ii) if it does not exist, why do people perceive that it does?; and iii) why does TANAPA not clarify the status of the buffer zone to the people living to the east of the park? The answer to question (i) was that legally there is no buffer zone on the eastern boundary of Tarangire, and that TANAPA Rangers have no legal authority outside the park. In response to question (ii) he said that TANAPA Rangers enforce the buffer zone for the good of the communities to the east of the park. Finally, in answer to the third question he stated that the Community Conservation Service would only clarify the boundaries of the park if specifically requested to do so by village governments bordering the park.

He further stated that the human rights abuses that have occurred both within and outside of the park are the acts of a few corrupt individuals and not the product of TANAPA policy. However, the ambiguity which exists makes it easier for these individuals to exploit ignorance of the park boundaries. Often this situation is used to extort bribes from people who are intimidated by the rangers and fear possible arrest

ii) Tsetse fly

Another problem that has plagued Loibor Serrit since the mid-1970s is a heavy infestation of tsetse flies. Tsetse flies are dependent on relatively dense bushland habitat. Fluctuation between woodland and grassland is commonly observed in East African savannas, and it is generally affected by human and wildlife activities. Although no scientific studies have been

[13] TANAPA took over the Tarangire Game Reserve from the Department of Wildlife in 1968, and evicted the people living there in 1970.

conducted of the recent growth of the tsetse population in Loibor Serrit, residents of the village attribute it to the following factors:

a) A decline in the elephant population following heavy poaching in the area. Several informants claimed that browsing by elephants inhibits the spread of bushland, which coincidentally contains the tsetse populations[14].

b) The end of the British tsetse eradication scheme, which served all areas from the Lolkisale Game Control Area down to Kimatoro[15].

c) Prohibition of controlled burning by local herders, which they claim was essential for keeping down tsetse populations.

d) The eviction of herds from the park, which resulted in heavier grazing on its borders and bush encroachment.

iii) Large-scale farms

The following example illustrates this problem. A 1,000-acre farm, in the area called Esing'ai, on the north-eastern border of Simanjiro village has been leased to an expatriate farmer by the former village chairman. People in Loibor Serrit resent this arrangement. They claim that the village chairman abused his office by leasing the farm.

The farm, though relatively small, is at a higher elevation than the rest of the village, and therefore generally receives the earliest rains. In the past, herders would take their animals up to Esing'ai at the first rain, which might be a month earlier than lower elevations. Herders would keep their animals there until the seasonal water sources finally dried up. The majority of these water sources are enclosed by the farm.

Another problem is that the farm is the mid-point between Loibor Serrit, Narakawa, Sukuro and Emboret villages, all of which once used Esing'ai for wet season pasture. The farm also occupies a pass between two mountains. This means that livestock from the south no longer have easy access to other important areas, including the Simanjiro plains, the Sukuro dam, and the Eulenye Nanyuki dam. They now have to go around the mountains through tsetse-infested scrub.

Women in Loibor Serrit also complain of loss of access to natural resources which they used to harvest in Esing'ai. The place was traditionally an important area for cutting branches for the construction of houses and the thorn fences that surround family *bomas*; for wood to sterilise milk calabashes; and for traditional medicines. The women complain that when they are at their wet season *bomas* it is increasingly difficult to obtain firewood and drinking water for daily use.

[14] Since the CITES ban on ivory trade the elephant populations of Tarangire have increased. It will be interesting to see if there is also a corresponding decrease in local tsetse populations in the near future. Ironically, because of the growing importance of farming in the area, local Maasai are now less happy to see elephants than perhaps they once were.

[15] This programme involved the wholesale clearance of trees and bush by local people, an extremely labour intensive process. Labour in tsetse eradication schemes was required as part of the payment of local head and hut taxes. However, non-Maasai informants in various parts of the district complained that the Maasai actually did very little of this work, which they disdained. Instead they made their payment in livestock, which went to feed the work crews (cf. Hodgson, 1995).

Local people claim that the farms at Esing'ai has exacerbated the general land shortage in Loibor Serrit. They argue that if anyone is allowed to farm Esing'ai it should be them. Local elders claim that Esing'ai could easily provide farms for the next two generations of Maasai in the area.

iv) Mining

Kangala is a large mining settlement, of approximately 1,000 people in the south-west corner of Loibor Serrit village. It started as a small charcoal camp in 1988. In 1991, charcoal burning came to an abrupt halt when the area was found to be rich in rubies and rodalite.

The camp has since become a permanent settlement with shops, a pharmacy, and daily transport to Arusha. The settlement has attracted registered companies and individual prospectors from as far away as Kenya, Burundi and Zaire. The mines have now spread east to the boundary with Narakawa, south for several kilometres, and west to within 2 km of Loibor Serrit's trading centre.

Residents of Loibor Serrit claimed that Kangala and its associated mining activities have caused a number of problems in their day-to-day lives (Box 3, page 28). They were generally displeased with the types of people attracted to the community, many of whom are transients and some are criminals. They complained that the settlement is rife with social problems, including alcoholism, drug abuse and prostitution, which were now spreading to the village proper.

They were also concerned about the environmental changes caused by activities in Kangala. They allege that charcoal burning that took place between 1988 and 1991 destroyed most of the mature hardwood trees in the south-west part of the village. Use of hardwoods for firewood, fences and houses is an important aspect of the Maasai economy. Seed pods from mature *Acacia* (*oltepesi*) are important dry season fodder for goats. More recently, mining activities have affected peasant agriculture in Loibor Serrit. Pit mines have made it difficult to plough with tractors or with oxen. Moreover, miners following a vein have been known to continue right into people's farms.

Finally, the mining settlement has had an adverse impact on the economy of Simanjiro as a whole. Consumer goods have to be brought in from distant places at inflated prices. There is a sizeable minority of miners who can and do pay top prices for such goods. The result is that the prices of most consumer goods, including staples such as maize and beans have gone up substantially in Loibor Serrit.

Box 3: Examples of a *kitongoji* leader defending people's land rights

A common feature of resource management in Simanjiro District was that in the face of alienation of land by the Village Council, *kitongoji* leaders often acted as more trustworthy guardians of resources. One *kitongoji* of Loibor Serrit village consists of a cluster of three *bomas* in the south east part of the village near the Kangala mining settlement. Several households in this *kitongoji* moved to Kondoa during the drought of 1993-4. One *murrani* approached the *kitongoji* chairman before he left, indicating that he intended to return and that his farm should not be given away in his absence.

In 1995 the village allocated a 10-acre plot of land to the Pentecostal church on the western edge of the *kitongoji*. In early 1996 a young boy taking livestock to the Loibor Serrit river was beaten by workers of the church for allowing livestock to wander onto the church farm. When the chairman enquired into this incident he discovered that the church building and farm had blocked access to the river and taken up land of the farm of the *murrani* who had gone to Kondoa. When the chairman offered to provide them with a similar amount of land some 200 m away, the church leaders said that they had been given the land by the Village Council, that they had a title and had no intention of moving. An appeal to the Village Council brought the reply that the lease had already been granted, that the *murrani* who went to Kondoa had automatically forfeited his farm by leaving the village, and that the livestock of the *kitongoji* would have to go round the farm to get to the river, even though this meant sending them into tsetse-infested bushland. Residents of this *kitongoji* resent the decision of the Village Council and the inflexibility of the church and intend to take the matter to the District level. Similar conflicts - all involving the appropriation of small-scale farms by the Pentecostal Church - have also occurred in Namalulu and Orkesumet villages.

Responses of pastoralists

Because of the constraints on herding outlined above, few residents of Loibor Serrit currently keep their livestock in the village. Those with large herds keep only a small herd of immature and lactating cattle in their *bomas* together with some smallstock. They keep the bulk of their herds outside in the villages of Emboret, Sukuro, and Kimatoro.

In the wet season, animals kept in the village are generally grazed on the hill slopes near Esing'ai where pasture and water are limited because of the farm. During the dry season they are brought back to the Loibor Serrit river, and grazed on farm stubble and on designated pastures on the east side of the village.

A number of Maasai living in Loibor Serrit have sent their livestock with kinsmen or stock associates to south in Kimatoro, often accompanied by *murran* to assist in herding the combined livestock of the two *bomas*. In exchange, the Kimatoro herders are given farms in Loibor Serrit. Aside from having land gazetted for agriculture, Loibor Serrit offers a number of advantages to these Kimatoro Maasai. First, agriculture is long-established in Loibor Serrit; Maasai in this village have accumulated a great deal of useful knowledge about hybrid seeds, animal-drawn ploughs, the best times to plant and insecticides, which most Maasai in Kimatoro lack. In addition, the fact that agriculture is well established means that tractors for rent and seasonal itinerant labour are readily available in the village. Maasai from Kimatoro can, therefore, leave their farms in the hands of their kinsmen or stock associates in Loibor Serrit, visiting periodically to monitor the progress of their crops. The bulk of their energy can therefore still be given over to livestock management (Box 4, page 29).

Naberera village

Geography and origins

Naberera is a registered and titled village in central Simanjiro District, about a third of the way from Arusha to Kibaya on the main highway. The 1988 census reported a population of 3,830 (Muir, 1994). This figure has probably grown since then, due to a large charcoal burning settlement on the northern border of the village. Its strategic location makes Naberera more accessible to urban areas than the majority of villages in Simanjiro.

Box 4: Agriculture and changing attitudes to cattle

When Alan Jacobs did his research in Simanjiro in the 1950s, agriculture was uncommon among resident Maasai (Jacobs 1965). The situation has now changed. In the late 1980s, animal traction was imported to Loibor Serrit from Loswaki. Several influential elders began by using donkeys to pull the ploughs, but they soon discovered that these animals were not disposed to such activity. It was not long, therefore, before animal traction ploughs in Loibor Serrit were pulled exclusively by oxen. At the time of my survey respondents in eleven *bomas* indicated that they had animals-drawn ploughs, and in several others indicated that they intended to purchase them.

I asked about the cultural implications of animal traction ploughs pointing out that in Maasai culture the cow is a revered animal and that the Maasai were understood to view agriculture as a demeaning activity. How did they resolve a situation where the most revered animal in the Maasai culture is required to undertake one of the most demeaning activities? They replied that this had originally been a problem, but that they had come to value agriculture more as they discovered that it saved them from having to sell off their livestock. They eventually realised that their plough oxen were no different from a lactating cow - the cow feeds them by giving them milk and the ox feeds them by giving them maize. They came to view their plough oxen as special animals, the stubble in the fields was often reserved for them so that they could regain their strength to plough again the following season. Some informants even went so far as to say that if their plough oxen died, they would not eat the meat. Most informants, however, said that they could imagine situations where they would slaughter plough oxen themselves

The earliest information about Naberera goes back to the *Iloikop* wars of the nineteenth century, when the Maasai were advancing into the Simanjiro plains from the north and west. The wells in Naberera, Namalulu, and Orkesumet were a strategic objective of these invasions; whichever group controlled the wells controlled the surrounding plains and their abundant pastures. The Maasai were ultimately victorious, and drove out the native Parakuyo pastoralists who fled east to Same and Lushoto and south to Handeni and Morogoro Districts (Hurskainen, 1984).

Naberera became a staging point in the southward invasion for several years (Ndelelya, pers. Comm.). The area had two features which made it an attractive resting place for the advancing Maasai. First the wells provided permanent dry season water; second the surrounding mountains and rock outcrops, which received more rain than the plains, acted as wet season dispersal areas replete with mineral-rich pasture and seasonal water sources.

Constraints on pastoralism

Conditions for pastoralism in Naberera have deteriorated since the mid-1980s and the advent of economic liberalisation. Problems faced by pastoralists in Naberera include (Map 6, appendix):

i) Large farms

Because of its natural features and strategic position, Naberera became an attractive location for large-scale commercial agriculture. The first of these was Royal Sluis, a Dutch based seed company, which was given a 7,000-acre lease in the Rotiana area of the village by former president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, in 1985. In the years that followed, over 20 expatriate and Tanzanian entrepreneurs rapidly followed suit. The result is that the bulk of Naberera's wet season dispersal areas and seasonal water sources are now given over to mechanised large-scale agriculture.

The farm owned by the Royal Sluis company grows maize and seed beans for export to the Netherlands and other European countries. It appears to have expanded its land holdings in Naberera since 1985; some estimate them at 27,000 hectares. Whatever the precise figure, they appear to be substantially larger than the original 7,000-acre title.

Another area to experience considerable loss of land was Okutu. Farms here were established shortly after Royal Sluis arrived. Like other parts of the village affected by alienation, Okutu was an important wet season grazing area and drought reserve. It has over twenty seasonal water sources, twelve of which have been closed off by the farms. The impact of the Okutu farms has not been felt in Naberera alone. Herders in western Sukuro regularly moved their livestock to Okutu during the wet season. The area was also reported to be frequented by herders from Komolo.

Okutu is the area that local herders seemed most bitter about losing. They are currently in the process of trying to regain control of it. Alienation of the Okutu farms is currently being challenged by the Naberera Village Assembly in the Tanzanian Courts.

Finally, the last major wet season grazing area in Naberera to be taken over by large-scale farms was at Ngoisuk. All the farms here were gazetted within a year. Herders in the area were surprised, because it happened so quickly. Village leaders seemed addicted to selling off village land (Box 5). Local people claimed that the farms in Ngoisuk have no official boundaries and expand at will. They cannot even be sure what resources will remain available to them on a year to year basis.

Box 5: *Kitongoji* leaders defend land rights

This incident took place in a *kitongoj*i on the eastern edge of Katikati village on the border with Naberera. In this case the Village council granted a 1,000 acre lease to a wealthy Arusha farmer from a village in northern Simanjiro. When he arrived with members of the Village Council to mark the boundaries of the farm, he was challenged by the *kitongoji* chairman, and left without giving an adequate explanation. The next day the *kitongoji* chairman went to the village office to learn the details of what was going on. He subsequently called a meeting and then returned to the village office with several influential elders who informed the village chairman that they were unwilling to surrender 1,000 acres of their land, and that if the chairman wanted to give away land it should be from his *kitongoji*. As a result, the lease was withdrawn. *Kitongoji* residents who attended the meeting explained that it was unfair for village leaders to issue leases in areas of the village that did not directly affect them, and that such matters should be under the authority of the *kitongoji* concerned.

ii) Charcoal burning

As in Loibor Serrit, herders in Naberera are concerned about the impact of charcoal production. Naberera is among the villages in Simanjiro which are most affected by charcoal burning for the markets in Arusha and Moshi towns. Its position on the Arusha-Kibaya highway made it attractive to charcoal burners moving south from areas near Arusha which has largely been denuded of suitable trees (Peterson *et al.* 1995).

Charcoal burning in Naberera has resulted in the growth of a large settlement and trading centre on the north side of the village, called Ndovu. As hardwoods in northern Naberera become depleted, people in Ndovu are increasingly resorting to small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods. Small-scale farms at Ndovu are adjacent to the large-scale farms at Okutu. All of these farms together have made a tremendous impact on local herding movements, which have traditionally depended on the area as wet season dispersal areas.

Ndovu village has already been registered and its leaders are now trying to obtain a village title (see footnote 4). The Naberera Village Council, and much of the population, are strongly opposed to this. For if Ndovu obtains a title, Naberera would lose a large proportion of its agricultural land and wet season dispersal areas.

iii) Competition for permanent water sources

Wells in Naberera are located about 1½ km south-east of the village centre; each belongs to a particular individual or clan. As the wells are deep and narrow, only about six head of cattle or a dozen head of smallstock can be watered at one time. They therefore require large holding areas where stock wait to be watered. Loss of seasonal water sources has meant increased dependence on grazing near to the wells, and more animals are in the holding areas more often. Livestock are now watered at the Naberera wells from June or July to February, rather than from October to February.

The large-scale farms are also dependent on the aquifer for all their water needs. Royal Sluis uses generator-powered pumps to draw up to 40,000 litres a day. This is substantially more than herders can draw with buckets. Additional strains come from Ndovu villagers who are reliant on the wells and carry water from the wells every day by bicycle and on charcoal lorries. The increasing demands appear to be putting a strain on the aquifer. In the past five years, several of the wells on the northern part of the aquifer have run dry. Others are being constructed to replace them and the large-scale farms require more water also. Villagers feel resentment that those who occupy their land may well be over-using the aquifer.

Responses of pastoralists

These recent developments in Naberera have been made at the expense of the local herders. Prior to the land alienations, the Maasai of Naberera followed a system of transhumant pastoralism. This depended on the availability of a permanent water source and well watered wet season dispersal areas. During the dry season, the herders lived in permanent *bomas* within the relative proximity to the Naberera wells. At the first rains, they dispersed to wet season grazing areas in Ngoisuk/Lengai and Ngasai in neighbouring Landenai, Rotiana, and Okutu/Ndovu villages.

Since the land alienations and the incursion of extensive charcoal burning, pastoralists have lost wet season dispersal areas and flexibility of movement. They have had to develop new strategies to compensate for this devastating loss of access to natural resources. These strategies

include engaging in small-scale agriculture, moving closer to wells, and seeking employment or taking up business opportunities on the large farms or in charcoal burning settlements.

In the course of my survey it soon became apparent that relatively few people were moving away from the area, even during the drought. The main reason respondents gave for this was that they were familiar with conditions in Naberera and could plan their food procurement strategies accordingly.

Instead of moving beyond the village the people of Naberera appear to be moving within it. This type of movements are made for the following reasons:

- to be closer to the Naberera wells;
- to have access to farm land;
- to have improved access to pasture; and
- to engage in income generating activities.

Those who have moved closer to the wells are generally herders who had previously lived in or near wet season dispersal areas that were now restricted by large farms and the presence of subsistence agriculture.

This internal migration represents a total restructuring of previous livelihood strategies. Some strategies are more attractive than others and options were generally based on relative livestock wealth. In all cases, however, a great deal of the former flexibility was lost, and the resilience of these recently developed strategies to periods of high-stress (eg. droughts, livestock disease, etc.) has yet to be tested.

Legal action (Box 6, page 33)

Naberera herders are bitter about the loss of access to natural resources. Many of them also feel helpless to do anything about it. They blame national, regional, district, and village leaders for 'selling' their land from under them. They also blame themselves for not recognising what was happening until it was too late. Now they are seeking the eviction of the large-scale farmers in the Arusha High Court. In a similar case, judgement was given in favour of the villagers of Orkesumet, but has yet to be enforced.

Box 6: Court action against land losses

In 1995 a group of concerned citizens of Orkesumet village took their Council to court after it sub-leased 130,480 hectares of land to large-scale farmers. The plaintiffs argued that such an allocation should be approved first by the Village Assembly (a meeting of all adults in the village). The judge concurred with this view. The Village Assembly cancelled the allocations.

It is important to note that this judgment does not set a precedent. The case was not contested properly by the defendants and the court issued a consent settlement order agreeing that the Village Assembly should be consulted about the allocations. It is important to note that although the Orkesumet Village Assembly overturned the allocation of village land to outsiders by the Village Council, no execution order has ever been handed down by a Tanzanian court. Three years later, the landscape of Orkesumet remains essentially the same. The outsider's who were officially evicted from the village continue to farm there illegally.

On 20 February 1996, residents of Naberera went to court over land allocations made by their Village Council, which they claim has no right to alienate land from them. They further listed 12 farmers whose land allocations they regard as illegal. These farmers do not include those discussed in the text above. They ask that these farmers' titles be declared null and void and they be deemed trespassing on the land. Judgment in this case, which could set the precedent by-passed in the consent agreement at Orkesumet, is awaited

Sukuro village

Geography and origins

Sukuro village lies on the southern margins of the Simanjiro plains, about 40 km north-east of Loibor Serrit and about 50 km north-west of Naberera villages. It differs substantially from these villages in that it has no large-scale settlements outside the village centre and very few economic activities apart from livestock herding and small-scale agriculture.

While the populations of Loibor Serrit and Naberera are now more than 50% non-Maasai, that of Sukuro is approximately 90% agro-pastoral Maasai (estimates based on 1988 census data reported in Muir 1994 and current fieldwork). Most of the Maasai herders in Sukuro practise agriculture, but not on the same scale as those in Loibor Serrit and Naberera; they remain much more dependent on their livestock than herders in other parts of the survey area.

Sukuro is part of the larger transhumant pastoral system, found throughout the Simanjiro plains. Its main drought reserve pasture was the Silalo swamp (now inside Tarangire National Park). Permanent dry season water sources included the Tarangire river (also inside the park), the Loibor Serrit river, and the Laivera wells. Wet season dispersal areas included Makame, Laivera, Mbolio, Okutu, Rotiana, Esing'ai, and numerous seasonal water sources scattered throughout the plains, including areas now enclosed inside Tarangire.

The establishment of dams in the 1950s at Sukuro, Narakawa, and Emboret had significant impacts on the transhumant systems of the plains. The dams are reliable; Sukuro dam has only gone dry in one year (1994) since its construction. All three are in close proximity to the village centres of Sukuro, Narakawa, and Emboret. Their construction enabled the resident herders to live in more concentrated clusters than hitherto.

Constraints to Pastoralism

i) Land alienation in neighbouring villages

Although there is no large-scale land alienation within the boundaries of the village itself, Sukuro has been profoundly affected by land alienation in neighbouring villages (see Map 7, appendix). Since 1988, Sukuro herders have seen almost all their wet season dispersal areas appropriated by farms beyond the boundaries of the village itself. As one elder described the situation: *"The European farms surrounding Sukuro are like teeth surrounding a tongue."*

Maasai using the Sukuro dam as their permanent dry season water source listed their wet season dispersal areas as: Okutu (Naberera), Laivera (Narakawa), Mbolio (Sukuro), and Esign'ai (Loibor Serrit). Notably, only one of these is within the boundaries of Sukuro village and it is the smallest of the four. Perhaps more importantly, all of them have been enclosed within large-scale farms in the past ten years. This land loss places unprecedented pressures on the grazing systems of the Sukuro Maasai, who have found their wet season dispersal areas eliminated from their migration.

Since knowledge of grazing areas is based on generations of accumulated information, the loss of these resources represents the loss of the very basis on which Maasai elders make herd management decisions. This was concisely stated by one informant when he said; *"I no longer know how to answer my* murrani *when they ask me where we should move the cattle this wet season."*

What this illustrates is that in arid and semi-arid areas land alienation within villages will affect resource users residing outside the village boundaries. The primary problem facing pastoralists in Simanjiro District is the imposition of boundaries on a system of resource use that depends on flexibility of movement.

The territory across which people have links and negotiable rights of access is extremely large. In the wet-season when resources are plentiful more areas are accessible to more people, fewer controls are in operation and the resultant movement can be considerable. The widespread access that can be negotiated between herders means that there are relatively few boundaries restricting movement. Indeed respondents stated time and again; *"Our cows know no boundaries."* Boundaries to villages, districts, regions, national parks, as well as large and small-scale farms, have been imposed upon the traditional herding systems in Simanjiro which have reduced flexibility for pastoral resource use generally.

ii) Wildebeest culling

Sukuro is not directly affected by large-scale agriculture, nor is it directly on the border with Tarangire National Park, but its location on the Simanjiro plains exposes it to the spectacular wet season wildebeest migration. The presence of wildebeeste causes problems for cattle herders because the animals spread malignant catarrhal fever (MCF) (Homewood and Rodgers, 1991), which is fatal to cattle. MCF is spread by wildebeest calves and herders avoid wildebeest during the rainy season when they are calving. The migration also makes the place attractive for commercial hunting. This is of two types: private tourist trophy hunting (see Box 7, page 35) and the activities of the Tanzania Wildlife Corporation (TAWICO), which are more extensive.

TAWICO is a parastatal organisation with a mandate to control wildlife populations in Tanzania. On the Simanjiro plains, its main activity is culling zebra and wildebeest during the wet season when they disperse from the Tarangire National Park onto the plain.

Villagers complain about the impact of TAWICO's hunting techniques on wildebeest migration patterns. They claim that since TAWICO has begun culling wildebeest herds in Sukuro (and other neighbouring villages), the incidence of MCF has increased dramatically. Informants claim that the increase is directly related to TAWICO's activities in the area as they break up and disperse wildebeest herds so that it is harder to avoid specific calving areas.

Box 7: Trophy hunting in Sukuro: a case study in conflict over natural resources

Sukuro village makes up the major part of the hunting block of a local hunting company. Although this company hunts in other villages, its main camp is in Sukuro. The company has a policy of revenue sharing with host villages. Rather than giving the money directly to the village government, however, it assists the village in various construction projects and in obtaining materials for development activities.

Sukuro is a large village and some settlements are as far as 50 km from the village centre. It is impossible for women from these settlements to walk the distance necessary to use the village grinding mill. The company owners recognised the problem and proposed the construction of a second grinding mill in the south-west part of the village. At a village meeting to determine the location of the mill, a great deal of conflict ensued. The chairman of the *kitongoji* adjacent to the hunters' camp argued that the mill should be constructed in this area because it was close to the geographic centre of the village. He also asserted that the people of his *kitongoji* were the company's neighbours and should therefore be given consideration in this matter. The village chairman, on the other hand, felt that the mill should be built on his *kitongoji*, although he gave no specific reason for this. Both individuals lobbied the company to build the mill at their respective locations.

A third group argued that the mill should be constructed at neither of these locations, since they were both relatively close to the village centre, but near the landing strip of the flying doctor's clinic, which would make it accessible to all the settlements that were beyond walking distance to the village centre. Unfortunately, none of the individuals from this group had any direct dealings with the company. The location of the mill became a political contest between the hunters' neighbours and the village chairman. In the end the company owners succumbed to the wishes of the village chairman, as he was their most important contact in the village. Not only was the mill constructed in the chairman's *kitongoji*, it was literally appended to his boma only 7 km from the village centre, and still more than 40 km from the settlements in the south-west of the village.

The problem in Sukuro is compounded by the loss to large scale farms of traditional wildebeest refuge areas. Laivera, Mbolio and Esing'ai were places herds were traditionally moved to during the wet season so as to avoid calving wildebeest as these wooded areas were avoided by wildebeest which prefer to calve in open areas.

Responses of pastoralists

Drought survival strategies have changed. During the drought of 1960/61, most respondents in Sukuro indicated that they took their livestock to the Silalo swamp. Another destination was Lokii which was favoured because of the availability of cheap maize, the absence of tsetse flies, and the presence of irrigation ditches to water livestock. People who went to Lokii also indicated that they had relatives there.

The impact of land alienation was profoundly felt by herders in Sukuro during the 1993/4 drought. They were unable to go to the Silalo swamp because it was in Tarangire National Park, or to any of the places mentioned because of large-scale farms. Since the drought people in Sukuro have taken farming much more seriously. They see agriculture as their only means of recovering their herds, and the only way that they can hope to survive future droughts as they have nowhere left to take their livestock.

The ability to farm larger plots has been facilitated by individuals who have moved in from Loibor Serrit and Loswaki bringing tractors with them. However, most farms are between 3 and 10 acres, and mostly located directly adjacent to their *homas*. There are however no areas given over exclusively to small-scale farming as in Loibor Serrit or Naberera, and large areas of the village are still available to herding. Sukuro is larger than Loibor Serrit and it has not experienced the same large-scale alienation of land as Naberera.

Loibor Soit (Moipo)

Geography and origins

Loibor Soit (Moipo) is one of two villages registered with this name in the District of Simanjiro. The village was registered and titled in 1988. A survey of the village undertaken by PANET (Pastoralist Network of Tanzania) gives the population of the village as 1,940 (Lendiye, 1993). Administratively, Loibor Soit is part of Moipo division, which includes all the villages which lie along the Ruvu/Pangani river and Nyumba ya Mungu dam. The river itself divides Arusha and Kilimanjaro Regions (Simanjiro and Same Districts).

Maasai in Simanjiro District distinguish between the Moipo area and the Simanjiro plateau. Moipo and Simanjiro are two distinct traditional locations, each with its own leadership (*laigwanak*). In the past, leaders from these two locations met to discuss matters of regional importance.[16]

Ecological conditions in Moipo are quite different from those of the Simanjiro plain. Villages in Moipo generally receive about 200 mm less rain than those in Simanjiro. The area is typified by light sandy soils, which are less productive than the soils of the plains (Muir, 1994).

Unlike the other villages in the case study, Loibor Soit has been ethnically mixed for most of this century. Some Maasai and non-Maasai residents have been in the area since the early

[16] When a herder in Moipo speaks of Simanjiro he is generally referring to the Simanjiro plain and not the entire district.

1930s. They said that when they came to Moipo there were already people in the area, but that it was very sparsely populated. In the early part of the century, Moipo was inhabited by Zigua people who had come to fish on the Ruvu river. Maasai used the area for dry season grazing but they did not then settle permanently by the river.

In the 1930s and 40s, more Maasai began to settle by the river and to build permanent *bomas* there. The fish in the river also began to attract an increasing number of non-Maasai people. These people, who are now known in Moipo as "Swahili", were ethnically mixed and not originally from the area. Almost all of the Swahili in Moipo are (or are descendants) from south-western Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia. These people originally came to Tanga Region to work on sisal plantations in the 1920s-30s. When their contracts ended they began fishing on the river instead of returning to their countries of origin.[17]

As the population of non-Maasai continued to grow in Moipo, colonial administrators began looking for a way to administer them. In 1942, the Swahili were assigned their own chief, who would work with the Maasai chief to administer the area. This chief arranged for all of the Swahili to live in settlements which corresponded to their areas of origin. Each household in these settlements was also given a farm on the bank of the river.

There were settlements for Nyamwezi, Nyamwanga, Goni, and Wemba peoples among others. A newcomer to Moipo would, therefore, be assigned to the settlement that corresponded with his/her ethnic affiliation. The existence of these settlements attracted increasing numbers of people to Moipo throughout the 1940s-50s.

Pastoralism in Moipo depends on the Ruvu river as a source of permanent dry season water and pasture. A key feature of dry season grazing was the annual floods in the Ruvu valley. These floods fulfilled two functions; they replenished and watered the soils of the flood plain and they greatly reduced the tick population. Resident pastoralists claim that these floods 'wash' the grass of their diseases.

During the wet season, herders in Loibor Soit moved their livestock to higher ground with seasonal water, which is known as *Alalilae*. Herders on the west side of the river moved their livestock to *Alalilae Nondoto* on the Simanjiro and Kitwai plains. This pattern was observed by officials in the early 1950s.[18] Herders on the east side of the river (in Kilimanjaro Region) moved their livestock to *Alalilae Mwanzoni*, which is now inside the Mkomazi Game Reserve.

Constraints to local production systems

i) <u>The Nyumba ya Mungu Dam</u>

In the late 1960s the construction of the Nyumba ya Mungu dam reduced the extent and frequency of the Ruvu river floods. The result was that the quality of the dry season pastures decreased, and the tick load and incidence of tick borne disease increased. Herders on both sides of the river have moved away in response to these problems.

Fishermen believe that the floods were also crucial to fishing activities in the area. They explain that fish laid their eggs on the flood plains and the eggs hatched before the water receded. Respondents said that as flooding was disrupted by the construction of the dam, fish

[17] In 1948 a stock inspector reported that "almost every tribe in the East African territories, the Belgian Congo and Mozambique" was represented along the river (TNA File 723/II, December 1948).
[18] Tanzania National Archive [TNA] File 11/5 vol. III 19/11/1953.

populations declined. Many of the Swahili moved away to fish above the dam. Maasai women complain that this resulted in a collapse of the local milk market, which was their primary source of cash income.

ii) Operation Vijiji

Unlike the other areas of Simanjiro, Moipo was profoundly affected by Operation Vijiji in the mid-1970s. The main thrust of the operation in this area was to separate the Maasai and the Swahili. The Swahili in Loibor Soit were moved to the neighbouring village of Ngage, where they were promised farms on newly constructed irrigation channels. The Maasai were told to settle in Loibor Soit and to herd their livestock near the river on a year round basis. Many Maasai left the village to avoid settlement. In the mid- to late-1970s, Loibor Soit was essentially depopulated, although people began returning in 1976.

iii) Evictions from the Mkomazi Game Reserve

Evictions from Mkomazi meant that herders on the east side of the river could no longer take their livestock there during the wet season. Consequently, these herders have begun crossing the river during the wet season and taking their livestock to *Alalilae Nondoto*. Herders in Loibor Soit complain that this increases pressure on their wet season pastures. This is compounded by the farms in central Simanjiro (especially Naberera, Namalulu and Landanai) which limit how far west livestock from the Ruvu valley can range during the wet season. Additionally, *Alalilae Mwanzoni* held important drought reserve resources for the herders of Moipo.

Responses of pastoralists

The increased tick load increases the incidence of *ndigana* and brings greater costs to herding in the Ruvu valley.[19] Those who are able to stay are generally the wealthier herders. Their strategy is to intentionally expose their calves to the disease every year, as this will result in natural immunity (cf. Waller and Homewood, 1997). Calves which are exposed to *ndigana* have about a 60-70% survival rate. The future benefit of adult animals having access to permanent water compensates for the high calf mortality rate.

This strategy is not an option for poorer herders who cannot afford to lose 30-40% of their calves every year. Many of these herders remain within the village, but move above the escarpment to *Alalilae Nondoto*. They are able to keep small herds in this area all year round because of access to wells.

Pastoralists in Loibor Soit have also experienced a restriction to their movements and their access to drought reserve pasture has dwindled. In the droughts of 1947-48, 1960-61, and the early 70s, herders from Loibor Soit took their animals to the Simanjiro plain and the Silalo swamp, Kisiwani, the Mkomazi Game Reserve and Handeni. By the time of the drought of 1993-94, these areas were no longer viable destinations. The Simanjiro plains had become crowded with commercial and peasant agriculture, and the Silalo swamp had become part of Tarangire National Park. Drought reserves inside Mkomazi have been off limits since the evictions of 1988, which has resulted in over-crowding in Kisiwani.

Some herders no longer send their livestock outside the Ruvu valley in search of drought reserve pasture. During the drought of 1993-94, my respondents indicated that they remained in the area. During my research in Loibor Soit, at the time of the extended dry season of early

[19] *Ndigana* is a generic term that covers *Anaplasmosis* and East Coast Fever.

1997, I observed that large herds were being driven up or down the river in search of areas that may have had some residual pasture.

Concentrations of herds along the river during the wet season has led to conflict with the Swahili who keep farms on the banks of the river. Herders were desperate for pasture and therefore grazed their animals inside farms. The herders maintained that their livestock only ate the grasses which were standing in the fallow parts of the farm. The farmers, however, argued that their farms were being destroyed by livestock and hungry herd boys.

The impacts of conservation activities in the Simanjiro Conservation Area - Jim Igoe

Community conservation initiatives in Simanjiro are focused on villages that border Tarangire National Park.[20] The central goal of these projects is to conserve the wider Tarangire ecosystem and wildlife outside the Park.

In all, villagers in Simanjiro district have suffered considerable resource loss, particularly in recent years. This loss of control over resources, and changed land use patterns is in itself a serious problem to conservationists who want pastoralism to predominate next to the Park. However, there are a number of constraints that could limit the effectiveness of Community Conservation projects. Communities in Simanjiro are generally suspicious of the rhetoric and philosophy of conservationists for several reasons.

Tarangire National Park is run by TANAPA. It has taken initiatives to promote good relations between all national parks and their neighbours through a Community Conservation Service. The Service was initiated in 1993 when TANAPA began planning its programme of '*Ujiriani Mwema*' (Good Neighbourliness) (Hartley, 1996).

In 1994, the Community Conservation Service became the official mechanism through which TANAPA communicates and channels tangible benefits to neighbouring communities around its national parks (TANAPA, 1994). TANAPA has put one Community Conservation Service warden in every national park in the country. It is their job to interact with local communities. One of the means they use to encourage 'good neighbourliness' is by funding community projects. The Tarangire Community Conservation Service has been operating in Simanjiro since 1993, and has already initiated Support for Community Initiated Projects (SCIP) in several villages, including the installation of hand water pumps in Loibor Serrit, and helping with the construction of schools and teachers' houses in Emboret and Narakawa.

In 1996 TANAPA commissioned an evaluation of its Community Conservation Service pilot projects in Loliondo and Simanjiro (Kipuri and Nangoro, 1996). The findings of its report confirm the findings recorded here; both reports were separately researched but written at approximately the same time. Both conclude that community conservation in Simanjiro currently faces formidable historical and political challenges. Addressing and working actively to overcome these challenges is a necessary prerequisite to the implementation of effective community conservation in Simanjiro as elsewhere.

[20] Villages that have been targeted for community conservation are: Kimatoro, Loibor Sirret, Emboret, Loibor Soit, Narakawa and Sukuro. Loikisale, in neighbouring Monduli district, has also been part of these initiatives. Community conservation around Tarangire includes a wide variety of projects. TANAPA's Community Conservation Service has targeted some villages for development projects. Private initiatives such as Dorobo Tours and Oliver's Camp have attempted to bring tourist revenues to some villages. *Inyuat-e-Maa*, a Maasai NGO, plans to develop a community conservation programme in the area.

The most general challenge to Community Conservation Service success in Simanjiro is the antagonistic relationship between TANAPA rangers and the surrounding communities since gazettement in 1970. Informants in Loibor Serrit portrayed rangers as an exploitative paramilitary force who harass them and deny them access to natural resources. The problems of this relationship have been exacerbated by the ambiguity concerning the Park's eastern boundary. Herders report being arrested, threatened, tied up, beaten and having their animals confiscated. Fines for trespassing and for retrieving confiscated livestock run into several hundred thousand shillings (c.f. Kipuri and Nangoro, 1996).

Informants do not see the park bringing public benefit but rather imposing considerable personal cost. They have to pay bribes to rangers of between £300 and £600 in local currency just to be allowed to graze their livestock in the Park. Their perception is that grazing resources, which they view as part of their traditional pastoral regime, have been confiscated from them so that they can be charged for access to them (c.f. Kipuri and Nangoro, 1996).

Pastoralists in Simanjiro also complain that they have borne the brunt of the cost of Tarangire. They argue that it is unfair that they should have to pay for protected areas so that rich Westerners can visit them to look at animals. They are aware that the tourist industry has benefited a wealthy élite while bringing few benefits to the people who have been most directly affected by the alienation of large areas for conservation by the Tanzanian State.

Animosities turned to anxiety in 1989, when a group of Tanzanian and expatriate conservationists attempted to establish a conservation area on the Simanjiro plain along the lines of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. The primary objective was to protect wildlife migration routes near the Tarangire river and on wet season dispersal areas on the plains.

The proposed Simanjiro Conservation Area (SCA) is similar to suggestions made in an article by Marcus Borner, Director of Frankfurt Zoological Society in Tanzania (Borner, 1982). This article was later published in Oryx under the title "The increasing isolation of Tarangire National Park". It concerned the nature of the Tarangire/Simanjiro ecosystem and the current threats to its continued ability to support its resident wildlife and livestock populations.

Borner's general argument is that Maasai pastoral systems in Simanjiro are largely compatible with wildlife conservation and the preservation of the Tarangire/Simanjiro migration routes. He recommends "a dual use [of the Simanjiro plains] by Maasai pastoralists and wildlife" (Borner, 1985). He continues:

> *"Large-scale mechanised agriculture and fenced-in cattle ranches are not compatible with dual pastoralist/wildlife land-use and could contribute to the desertification of the area."* (*ibid*: 95)

The bulk of his recommendations concern the eastern wildlife migration routes and the Maasai herders of the Simanjiro plains. He points out that the natural resource base available to herders has significantly shrunk, the main reason being the presence of large-scale farms on the north-eastern border of Tarangire National Park, which also threatens migration routes.[21]

[21] These farms are mainly found in Monduli district. The article pre-dates the subsequent expansion of large-scale farming into central Simanjiro district following economic liberalisation.

Borner asserts that the reduction of available pasture, combined with the cultural values of keeping large herds of livestock, has caused overgrazing and increased deterioration of wet season dispersal areas on the plains. However, his argument ignores the fact that the livestock population near Tarangire is not increasing and in some villages it has fallen significantly (see case studies in Chapter 4). There are now a substantial number of stockless, or almost stockless Maasai who are practising small-scale subsistence agriculture in villages bordering the Park.

Borner's recommendation is that a 6,000 km^2 Conservation Area be established in the area east of Tarangire, so as to ensure the continued existence of migration corridors between the Park and the Simanjiro plains. He further recommends that agriculture be prohibited in this area, and that resident herders be forced to reduce their herds. If these recommendations had been implemented, the ability of the Simanjiro Maasai to feed themselves would have been severely constrained.

The Simanjiro Conservation Area Proposal Document (SCAPD) contains all Borner's original recommendations, except that pastoralists should destock. It additionally recommends that people living within 10 km of the Park should be relocated.

The drafters of the proposal showed little concern for the livelihoods of those living in the proposed Conservation Area. The document contains no discussion of the potential impacts of the proposed restrictions and forced relocation on livelihood strategies of the herders in the area.

The only provision it makes for loss of food security is to state that villagers should receive *"token compensation for the land hitherto excluded from their various activities"* (SCAPD: 3). This compensation was to be in the form of a revenue-sharing programme in which 5% of the revenue accruing from conservation in the area would be paid *"directly to village governments for the creation of alternative occupations"* (*ibid*). The document does not mention what these occupations might be.

The proposed conservation area was probably never a real threat to the villages of Simanjiro or to the herders of the Simanjiro plains. However, it and schemes like it, reflect a persistent theme in government thinking about the district. The National Land Use Planning Commission proposed that a new Game Reserve of 3,822 km^2 be gazetted on the Simanjiro and Sanya plains (1993), although this plan now appears to have been abandoned.

SCAPD has contributed significantly to the poor relations that still exist between TANAPA and the Simanjiro herders. Herders certainly felt the threat to be real. They remember their eviction from the park itself, and they extrapolate from their relationship with the TANAPA authorities to imagining that these people can and will expand the Tarangire National Park at their expense. They know that the proposed Conservation Area would have entailed the eviction of pastoralists living within 10 km of the Park (i.e. parts of Kimatoro, Loibor Serrit, Emboret, and Loibor Soit), as well as them facing a total prohibition of agriculture within the area. This has made them suspicious of everything TANAPA has subsequently done in the area (c.f. Kipuri and Nangoro, 1996).

The underlying distrust recently surfaced in response to a European Commission-funded project called the Tarangire Conservation Project. The project had a number of links with the Tarangire National Park that alarmed residents of Simanjiro. First, the rhetoric of the project

contained ideas similar to those that had motivated the SCA. Its Interim Report states that without such planning:

> *"more and more large mammal migration routes could be cut off by human activities, and Tarangire is in danger of becoming an isolated 'island Park' with only resident species surviving. This could cause not only the depauperation of the Maasai Steppe, but also the loss of a natural resource potentially important for the economic development of local communities."* - Tarangire Conservation Project, Interim Report 1996: 1.

The original project proposal stated that its rationale was based on the ideas in Borner's 1985 article. Educated Maasai, given copies of the Interim Report, found this alarming. It was easy for them to interpret the document as merely another way of achieving SCAPD goals of preserving wildlife migration routes at the expense of indigenous people.

Second, a component of the Project entailed mapping village resource-use using Geographical Information Systems equipment. The mapping itself was undertaken with the co-operation of Tarangire Community Conservation Service staff, and the mapping team was often accompanied by an armed Park Ranger. People seeing the project vehicle in Loibor Serrit became alarmed and began asking what was going on. Rumours began to circulate that the Project was actually preparing the way to expand the borders of Tarangire National Park.

The conflict and controversy surrounding the Project came to a head during three meetings in Sukuro between July and September 1996. They were partly swayed by the influence of *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei* which took a stance against the Project in order to increase its support amongst the local community. Nevertheless, the message reiterated constantly by the local community was that they did not trust the Community Conservation Service or the Project. This distrust is based on a perception that the project threatens their already shrinking natural resource base, a perception derived from individual and collective experiences of previous encounters with TANAPA and common knowledge of the thwarted plans for a Simanjiro Conservation Area. As one community spokesperson put it in the meeting: *"We are afraid and we have a right to be afraid".*

In the end, *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei* was able to capitalise on this distrust and stonewall the meetings, preventing the development of any meaningful understanding between the Project and the people of Sukuro. The outcome was that both the Community Conservation Service and the Project staff were asked not to return to Sukuro village. Terrat villagers later followed suit.

The Community Conservation Service and community leaders eventually reached an impasse throughout western Simanjiro. Influential individuals, such as the leaders of *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei*, saw the Community Conservation Service as more of the same and said that they have seen nothing to dispel their convictions. Village government officials in Loswaki, Terrat, and Sukuro were of the same opinion.

Community Conservation Service leaders in turn saw *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei* as a group of radicals who were gratuitously disrupting what they were trying to do and confusing the local communities. In fact, local communities were not confused. They were following the lead of a group of people who they believed were protecting their interests. The result is that no progress has been made towards community conservation or SCIP in any of these villages.

This situation is regrettable, since there is a great deal of overlap between the stated objectives of Community Conservation Service and those of Maasai NGOs in Simanjiro district.

The inability of the Community Conservation Service to work together with organisations like *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei* to achieve common goals is a major hindrance to community conservation in the area. As long as these organisations remain at odds, meaningful collaboration will not occur. A coalition between the Community Conservation Service, village leaders, local NGOs, influential elders and international donors would be an important first step in addressing resource losses that are detrimental both to pastoral resource-use and the maintenance of wildlife migration routes.

More recently there has been another development which has implications for community conservation in Simanjiro. The Department of Wildlife has drafted a policy allowing for the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in those areas with high wildlife population densities (Department of Wildlife, 1996). By establishing WMAs, individual communities will be able to manage their own wildlife resources for their own benefit. Although WMAs have yet to become law, the Department of Wildlife has already implemented some pilot WMAs, for example around Ruaha National Park, and has given the green light for additional ones.

The Department of Wildlife has worked with the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) in developing the idea of WMAs. The first step in this process was to inform community leaders from those villages that could potentially benefit from WMAs, through AWF-sponsored study tours. This phase appears to have been successful. Elders from Loibor Serrit who participated in a recent study tour were excited by what they saw. They returned to their village and told others about WMAs. Community enthusiasm is high, and representatives have gone to Arusha town to find out what they need to do to get a WMA for the village.

The establishment and administration of a WMA requires the type of coalition referred to above. AWF plans to work with another Maasai NGO called *Inyuat-e-Maa* in organising people for WMAs in Simanjiro (Bergin, pers. comm.). *Inyuat-e-Maa* is based in Arusha town, but has an affiliated grass roots organisation in parts of Simanjiro District. If it is able to establish a working relationship with community leaders in Loibor Serrit, this may result in a collaboration that enhances both rural livelihoods and wildlife populations.

However, animosity and suspicion stemming from decades of resource appropriation and its resultant impoverishment cannot be erased overnight. As Kipuri and Nangoro write:

> *"The local people saw Parks as encroachment on their prime dry season grazing, areas where special salt licks are located, and where permanent water sources are situated. ... In this sense, protected areas are viewed as threats to the optimum management of livestock and, therefore, they undermined the very essence of pastoral livelihoods."* (1996:44)

The types of projects currently undertaken by the Community Conservation Service, and potential WMAs can play an important role in the development of local communities, but they do not redress the fundamental issue of resource loss and human rights abuses that have been part and parcel of conservation methods at Tarangire National Park. Until these issues

are seriously addressed by the institutions/organisations carrying out community conservation in Simanjiro, current and future initiatives will continue to be met with resistance (or apathy) by large numbers of local people.

Impacts of conservation policy at Mkomazi Game Reserve - Dan Brockington

Research work around the Mkomazi Game Reserve began in July 1994. The main focus was a household survey (five return visits per household) of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists conducted between April 1995 to July 1996. This was based at two locations around the Reserve: Kisiwani and Mnga'ro. The survey comprised 52 households, mainly Parakuyo and Maasai, but included other ethnic groups. Historical and qualitative data were collected by interviewing a large number of elders about village history. Meetings were also held with groups of elders from neighboring villages. Interviews were also conducted with *murran*, women, and other adults. Demographic work on the dispersal of families after eviction was also undertaken. Oral histories and interviews were cross-checked with archives in Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Same which provided written records of the history of the Reserve and of economic activity such as cattle markets. The data were used to examine the importance of pastoralism to families' livelihoods and the economy of the area, and to build up a picture of how local pastoralism has changed. Much of the material on which this section is based is detailed by Homewood *et al.* (1997).

Background

Mkomazi Game Reserve lies north of the Pare and Usambara mountains. It occupies two Districts, Same and Lushoto, in Kilimanjaro and Tanga Regions respectively. Mwanga District, also in Kilimanjaro Region, borders the Reserve to the north. The Reserve's northern boundary adjoins the Kenyan border and the Tsavo National Park. Mkomazi is an important wet season dispersal area for the wildlife of Tsavo, which makes it internationally important for conservation.

Over 60,000 people live in villages around Mkomazi (Homewood *et al.,* 1997), mostly to the north of the Pare and Usambara mountains. There is little space between the Reserve and the steep slopes of the mountains. This particularly affects herders who need extensive pastures and who cannot use the mountain slopes because of the risk of livestock disease and the presence of cultivation there.

The main ethnic groups around the Reserve are principally Pare and Sambaa agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists, located near to the Pare and Usambara mountains respectively. Herders from these groups, and the Maasai, Parakuyo and Kamba, depend on the plains for their livestock. There are many other peoples resident in the area, but most of the population comprise these five ethnic groups.

As a game reserve, Mkomazi is managed by the Wildlife Department. Unlike TANAPA, the Wildlife Department is legally allowed to sanction human use of protected resources. When Mkomazi was gazetted in 1951 some Parakuyo pastoralists were still permitted to live and graze their animals within its boundary. However, there was considerable interest to use the Reserve and the number of people and animals using it gradually increased until the late 1980s.

The Department's priority is to conserve wilderness and wildlife and protect it from the threats of human use. Officials felt that the steady growth of pastoralism in Mkomazi made it impossible to meet these goals. At Mkomazi, Department officials saw a Reserve ravaged by

human habitation.[22] Poaching was rampant, wildlife numbers were low and it was virtually impossible to administer the Reserve as a wilderness if people were resident there. Wildlife officials saw eviction of all residents as the only way to save the Reserve.

In the late 1980s, all residents were evicted and forbidden to use the Reserve. The Reserve was made a National Project, with the Manager reporting directly to the Wildlife Department in Dar es Salaam. A group of allied private conservation organisations, registered as charities in the USA and Europe, have been actively involved in its rehabilitation.

It is difficult to assess the impact of the evictions on wildlife populations due to lack of data on the state of the Reserve prior to eviction. Rigorous evaluation of the change to wildlife populations is therefore not possible. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among conservationists that both the environment and wildlife populations have recovered considerably. Conservationist literature describes Mkomazi as a 'recovered pearl', a gem salvaged from destruction (Mangubuli, 1992, Watson, 1991). The evictions and rehabilitation of the Reserve are widely thought to have been successful, both for Mkomazi and for wildlife dispersing out of Tsavo National Park in the wet season.

In this context, it is important to consider what is happening at Mkomazi according to other criteria and to assess conservation activities by looking at broader social and economic factors (see Box 8, page 46). This is especially appropriate at Mkomazi where consideration of human needs has always been a part of the declared conservation strategy:

> *"First and foremost the area [Mkomazi] provides a sanctuary for game without in any way interfering with the legitimate present or future needs of the local population."* (Same District Commissioner, 25 April 1949. TNA File 451/IV)

To understand the consequences brought about by the evictions, it is necessary to consider the current policy of exclusion in terms of its impact on local resource users, and this requires an understanding of how the Reserve was used before the evictions. This account is a summary of the history of Mkomazi reported in Brockington (1998).

Management and development of pastoralism at Mkomazi

Mkomazi is over 3,200 km^2 in size and contains resources which are of immense value to local people. The land within the Reserve has long been used by many people, especially pastoralists, hunters and honey gatherers. Exclusion from it has had severe consequences for indigenous resource users (Homewood *et al.*, 1997). Its gazettement was disruptive and unpopular to local rural communities (see Box 9, page 47).

Pastoral resource use at Mkomazi was part of broader systems that expanded beyond its boundaries. Before gazettement the Reserve contained two pastoral territories (Map 8) which provided wet season grazing and drought refuge to people drawn from a larger area.

[22] A key contention of conservationists is that pastoralism degrades the environment because pastoralists cause overgrazing and environmental degradation. The ecological theories that support this are now questioned for pastoralism generally (Behnke *et al.*, 1993; Sullivan, 1996), and for Mkomazi in particular (Brockington and Homewood, 1996). Accusations of environmental degradation, and claims that livestock have not damaged the environment, need to be treated as competing hypotheses and refuted with empirical data.

Respondents claim that these areas offered good grazing and were largely free of cattle disease such as East Coast Fever and *Trypanosomiasis*.

Box 8: Divergent opinions about the future of Mkomazi Game Reserve

Mkomazi did not enjoy full official support when gazetted. Despite the District Commissioner's assurance it was felt that Mkomazi was large and the needs of people outside it were considerable even in the 1950s. The central arguments of that debate are as follows:

" .. the policy of this department is to create throughout the Territory a well-balanced distribution of national parks, complete and partial reserves, and controlled areas. The Mkomazi Reserve, though comparatively small in area (1,470 square miles) is valuable for the following reasons: (a) It is the only reserve in Tanga province and the only other one of two of its type in the Territory. (b) It borders on Kenya and the Tsavo National Park. (c) Its proximity to Tanga is in itself a potential tourist attraction. (d) It is unsuitable for agriculture and, due to the presence of tsetse fly, is in part unsuitable for cattle. (e) There are no main highways passing through it. (f) It contains a large variety of game animals e.g. elephant, rhino, buffalo, lion, kudu, gerenuk, eland, hartebeest, zebra etc. (g) Apart from my opening remarks, I do not believe that it is scheduled for large-scale development." The Senior Game Warden, Arusha to the Provincial Commissioner, Tanga after the value of Mkomazi Game Reserve was questioned. 15th June 1953. TNA G1/7.

"The question of the extent of the reserve has been reviewed recently by the District team in Same and Lushoto. In Same, the team was unable to come to a unanimous decision, and put briefly, the matter was seen as a simple conflict of interests between the needs of the local inhabitants and their stock on the one hand and Game on the other. Owing to overstocking, cattle owners are beginning to press for rights to the Reserve, particularly in the Same area. Moreover, in spite of the original view that the declaration of the area as a reserve would not interfere with existing or future needs of the local inhabitants, the fact is that the area now contains several hundred people, supports about 10,000 stock units at some seasons of the year and is clearly a possible area for future development and further settlement by local people. In my view it would be unwise politically to attempt to remove those people and stock from the area required as a reserve and I think you will agree that any attempt to 'freeze' present numbers will be impracticable." Draft letter from the Provincial Commissioner of Tanga to the Principal Game Warden in Arusha. 10th September 1953. TNA G1/7.

(the) Government accepts that where the interests of man and game conflict, the needs of man are regarded as paramount. At the same time, Government has obligations and attaches importance to the preservation of the natural fauna of this territory and is not prepared to open up game reserves without very good reason. In particular, before it could consider any reduction in the status of the reserve, Government would have to be satisfied: (1) that the fullest practicable use of all other land in the vicinity was being made; (2) that human interests would suffer materially by the retention of a game reserve; and (3) that these interests would be appreciably promoted by opening up a game reserve. I am very far from convinced that these conditions could be satisfied in this particular case." The Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources to the Provincial Commissioner of Tanga giving his final ruling that ended early debates about the value of Mkomazi Game Reserve. 21st December 1955. TNA G1/7.

In the eastern half of the Reserve, the principal pastoral group was the Parakuyo. Their resource use centred on the rivers draining the northern edge of the Usambara mountains, in particular the Umba river and wells at Kamakota. Dry season pastures, including designated calf pastures, were based around the river and wells. Adult cattle grazed along the river in the

dry season, and in a drought could reach as far as the better watered lands of the coastal strip. Some stock would also be sent westwards to the wells of Kifukua and the northern slopes of the Pare mountains.

In the wet season the pastoralists would move north away from the mountains, making use of the grazing made available by the presence of seasonal pools and water holes. Before the 1950s, a favoured destination was the Katamboi water holes, just north of the border in Kenya (TNA file 723/III, August 1952). Use of this was denied after the Tsavo National Park was gazetted.

Box 9: The needs and claims of the Pare, Sambaa, Parakuyo and Maasai

" ... when the government came to put Game Reserve borders here there's not one citizen who was asked or informed where the borders would go; now several citizens have received severe fines ... We bring our request that the borders be placed far away (up to Kifukua) so that there will not occur again other complaints which cause disagreements between the government and the citizens. But this request is disregarded by the Game Ranger. Now what is your decision now that the dry season has come?" The Gonja branch of the Tanganyika African National Union writing to the DC of Same on behalf of Pare pastoralists. The Kalimawe Game Controlled Area was subsequently excised east and south of Gonja to provide room for these pastoralists. 1st July 1956. TNA File G1/7.

"We are residents of Kizungo (the Pare people); we are not businessmen or office workers but we get our food and tax for the government from our herds, our farms and our beehives since a long time ago ... All these lands have been the dwelling places of people (our grandfathers until our fathers) since 300 years ago. ... People have been moved suddenly and left their farms or been evicted from their watering places and houses have been burnt. This was done by armed game guards who evicted people like animals. People moved to areas which for a long time have not sufficed for living, much loss is incurred from the death of goats and sheep and from the lack of water. Moreover the beehives which were hung the Game Ranger decided should be cut down and split, and they were cut down and split and all the honey was eaten by the vandals ... Since the tribulation we face is great we have no other purpose except this need: that we want help quickly to get our rights which have been lost and to be given our freedom as are the other citizens of the realms of this kingdom." The Pare people of Kizungo to the District Commissioner of Same. 24th January 1957. G1/7. ...../continued

...../cont

"Under instructions from Huseini Mane, Musa Kirewasha and 25 Africans of Baramu in Usambara District I have to address you the following: 1. My clients are African herdsmen and have their cattle bomas in Mnazi - Kamba near Kivingo. 2. Until recently they were grazing in the Mkomazi area but owing to the said area being declared a game reserve, my clients have been prohibited to enter this area and they have been ordered to graze only in the Bambo near Kamba area. 3. The area allocated near Bambo is a small piece of land infested with tsetse flies and the grass appears poisonous. This area has no water supply as the river dries up in the hot season and the insufficiency of pasturage has put my clients who own about (a) few thousand cattle, sheep and goats into a very awkward situation. 4. The pasturage in the Bambo area has taken a heavy toll of my clients' cattle in that they have lost about 150 heads of cattle recently and they are convinced that the reason is because of the poisonous grass. 5. My clients desire to petition the government for excising a sufficient land from the Mkomazi Game Reserve for their cattle and at which place in the past they .... had acquired grazing rights." Barrister writing to the District Commissioner of Lushoto on behalf of Pare and Sambaa herders following the clearing of Reserve boundaries in the late 1950s. 4th February 1960. TNA G1/7.

"We stock farmers of Same and Lushoto District have the honour to write to you so as to produce our problems before your high office. The problems are as follows: 1. We have shortage of grass because of the Reserve. 2. Those people living on the borders of the Reserve are not free to be visited by their friends." *Laibon* Paul Moreto, of Hedaru, Same District, a Kwavi leader writing to the Minister of Natural Resources. 20th December 1960. TNA G1/7.

"Concerning the matter (of getting game meat to buy) the citizens of (Kisiwani) ward ask that the Union of Wildlife serve in the villages of this ward. This request results from the decline in cows for sale and since the union has the power to hunt animals and to sell them to citizens so we ask that permits be given to hunt wildlife." Kisiwani Ward Secretary to the District Commissioner, Same. 30/12/1976. (The Kisiwani cattle market began in February 1977).
(from Homewood *et al.* 1997)

After Mkomazi Game Reserve was established, a number of Parakuyo pastoralists were allowed to carry on living in it as they were deemed to be traditional users of the area. However, there were also others. Pare pastoralists who herded around the Pare mountains in Same district migrated seasonally to Lushoto district to take advantage of growth prompted by the early rains that prevailed in the area. Sambaa livestock keepers also came down from the mountains by the Usambara Mountain Development Scheme in the early 1950s (Rogers *et al.*, forthcoming). Kamba herders built up cattle herds from the proceeds of ivory hunting.

The eastern half of the Reserve was the focus of considerable immigration in the 1950s and 1960s. Maa-speaking pastoralists from Toloha were forced from their grazing grounds in 1950 after the Kenyan government denied them permission to use the main dry season water source on the Kenyan side of Lake Jipe. Access was not possible on the Tanganikan side and some of these pastoralists moved to the Katamboi waterholes near Lushoto district. However, the Parakuyo pastoralists resident in Lushoto fought with the immigrants and encouraged the district authorities to evict them.

Following their removal from Lushoto, these Maasai pastoralists sought friendlier relations with the Parakuyo in order to gain access to resources within Mkomazi. They inter-married, and established 'stock relations' with families living in the Reserve. Some also took the names of dead Parakuyo who were still on the list of permitted residents of the Reserve.

As a result there was a steady build up of stock inside the Reserve that belonged to families normally resident outside it. There were continual contests throughout the 1960s as wildlife authorities tried to limit the number of stock, while pastoralists, backed by allies in district government tried to circumvent the restrictions. Eventually the wildlife authorities backed down and a new, larger list of legal residents was drawn up and the number of cattle allowed inside the Reserve was increased from around 3,000 to 21,000.

The Sambaa, Kamba and Pare also sought access to Mkomazi. They objected to policies which allowed only Parakuyo people into the Reserve. They complained that the boundaries restricted their grazing. Their plight gained the attention of a number of government officials who favoured degazetting the Reserve. Under these pressures the number of people using the eastern part of the Reserve increased substantially. The western part, however, remained comparatively unpopulated.

The western half of the Reserve was also inhabited by pastoralists before gazettement. At the north it contained part of the wet season range of the Toloha Maasai and Pare people clustered around the base of the mountains. After the Reserve was first established the boundaries had to be altered and the Kalimawe Game Controlled Area was excised to make room for Pare pastoralists based at Gonja.

After gazettement the western half of the Reserve became increasingly important to pastoralists for two reasons. First, Pare pastoralists who moved to Kisiwani in the 1950s undertook the systematic burning and bush control that reduced tick and tsetse pests. Their success resulted in large, healthy cattle herds which attracted others. Second, the Wildlife Department built dams in the 1950s and 1960s which provided good, though not always permanent, water supplies.

Rainfall was low at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s. As a result, there was pressure from pastoralists to be given access to resources in the western half of the Reserve. Large numbers of Maasai, Parakuyo and Pare pastoralists were granted permits to graze and reside there. These permits were initially intended to be temporary. In the early 1970s, decentralisation divided the Reserve into two separately administrated halves: the Umba Reserve in Lushoto district and Mkomazi Reserve in Same district (Mangubuli, 1992). Management at this time was weak and residence was uncontrolled, and the temporary permits that were given were not revoked.

In the west of the Reserve pastoralists based themselves at wells at Kisima and Kifukua, streams draining the northern slopes of the Pare mountains and at dams built by the Wildlife Department. In the wet season they dispersed northward towards Kenya. There were close ties between the pastoralists of both 'halves' of the Reserve, with considerable movement between them; many moved west after the Umba Reserve was opened up. The west was also used seasonally by pastoralists from the Ruvu valley (part of the middle Moipo area), who exploited the Reserve's earlier rains (see below).

Local economies of Mkomazi

People and livestock living in the Reserve made a significant contribution to the economy of the area. Livestock were economically important simply because of their number (Table 2, page 49). Livestock census data can be inaccurate and are usually underestimated, but they do provide a snapshot of fluctuating numbers. Pastoral herds are highly mobile and numbers

of stock in the Reserve were variable. The 1984 totals were probably not the highest numbers reached.

Table 2: Cattle populations in and around Mkomazi Game Reserve

Year	Lushoto Division	Same	Total
1960	21,984	no data	incomplete
1966	45,245	no data	incomplete
1978	28,219	39,539	67,758
1984	48,131	39,977	88,128

Further evidence of the numbers of cattle in the Reserve and the health of the livestock economy comes from Same district cattle markets records. As a result of the influx of cattle into the west of the Reserve, a cattle market was opened at Kisiwani.

Table 3 shows that this market, in the three years after it opened, rapidly became one of the two most important markets in the district. At times its revenue exceeded that at Makanya market, which now regularly turns over more than 10 million Tanzanian shillings (c. £10,000) per month in livestock sales. Official sales are far less than unofficial transactions, both in terms of numbers of animals sold and revenue generated. The table below gives an indication of the relative scale of economic activity that livestock generated in the Reserve.

Table 3: Cattle sold in Kisiwani and Makanya markets

Period	Kisiwani	Makanya
Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	139	266
Jul 1977 - Jul 1978	no data	no data
Aug 1978 - Jan 1979	433	567
Feb 1979 - Jul 1979	279	183
Aug 1979 - Jan 1980	763	886
Feb 1980 - Jul 1980	602	1064
Aug 1980 - Jan 1981	1025	957
Feb 1981 - Jul 1981	852	1054
Aug 1981 - Jan 1982	424	980
Feb 1982 - Jul 1982	448	811

A large number of non-pastoral people also depended on the Reserve for their livelihoods (Homewood *et al.* 1997). In particular, it was valued as a place to keep beehives. Honey gatherers were amongst the first to protest about their exclusion when the Reserve was gazetted (Box 9). Since their eviction they have complained that yields are down, and damage and thefts of hives placed outside the Reserve has increased. Honey collection can provide an important income, with honey selling for 1,200 Tanzanian shillings a litre (c. £1.20) and a hive yielding between 20 and 60 litres depending on size (c.f. Homewood *et al.*, 1997).

The Reserve is also an important source of firewood for many families. It provides many wild foods which play an important part in some people's diet and are sold at local markets. The sellers are commonly young women who often use the income generated by this activity to buy school books and other supplies (Homewood *et al.*, 1997).

Impact of evictions on pastoralists

The evictions were sudden and are alleged to have been violent (Mustafa, 1997). The depth and intensity of pastoralist opposition gives an indication of the predicament into which they have been forced. Pastoralists universally complain that they were found no alternative places to live after their eviction (Box 10). The evictions from Mkomazi had a number of negative impacts on day to day lives. These include displacement, increased resource pressure in areas adjacent to the Reserve, livelihood changes - especially for women - damage to the livestock economy and loss of a drought refuge for more distant pastoralists.

Box 10: The evictions

Elena was a bright, educated girl from Monduli who married into the area in 1986. Initially, she went to live with her new husband at Kisiwani, where they practised transhumance using Kavateta dam and the Kisiwani river as their main sources of water.

Her experience of the eviction was typically unpleasant. Her home was burnt along with others, some of them with smallstock and calves still inside. They were given no chance to prepare properly to leave the house. Numerous household goods were lost. There was no reception area for evicted people. Cattle were herded on ahead by men and game guards until they arrived south of the Pare mountains where they were abandoned. Elena and her family spent three days near Same town with no proper accommodation. She said that in some cases children were separated from their parents in the confusion. She and her family moved to Ndea, where they are now living. In this they are luckier than most. Others went to the Ruvu valley first and lost many cattle to East Coast Fever and *Anaplasmosis*. Others tried to settle in Kenya and were evicted to Ndea.

Elders recount how they went to the District Commissioner of Same to complain about the way that they were being evicted and were told that they would be arrested if they came to his office again. They then went over his head to the office of the Prime Minister and then to the Regional Commissioner to lodge their protests. However, by the time this was done, most of the evictions were completed.

i) Displacement

Local estimates are that 75-80% of cattle and 5-10,000 people left the area following eviction. A survey of siblings of pastoralist residents around the Reserve gave some idea of the nature of human dispersal following eviction: 126 Maasai and Parakuyo pastoralists were asked about the whereabouts of their living adult brothers and sisters, and whether each had been evicted (Table 4).

Table 4: The number of sibling groups in the survey

District	Groups interviewed	Siblings located	Located evicted siblings
Lushoto	52	449	248
Same	74	584	340

The distribution of evicted siblings (Map 9, appendix) shows a clear difference between the movements of the pastoralists of Same district and those in Lushoto. The former have more links with Simanjiro, which is nearer. The (mainly Parakuyo) pastoralists of Lushoto have stronger links with the more coastal and southerly areas of Handeni, Morogoro, Pangani and Tanga districts.

Map 9 gives an indication of the direction of movement and shows the places that were put under consequent pressure. It corroborates other findings (Ibrahim and Ruppert, 1994) and demonstrates again the links across the study site and beyond to other areas.

The movement into Simanjiro, Kiteto, Ruvu and Moipo meant that those evicted are now living in areas where there is increased resource pressure. This pressure has been increased since the evictions because Mkomazi was an important source of wet season grazing for pastoralists in the Ruvu valley. Pastoralists who used to move east to Mkomazi now look west, adding yet more pressure on Moipo and Simanjiro. The evictions have added to the demands made on social systems and resource use strategies at a time when pastoralists are least able to cope.

ii) Increased pressure on resources around the edge of the Reserve

In addition to those who have moved away from Mkomazi, there are many evicted people living close to the Reserve. Those who have remained around the Reserve tend to be those whose families have lived in the area longest. They are most closely tied into local social networks, and had few other places to go to.

The pastoralists who still live in this area are restricted to a narrow band of land between the Reserve's edge and the mountains - dry season pasture reserve once found in Mkomazi is no longer available. It is a universal complaint of all pastoralists that they are unable to manage their pastures properly since evictions. Many of the traditional calf pastures are either inside the Reserve and inaccessible, or inadequate because there is insufficient space available for reserved grazing. Many herders graze illegally in the Reserve, where they are subject to heavy fines and are in danger of having their livestock confiscated.

The lack of space also forces herders and farmers to live closer together than they otherwise would. Proximity of livestock to farms has increased conflict between them. Livestock increasingly enter people's farms (both accidentally and intentionally) and there has been an increase in the number and severity of conflicts and court cases between herders and farmers. In Mkundi in 1996, for example, a Pare boy was killed in a skirmish with a Maasai herder.

The lack of space outside the Reserve is a long-standing complaint of pastoralists, especially those who are unable to send their stock to distant pastures. Such complaints motivated some of the previous generation of Pare and Sambaa pastoralists to hire a lawyer in the late 1950s to contest the Reserve's boundaries and negotiate terms for daily use of the Reserve.

iii) The consequences of eviction for the livestock economy

Removal of 3,200km^2 of rangeland and an estimated 75% of the local cattle population has been detrimental to the local livestock economy. Data from Same district cattle markets dating back to 1974 has been analysed (Homewood *et al.*, 1997) and three important changes coincide with the evictions:

1. Overall cattle sales fell to half pre-eviction levels.
2. The ratio of male to female cattle sold declined from 2:1 to nearly 1:1. (Female cattle are the productive nucleus of the herd, and high levels of female cattle sales is a sign of stress in pastoral societies).
3. The Kisiwani cattle market, set up after the growth of pastoralism in the west of the Reserve, has collapsed and the associated businesses and retail economy have suffered.

Overall, the value of lost sales was conservatively estimated at £150,000 per year, and more realistically put at £500,000. According to Homewood *et al*, this *"represents a serious economic collapse"* (1997:49).

iv) Livelihood changes: examples from Lushoto district

The three sub-villages of Kivingo, Kisima and Mahambalawe are contiguous pastoral settlements bordering Mkomazi just north of the Usambara mountains (Map 8). Records here indicate the nature of livelihood changes occurring around the Reserve.

Prior to eviction pastoralists in these villages followed the pattern of resource use outlined above, making use of wells and rivers as a base for dry season grazing and moving north into the Reserve in the wet season. The management pattern of these pastoralists was disrupted by the evictions. Access to wells and calf pastures they had relied on inside the Reserve is now illegal. Legal grazing is possible only south of the Umba river and near the road to Kivingo and Mnazi. New dry season grazing areas have been set aside where possible, but there is not always enough space for them. Herders complain that they have a high incidence of *Trypanosomiasis* and East Coast Fever and lack access to the nutritious grasses needed to build up the strength of livestock to withstand such diseases. Illegal grazing in the Reserve leads to conflict with Reserve staff and fines in excess of £300 - more than a year's salary for a wage earner.

Since the evictions, pastoralists have had to seek other livelihoods in order to maintain their income and safeguard their herds. The Kisima area, although not preferred as it is swampy and prone to tick-borne diseases, was originally a dry season reserve and drought refuge for smallstock, calves and sick cattle. Since the evictions many of the more impoverished families have settled there in order to farm. It is not a suitable place for livestock, and animals are sent to other areas and households are split so that some tend the farms and others livestock.

Other wealthier pastoralists have invested in agriculture to avoid selling their livestock. They have bought plots at the nearby Mng'aro rice irrigation project, and pay labourers to work them and tend farms nearer their homes. Two have bought petrol-powered pumps to irrigate plots of land near the Umba river.

Eviction has particularly affected the poorest families who are unable to support themselves from their herds or from farming. Analysis of household economic activity (Homewood *et al.* 1997) found that women in these families were selling goat's milk, firewood or traditional medicine in order to buy food for daily consumption. Some women travelled long distances selling medicines in Kenya and Tanzania in order to earn money to support their families. This can be part of a 'normal' woman's activities and constitutes a valuable source of income. At Mkomazi, however, these journeys have been necessitated by the failure of their traditional rural livelihoods near the Reserve. Income from these trips is sometimes required to support the whole household (Box 11, page 54).

Box 11: The family of Moses

Moses is an influential elder directly descended from Kamunyu, the patriot of the Lushoto Parakuyo. When he was evicted from the Reserve he settled at Kapimbi, in Same district - a village particularly close to the Reserve. Here the boundary coincides with the road to the village. Mose's boma is about 100m from the border. Moses has five wives and numerous children. His first children are now all men and of marriageable age. In setting up marriages for six sons at once Moses was faced with numerous expenses, combined with stock losses after eviction. Moses convened a meeting and reduced the bride price from 15 cattle to 12; however, this did not prevent his herd from coming to an end by the time I started work there.

Moses' family does not have access to irrigated fields nor the expertise to farm. The family depends on the women of the boma travelling to sell medicines. The women travel enormous distances, from Chalinze to Moshi, Dodoma and into Kenya down to Mombassa. They tend to travel on circuits, sending money home whenever possible. They told me that when they first started they had no experience of selling medicine. They had no place to stay in the towns when they arrived, and would rely on churches or helpful customers or seek help from Maasai and Parakuyo people working in the towns (often *murran* who were working as watchmen).

The women are often away for long periods; it was typical to find half of them absent when I visited the boma. Some I only met after 6 months of work. However, they have to travel if their families are to have food and their children are to be educated. All travel is dangerous. On 10th September 1996 three women, Ruth, Yehobet and Elizabeth, were traveling to Marangu, on Kilimanjaro mountain in a pickup that veered off the road. Elizabeth died at the scene, and Ruth was seriously injured, but fortunately she recovered and was able to return home. However, it is still not certain whether or when she will be able to support herself and her family by selling medicine again.

Women in richer families also sell goods, but less frequently; their income is to a greater extent supplemented by the livestock economy and agricultural produce and this affords them greater independence. For impoverished families, however, these activities take on a new significance and have become the major means of household survival.

v) <u>The impact on more distant communities: the Ruvu valley</u>

Pastures on the east of the Ruvu valley in Same district lie opposite Moipo. Table 5 and Map 10 show where people went during drought years since 1948 in the areas of Ruvu Mferjini village of Same district.

Table 5: The location of drought refuges used by residents of three *vitongoji* of Ruvu Mferejini village

Drought order	Mungano		Marua		Mkanyene	
1	1948 - 1950	Kisiwani- Gonja	1946	Makame, Kiteto Mabla, Handeni Lokii, KIA	1960-1961	Mabla, Handeni, Kasumeni, Kenya Kalalani, K'gwe
2	1973-1975	Kisiwani Gonja	1960-1961	Mabla, Handeni Kumolo Sukuru, S'jo Toloha	1974-1975	Gonja, Mnazi - Umba Orgusumet, S'jo Kitwai, S'jo Elangata, S'jo
3	1960-1961	Mabla, Handeni	1973-1974	Kisiwani, Alalilai, Simanjiro	1980-1981	Ndungu, Mnazi Umba, Lelwa, Engasurai, S'jo Orgusumet, S'jo
4	1984-1985	Kisiwani-Gonja	1994	Pangaro, Ndea	1970-1971	Kisiwani – Gonja Nabor, Kiteto, Ndea, Mwanga Msitu wa Tembo Losokoni, S'jo
5	1967-1969	Losokoni, Lendanai	1983-1984	Kisiwani - Gonja	1993-1994	Kisiwani-Gonja Ndea, Pangaro
6	1993-1994	Pangaro, Kisiwani	1967	Orgusumet, S'jo Lenkumungea, S'jo Letalass, S'jo	-	-
7	-	-	1991	Kisiwani Ndea	-	-

Abbreviations:
KIA - Kilimanjaro International Airport
S'jo - Simanjiro
K'gwe - Korogwe

These data indicate:

1. Drought is frequent and recurrent in these areas.
2. Pastoralists from the Ruvu can range extremely far in search of the grazing they require during drought.
3. There is some consistency in the timing of the droughts and their order of severity. For those people old enough to remember, it was clear that there had been a severe dry spell in the late 1940s. The two next most severe droughts occurred in 1960-1 and 1973-5. Thereafter, consensus on severity breaks down, but there were clearly problems at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
4. There is a trend of increasing recourse to Mkomazi after 1970.

During drought, pastoralists have to seek places where both water and grazing are available. Grazing around the Ruvu river becomes scarce during an extended dry season or drought. In the past, many pastoralists sought refuge from the droughts in Mkomazi, where mountain streams persist and where pasture quality may be better than at the Ruvu. The importance of the Reserve continues today. During the extended dry season of 1996-7, thousands of stock descended on Kisiwani to drink at the river there. The difficulty is that this is now illegal. Research in Moipo suggests that many pastoralists feel that drought refuge pastures at Mkomazi are no longer a viable option.

Exclusion from the Reserve has constrained the options of pastoralists in a wider region. Those in the Ruvu valley have suffered the triple impact of receiving evictees of the Reserve, loss of wet season grazing inside it, and loss of drought refuges.

Further considerations of current policies at Mkomazi

Wider economic issues

Alienation of land for wildlife comes under the category of projects in the national interest. The general principles used to assess such projects applied by the Land Commission are therefore applicable here. This means examining how these wildlife projects serve considerations of justice, equity, and 'good development'.

The Land Commission was suspicious of large-scale alienation of land since it deprives smallholders of resources they need to feed themselves and supply the domestic economy. Alienation places resources in the hands of those more likely to produce for export and profit, rather than for food and the domestic market. It risks depriving smallholders of both land and food resources (1994). Cernea (1988), writing about the World Bank's perspective on involuntary resettlement, observes that those paying the costs of development projects which cause resettlement rarely receive the benefits. On the contrary compulsory resettlement:

> *"impoverishes the people who are displaced ... disrupts the social fabric. Research has found that involuntary resettlement is also associated with increased socio-cultural stress, morbidity and mortality. Environmental degradation, including lost forest and grazing lands, is compounded if the site to which people are relocated cannot sustain both the populations already living there and the new arrivals."* (Cernea, 1988: 44)

It has been argued here that Mkomazi was supporting a thriving community of people pursuing a variety of livelihoods, in which the pastoral sector was particularly strong. It has also been shown that most of the pastoralists and their livestock have now dispersed, and that the area no longer supports the wealth it once did. These people, who were feeding themselves and their fellow citizens, have been left without their land and resources. Many have been impoverished.

Some argue that this can be justified where the nation as a whole gains and the losses suffered locally are borne by relatively few people. Some conservationists argue also that benefit sharing may ease the difficulties suffered by local communities living near to protected areas. Both these views rely on the protected area generating revenue sufficient to offer benefits at least matching the costs of foregoing resource use.

Mkomazi earns little revenue from tourism. It has no facilities to accommodate tourists apart from camps. It is not central to the northern tourist circuit. It is a wet season dispersal area

for wildlife and not a dry season concentration area, as are popular destinations such as the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks. It is not possible to see wildlife there in the numbers or at a frequency which most tourists desire in the 'tourist season'.

It could be marketed to those seeking a 'wilderness experience'. However, such tourists are few in number and do not generate much revenue. One operator forecasted that Mkomazi could support a 20-bed luxury camp, but this has not yet been realised (Oliver, 1994). Between 1991 and 1994, Mkomazi earned less than £10,000 from tourism. At this rate, it cannot even cover its own running costs (Homewood *et al.*, 1997).

Perhaps the most substantial revenues can be earned from hunting. In a truncated hunting season between 1994 and 1995, the Reserve generated 16 million shillings (then worth around £20,000), with 1.6 million shillings going into development projects in Same district. However, the hunting took place in the face of vigorous opposition from conservationists. The hunting companies were run by the relatives of the Minister for Environment, Natural Resources and Tourism (Chachagge, 1996; Express, 1995); conservationists argued the affair smacked of corruption and that the Reserve cannot support it. Hunting in the Reserve has now been banned by Parliament.

Finally, even the high sums generated by hunting simply do not match the needs of people living in the area or compensate them for the revenue forgone by not being able to use the Reserve's resources. This is partly because there are so many people living near the Reserve and partly because the cattle industry is so profitable. The 1.6 million shillings (then worth c. £2,000) returned to Same district from hunting compares poorly with the current monthly turnover of the cattle markets which can reach 10 million shillings a month (c. £10,000).

The Reserve's management has initiated projects aimed at appeasing local communities and persuading them of the Reserve's value to them. To pay for these projects, the Reserve Manager applied to the Tanzania Wildlife Protection fund. Millions of shillings have been spent on Same secondary school and on dams outside the Reserve boundaries. However, these developments, though necessary and important, do not address the fundamental problem that those who have lost access to resources are not adequately compensated. For example, few pastoralists or bee-keepers, or their children, go to Same secondary school. This level of benefit is not sufficient for them to value the Reserve as a wildlife preserve rather than as a direct support to their livelihoods. As a consequence, 'invasion' and encroachment on the Reserve continue.

Legal implications

Discontent and anger at the evictions are strongly felt and are particularly strong amongst local pastoralists. Pare agro-pastoralists at Vumari contend that the Reserve boundary has changed since the evictions. They have taken legal action to challenge its current location. Former Maasai and Parakuyo residents in the Reserve have gone further. With the help of *Ilaramatak Lorkonerei*, they are contesting the evictions because they deny rights to customary lands. Lawyers of the Legal Aid Committee of the Faculty of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam have taken up the case. They argue that the very law invoked by the Department of Wildlife to bring about the evictions is unconstitutional because it denies

former residents their rights to live on their customary lands (Juma and Mchome, 1994). These cases have yet to be resolved.[23]

The cases challenge the laws that are the basis for protecting areas for wildlife in Tanzania. The first judge recognised this dilemma and subsequently declared himself unable to preside over the case as it was `too hard'. If he found in favour of the pastoralists this would set a precedent with implications for protected areas throughout the country. He ordered a retrial with another judge, and asked that both sides try and negotiate a settlement.

The second judgement found that the compensation claim for damages incurred during eviction was 'time-barred', meaning that the claim for damages was made too long after they occurred[24]. The defendants suggested unspecified nominal compensation be awarded and here the judge concurred, awarding 300,000/= Tz shillings each to 38 plaintiffs, but not to all of them. As to the crucial issue as to the legality of the evictions the judge held that the eviction of the plaintiffs was unlawful but the eviction took place over ten years ago and that therefore has 'been overtaken by events.' She concluded that 'an order for restoration would be impracticable in the circumstances.' This being the case she also suggested that the defendants should be found alternative grazing lands to which they could move on a self-help basis.

An appeal has been lodged against all the aspects of this decision. The plaintiff's lawyers argue that the damages incurred should not be rubricated as 'tort' and so should not be time-barred. They claim that the judge erred in law by taking extraneous matters into account when she decreed that a restoration order was impracticable. Further they note that the judge erred in law and fact by ordering that the plaintiffs be responsible for the costs of their own relocation following their unlawful eviction, and that she erred in law by not specifying a time frame within which suitable alternative lands should be found. The appeal was lodged in August, no further decisions have been made at the time of writing.

Constraints on the goals of the Department of Wildlife

In addition, there are also practical constraints impeding wildlife conservation at Mkomazi. Policing is difficult because the Reserve is narrow so that all parts are relatively easily reached from its boundaries by intruders, and it has a long perimeter with nearly 60,000 people living near its borders.

Mkomazi was first gazetted in order to conserve the plains' game. The first Game Warden described places in the west, where there were concentrations of these animals, as *"the main area of interest"* (Game Warden's report, TNA File 19/6/1 1952). Currently, approaches to conservation are changing and the emphasis is on conserving all biodiversity, not just large animals. Much of Mkomazi's biodiversity is concentrated in the western half where mountains provide a diversity of habitats supporting unusual plant, insect and bird species. The eastern half contains relatively little biodiversity.

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[23] *Paru Kamunyu and 16 others v. The Minister for Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment and threeOthers*, Civil Case No. 33 of 1994 and *Kopera Keiya Kamunyu and 44 Others v. The Minister of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment and three Others*, Civil Case No.33 of 1995.

[24] Under the Tanzanian Law of Limitation, Act No 10/71 1st Schedule, Column 1, item 6, tortious claims for damages have to be submitted within three years of their occurrence.

The eastern half of the Reserve is also disadvantaged in other ways. Protection of the Reserve is particularly hard in Lushoto district. With the headquarters on the westernmost edge, the Department of Wildlife has difficulty imposing its authority. Large stretches in Lushoto district have also remained unvisited by tourists because wildlife populations are low in that area.

The involvement of private conservation organisations

Meeting the diverse goals of conservation, local needs, and local and national development objectives is a complex matter. At Mkomazi the task is complicated by the presence of the Wildlife Preservation Trust (Tanzania), funded by the George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust, UK (GAWPT) and the Tony Fitzjohn/George Adamson African Wildlife Preservation Trust, USA (TF/GAAWPT).

These Trusts have been funding the Tanzanian Trust to rehabilitate the Reserve since shortly after the evictions. They have built roads and airstrips and equipped rangers with radios and uniforms. The main focus for their current activities is an endangered species reintroduction programme. A compound has been constructed to contain African Wild Dogs (*Lycaon pectus*) brought in from Simanjiro district, and a rhino sanctuary has been built to care for Black rhinoceros (*Diceros bicornis michaeli*).

The presence of the Trusts complicates matters because Trustees and Field Officers are not accountable to local people (c.f. Ghimire and Pimbert, 1996). Furthermore, in their rhetoric, the Trusts have variously ignored, misunderstood and misrepresented local people's interests. Their literature betrays ignorance and denies local people's needs. For example, some fund-raising documents in Britain and America declare that evicted local people were 'not indigenous to the area'; others omit to mention the conflict or the legal actions brought against the government. In an address made to the Royal Geographical Society in 1994, the Field Officer, Mr Fitzjohn, dismissed the trauma of the eviction and the ties people had to the Reserve by stating that the Maasai had *"got themselves organised ... and returned to their vast homelands"* (1994: 12).

Similarly the Chairman of GAWPT claimed in letters to *Tanzanian Affairs* that:

> *"the lot of the local villagers is no better and no worse than that of most of the rural population in Tanzania."* (1997: 30)

Whether true or not, this is hardly a relevant statistic. The important issue at Mkomazi is whether or not people have been impoverished since their eviction, and how they view the changes to their lives, regardless of how they compare to fellow citizens elsewhere in the country.

Overall, the image of Mkomazi presented by these conservationists is one of minimal disruption to local people. This representation reaches to the core of important projects and colours knowledge of the Reserve from funders in the West to other conservation groups in the rest of Africa (Box 12, page 61).

Representatives of the Trusts argue that the evictions are the policy of the Tanzanian government and so they cannot be blamed for them. However, the Trusts actively support the total exclusion of people. The Trusts' Field Officer is involved in policing and patrolling the Reserve and in keeping people out. The projects planned for the Reserve depend on the

removal of people. Some local groups see the Trust's activities diametrically opposed to their interests and obstructing satisfaction of their needs.

The consequences of the failure to grapple with people's needs and the impact of eviction are evident in the fate of the Mkomazi Outreach Programme supported by the Trusts. This programme attempted to generate good relations between local communities and the Reserve using the lure of benefit-sharing. It provided goods and services to local villagers, but in doing so it did not address the fundamental problem of costs to local people in order that the Reserve might exist. The Outreach Programme's manifesto stated that:

> *"environmental degradation is not only connected with poverty and low standards of living, but it is also connected with lack of awareness, irresponsible attitudes, a lack of interest in the future and a lack of interest in the local environment ... No one cares about anyone else and everybody is trying to avoid responsibility for the environment and for village development, in order to reach a higher economic level based on a quick and easy way."* (Simons and Nicolasen, 1995: 91)

This does not well describe the attitude observed among the pastoral and agricultural populations around Mkomazi (Homewood *et al.,* 1997). Ultimately, assistance to schools, clinics and individuals, whilst valuable and important in themselves, does not match the losses incurred as a consequence of eviction. The contradiction between local community needs and conservation practice is therefore not resolved by such an approach.[25]

These problems typify this approach to conservation more generally; the needs and ability of local people to manage their resources are ignored, and the damage done to local people's livelihoods is denied. This results in projects which further complicate and confound attempts to reconcile local people's needs with conservation objectives.

[25] At Mkomazi observers also noted that there was a problem with transparency, participation and assessment of the project (Kiwasila and Brockington, 1996). In the event, the Outreach Programme workers were asked to leave Tanzania in early 1997.

Box 12: The Mkomazi Game Reserve rhino sanctuary

The rhino sanctuary at Mkomazi captures much of the essence of the problems of conservation activities currently being planned for the Reserve. The sanctuary is a potentially valuable asset to Mkomazi that could benefit local populations as well as the Reserve. However, the means of its establishment suggests that local needs have not been properly considered.

The sanctuary is being sponsored by the GAWPT and the TF/GAAWPT. The Trusts have imported four black rhinoceros from the Addo Elephant National Park in South Africa which holds a number of the East African sub-species (*Diceros bicornis michaeli*). Addo authorities plan to sell these and buy the Southern African sub-species (*D.b. bicornis*). This will ensure the species occupies the correct range, and will extend the number of independent breeding populations of both sub-species. The Southern African sub-species will be bought from Namibia so Namibian farmers can be financially rewarded for conserving the Black Rhino on their land.

The Trusts see the sanctuary as more than just part of the rehabilitation of the Reserve and the preservation of the species, but quite explicitly as a project that could help legitimise the Reserve's existence. As the Field Director of the project, Mr Fitzjohn puts it:

"I do feel that a project as prestigious as the rhino sanctuary, plus some form of revenue from a small but exclusive tourist venture in the reserve, must be forthcoming within the next year from Mkomazi to survive as a game reserve." (1993)

Lack of attention to local needs is apparent in documents dealing with the sanctuary. A report on the sanctuary for the World Conservation Union (IUCN) African Rhino Specialist Group states that:

"There appears to be limited resentment towards the Mkomazi Game Reserve by the Msaai [sic], as they were well aware that their permission to graze within the reserve was only a temporary one (Harrie Simons and Truus Nicolasen pers. comm.).... The more numerous Wapare and Wasambar [sic] tribe members within the Kisiwane [sic] and Uzambaras areas were never historically associated with the reserve and thus have no negative feelings towards it. .."In the light of the above facts it would appear that the introduction of black rhino into the MGR would be: ... little affected by the limited to dwindling negative feelings towards the surrounding communities." (Knight and Morkel 1994: 6-7)

One author stated that the information was entirely derived from Simons and Nicolasen, the then Outreach Programme workers (Knight *pers. comm.* 3/12/1996).

Another inaccuracy in the IUCN report and fund-raising literature from the GAWPT and TF/GAAWPT is the claim that the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has donated $150,000 to the Outreach Programme. The WWF has denied this in writing and requested that GAWPT remove the claim from its literature (O'Connor pers. comm. 7/8/1997). When the South African authorities in charge of the rhinoceros at Addo made further enquiries into the details of the court cases brought by the pastoralists they were told by Tanzanian government officials that these were being brought by Maasai originating from Kenya (Koch 1997). In fact, in their written statement to the court, the Tanzanian government explicitly accepts that the plaintiffs are Tanzanian citizens. The rhino sanctuary could be a positive feature in support of local livelihoods. It could attract tourists and earn revenue for local communities. It is still unlikely, however, that it could satisfy all local needs. Meaningful benefits from the Reserve will require some sort of shared resource use by local people. Both benefits from tourist revenue and from shared use will require negotiation and compromise with the different groups around the Reserve. The first such meeting concerning the Reserve and the sanctuary only took place a few months before the rhinoceros were imported. More of such meetings are required to provide for local needs and ensure the long term security of the sanctuary.

Summary

Conservation efforts at Mkomazi can be found wanting on several counts:

1. They have numerous negative impacts and offer few benefits to local people. The operation to clear Mkomazi did immense damage to the local economy, and to the pastoral, agro-pastoral and bee-keeping economies in particular. Local people do not receive sufficient compensation for the resources foregone as a result of the Reserve's existence. It is unlikely that such benefits will ever be generated; the peripheral populations are just too large.

2. There is little national gain beyond a contribution to the overall wildlife estate. Damage to local and regional economies has not been followed by commensurate benefits to the state - hunting is not allowed and tourist revenues are insignificant. Contrary to the position of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, resources at Mkomazi are not being put into the *"most profitable ventures"* (Ndagala, 1994:33).

3. It is arguable that large parts of the Reserve are 'under-used' by conservationists, scientists and tourists and perhaps by wildlife. Given that it is already an extension to the much larger Tsavo ecosystem, it may be possible to achieve equivalent conservation goals with a smaller area, and with less cost to the local population.

5. LAND TENURE SECURITY AND COMMUNITY CONSERVATION: OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Community conservation and community needs

The community conservation movement faces considerable challenges. It has to try to reconcile competing and the sometimes conflicting goals of conservation and development. In doing so it needs to overcome long-established strongly institutionalised policies, attitudes and interests. As both the Simanjiro and Mkomazi cases illustrate, these policies are frequently inimical to local interests. These also tend to prevail in spite of the use of community conservation rhetoric. Community conservation can often be just the same as past wildlife conservation approaches dressed in different guises. However, different guises will do little to change local attitudes towards protected areas. People's experiences of resource loss and forced evictions have fostered a position of mistrust and resistance to anything called 'conservation'.

Local people lack access to information concerning government policies and international trends towards community conservation. Their impressions of conservation are based on first hand experience and word of mouth. The establishment of protected areas has lead to the criminalisation of activities that are undertaken on a daily basis to make a living from resources they regarded as their own. Their relationship with protected area authorities is usually antagonistic and one that is marked by harassment and exploitation.

In light of the prevailing mood of communities surrounding protected areas, the two approaches to community conservation described in this text will face different problems. Benefit-sharing approaches are likely to meet the severest obstacles. Neumann's analyses of the origins and practices of some early community conservation practices in East Africa suggest that this could be a difficult task (1997). This is because they have to wrestle with the contradiction of creating good relations between local people and the authorities who evicted them to create a protected area. Authorities have to try and ensure that benefits offered at least match the costs incurred. Matching losses with benefits can be hard if local people depend on gazetted resources to survive and prosper.

Community-based conservation does not always have to face that contradiction, because it depends on resources within community control.[26] However, it must result in people so benefiting from wildlife that they desire its continued existence.

> *"if wildlife is permitted to contribute meaningfully to their welfare, people will not be able to afford to lose it in their battle for survival. If wildlife does not contribute significantly to their well-being, people will not be able to afford to preserve it, except as a tourist curiosity in a few protected areas."* (Child, quoted in Murphree 1996:177)

Murphree further observes that the essential issue concerning 'wildlife and sustainable development' is one of development (1996:161). The prime goal has to be enhancement of people's development and livelihoods (Ghimire and Pimbert, 1996). Conservation objectives may be achieved as a consequence of this general advance.

[26] In practice community conservation programmes often border protected areas and so have to deal with issues of denying resources to local people.

Gamassa also argues that wildlife conservation needs to be incorporated into 'mainstream resource management'. He recognises that this will be a slow process, but notes that this must be predicated upon enabling local communities to obtain economic benefit from wildlife:

> *"survival of wildlife will require its integration in the socio-economic needs of the local community. Wildlife must pay its way to be accepted by the local community."* (1993b: 9)

For community-based projects to work, they must give people authority over resources. This requires that people control resources and areas of land. A prime issue is, therefore, how to provide secure tenure in a way that enhances people's lives and encourages sustainable use of wildlife resources.

The data from this study suggest that attempts to bring in community conservation face considerable problems if resource deprivation and land alienation have led to impoverishment. In addition, they must tackle the legacy of poor relations from previous initiatives. This makes it yet more important for community conservation initiatives to take place within an environment of secure tenure over land and resources held by villagers. The absence of this lies at the root of many of the problems.

In the study area, and for pastoral peoples in particular, tenure arrangements which provide for livelihood security need to allow flexible usufruct rights by which people can survive in dry environments. The consistent recommendation of much research is that pastoralists need to be given more flexibility and scope for mobility (Table 6, page 65).

Table 6: Recommendations made about pastoral land tenure

Observation and Recommendation	Source
Flexible movement a necessary feature of pastoralism on semi-arid lands. Flexible and secure tenure is required to support this.	Scoones, 1995
Alienation of pastoral land is a serious problem. Many government officials view pastoralism as backward, and their lands as relatively unused. Few of the organisations dealing with land consider the interests of local groups and people first. To safeguard lands, customary rights should be given legal backing and provide *"the basis for establishing recognised boundaries for the purposes of registration and titling"* (p. 34). Such boundaries cannot be drawn up on the basis of ethnicity.	Ndagala, 1994
Opportunistic grazing and high mobility are essential in arid and semi-arid areas. Pastoralists must be able to move with the rains and structure their herds to maximise offtake for survival in uncertain environments. Governments need to strengthen institutions for conflict management and provide information and legal support for weaker groups.	Lane and Moorehead, 1995
Pastoralism on the Maasai steppe has been generally compatible with wildlife conservation. *"pastoralists [should] receive exclusive leasehold right of occupancy in consideration of their traditional or communal land rights. The government should actively collaborate with traditional institutions, and try to facilitate the evolution of ... resource management systems from a grass roots level"* (p. 84).	Mwalyosi, 1994
Rangeland resources need to be managed and owned by their users but not divided into separate territories. Users will then be able to take advantage of their patchy resources spatially variable resources. Local government authorities need to be involved in conflict meditation between different users.	Behnke and Kerven, 1994

Community conservation and the Land Commission

The Land Commission's recommendations on land tenure marry with current thinking on community conservation. It argued that security of village land tenure should be strengthened. This means ensuring that village lands are not easily alienated to outsiders.

It recommended that there be two sorts of land tenure – 'village land' under the control of village councils, and 'national lands' under the control of the President. The former should be independent of the President. Ceilings were to be placed on the amount of land that could be given away by Village Councils and it suggested procedures to ensure transparency in land allocation. In particular, the Village Assembly, a meeting of all adults in the village, would have considerable powers over land allocation. These recommendations try to ensure that villages and local 'communities' remain in control of their resource base. This represents a shift from normal development priorities, which have depended upon facilitating investment by businesses and industry, with the associated alienation of land.

The principle guiding the Commission's investigations and recommendation is that local people should control the benefits deriving from the use of their land and resources:

> *" .Tanzania is a country of the smallholder (the peasant and the herdsman). .. Tanzania must feed itself, which means first and foremost, the peasantry must feed itself and secondly, feed the country. .. The investor from outside the village community, whether foreign or local, has little interest in investing in food production for the domestic market. His interest lies in high rates of profits in the first place, rapid returns in the second place and accumulation of his profits in a 'safe' haven outside in the third place. Such an investor is unlikely to produce food, and even if he does, he will produce it for the temperate export markets regardless of the need at home. Moreover his access to land has more often than not been at the expense of the food growing local peasantry or livestock holding pastoralists who consequently find themselves without food."* (URT, 1991:137, see also Box 13, page 67)

Murphree similarly argues that sustainable development of wildlife resources must depend on the devolution of power over resources to local communal property regimes. He states:

> *" .. there is no viable alternative to systems which devolve the authority and responsibility to use wildlife sustainably to communal regimes with strong proprietary rights."* (1996:177)

In advocating devolution of control over natural resources to communities, Murphree argues that this may give control of resources to those who are the *de facto* managers. As he states:

> *"For those with the conservation objective, the message is that the relinquishment rather than the retention of spurious control is the means to attain it."* (*ibid*: 177)

If the 'new' managers then benefit from such resources, this could further conservation goals.

The Land Commission goes further than advocating devolution of power over resources. It advocates that lost resources be returned to pastoralists and agricultural smallholders (Box 14, page 68). Given the land and resource loss that local production systems has suffered, the goal of greater security and flexibility can only be achieved by giving people more access to more resources more often. In practice, it will have to include restoring permanent or temporary (i.e. seasonal) access to lands lost to conservation and large-scale agriculture.

There is a school of thought which holds that the resource pressures being felt throughout Africa are largely the result of high rates of population growth. This view informs a large number of conservationists, development planners and policy-makers who argue that redistribution of land or increased access to protected areas can have no lasting impact on resource pressures as this does not solve the central problem of large numbers of children.

However, population pressure on resources in this area derives from two sources: land alienation and natural increase of population. They tend to operate simultaneously, but to different extents and with different results in different areas. Given the variation and

complexity of these processes, claims made about the primacy of one over another are questionable without support from empirical data.[27]

Rural communities can and do adapt to sudden changes, such as land alienation. However, the rapidity of the change can make adaptation harder. The nature of pressure on resources resulting from gradual population increase is qualitatively different from that arising from sudden and extensive land alienation. The effects of natural increases are felt over generations at a rate of change that facilitates adaptation.

Box 13: Recommendations on land alienation by the Presidential Land Commission

The thinking of the Land Commission is apparent in their recommendations about what should be done about land alienation by central government or by corrupt village officials:

Alienations by central government - Royal Sluis Farm.

Royal Sluis lands were given to the company by former President Mwinyi. The Commission reports villagers' feelings about this alienation. It quotes the testimony of a government Party Youth Chairman (village not disclosed), who, in talking about the Royal Sluis Company and Tanzania Cattle Products (a company which has since been evicted from neighbouring Moipo ward): *"implored [government officials] to remember that the people's voice is God's voice and that normally people choose freedom and justice rather than suppression and mistreatment"* (URT, 1993: 21). He pointed out that the most disappointing thing was that *"the villagers were not consulted on this issue and that Regional and national land authorities approved the alienation,"* and went on to say that once the *"foreign exchange had been paid, villagers were evicted by force and lost their appeal to higher authorities."*

The Commission makes the recommendations that land should be alienated only by the village-level executive, and then only with the approval of the Village Assembly. It points out that by putting all land under the authority of the executive branch of government, large tracts of land can be alienated without the consent of the communities that will be most affected. It calls into question the policy of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation by pointing out that foreign exchange is of little value if it is obtained through a process which creates widespread food insecurity in rural areas. It also be noted that central government is too distant to make appropriate and well-informed decisions about resource use and allocation of land in remote areas.

In addition, it observes that if communities are to benefit from commercial agriculture then the enterprises must make meaningful contributions to local livelihoods. They should have defined responsibilities towards local communities. Possible sharing of resources that could be considered with the Royal Sluis Farm includes grazing stubble and browse on bean fields. The argument constantly made by local people is that if outsiders are going to make a profit from their lands, then they need to put something back. The question then needs to be answered; should such use be negotiated it would need to be subject to a village by-law?

/.....continued

[27] One study found that population increase has been concomitant with, and has facilitated, greater productivity while actively enhancing environmental sustainability (Tiffen *et al.*, 1994).

……../cont

Alienation by Village Council – lessons from Ngoisuk

The situation in the Ngoisuk area of Naberera village is analogous to that in Lolkisale village, Monduli, which is cited extensively in Volume II of the Land Commission Report. In Lolkisale powerful and wealthy people are controlling and benefiting from the distribution of land. The Commission's report, and other relevant documents, reveal that this type of 'land grabbing' is constantly being effected in an ever-expanding area. Since all the best agricultural land in Arumeru and Kilimanjaro districts was occupied much earlier on, rich and powerful people from these areas are looking for the next most attractive place to acquire farm land. Lolkisale fitted the bill. The recent popularity of Ngoisuk is possibly related to the lack of land at Lolkisale. The Commission makes the following recommendations about this type of situation (*ibid.*: 65):

1. Outsiders could apply to become villagers. If the application is granted they could be granted a customary right of ownership known as *Hati ya Ardhi ya Mila*, in which case land holdings could not exceed a statutory ceiling of 200 acres.
2. Outsiders could surrender their rights to the village and be compensated for all unexhausted improvements and given alternative holdings from national land.
3. Outsiders could apply to the Village Assembly for 'their' land to be excised from village land and integrated into national land. This would require the approval of two-thirds of the Village Assembly.

Whilst applicable elsewhere these recommendations do not really apply to the farms in Ngoisuk. To quote the Commission:

> *"underlying all these options, the assumption would be that (the) acquisition of the land in question was lawful in the first place according to the then land law and procedure. Any dispute would eventually be resolved by reference to the competent circuit land court."* (URT, 1993: 65)

The farms at Ngoisuk are alleged to have been obtained by bribery, forging of minutes, and simple expansion. The legality of acquisition will be tested by these means in the Naberera Case in the Arusha *High Court (see Box 8, page 46).*

Box 14: Land redistribution recommended by the Presidential Commission

The Commission recommended land redistribution in crowded areas of Tanzania where there has been significant alienation of lands to large-scale agriculture. For example, according to the Commission some 18,000 people are landless in Arumeru district. The District Council was directed to settle them in Monduli and Kiteto districts (URT, 1993:9). Such resettlement is unpopular and can cause problems for those moved by the government and those living in the receiving areas. It is also possible to acquire and reallocate large farms, and/or revoke the titles of some farms and sub-divide them. District officials argue that revocation and sub-division can cause problems with the paying of compensation. Landless people complain that those who benefit from the reallocation of land are generally the wealthy and powerful.

The Commission argued against resettlement saying that *"large-scale resettlement/ relocation of the landless on lands which indigenous communities have rights is planting seeds for more problems and conflicts"* (URT, 1993:12). It also found that acquisition and reallocation of land rarely gets it to the landless because of faulty administration and corruption. There are problems of transparency and equity. It recommends that land pressure in Arumeru should be dealt with as a matter of land reform. Previous work had already identified the lands which could be acquired and redistributed. This exercise should not be left in the hands of the local government, but carried out by an autonomous body, the Land Reform Unit of the National Lands Commission. Redistribution procedures should be open and transparent and completed within a specific period of time (*ibid.*:13).

Resource management in villages

The central recommendation of the Land Commission is that power over land and resources be held in villages. There are a number of reasons observed in our fieldwork that corroborate this view:

1. Villages are already in place and have a long history in post-independence development strategies.
2. They are flexible units. Through by-laws resource use practices can be moulded to fit locally defined needs and desires.
3. They are institutionally consistent. Villages everywhere have the same administrative make-up, which facilitates inter-village co-operation.
4. Regional management could be implemented by means of co-ordinated by-laws in clusters of neighbouring villages. There is a precedent for supra-village co-operation in Simanjiro.
5. Village boundaries are political, not economic boundaries, and have little impact on extensive pastoral resource use.

However, some researchers and academics are wary about giving power to these institutions. This programme, begun in the late 1960s, first voluntarily then forcibly, led to the concentration of dispersed rural populations in villages. Villages were to apply for their lands to be surveyed and granted for 999-year leases, control being vested in Village Councils. Lane and Moorehead cite ways in which villagisation obstructed migration patterns and limited the mobility of pastoralists. They argue that village lands are unlikely to cover ecological units and so could disrupt pastoral resource management (1995).

However, villagisation has not been damaging in this research area because it was not so rigorously or extensively pursued. It did not have as great an impact on settlement patterns as

it did elsewhere. Second, the fact that village lands do not cover ecological units is currently immaterial as movement beyond villages is an integral part of pastoral resource use.

Mwalyosi (1994) writes that traditional Maasai resource management was 'supplanted' by villagisation. He argues that the young men appointed as village chairmen and secretaries, usually from outside the area, were not motivated to conserve local resources or manage them appropriately. As a result resource management practices declined.

Our data does not support Mwalyosi's observation. Traditional management of pastures and grazing patterns do still exist. As Ndelelya (1994) and Ndagala (1992) demonstrate, pastoralists do not practise *"unsystematic ways of moving their animals in search of pasture and water"*, as Mwalyosi contends (*ibid*:86). It may well have been the case that traditional management was supplanted in the 1970s, but it has now recovered at least to the extent that it remains a powerful force. The Village Council members are no longer young outsiders, but often elders from the local communities.

Parallels in Kenya

Galaty has reviewed the problems of pastoral land tenure and the experiences of Maasai Group Ranches in Kenya (Galaty, 1980, 1994a, 1994b; Galaty *et al.*, 1994). This has important lessons for land tenure debates in Tanzania. In some ways the situation in Kenya is similar to Tanzania, but there are important differences between land management in Group Ranches and villages.

Galaty initially regarded Group Ranches as providing security to Maasai pastoralists in the face of increasing individual titling and privatisation of rangelands and government appropriation (1980). However, he also saw that they would not add to the traditional institutions governing rangeland management. He foresaw that they would have substance only by virtue of Maasai institutions that were operating anyway: sections, age-set relations, stock partnerships and lineage ties.

Since his early writings Group Ranches have been sub-divided, with the committees granting members title deeds to portions of the land. This has eroded the integrity of the ranches. Furthermore, there have been conflicts over which sons of committee members should be granted membership. A combination of pressures for individuals to gain access to land encouraged sub-division and opting out of ranches while they still had meaningful territories to divide. The process was complicated by a Presidential decree abolishing the ranches and ordering that they should be divided up, and by corruption in the Ministry of Lands and in ranch committees that has seen numerous wealthy outsiders, with no right to land, receiving title deeds.[28]

Some Maasai deed-holders decided to liquidate their assets and sell the land. One of the main reasons title deeds are sought by outsiders is for use as collateral for loans. Once the loan is acquired, the land is left to be sequestrated by the creditor. It may not actually be used by

[28] Galaty reports from Loodoariak Group Ranch as follows: *"land adjudication officers, in collaboration with the group chairman, did register approximately 360 outsiders, among them high level civil servants from the Ministry of Lands and Settlements, the wife of the Minister, and other rich and influential persons .. This group was allocated approximately 20,000 hectares. About 450 legitimate Maasai residents were also registered, which left approximately 2,000 Maasai pastoralists off the register. Although many went landless, members of the land committee, the 'trustees' of the group domain, received title deeds to four to five parcels of land each."* (Galaty, 1994a: 194)

them at all and pastoralism may continue, but the pastoralists have no legal right to be there and there is no legal security safeguarding their continued use.

Galaty believes the root of the problem in Kenya is land scarcity, and the presence of a land market with credit widely available and the use of land as the collateral. Group Ranches fail because their lands can be subdivided and their leadership is corruptible, and because outsiders are widely allowed to hold title deeds. They also failed to *"establish definite membership and a defined community from which members are drawn"* (Galaty, 1994b: 119), which led to problems concerning who should 'inherit' the titles and be added to the membership list. Moreover, when land was subdivided and used by pastoralists to raise loans, many of them were unable to manage those loans properly due to unfamiliarity with credit arrangements.

An important difference between Kenya and Tanzania is that the Kenyan Group Ranches have a written list of members which excludes those not on the list from ranch resources. In Tanzania there are no such restrictions on the movement of people, or on their inherited right to live in a particular place. The exclusiveness of Group Ranches has caused much ethnic conflict in Kenya which does not exist in the pastoral areas of Tanzania.

A fundamental difference is that Group Ranches are economic entities and villages are political entities. Group Ranches exist around land titles and are aimed to produce changes in the economic behaviour of pastoralists. From the outset they were exclusive; their very existence was predicated on the legal ability to deny outsiders access to their resources. Villages, on the other hand, have a multiplicity of administrative and executive roles and are set within the government hierarchy. They are by definition inclusive and give equal status to all members (each member has a vote in the Village Assembly). Group Ranches are about controlling and governing resources (and so also people); villages are about controlling and governing people (and so also resources).

Applying principles to the study area: Simanjiro

Land tenure and community organisation

Simanjiro district has seen two unique developments which are a consequence of the failed attempt to introduce the Simanjiro Conservation Area. First, most of the villages are already titled. Secondly, there is also a forum for supra-village co-operation.

Unfortunately, one result of village titling has been the misuse of power by village officials. They have accumulated personal wealth and profit from the disposal of lands that were meant to be held in trust for the whole community.

The Land Commission found frequent incidents of such abuse of power by Village Councils. However, it maintains its faith in villages as the most appropriate unit of resource management. It tries to counter corruption by recommending that land should not be alienated from the villages without the consent (66%) of the Village Assembly. This is also the implication of the Orkesumet consent decree (Box 6, page 33), although this has yet to become legal precedent. Devolution of basic power to the Village Assembly would ensure transparency.

It may also be advisable to give *vitongoji* (sub-villages) powers over the use of their lands. Villages are often large and diverse entities and it may be possible for sections within the village to slough off land loss within the village for the benefit of some people, but to the

detriment of other *kitongoji* members who would be better protected if they had power over their own resources.

This devolution of decision-making authority would mirror a widespread feature of pastoral society. Decision-making about resources is often in practice devolved to *kitongoji* (see Box 3, page 28 and Box 5, page 30 for examples, and Box 15, page 73 for a complete development of the idea). Devolution of power would give this practice a measure of official authority.

The Land Commission also observed that some form of supra-village co-ordination should be established to ensure that parochial concerns could potentially be balanced by more regional considerations. The Simanjiro Land Committee is precedent for this; although unusual and a reaction to particular historical circumstances, it is transferable. In essence, this concern derives from the extensive space occupied by pastoral societies and a mental outlook that stretches far beyond village boundaries. Supra-village committees would fit well with pastoral patterns of resource use.

Box 15: *Vitongoji* and pastoral resource management

In the course of survey work in Simanjiro district, it became clear that the allocation and management of non-titled land for local use (i.e. the majority of land) takes place at the *vitongoji* level. *Kitongoji* leaders act as a liaison between clusters of homesteads and the local state institutions in village government. They have automatic seats on the Village Council and are expected to inform their constituents of Council decisions and enforce these decisions within the *kitongoji*.

Informants indicated that decision-making within the *kitongoji* resembles that of pastoral society. Decisions are reached through a consensus of elders from associated *bomas* during extensive meetings and negotiation. In the case of Maa-speaking pastoralists, local resource use and outsider access to local resources is controlled by elders of distinct *boma* clusters. In Simanjiro district *vitongoji* have been grafted onto already existing institutions, which means that these institutions have become part of the formal state structure and *vice versa*.

People said that as a general rule *kitongoji* leaders are less corrupt than village officials. There are two reasons for this:

1. *Kitongoji* leaders are not paid. They share and understand the problems of their constituents. Village leaders, on the other hand, are salaried and derive a number of other informal benefits from their position. They are, therefore, cushioned from resource loss in a way that *kitongoji* leaders are not.
2. The policy requirements that village officials must be literate has meant that illiterate but knowledgeable elders have effectively been barred from these positions. These elders, however, do become *kitongoji* leaders and can therefore use their social position and knowledge to influence resource management at the local level.

Unfortunately *vitongoji* have only existed as a way of facilitating the control and authority of central government. They have no authority to make rules, manage or dispose of natural resources within their boundaries. Although they do all these things informally, their decisions are not binding as they are not recognised by higher levels of government.

Increasingly *vitongoji* are becoming recognised as the basic unit of decision-making by development and conservation organisations working in Simanjiro and Monduli districts (such as the Tarangire Community Conservation Service). Villages in Maasai areas tend to be large and local needs and uses are bound to differ even within village boundaries and it is more practical for the local management of natural resources to take place at the *kitongoji* level.

The flexibility of villages as political units (through by-laws) means that the devolution of authority to the *vitongoji* level would require no institutional restructuring. Local resource management and land allocation could be better made by *vitongoji* and coordinated at the village level.

Natural resource management in Simanjiro district

There are numerous interest groups concerned with natural resource management in the study area. First, there are the diverse rural peoples who manage and use most of the land. TANAPA manages Tanangire National Park, and the Department of Wildlife controls the hunting blocks and Game Controlled Areas outside the Park. There are local community-based NGOs and international NGOs which support people or conservation interests. There are powerful individuals and corporate interests who wish to use the area for commercial agriculture.

Draft policy proposals offer the possibility of reconciling these different needs and providing the appropriate forum by which villages, with the government's assistance, might control wildlife resources on their land, benefit from them, and further conservation objectives. These proposals are found in the recommendations concerning Wildlife Management Areas in the draft Policy for Wildlife Conservation.

The draft policy proposes rural people should control Wildlife Management Areas, where certain forms of wildlife use are permitted and where local communities retain a proportion of the resulting revenue. The communities would be free to use wildlife themselves or lease their rights to others. Natural Resource Committees of the Village Council would control the use of wildlife. Wildlife officials in the Department of Wildlife or of TANAPA (if near National Parks) would be encouraged to assist these committees, although hunting of wildlife would still be limited by quotas set by the Department of Wildlife.

The proposals are a clear break from the past as they offer devolution of power over natural resources to rural communities. The policy is not yet adopted, and it is not known in detail how much freedom rural people will have. However, results from an initial three year project in the Ruaha area are encouraging (Hartley, 1997; Hartley and Hunter, 1997). The Department of Wildlife has also agreed to proposals to press ahead with a pilot scheme in parts of southern Simanjiro district.

There are a number of difficulties that co-operation between rural communities and conservation officials must face. For example, the difficulties over the abortive Simanjiro Conservation Area proposal have left a legacy of poor relations between communities and conservationists. These problems and the institutional philosophy from which the original proposal resulted need to be actively tackled. Also the local communities are highly divided. Different resource users have conflicting needs; miners, charcoal burners, farmers and pastoralists use land differently and have different perspectives.

There are also potential problems in the balance of control in Wildlife Management Areas. It is yet to be seen how much influence rural groups will have over the use of land in these Areas. There is a risk that they could become just another means by which the state, or conservationists, impose their agendas on rural people. Communities will need to have strong and clearly defined powers that give them ultimate authority over their land within the framework of national legislation (Neumann, forthcoming).

Wildlife Management Areas are primarily concerned with wildlife and not with more general natural resource use. This means that areas with fewer wild animals far from the main migration routes may receive less attention. The attention paid to wildlife and the income generated also removes emphasis from supporting economic production and development. The main recommendation of Murphree and others is that conservation needs to follow as a

consequence of development. In pastoral areas, promoting the development of pastoralism would also promote a land use broadly compatible with wildlife.

The Community Conservation Service of TANAPA has been criticised for not doing enough to support pastoralism in the hinterlands of the Serengeti and Tarangire National Parks (Kipuri and Nangoro, 1996). Kipuri and Nangoro argue that pastoralism is the form of land use most compatible with wildlife outside the Parks. However, no intervention around Tarangire has been of direct benefit to livestock keepers. Basic needs for livestock watering facilities, dips and reliable veterinary services have not been met. The result is that the projects:

> *"are yet to contribute to the security of livelihoods of pastoralists, reduce poverty and improve the quality of life for the concerned communities."* (1996: 36)

An additional means by which the Community Conservation Service could support pastoralism is by becoming actively involved in advocacy on behalf of pastoralists who are fighting land claims. For example, some farms in Loibor Serrit were stopped by an alliance between Maasai elders and TANAPA officials (see Box 16). If TANAPA were to get more involved in tackling the loss of pastoral land to commercial farming, it would be seen to be doing something of value to pastoralists.

This would require the Tarangire Community Conservation Service to look far beyond its boundaries and consider all the pressures on pastoralists in the area. It would entail lobbying against land alienations beyond its immediate borders. The Community Conservation Service at Tarangire has written position papers on the threats posed by some of these farming projects. If it were to go further and lobby publicly for its own and pastoral interests, it would be reaching out to the communities in the way they want it to. It might be possible, for example, to use SCIP resources to fund, jointly with local communities, legal action against illegal land alienation (c.f. Box 16, page 76).

Ultimately, the Service's benefit sharing approach will always fall foul of the contradiction that it demands good neighbourliness from people who have been evicted from their lands. Kipuri and Nangoro observe that tensions at Tarangire are exacerbated because wildlife depend on pastoral areas for their survival. They quote one elder who stated:

> *"When (the wildlife) come to our area, we do not bother them, but when our cattle go to TANAPA side, even during serious droughts, we are charged and sometimes jailed. This does not indicate that they want to establish good neighbourliness with us."* (1996: 45)

In pastoral societies good neighbourliness means reciprocal access to resources. That is the principle that governs extensive pastoral herding systems. The logic of terms such as 'good neighbourliness', or 'partners in conservation' is to offer neighbouring communities access to Park resources. Then the Community Conservation Service and local communities would be partners on equal terms, negotiating about each other's land rather than just village territories.

Box 16: Alliances between local interests and TANAPA

In around 1994 a number of farms, totalling hundreds of thousands of acres, were given title under the supervision of the former chairman of Loibor Serrit village. The legality of the titles was questionable. Certainly the process was not transparent to the villagers concerned. The farms were being sought by four companies/individuals including the infamous Stein lease (which apparently penetrated down into the northern part of the village from Emboret).

Fortunately, influential elders became aware of these matters and intervened to stop the farms. Notably, they recruited TANAPA who pointed out that the farms were close to the park and would disrupt wildlife migration routes. This coalition of influential elders and TANAPA was successful in preventing the farms. The corrupt chairman was ultimately ousted and the new village chairman informed the speculators that the land was no longer available.

This case is notable because of the fact that several influential elders were able to override the wishes of the village government (more specifically the village chairman). It indicates that traditional leaders and elders can still bring pressure to bear on government officials. It is also important that the elders recognised that these large-scale farms were not in their interests, nor those of the wider community, nor those of wildlife conservation. These individuals fall into Shivji's definition of 'kulaks' - the wealthier individuals in the community, the types of entrepreneur who can drive rural economic development in Tanzania. It is significant that these individuals are still heavily dependent on traditional systems of production, especially through management of the commons. In addition, they are bound by social ties and accepted norms to cater for the best interests of the wider community and of specific individuals within this community. This has been their role in Maasai society from time immemorial.

Another encouraging aspect of this case in Loibor Serrit is the alliance that was struck with TANAPA. By pointing out that people were surveying farms in the established (if not exactly legal) buffer zone, they ensured TANAPA were put into a position of having to do something. The Tarangire Community Conservation Service talks regularly about being opposed to the large-scale farms (especially around Lolkisale, Loibor Soit, and Emboret). In this case their rhetoric became reality.

This is currently not legally possible in Tanzania. National Parks are gazetted to create and preserve 'wilderness'. They allow no human use or habitation. Innovative thinkers are arguing that this is not necessary, that multiple land use can work. They emphasise that it would still entail safeguarding 'no-go' areas, strict enforcement of rules and close guarding of endangered species. They observe that shared use could be restricted to certain key times, such as dry seasons and droughts, when resources in the parks are most needed. However, the pressure to tackle fundamental injustices that can underlie gazettement of protected areas is growing. As Ghimire and Pimbert put it:

> *"The present models (of protected areas) are simply not designed to combine amelioration of local ecology and livelihoods; and they ignore their own social sustainability."* (1997: 38)

Recommendations for Mkomazi Game Reserve

Currently, both conservation efforts and local development face difficulties. Conservation policies have impoverished significant sections of the local population. This bodes ill for the long term future of the Reserve and has resulted in confrontational legal action. At the time of writing, the Wildlife Department and pastoral NGOs were locked in a high profile conflict, with neither willing to back down. Meanwhile, private conservation organisations attempt to

push through their projects with funding from the US and Europe. Rogers *et al.* articulate the dilemma of the Reserve by looking to its future:

> *"What might Mkomazi be like ten years from now? The scenario from the viewpoint of a conservation optimist might be that the international scientific presence will be maintained, that international conservation funds will continue to flow, that a much reduced Game Reserve staff will function effectively to limit illegal use of Reserve resources, and that revenue from tourism and hunting, though inevitably low, will be put to such good use that the Reserve-adjacent communities will give the Reserve their wholehearted support.*
>
> *"A more pessimistic view would see the scientific presence in Mkomazi coming to an end and the decline and eventual cessation of international conservation funds. The reduced Game Reserve staff would be unable to exercise effective control. With rising pressure to trespass on Reserve resources, increasingly punitive measures for those cases that are pursued would generate corruption and antagonism, while failing to stem resource degradation, possibly even eliciting vengeance targeting of conservation values."* (Rogers *et al.*, forthcoming: 28)

The consequence of these problems is that any attempt to promote good relations between the Reserve and the people faces severe problems. Attempts at reconciliation need to involve compromise based on comprehensive consultation. In the judgement of Homewood *et al.* (1997) the compromise must involve some form of shared use by people and wildlife. The revenue generated by the Reserve is too low and the number of people involved too numerous for benefit-sharing to work well. The buffer zone between the Reserve borders and the mountains is too narrow to provide wildlife for the people living there. There is little prospect of local communities hunting their own wildlife outside the Reserve, as might occur if Wildlife Management Areas were established around the Reserve. Wildlife populations in the area are too low to sustain hunting. Homewood *et al.* conclude:

> *"It is clear that several factors limit revenue accruing to the Reserve and the ability of communities to benefit from that revenue. As the interest of the government is to foster community conservation, and to create good relations with villagers living around the Reserve other ways to enable communities to benefit from Reserve resources must be investigated. ... It is difficult to envisage negotiation and community involvement that does not have some form of zoning allowing access to resources currently within the protected area."* (1997: 66)

Shared use of natural resources has been a constant aspect of Mkomazi's history, both in actual terms and in proposals for its management. Many, though not all, who have assessed the Reserve in terms of its neighbours' needs have advocated this (Table 7).

Shared resource use in game reserves is legally possible and can be permitted at the discretion of the Department of Wildlife.[29] This gives the Department a powerful bargaining chip in its

[29] For example, in Ugalla Game Reserve, beekeepers are allowed to hang hives in the Reserve and harvest them four times a year. Fishing is also allowed.

dealings with local communities which could make compromises, diffuse conflict, and improve relations with them. Shared use has been practised and recommended many times in the past.

Unfortunately, there are severe constraints on the capacity of the Department of Wildlife which limit its ability to foster and develop good relations with communities near to protected areas (Wildlife Sector Review, 1995). It does not have an equivalent to TANAPA's Community Conservation Service and it lacks the resources to train and develop an equivalent body. TANAPA is a parastatal, whereas it is a government department within the Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and the Environment. TANAPA has a more secure financial status as it is not entirely dependent on central government funding.

In sum, there is potential for compromise and reconciliation through multiple use. The plans piloted at the Ugalla Game Reserve (footnote 29) and being discussed as a Wildlife Management Area, show that the Department of Wildlife can achieve progress and compromise notwithstanding the difficulties. However, any compromises need to involve all the different interest groups. A problem with current publicity surrounding Mkomazi is that it tends to deal mainly with pastoral interests (c.f. Johnston, 1996; Juma, 1996). Although the pastoral economy has been severely affected, pastoralists only constitute a minority, and to focus on them alone will yield less than satisfactory results.

In part the recent attention on pastoralists is due to the high profile given to the court cases. The implications of the court case are immense. At stake are the rights of the government to evict people from Game Reserves anywhere it pleases and of Tanzanians everywhere to control and manage resources they perceive to be theirs. Consequently, attention no longer centres on what is best for the Reserve and its neighbours. Balancing ecological, administrative and economic considerations specific to Mkomazi has fallen by the wayside. This is now a test case with national implications. Given what is legally possible at Mkomazi, what has been recommended previously, and the trends in conservation generally, it is regrettable for both sides that negotiation and pragmatism seem no longer possible.

In advocating negotiation we are not arguing that the rights of local people to resources in their environment are not important. We are stating that if community conservation is to be a meaningful exercise, it cannot be based on the demand for, or denial of, absolute rights to resources on the part of either the state or local communities. It needs to be based on a common desire to conserve resources by all stakeholders. It needs to be based on managing resources to promote lasting prosperity. If different definitions of resources, resource management and conservation are to be reconciled, this needs to be done by negotiation and compromise.

A positive effect of the court cases is that they can hasten the onset of negotiation. Out-of-court negotiations are normal practice in most civil suits. With pending civil suits as a bargaining counter, evicted pastoralists are in a position to approach the government on a more equal footing. If other groups around the Reserve were included, the stage would be set for lasting and acceptable compromise to be reached.

Table 7: Previous recommendations about Mkomazi Game Reserve

(This is not a comprehensive list of all that has been said about the Reserve. However, it does represent a spectrum of opinions and the key events in its history)

Date	Person	Situation	Recommendation/Action	Expressed opinion	Source
1952	D. Anstey, Game Warden, Tanga.	When gazetting the Reserve he found some pastoralists in Lushoto District.	Established a list of pastoralists who were to be allowed to live in the area.	*"Their traditional system of wet and dry season grazing was the way the nomadic clans of Maasai had evolved in reasonable tune with the environment ... their cattle not only did no damage to wildlife but the effect on the grasses etc. seemed to increase the wildlife carrying capacity."*	Personal comm. 5/8/1996
1953	D. Anstey	20-30,000 head of cattle included in original reserve boundaries	Excised an area of land for Kalimawe Game Controlled Area.	NA	TNA File 6/1/ vol. 3
1966, 1968	D. Anstey	Following up studies done on overgrazing outside the Game Reserve and alarm expressed at stocking rates in and around the Reserve.	Destocking, by relocation of large herds to other areas of Maasailand and the establishment of sustainable stocking rates. Removal of pastoralists.	*"If we are ever to save this land from total collapse now is the time to act."*	URT TA/GD /G.10/16/ 22/19.
1966	M. R. Kundya - Tanga Regional Commissioner	Responding to the 1966 request to clear all Maasai pastoralists from MGR.	Writes to the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Wildlife. Requests direction as to how this can be done..	*"I would be most grateful if you could advise on how the above resolution could be put into practice."*	G1/7/192.
1968	M. Mwaimu - Lushoto Dep. Game Warden.	Came across many unlisted people trying to verify the list of legal residents.	Expanded the list.	NA	URT TA/GD/ G10/22/193
1970	I. Parker D. Archer -	Reporting an economic valuation of different Reserve	Degazette the Reserve, give it over to the Parakuyo for a modern cattle	*"As Mkomazi has potential for beef, why not throw it open to the Kwavi (Parakuyo) and*	Parker and Archer 1970

Date	Person	Situation	Recommendation/Action	Expressed opinion	Source
	Wildlife Services Ltd.	uses - tourism, hunting or ranching	ranch of some 13,000 head.	*other pastoralists letting them produce the cattle of the Range?"*	
1976	H. R. Mwamba - Mkomazi Game Reserve Warden	Meeting with pastoralists to consider what to do about their westward expansion.	All pastoralists permitted to stay	NA	URT DSG / f/40 / 1/77
1976	I. Ibeun - CAWM student	Management plan written as part of post-graduate Diploma requirements.	Allow pastoralism in the eastern half of the Reserve.	NA	Ibeun 1976
1983	J. Mangubuli - CAWM student, now a zoologist at the University of Dar es Salaam.	Management plan written as part of post-graduate Diploma requirements.	Evict all pastoralists and establish the Reserve as a special national project. Establish grazing controls outside the Reserve.	NA	Mangubuli 1983.
1988	Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism.	Letter to all concerned at Mkomazi to state the government's position.	Reconfirmed the final revocation of permission to live inside the Reserve.	*"This decision was arrived at with the intention of saving this wilderness and thus making it possible to arrange a development plan so that it can contribute completely to the purse of the Nation as well as conserving the original game who were there."*	URT GD/18/R/8/226
1990	M. Zacharia - Department of Wildlife	Dissertation written as part of Masters degree	Return pastoralists to the eastern half of the Reserve.	NA	Zacharia 1990
1992	H. Fosbrooke - Sociologist and former conservator	Reported on the plight of the pastoralists	Return the pastoralists to the Reserve.	*"Urgent Government action is required to rectify the social injustice, economic loss and negative national impact arising from the*	Interim report to IIED.

Date	Person	Situation	Recommendation/Action	Expressed opinion	Source
	of NCA and consultant to the Presidential Land Commission.			*mishandling of the human/ wildlife relationship in the Mkomazi Game Reserve."*	
1993	Kemal Mustafa - Sociologist, University of Dar es Salaam.	Report prepared on the plight of the pastoralists for IIED	Allow pastoralists to use the Reserve.	*"Interests of pastoralists and wildlife can both be met within a coherent conservation strategy based on participatory management and just use of pastoral resources. Failure to pursue such a course will, it is suggested, lead to continued and more hostile social conflict to the ultimate detriment of conservation values."*	Mustafa 1997
1994	Ibrahim Juma and Sifuni Mchome - Advocates.	Taking up the pastoralists' case for Ilaramatak Lorkonerei as the Legal Aid Committee of Dar es Salaam University.	The evictions were unconstitutional as pastoralists were lawful occupiers of MGR. The eviction decisions should be quashed.	*"(We submit) that these were customary land rights existing in the area declared to be MGR. These customary land rights were never extinguished under the Fauna Conservation Ordinance 1952 or Wildlife Conservation Act 1974 or even the Land Acquisition Act 1967."*	Juma and Mchome 1994

CAWM: College of African Wildlife Management
NCA: Ngorongoro Conservation Area
IIED: International Institute for Environment and Development

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have argued that alienation of land has caused deprivation locally and reduced options for pastoralists regionally. We suggested that local management of resources is strong. The strength of local organisation is partly visible in the many ways in which smallholders, far from being passive victims to alienation, are contesting and challenging the evictions.

We have argued that Tanzania's current approach to conservation and modernisation of the agricultural sector has its roots in the colonial era and the structural adjustment process initiated in the mid-1980s. These policies were adopted with little concern for local needs and food procurement strategies. By continuing to implement them, the government is able to do little to alleviate the problems of the rural population.

When in 1991 the Land Commission made its extensive tour of the country, it found that rural Tanzanians were predominantly dissatisfied with this situation. Rural food producers, who are the vast majority of Tanzania's population, continue to be displaced and dispossessed by large scale agriculture and alienated for conservation projects. They bear the brunt of the costs of these projects, while gaining few if any of the benefits.

The same process that has brought about economic liberalisation has also engendered political liberalisation and a multi-party system for Tanzania. Liberalisation has given rise to a plethora of NGOs which are now operating throughout Tanzania. It is through such organisations that some of the dissatisfaction of Tanzanian citizens with current land tenure policy and practice finds public expression. A number of these groups are actively involved in drafting alternative land tenure legislation, as well as in policy planning for community conservation (see Shivji, 1998).

Tanzanian policy makers have begun to rethink the country's land tenure and conservation policies. There are currently two new pieces of draft legislation which have significance for land tenure and conservation in Tanzania. The first of these is the National Land Bill which was drafted with the aid of the Department of International Development of the British Government; the second is the draft Wildlife Conservation Policy which has received input from international conservation organisations such as the African Wildlife Foundation among others.

Both of these pieces of draft legislation have the potential to improve conditions for many people in rural Tanzania. The Land Bill includes measures to strengthen the pastoral sector as well as village control over village land.[30] The draft Wildlife Conservation Policy makes provisions for WMAs which could potentially give people more control over wildlife resources in their areas.

Both these bills, however, are being opposed by land rights advocacy NGOs. The main criticism that these groups make of the bills is that they do not give people enough control over land or the natural resources on which they depend for their livelihoods. The Land Bill,

[30] The report was presented in the form of a draft bill, but did not constitute a piece of draft legislation. The report makes provision for agreements between pastoralists and non-pastoralists over access to grazing to be approved by the Village Council (Clause 107), pastoral organisations can also negotiate with village councils for use of land (Clause 107 sub part 4 of part 7). Provision is also made for joint village land use (Clause 59).

for example, vests radical title in the President who retains extensive powers of alienation. The crucial issue of who wields what power in WMAs remains undefined.

In spite of these shortcomings, this draft legislation does provide some opportunities for rural populations to improve their standard of living in certain contexts. For instance, the establishment of WMAs in Simanjiro could have a significant impact on the lives of people in this district. However, in other areas, such as Mkomazi, these opportunities are almost non-existent.

The prevailing situation at Mkomazi indicates that legislation is not the only variable affecting rural land management systems in Tanzania. In this case, legislation already exists which could potentially allow people more access to land and natural resources. In spite of this, people are still denied access to resources. The defining variables at Mkomazi are the policy of the Department of Wildlife for this particular Reserve, and the involvement of various interest groups and individuals. A solution to this situation must be specific to the unique history, economy, and cultures of Mkomazi.

In response to the problems at Mkomazi and Simanjiro, NGO leaders have launched several programmes of 'community organising' and 'consciousness raising'. They argue that communities which are well organised and which understand their rights will be better equipped to hold government officials accountable and to demand more equitable access to natural resources.

Thus far, this approach has not been very effective. People in some areas are now painfully aware of the nature of their problems, but it is difficult to represent the full diversity of interests found within a single 'community'. Also 'capacity building' tends to be based on sporadic events, rather than the development of sustainable programmes. The pressures of day-to-day life preclude meaningful lobbying and advocacy capacities. The voices of these communities continue to be channelled through a few, mostly educated, élites.

An additional obstruction to meaningful community conservation is institutional inertia in the relevant organs of the Tanzanian state. The institutions with the authority and resources to bring about the kinds of change which communities seek have had little experience of operating with extensive and thoroughly consultative methods. They are not really accountable to the people whose lives they so profoundly influence. Currently, the mechanisms through which local groups can communicate with policy makers and attempt to influence practice in particular areas are undefined. In spite of legislation and improved 'capacity building', groups around Mkomazi have little recourse to institutions that will be responsive to their plight.[31]

There is also the danger that local groups will become commodities, rather than participants, of community conservation. With the level of funding for community conservation increasing every year, so too the number of organisations and individuals involved has begun

[31] For much of the Reserve's history there was considerable consultation between local groups and wildlife officials who met each other to discuss their needs and resource use possibilities (Rogers *et al.*, forthcoming). This appears to have ended with the evictions. Recently, there have been both encouraging and discouraging developments. The Director of Wildlife personally visited villagers at Kisiwani village in 1997 after they wrote to him with a number of grievances. However, a more recent 'community planning' meeting to discuss a new management plan involved very few villagers or village representatives and gave local groups little chance to express and formulate their ideas.

to proliferate. In order to be recognised as legitimate 'stake holders', these people must be able to claim that they have local support. This could lead to various institutions (both government and non-government) vying for a mandate with little meaningful consequence. Communities are talked about and represented at various levels by different groups without necessarily becoming participants in the negotiations themselves.

In the final analysis, the implementation of community conservation in Tanzania will be a long and complicated process. It will require the gradual reversal of historical processes and institutional cultures which are premised upon centralised control over natural resources. It will require flexible policies and institutions which are able to respond to a myriad of situations in a variety of local contexts.

Ultimately, rural people will have little interest in community conservation without increased control over land and natural resources. Both the Land Commission and advocates of community conservation recommend policies and programmes which enhance community control over natural resources, as well as local resource management systems. Such an approach pre-supposes the devolution of authority to use and manage natural resources and allow local groups to enter negotiations over resources as equal partners with the prospect of real gain.

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APPENDIX: MAPS

Map 1: The area studied



Map 2: The geography of the region



Map 3: The location of the fieldwork



Map 4: The Simanjiro study area



Map 5: Loibor Serrit village



Map 6: Naberera village



Map 7: Sukoro village



Map 8: Pastoral resource use in Mkomazi Game Reserve before eviction



Map 9: The location of siblings who were evicted from Mkomazis



Map 10: Where pastoralists from Ruvu Valley have gone in droughts



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