

Governance Assessment for Protected and Conserved Areas (GAPA)

Early experience of a multi-
stakeholder methodology for
enhancing equity and effectiveness

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We are increasingly recognising that governance is key to enhancing the effectiveness, equity and sustainability of conservation efforts. There is abundant literature on the theory of governance and conservation practitioners are increasingly familiar with the concepts of accountability, effective participation and equitable benefit sharing. But what do these terms mean in the context of conservation? How do you assess strengths and challenges with respect to these concepts at a particular site in a way that encourages key stakeholders to work together to improve the situation? This report describes a multi-stakeholder approach to governance assessment where the stakeholders do the assessment. In it, we unpack the key concepts, review existing assessment approaches on which our approach is based, present the results of applying the assessment in Bangladesh, the Philippines, Kenya and Uganda and discuss our learning from this experience.

Contents

Acronyms	5
Summary	6
1 Background	11
1.1 Introduction	11
1.2 Governance in a PA/CA context	12
1.3 Equity and its relationship with governance	13
1.4 Policy context	15
1.5 IUCN Green List	15
2 GAPA – an overview	16
2.1 Good governance principles	17
2.2 Assessment process	17
2.3 Methods and tools	17
2.4 Roles in the GAPA process	20
3 Overview of GAPA results from six sites	21
3.1 Sundarbans Mangrove Forest, Bangladesh	21
3.2 Kalama Conservancy, Kenya	24
3.3 Agusan Marsh Wildlife Reserve, Philippines	26
3.4 Mara North Conservancy, Kenya	28
3.5 Kanamai co-management area and <i>tengefu</i> , Kenya	31
3.6 Lake Mburo National Park, Uganda	33
4 Synthesis of experience and results from six sites	36
4.1 Governance challenges	36
4.2 Ideas for action	41
5 Applying the GAPA methodology: lessons learnt	44
5.1 Under what conditions is GAPA appropriate?	44
5.2 Limited understanding of key governance concepts and terms	45
5.3 Who to engage when	45
5.4 Can we quantify and aggregate GAPA results?	46
5.5 Advantages and disadvantages of open questioning	46
5.6 Getting to root causes	47
5.7 Accuracy of results	47
5.8 Differences between GAPA and the IUCN guidelines processes	48
6 Framework of good governance principles and themes	50
7 Conclusion	53
References	54
Appendices	
Appendix 1: Good governance principles and themes for protected areas	55
Appendix 2: Inventory of governance methodologies and tools	58

Acronyms

AGM	annual general meeting
AMWS	Agusan Marsh Wildlife Sanctuary
BDF	Bangladesh Forest Department
BLC	boat license certificate
BMU	Beach Management Unit
CA	conserved area
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CMO	co-management organisations
COP	Conference of Parties
CORDIO	Coastal Oceans Research and Development
DoF	Department of Fisheries
FPIC	free, prior and informed consent
GAPA	Governance Assessment for Protected and Conserved Areas
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IPs	indigenous peoples
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
LMMA	locally managed marine areas
LMNP	Lake Mburo National Park
LOC	landowners' committee
MNC	Mara North Conservancy
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NRT	Northern Rangelands Trust
OECMs	other effective area-based conservation measures
PAMB	Protected Area Management Board
PA	protected area
PF	People's Forum
POWPA	programme of work on protected areas
SAPA	Social Assessment for Protected and Conserved Areas
SMF	Sundarbans Mangrove Forest
SMP	Management of the Sundarbans Mangrove Forests for Biodiversity Conservation and Increased Adaptation to Climate Change
SRF	Sundarbans Reserved Forest
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
VCF	village conservation forums
WCPA	IUCN's World Commission on Protected Areas

Summary

As global and national conservation policy evolves to include stronger ambition on governance issues, there is growing recognition that practice often falls far short of the standard set in policy. In response, IIED has been leading efforts with partners Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to better understand and assess governance of protected areas (PAs) and conserved areas (CAs). The result is our Governance Assessment for Protected and Conserved Areas methodology (GAPA).

In this working paper, we outline the methodology and key concepts and present the results and lessons from six sites where we piloted and refined it. We also discuss insights from our inventory of existing methodologies and our work on the relationship between governance, equity and social impacts and associated assessment methodologies. GAPA remains work in progress: we are still developing and testing the final 'taking action' phase, which will provide a structured approach to applying results and reviewing progress. We will include this in the users' manual, to be published in early 2019.

WHAT IS GAPA?

GAPA is a relatively simple, rapid and low-cost governance assessment methodology for use by PA/CA stakeholders working together to assess governance strengths and challenges of a PA/CA and help promote stronger and fairer governance. Based on IUCN's framework of principles and considerations for good PA governance, GAPA can be used with any kind of PA/CA and may also cover any conservation and development activities related to the PA/CA. Key actors prioritise five or six of GAPA's 11 good governance principles for in-depth assessment, and use a combination of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and workshops to gather information, validate results, generate ideas for action and review progress.

Governance in a PA/CA context

Governance is distinct from management. Governance is about power, relationships and accountability. It is about who makes decisions, how they make decisions, how they allocate resources and how actors have their say and hold those in power to account.

Management is about implementing strategic decisions and objectives, including defining and allocating lower-level objectives, authority and responsibilities. Management must be accountable to governance through clear governance structures and processes.

In the context of conservation, governance has two key aspects: diversity and quality. The former concerns the nature and variety of governance types within a system of PAs, determining how authority and responsibility for conservation is expected to be divided among actors. Governance types include state governance (by government), private governance (by organisations or individuals), community governance (by indigenous peoples and/or local communities) and shared governance (where two or more groups share authority). GAPA focuses on governance quality: how a PA/CA's governance arrangements perform in terms of principles of good governance.

Equity and governance

Equity simply means fairness. It is closely related to justice, particularly social justice. In our conservation work, we regard the terms as equivalent, but we have opted to use the term equity because it is the term used by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their targets. In the context of conservation, equity is largely a matter of good governance, so equity assessment for PAs/CAs is a subset of governance assessment.

Policy context

The IUCN World Parks Congress in Durban in 2003 brought PA governance and equity to the forefront of the global PA conservation policy agenda and the following year, parties to the CBD recognised poor governance as a significant challenge to PA conservation, including governance and equity in its programme of work on PAs. Since then, the concepts of governance and equity have featured prominently in CBD decisions, including Aichi Target 11 of the CBD Strategic Plan.

IUCN Green List

The IUCN Green List Standard aims to increase the number of PAs and CAs delivering effective and equitable conservation outcomes. Its good governance component focuses on three key issues: guaranteeing legitimacy and voice, achieving transparency and accountability and enabling governance and the capacity to respond adaptively. GAPA aims to address these issues and thereby help PA/CA managers and other key actors achieve Green List certification.

GAPA – an overview

GAPA can be used as a *health check* to determine governance strengths and challenges and identify issues that need attention, as a *diagnostic* to understand the underlying causes of challenges and identify actions that could improve the situation and to establish a baseline for *monitoring* changes in governance over time. It is most effective as a health check and diagnostic, but ongoing work on a governance scorecard will strengthen its suitability for monitoring changes over time.

GAPA builds on existing methodologies, methods and tools. The development process started with a set of 27 methodologies, 73 methods and tools and 103 relevant guides and resources. It has three main elements: good governance principles, an assessment process and a set of methods and tools.

GAPA's 11 principles define the major issues to be assessed and a desired level of achievement. Each principle is unpacked into five to eight key themes to help facilitators understand the scope of governance

issues under a given principle and structure the assessment.

Site-level actors prioritise five or six principles for in-depth assessment. We advise them to include participation (3) and either transparency (4) or accountability (5), plus one distributive principle – either mitigation of negative impacts (8) or equitable benefit sharing (9) – as their core principles, which leaves two or three slots for other principles that reflect site-level priorities.

Process, methods and tools

GAPA has five phases: preparing, scoping, information gathering, assessing and taking action. Implementing an assessment involves four key roles: convenor, host – both of whom must be identified before embarking on a GAPA – facilitator and notetaker. Facilitators work as a team, should be experienced, have good facilitation skills and be perceived as neutral and unbiased. The notetakers capture the information.

Facilitators use open questions in workshops, key informant interviews and focus group discussions to gather information, asking what is working, what is not and why, for each good governance principle. Each method concludes with a discussion of ideas for actions to improve the situation.

GAPA's multi-stakeholder approach fully engages actors in designing the assessment, interpreting and validating results, generating ideas for action and reviewing progress. This is key to transparency and ownership of the process, accuracy and credibility of results and buy-in for actions.

GAPA'S 11 GOOD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES

1. Recognition and respect for the rights of all relevant actors
2. Recognition and respect of all relevant actors and their knowledge, values and institutions
3. Full and effective participation of all relevant actors in decision making
4. Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information in appropriate forms
5. Accountability for fulfilling responsibilities and other actions and inactions
6. Access to justice, including effective dispute resolution processes
7. Effective and fair enforcement of laws and regulations
8. Effective measures to mitigate negative impacts on indigenous peoples and local communities
9. Benefits equitably shared among relevant actors based on one or more agreed targeting options
10. Achievement of conservation and other objectives
11. Effective coordination and collaboration between actors, sectors and levels.

Results from six sites

From February to October 2017, we conducted assessments at six sites – five PAs and one CA – in Bangladesh, Kenya, Uganda and the Philippines with a range of habitat and PA/CA governance types. An overview of the strengths and challenges for the good governance principles selected in each site (in the main body of this report) is followed by a synthesis that further explores the challenges identified and ideas for action.

Governance challenges

Participation: Our broad understanding of participation recognises consultation as a light form of participation. Across the six sites, challenges largely revolved around the exclusion of marginalised groups, particularly women, how groups are represented in decision making and whether actors' contributions to decision making had any real influence.

Recognition and respect for rights: Half the sites did not prioritise this principle, either because rights are well established and respected or because people are unaware of them. Even in sites that selected the rights principle, a general lack of awareness and understanding of the relevant rights or political sensitivities prevented meaningful discussion, raising concerns over the suitability of rapid methodologies based on open-ended questioning for assessing substantive rights. Procedural rights are a different matter, since access to participation, information and justice are core governance issues, each represented by a specific good governance principle.

Fair and effective dispute resolution: Four sites claimed to have formal dispute resolution processes, but only use them for specific disputes. Other disputes remain unresolved or are dealt with informally or through traditional means. All sites seemed to need greater clarity on which mechanisms exist for different types of dispute.

Fair sharing of benefits: Three of the six sites have benefit-sharing schemes that are funded by revenue from tourism which provide communities with very substantial benefits. A fourth site provides substantial benefits in the form of rights to fish in the PA/CA. At all sites, there were claims of unfair benefit sharing processes and a lack of transparency. Other concerns included men benefiting more than women, unfair spatial distribution and corruption.

Transparency: We identified a number of issues around a culture of openness, information collection, analysis and sharing, what information is shared and whether the act of sharing information increases awareness of key issues. The latter is the ultimate desired outcome; the others are steps towards it.

Accountability: Three broad accountability categories emerged: actors' performance versus what is expected of them, structures and processes for holding actors to account and responses (if any) to issues raised. There were many challenges and a number of practical ideas for action.

Fair and effective law enforcement: A number of law enforcement issues emerged under this and the next principle, including a lack of awareness of detailed regulations, susceptibility to corruption among law enforcement agents, a reluctance to arrest friends and family members and a lack of respect for volunteer law enforcement agents.

Achievement of objectives: This principle is about achieving site-level objectives over which the relevant actors have control or substantial influence. Although most of the issues were site-specific, we identified two broad categories: the content of strategies and plans, the process used to develop them and the sources of knowledge they are based on; and the achievement of objectives and using adaptive management based on learning to improve effectiveness. Most sites reported a lack of success with measures to reduce demand for natural resources, and little change in absolute numbers of people in acute poverty.

Effective coordination and collaboration: Although most issues were site-specific, we identified several challenges that are common to at least two sites, including poor information sharing between coordinating/collaborating actors, overlapping mandates leading to uncoordinated and conflicting efforts and a lack of clarity with shared governance on what decisions should be shared versus what should remain under one of the collaborating organisations.

Ideas for action

Both interviews and focus group discussions included a simple brainstorming of ideas for action to address identified challenges. Facilitators compiled and subjected these ideas to a basic feasibility filter at the second workshop, to identify practical actions that are realistic to implement.

The feasible ideas differ in terms of the level where decisions to act can be made, the financial and human resources needed to implement action, the level of political support needed to overcome inevitable resistance and the time needed to see signs of success.

While measures to address the results of social assessment and ecological monitoring can take years to deliver success, measures to strengthen PA/CA governance can deliver visible success quite rapidly and may require relatively little investment of financial capital (but more investment of political capital). Rapid success boosts confidence and mutual trust, which are foundation stones of good governance. So, under the

right conditions, we may see a relatively rapidly evolving virtuous cycle.

Applying the GAPA methodology: lessons learnt

When is GAPA appropriate? Governance issues such as accountability and transparency can be sensitive, and GAPA is not appropriate for all PA/CA situations. Key actors must be willing and able to engage in the process and have the power and resources to tackle some of the results. Facilitators must be competent, respected by key actors and impartial – and there can be no risk of causing or exacerbating conflict.

Who to engage and when: GAPA is based on the notion that actors make their own assessment of governance quality of a PA/CA and any related conservation and development activities. Although the process must engage a wide range of actors, involving representatives of all actors would be too expensive and complex. Stakeholder analysis helps prioritise actors and ensure that the more powerful actors do not overwhelm the process.

It was hard to get close to 50:50 gender balance in most stakeholder workshops. Officials and leaders are typically male and women are often not formally represented. Many women did not attend the meetings and workshops due to a variety of reasons including traditional expectations of a woman's role, a lack of involvement of women in conservation and the cost of neglecting other household responsibilities. Affirmative action can help address this issue.

Are results quantifiable? Although GAPA generates largely qualitative information, quantitative information is also useful. Our initial idea was for facilitators to use a governance scorecard tool after interviews and focus groups, but we realised that they would not have a good enough understanding of local governance issues at that point to develop good indicators. So the scorecard has become an output of GAPA that will increase the rigour of results by engaging more actors, generating quantitative data for more effective communication of results and providing a baseline for monitoring change over time.

Open questioning approach: GAPA's open-ended question approach reduces the risk of bias caused by pre-selecting issues or asking leading questions. Although it worked well in terms of exploring the root causes of governance challenges, some facilitators found it hard to know how deep to dig and missed some important points. This emphasises the methodology's dependence on strong facilitation skills and a good

understanding of governance; without them, there is a greater risk of a few individuals dominating discussions and 'group-think'.¹

Getting to root causes: Given the time constraints, there is a trade-off in balancing the time spent digging down on one issue, the number of issues that can be explored and the need to keep the length of discussions within acceptable limits. As facilitators became more experienced, some were able to cut interviews from over one and a half hours to one hour and focus group discussions from three to two hours.

Accuracy of results: Focus group discussions and key informant interviews generate raw qualitative data from multiple sources. We developed a simple process to help facilitators analyse this qualitative data, which also greatly contributes to their understanding of the results. The accuracy of the assessment has been enhanced by a combination of triangulation within this analysis process and validation in the final workshop.

GAPA v IUCN guidelines: The GAPA process is closely aligned with the process outlined in the IUCN guidelines on governance for PAs with two main differences: a) we limit the duration of stakeholder workshops to one day and b) we conclude the assessing phase with ideas for action rather than action planning. At the three sites in Kenya the assessment would have ground to a halt at this point. This is a risk with any kind of assessment or evaluation and emphasises the need for the GAPA convenor to commit to at least six months support for the final 'taking action' phase.

Framework of good governance principles and themes

The framework of good governance principles and themes that we developed and used for training and analysis is an important output of this work (see Appendix 1). First developed in early April 2017, we have further refined the framework to take account of learning from later assessments and align it with the equity framework for PA/CA management and governance that we have been developing with our partners over the last three years.

Learning from future assessments will no doubt lead to further tweaks, so this framework remains work-in-progress. But we are confident that it is now fit for purpose as a tool for PA/CA governance capacity building, for coding and analysing qualitative GAPA data and for developing a governance scorecard.

¹ The process in which bad decisions are made by a group because its members do not want to express opinions, suggest new ideas, etc. that others may disagree with (Cambridge English Dictionary)

Conclusion

A fundamental takeaway from this work is that there is little understanding of good governance beyond jargon. Although our framework with just 11 principles helps unpack the key concepts, it still has too many aspects of governance for a process that seeks to fully engage the key actors. So, scoping is a crucial element of GAPA.

The governance strengths and challenges that consistently appeared across the sites, though new to some actors, are not new issues. A standardised methodology like GAPA should help us get a better sense of the scale of the challenges and cross-site analysis will help us differentiate between what is site-specific and what is systemic.

GAPA has its limitations. A multi-stakeholder approach will only work under certain conditions and needs strong, impartial facilitation. In situations where in-depth governance assessment is neither advisable nor feasible, IIED's Social Assessment for Protected and Conserved Areas methodology (SAPA for short) can serve as a stepping stone.

GAPA can bridge the gulf between the rhetoric of good governance and equity and the reality of poor governance performance and social inequity in many PAs/CAs. We have the tools, but do key actors have the incentive to take action that might challenge powerful interests and the status quo? Recognition of good governance performance can be a powerful incentive, and the IUCN Green List has real potential in this respect. We developed GAPA with this in mind. The potential for improved governance and equity to lead to better conservation outcomes is another incentive. In addition to providing a practical tool to strengthen PA/CA governance, scaling up site-level governance assessment using a standardised methodology such as GAPA also provides an opportunity to make a more robust case for the benefits to conservation of investing in good governance.

1

Background

1.1 Introduction

As global and national conservation policy has evolved to include stronger emphasis on governance issues, there has been growing recognition that the main constraint to progress is no longer policy, but policy implementation. All too often, practice falls far short of the standard set in policy.

IIED has been leading an effort with partners – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) – to address this gap between policy and practice. One of the key issues constraining progress is the lack of detailed guidance on how to understand and assess governance and equity in protected areas (PAs) and conserved areas (CAs).² We have been developing and piloting a methodology to understand and assess governance of individual PAs and CAs. The result of these efforts is the Governance Assessment for Protected and Conserved Areas methodology (GAPA).³

This working paper outlines the GAPA methodology, reflecting that it remains work in progress. We discuss key concepts, other assessment approaches we drew on and our methods, tools and roles. We also present our experiences, results and lessons learned from applying and refining the methodology at six sites in Bangladesh, Kenya, Uganda and the Philippines.

We are still developing and testing the final action phase of the GAPA process, which provides a structured approach to applying results and reviewing progress. We will include this in the comprehensive GAPA users' manual, to be published in early 2019.

WHAT IS GAPA?

GAPA is a relatively simple, rapid and low-cost governance assessment methodology for use by PA/CA stakeholders working together to assess PA/CA governance strengths and challenges, and help promote stronger and fairer governance. Based on IUCN's framework of principles and considerations for good PA governance, GAPA can be used with any kind of PA/CA and may also cover any conservation and development activities related to the PA/CA. Key actors prioritise five or six of GAPA's 11 good governance principles for in-depth assessment, and use a combination of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and workshops to gather information, validate results, generate ideas for action and review progress.

² We use the CBD's definition of CAs as "other effective area-based conservation measures". See Worboys *et al.* (2015) for comprehensive explanation of the concept of CAs.

³ See www.iied.org/assessing-governance-protected-conserved-areas

1.2 Governance in a PA/CA context

Governance is distinct from management. It is about power, relationships and accountability; about who makes decisions, how they make them, how they allocate resources and how actors have their say and hold people in power to account. Management is about how they achieve these objectives and includes defining and allocating lower-level objectives, responsibilities and accountabilities. It is important to ensure that management is accountable to governance through clear governance structures and processes – although the line between management and governance will vary from one situation to another.

Governance in the context of conservation has two key aspects – diversity and quality. Governance diversity concerns the nature and variety of governance types within a system of PAs/CAs and illustrates, at a broad level, how authority and responsibility for conservation

is expected to be divided among actors. Governance types include state governance (by government), private governance (by organisations or individuals), community governance (by indigenous peoples and/or local communities) and shared governance (where two or more groups share authority). Governance quality concerns how a PA/CA's governance arrangements perform in terms of principles of good governance. This is the focus of GAPA.

Figure 1 presents a typology of governance types. In principle, these can apply to all of the IUCN PA management categories and any type of CA.

Although GAPA focuses on governance quality rather than diversity, information on the quality of actor participation provides a good indication of the governance type at a site. Where we conduct GAPA at a number of sites, the results can contribute to a wider system-level governance assessment process if we take care to ensure consistency in our assessment approach across all sites.

Figure 1. IUCN classification of PA governance types

A. STATE GOVERNANCE (by government)	B PRIVATE GOVERNANCE (by organisations or individuals)	C. COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE (by indigenous peoples and/or local communities)	D. SHARED GOVERNANCE (where two or more groups share authority)
Federal or national ministry or agency in charge Sub-national ministry or agency in charge Government-delegated management (eg to an NGO)	Conserved areas established and run <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • by individual landowners • by non-profit organisation (eg corporate landowners) • by for-profit organisations (eg corporate landowners) 	Indigenous peoples' conserved areas and territories – established and run by indigenous peoples Community conserved areas and territories – established and run by local communities	Transboundary governance Collaborative governance (various forms of pluralist influence) Joint governance (pluralist governing body)

Source: Based on Borrini-Feyerabend *et al.* (2013)

1.3 Equity and its relationship with governance

In plain English, equity simply means fairness. It is closely related to justice, particularly the concept of social justice. In our conservation-related work at IIED, we see the terms as equivalent. People and organisations that frame their conservation work in terms of governance and social impact tend to speak about equity, fairness and inclusion. Those taking a rights-based approach tend to use the term justice. We have opted for equity because this is the terminology the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and Sustainable Development Goals use. The SDG targets refer to equity, equality and closely related terms 24 times; they mention justice only once.

IUCN has developed a good governance framework for PAs, based on a UNDP framework (Graham et al. 2003). This framework has five major governance principles, under which lie 40 considerations (Borrini-Feyerabend 2013). Building on research on equity in payments for ecosystem services and environmental justice, we have worked with a broad group of conservation actors at international level to develop a new framework for understanding and assessing equity in PA governance and management (see PA equity principles in Figure 3).


At the highest level, our framework defines three dimensions of equity (see Figure 2), under which we define the key issues by 12 equity principles:

Recognition: Acknowledging and respecting rights and the diversity of identities, knowledge systems, values and institutions of different actors (equity principles 1–5).

Procedure: Actors' participation in decision making, transparency, accountability and dispute resolution (equity principles 6–9).

Distribution: How benefits and costs are shared across the set of actors and mitigating the costs some actors experience (equity principles 10–12).


Figure 2. The three dimensions of equity



Historically, conservation has focused mainly on the distribution dimension of equity. Our equity framework places more emphasis on recognition and procedure than has generally been the case. (Franks *et al.* 2018).

Figure 3 shows how IUCN's five principles (left column) and the 12 PA equity principles discussed above (right column) map onto the 11 good governance principles we use in GAPA. It is important to note that IIED's governance principles 10 and 11, and by implication most of the content of IUCN's principles of direction and performance, lie beyond equity (being more relevant to the effectiveness of conservation measures). In other words, in the context of conservation, we can consider equity to be largely a matter of governance. As such, we can regard equity assessment for PAs/CAs as a subset of governance assessment. This is not the case in some other sectors, such as education and health, where equity in social outcomes (eg child mortality rates) is usually a key consideration in assessing equity alongside governance issues.

Figure 3. Mapping IUCN PA governance principles and PA equity principles onto IIED PA good governance principles



1.4 Policy context

The IUCN World Parks Congress in 2003 brought issues of PA governance and equity to the forefront of the global PA conservation policy agenda. This was reflected less than a year later, when parties to the CBD recognised poor governance as a significant challenge to PA conservation, including Element 2 in their Programme of work on protected areas (PoWPA), which specified goals on governance and equity (CBD 2004).

The years that followed have seen substantial progress in terms of elaborating the meaning of governance in a PA context as the concepts of governance and equity have continued to capture attention in international decision making.⁴ Key examples are Aichi Target 11 of the CBD's Strategic Plan, which calls for terrestrial and aquatic habitats to be conserved through "effectively and equitably managed ... protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures," (CBD 2010) and the July 2018 CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice's endorsement of a recommendation for submission to CBD COP14 that includes specific guidance on effective and equitable PA governance.⁵

But despite the attention and the development of comprehensive guidance,⁶ there has been relatively little progress on the governance elements of CBD's PoWPA. In IUCN's 2014 World Parks Congress, there were calls for more progress on PA governance, rights-based approaches and addressing Aichi Target 11's equitable management dimension (WPC 2014).

One of the key issues constraining progress is the lack of detailed guidance on how to understand and assess governance and equity in PAs and CAs. The GAPA methodology responds to this gap by offering a relatively simple and rapid methodology that site-level actors can use themselves (in other words, we can describe it as a self-assessment methodology).

1.5 IUCN Green List

The IUCN Green List and its supporting implementation programme aims to encourage, achieve and promote effective, equitable and successful PAs/CAs in all partner countries and jurisdictions. Its overarching objective is to increase the number of effectively and equitably managed PAs/CAs delivering conservation outcomes.

At its heart is the globally applicable Green List Standard. Describing a set of components, criteria and indicators for successful conservation in PAs/CAs, it provides an international benchmark for quality that motivates improved performance and achievement of conservation objectives. By committing to meet this standard, PA/CA managers seek to demonstrate and maintain performance and deliver real conservation results.

The standard aims to "encourage protected and conserved areas to measure, improve and maintain their performance through globally consistent criteria that benchmark good governance, sound design and planning, effective management, and successful conservation outcomes." Its good governance component has three key criteria, to:

- Guarantee legitimacy and voice
- Achieve transparency and accountability, and
- Enable governance and capacity to respond adaptively.

Working in close collaboration with IUCN and GIZ, we designed GAPA to comprehensively address these criteria and serve as a tool for PA/CA managers and other actors to achieve Green List certification. It also addresses one key criterion under the standard's effective management component: to effectively and fairly enforce laws and regulations.

⁴ For a more comprehensive assessment of governance and equity commitments by parties to the CBD, see CBD SBSTTA (2018)

⁵ CBD/SBSTTA/22/6

⁶ IUCN's World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA) 'Best practice guidance on governance of protected areas' (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013)

2

GAPA — an overview

There are a number of reasons for assessing the governance arrangements of a PA/CA:

- **As a health check**, to determine strengths and challenges of governance arrangements and identify issues that need attention
- **As a diagnostic**, to understand the underlying causes of existing challenges and identify actions that could improve the situation, or
- **For monitoring**, to establish a baseline against which to measure changes (hopefully improvements) in PA/CA governance over time.

We designed GAPA with these objectives in mind. In its current form, it is most effective as a health check and diagnostic, but ongoing work is focusing on a governance scorecard to improve its ability to monitor changes of governance quality over time.

GAPA builds on existing methodologies, methods and tools. We started with an inventory of what exists and a detailed specification of what we thought we were looking for. We reviewed more than 200 methodologies, methods and tools and other relevant guides and resources. In particular, we closely reviewed 11 methodologies designed for site-level PA governance assessment and a further four methodologies designed for forest landscapes that have been used in landscapes containing PAs (see Appendix 2). Through an IIED survey, some of the developers of these methodologies provided additional information on the scale of their application, required resources and roles, experience with actor engagement and use of results. The survey revealed that, with the exception of the relatively simple methodologies developed for participatory forest management in Nepal (>1000 sites) and Tanzania

(>300 sites), the methodologies had not been used in more than ten sites; most had only been used in a couple of sites.

Our overall purpose was to inform efforts to strengthen PA governance at site level. At a meeting of our technical advisory group, we developed a list of GAPA's desired characteristics, which originally ran to four pages and included being:

- Focused on strengthening governance quality
- Focused on site level, but able to contribute to system-level governance assessment
- Universally applicable to PAs of any governance type and management category; more recently, we extended this to CAs that are not officially designated as PAs
- Multi-stakeholder: engaging all key actors determined by stakeholder analysis
- Self-assessed: conducted by stakeholders, not external experts
- Socially differentiated and able to capture different social groups' perspectives
- Action-oriented: generating ideas for action to address identified challenges; in the last year, we extended this to fostering accountability for implementing proposed actions
- Standardised, yet adaptable: using the same process, good governance principles and methods, yet able to focus on a site's specific priorities
- Relatively low-cost: costs should be commensurate with the goal of scaling up the methodology to at least 500 sites within five years.

Although none of the existing methodologies we reviewed met all these criteria, we included elements of a number of them in GAPA.

In the next sections, we examine the three main elements of the GAPA methodology: good governance principles, an assessment process and methods and tools.

2.1 Good governance principles

In broad terms, good governance principles describe the issues to be assessed and give a sense of the desired level of achievement. When applying GAPA, we advise site-level actors to prioritise five or at most, six, of the 11 good governance principles (see Figure 3) for in-depth assessment.

The governance frameworks of major multilateral development agencies and banks generally include three core principles: participation, transparency and accountability (Moore *et al.* 2011). Following this approach, we suggest that all site-level actors prioritise the following core principles:

- Participation
- Transparency or accountability, and
- A distributive principle – either mitigation of negative impacts or benefit sharing, whichever is more important for local communities.

In the scoping phase, they can then select another two to three principles to prioritise for in-depth assessment according to local perspectives on priority governance issues.

2.2 Assessment process

The assessment process describes when to use the different GAPA methods and tools. Table 1 shows the five phases of GAPA: preparing, scoping, information gathering, assessing and taking action. The fieldwork comprises Phases II (scoping) to IV (assessing). Working full time, it is possible to complete this in as little as five days for a small PA/CA. However, more typically, it takes eight to ten days full time or three weeks on a part-time basis.

GAPA uses a multi-stakeholder approach to ensure that all key actors are fully engaged in designing the assessment, interpreting and validating the results and developing ideas for action. Determining how different site-level actors can own and engage in the assessment, this multi-actor process is key to its transparency and ownership, the accuracy and credibility of results and to building support for taking action to improve the situation.

If key local actors resist or try to dominate the process, it can undermine the whole GAPA process. So the team of facilitators must be experienced, independent and able to carefully and sensitively manage the process to develop an atmosphere of shared problem solving while avoiding finger-pointing and conflict.

2.3 Methods and tools

GAPA uses a combination of methods and specific tools, applied in the order presented in Table 1. Information gathered from each method informs subsequent methods.

Phase III – information gathering –uses two methods: key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Both use an open-ended questioning approach based on just two questions: What is working well regarding the principle in question? What is not working well? The conversation goes on to explore the underlying causes of why things are not working well and ideas for actions that might improve the situation. The box below shows guidance questions for the participation principle.

Table 2 presents an overview of the GAPA methods and tools. Because GAPA remains under development, this list is not comprehensive. In particular, we are still developing a governance scorecard that will:

- Validate governance challenges with a larger sample of local actors
- Establish a baseline and then monitor change in governance quality over time, and
- Generate numerical data and graphics to help communicate the results.

We are also piloting a dedicated action planning workshop where key actors can refine and plan the implementation of ideas for action, rather than leave it to happen within their existing planning processes.

Table 1. GAPA process, outputs and typical timeframe

PHASES AND MAIN ACTIVITIES	TYPICAL TIMEFRAME	OUTPUTS
PHASE I: PREPARATION		
1.1 Feasibility check	Week 1	• Go/no go decision
1.2 Reviewing existing information	Week 1–3	• Site profile
1.3 Planning the assessment	Week 3	• Assessment plan; provisional selection of actors to participate and principles
1.4 Facilitation team selection and training	Week 1–6	• Skilled and confident facilitators
PHASE II: SCOPING		
2.1 Scoping workshop	Week 7	• Comprehensive stakeholder analysis • 5–6 priority good governance principles
PHASE III: INFORMATION GATHERING		
3.1 Focus group discussions	Week 7–8	• Completed reporting templates for focus groups and informant interviews
3.2 Key informant interviews		
3.3 Data analysis		• PowerPoint presentation of the results
PHASE IV: ASSESSING		
4.1 Second stakeholder workshop	Week 8	• Validated results • Ideas for action
PHASE V: TAKING ACTION		
5.1 Communicating the results	Months 3–15	• Results shared with assessment participants and other key actors
5.2 Planning action	Months 3–15	• Governance action plan (optional) • Results presented at planning events
5.3 Monitoring progress	Months 3 onwards	• Monitoring, assessment and learning systems strengthened
5.4 Reviewing progress	Month 8–15	• Growing trust between stakeholders

GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR ACTORS' PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING

- 1. Which actors are particularly important to consider in decision making?** Probe to get at least three important types of actors. This question is to set the scene.
- 2. What is working well or what is good regarding these actors' participation in decision making?** Ask for one example and check that it is clear to everyone and that most (but not necessarily all) participants agree with it. Then ask for more examples until you have at least three good examples.
- 3. What is not working well or what is not good regarding these actors' participation in decision making?** Ask for one example and check that the example is clear to everyone and that most (but not necessarily all) participants agree with it. Then ask:
 - i. Why is the situation like this?** Keep asking this question until you get to the bottom of the problem or participants become uncomfortable and do not want to discuss more.
 - ii. What ideas do you have to improve the situation?** Probe to get at least three ideas for action by various actors – not just the ones you are talking to.

Repeat the process for two more examples of something that is not working well/not good.

Table 2. An overview of GAPA methods and tools

METHOD	TOOLS	OBJECTIVE
Scoping workshop	Stakeholder analysis template Prioritising the good governance principles	To identify key actors that should be engaged in the GAPA process and the PA/CA's priority governance issues To ensure that key actors have a good understanding of GAPA – including the purpose, process and their roles and responsibilities
Key informant interviews	Key informant interview guide Key informant interview recording template	To understand the key governance strengths and challenges of the PA/CA. This method engages individual representatives of key local organisations or institutions
Focus group discussions (10–15 participants)	Focus group discussion guide Focus group discussion recording template	To understand the key governance strengths and challenges of the PA/CA. This method engages local communities or natural resource user groups
Group data analysis	PowerPoint template for results	To identify governance strengths and challenges To summarise ideas for action suggested by key informants and focus groups
Stakeholder workshop	Template for validating results and ideas for action	To review and validate assessment results To explore ideas for action to tackle governance challenges and underlying causes

2.4 Roles in the GAPA process

There are four key roles in an effective, multi-stakeholder GAPA process: convenor, host, facilitator and notetaker. The first two must be identified before embarking on a GAPA.

The **convenor** is the organisation that invites people to participate in an activity, event or initiative and sets the agenda with input from other key actors. An organisation's appropriateness to convene a governance assessment will depend on how much other actors respect it. So it is important to consider whether key actors can trust a potential convenor to oversee a successful and fair process. The convening organisation must be interested in GAPA's objectives and believe in the value of a multi-stakeholder process. It will typically be well known by all actors and have a good understanding of the PA/CA. It must have the respect, motivation and resources to lead all phases of the GAPA process, including the taking action phase. Becoming a convenor means an organisational commitment to support the process for at least 12 months including the first six months of Phase V (taking action).

The **host** organisation or individual formally receives the people who are participating in the assessment, activity or event. There can be a number of hosts – for example, the PA/CA management or local government might host the scoping workshop, while community leaders or the local administration host a focus group discussion. If there are concerns that a host might bias an event or activity, co-hosting is an option.

The **facilitator** helps engage people in an activity, event or initiative. Facilitators should work as a team, using GAPA methods and tools to achieve the assessment's objectives. An individual's ability to successfully facilitate GAPA will depend on their experience and facilitation skills. Other vital characteristics are trustworthiness and independence – all key actors participating in an assessment should perceive a facilitator as neutral and able to ensure a fair process that is not biased to the interests of any particular actor.

Notetakers support each facilitator to capture the information gathered by focus groups and interviews and key points of discussions at the two workshops.

3

Overview of GAPA results from six sites

In this chapter, we provide a chronological overview of the assessment results from six of the sites – five PAs and one CA – where we used the GAPA methodology, starting in Bangladesh in February 2017, through three sites in Kenya and one in the Philippines to a site in Uganda in October 2017. For each section, we give a short description of the PA/CA followed by an overview of the assessment process and a summary of the strengths and challenges for each of the five or six principles they prioritised. We do not cover ideas for action, which tend to be more site-specific than strengths and challenges. There is an overview of these in Chapter 4.

3.1 Sundarbans Mangrove Forest, Bangladesh

Authors: Mostafa Sharif, Dhali Panchanon, Carina van Weelden, Oemar Idoe, Mehzabin Rupa, Professor Golam Rakkibu, Sharmilla Dhali, Manzura Khan, Barbara Lang, Phil Franks and Francesca Booker

The Sundarbans is the world's largest mangrove forest, covering 6,000km² of southwestern Bangladesh and 4,000km² of India. The Sundarbans Mangrove Forest (SMF) is made up of the Sundarbans Reserved Forest (SRF), three wildlife sanctuaries and three dolphin sanctuaries.

Bangladesh's Wildlife (Preservation and Security) Act of 2012 recognises sanctuaries, but not forest reserves, as PAs. As such, SMF is a *de facto* PA with a legal framework that forbids conversion and settlement and restricts resource use. No-one lives within the SMF, but the surrounding land is densely populated and many people enter the mangrove forests – legally and illegally – to sustain their livelihoods, harvesting fish, shrimp fry and mud crabs and collecting wild honey and fuel wood.

The Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) is the official custodian of the SMF and oversees conservation activities, access to the forest and resource use. Since 2011, it operates a co-management system around the SMF with a three-tiered structure made up of:

- Village conservation forums (VCFs): the basis of the co-management system at village level
- People's Forum (PF): the umbrella structure for VCFs
- Co-Management Executive Committee and Co-Management General Committee (CMC): the general committee has 40–42 members with representatives from PF, BFD officials, other government officials, local government, civil society members and other relevant actors. The 26-member executive committee sits under the general committee.

We can categorise Bangladesh's system of co-management according to the IUCN framework as a system of shared governance, which includes collaborative governance systems where key actors

(in this case the state and bordering communities) have some level of influence over decision making. The legal and policy framework for co-management is linked to PA status, which means that within the SMF, co-management applies only to the sanctuaries and not the SRF. However, wildlife sanctuaries are by law no-take zones, so resource use takes place only in the SRF where co-management does not apply. These constraints limit the legal scope for co-management within SMF.

Assessment principles and process

GIZ programme staff provided support for GAPA under their Management of the Sundarbans Mangrove Forests for Biodiversity Conservation and Increased Adaptation to Climate Change Project (SMP). As official custodian of the SMF and implementing agency of SMP, BFD convened and hosted the assessment. Focusing on the Chandpai Range (one of four in the SMF), the fieldwork took place from 5 to 16 February 2017. A team of four people from external organisations (Omar Sharif, Mehzabin Rupa, Professor Golam Rakkibu and Sharmilla Dhali) facilitated the assessment to guarantee independence.

At the scoping workshop, key actor representatives conducted a full stakeholder analysis to identify the individuals and organisations to involve in the assessment, selecting six good governance principles, five of which we discuss below.

In the four days of information gathering that followed this workshop, the team discussed four principles – participation, benefit sharing, accountability and law enforcement – with five community focus groups and all six principles with 11 key informants. The assessment concluded with a second workshop on 13–14 February, where participants validated results and suggested ideas for action for the four principles.

Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making

All actors that participated in the governance assessment perceived the existence of co-management organisations (CMOs) (VCFs, PFs, CMCs) as an important strength of the relatively new co-management regime. Such CMOs have created a new platform for community members to discuss issues related to livelihoods, mangrove forest management and biodiversity conservation. Community members also reported that, upon invitation, BFD staff have shown willingness to engage with community members by participating in VCF and PF meetings.

Despite this, community members described CMOs' decision making as slow due to the three-tiered co-

management structure and limited capacities across the levels. They see influential individuals as holding key positions and dominating decision making over PFs and VCFs, and poorer resource-dependent users as missing out in the current structure, often unable to raise their voices in front of influential people. Other more practical challenges for CMOs relate to meeting places being not easy to reach for all community members, insufficient compensation for travel costs and a lack of meeting refreshments. While sounding trivial, these factors can play a key role in limiting participation.

More widely, there has been criticism that co-management at the Sundarbans is predominantly used by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), other donor-funded projects and government institutions to distribute development benefits to communities, rather than making a genuine effort to share decision-making power between government institutions and local communities. Community members' reports within the governance assessment support this view, as participants stated that the BFD and sometimes NGOs take the majority of decisions affecting the Sundarbans with limited inputs from communities and resource dependent users. However, there was a lack of consensus between GAPA actors around community participation in decision making. This reveals different ideas and attitudes around co-management of the Sundarbans, with communities perceiving an unequal power balance between communities and the government. Within government, there are differing understandings, motivations and ideas around the degree to which they should share power over, and benefits from, the Sundarbans with local people.

Other non-validated results related to allegations from some community members of irregularities in the election of CMO committee members. This finding was not validated as there was no consensus between community members, probably due to the taboo nature of the subject. There were also several other issues where there was no consensus despite efforts to facilitate rewording of the challenge.

Fair sharing of benefits according to criteria agreed by relevant actors

A key benefit that community members associate with co-management is the allocation of alternative income opportunities by CMO structures. However, as is common with many alternative livelihoods projects associated with conservation, community members reported few beneficiaries, little targeting of resource dependent households and limited consultation on needs and preferences. They also described powerful local people as unduly influencing the selection of beneficiaries.

The BFD allows fishing within certain areas of the SMF, but only for those who have a boat license certificate (BLC), administered by the divisional forest officer through forest stations. Up to 12,000 BLCs are issued on an annual basis, equally spread across the two divisions of the SMF (Sundarbans East and West Division). Community actors in this assessment reported that a key strength of this resource access permit is that each BLC allows fishing by up to four people per boat.

A key challenge for fishers within the community is middlemen who are not resource-dependent obtaining BLCs from the forest stations. This is not against the Integrated Resource Management Plan, which states that first priority should be given to boat owners who live within 5km of the SMF and second priority to those who live within 10km. Regardless, community members perceived this as unfair and suggested that it resulted in poorer resource-dependent households missing out on getting BLCs.

Non-validated results related to BLCs include reports that the current rules and regulations – such as the requirement to have official documents and the costs involved in travelling to the forest station to apply for a BLC – are not favourable to poor and often illiterate fishermen. There is also confusion among actors over how the annual BLC quota is determined and distributed. Community actors raised questions about whether the quota considers sustainable harvesting rates, seasonal fluctuations and geographical differences across the four ranges of the SMF. There were also reports from community members that fishers are required to pay over and above established rates for BLCs.

A potential strength for the future of co-management at the Sundarbans is generating benefits from tourism for local communities. According to BFD representatives, the new PA management rules 2017 permit sharing 50 per cent of tourism revenue with local communities. The modalities and by-laws to guide implementation of these new rules (approved following the governance assessment) – including the role of CMOs – is yet to be finalised.

Accountability for fulfilling responsibilities, other actions and inactions

Participants found issues of accountability a difficult topic to discuss, particularly as there seems to be limited transparency and information sharing between the actors. For example, there were reports of CMOs not effectively sharing information about decisions and scheduled meetings, unclear processes for selecting community patrol groups (CPGs) and limited

information sharing from the BFD on BLC allocation and the rules and regulations that regulate resource access.

Generally, community members said that they know the BFD has a role as main custodian of the Sundarbans, and that CMOs have a responsibility to raise people's awareness about conservation of the Sundarbans. However, when attempting to elicit specific roles and responsibilities of the BFD and CMOs around the Sundarbans, community members were unsure. Participants noted, for example, that there are no written terms of reference for CMOs. Some community participants also complained that NGOs' roles and responsibilities are not clear and that NGOs lack accountability to the CMOs.

There were mixed feelings as to how a CMO representative who engages in inappropriate or illegal conduct should be dealt with, and provisions for removing non-government members from CMOs are unclear. There was no consensus on how BFD staff should be sanctioned for poor performance and BFD representatives acknowledged that there are no formal incentive mechanisms for good performance.

Fair and effective enforcement of laws and regulations

BFD representatives noted that existing laws and regulations generally provide an effective basis for executing law enforcement and felt that the PA management rules 2017 provide further clarity. One concern for BFD enforcement staff is the Wildlife Act of 2012, which they described as providing insufficient safeguards for BFD staff that can hamper the prosecution of offenders. For example, BFD staff may be made liable by the defendant where a court rules that there is insufficient evidence for prosecution. In terms of prosecution, actors reported that the judiciary process takes too long to deliver verdicts and cited cases of political interference.

Overall, participants perceived improved compliance from local people to forest laws and regulations, attributing this to awareness raising by CMOs, CPGs and BFD SMART (spatial monitoring and reporting tool) patrolling activities. Actors including BFD representatives recognised that their law enforcement activities are strengthened by community participation through CPGs and village tiger response teams, as well as external support to SMART teams, but there were questions about the sustainability of this approach. While there were perceptions of success, all actors conceded that illegal activities such as tiger and deer poaching, illegal logging, poison fishing, harvesting from sanctuaries and during closed periods persist. Some law enforcement staff were also alleged to collect irregular payments.

There were positive reports of the BFD and Department of Fisheries announcing seasonal closed periods for fishing and crab collection. However, community members typically felt that they lacked information on all the rules and regulations related to resource access and use within the Sundarbans. This was linked to different rules for different geographic areas (which are not always marked with signs) and rules being administered by different government agencies. For example, BFD is responsible for law enforcement within the SMF and the Department of Fisheries is responsible for water channels outside the SMF.

All actors suggested that the BFD being under-resourced limits fair and effective law enforcement at the Sundarbans. Resource needs include more staff, arms, testing kits for poison fishing, vehicles and boats, and fuel to keep these running.

Effective coordination with plans and policies of other sectors and levels

The results for this principle were discussed in key informant interviews and were not validated at the second actor workshop. In this summary, we only include results for which we have two sources, and we should regard these as tentative.

Some GAPA participants indicated that there is a lack of coordination among different BFD units and different agencies operating in the Sundarbans. For example, BFD representatives noted that there are overlapping and perhaps contradictory interests between their units and the Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority, but little effort or motivation to harmonise interests. Similarly, there is limited coordination of BFD and coastguard law enforcement efforts, despite growing safety concerns among community members when collecting resources in the SMF due to incidences of piracy.

Crucially, the DoF and BFD could be working together for better governance and management of Sundarbans resources. Yet some actors described these two departments as competing for authority over these resources.

3.2 Kalama Conservancy, Kenya

Authors: Susan Kiringo and Phil Franks

Kalama Conservancy is 497km² of open woodland bordering the Samburu Game Reserve in Samburu County, northern Kenya. Established in 2002, it lies at the heart of a large conservation area comprising 20 conservancies and four government-owned PAs. Kalama Conservancy is part of the larger Girgir Group

Ranch, collectively owned by around 1,500 households who are mostly ethnic Samburu but also include Boran and Rendille people. The Group Ranch area outside the conservancy is divided into 13 settlement areas.

The conservancy has a team responsible for all management operations, including law enforcement and activities with Group Ranch members such as problem animal control and benefit sharing. This management team has full authority to manage the land and its wildlife (subject to constraints of national law) and reports to a board of community members (nine men and four women), which has several sub-committees dealing with issues such as grazing and tourism. The three main revenue sources for conservancy operations and benefit sharing are fees paid by a tourist lodge that has a concession within the conservancy, fees for using the airstrip that lies within the conservancy and financial support from the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT).

Assessment principles and process

NRT convened and facilitated Kalama GAPA between 25 and 31 March 2017. At the scoping workshop, key actor representatives prioritised five good governance principles for the assessment to focus on, which we discuss below.

In the three days of information gathering that followed this workshop, facilitators discussed the three core principles – participation, benefit sharing and accountability – with focus groups of men and women in three different settlement areas and all five principles in one-to-one interviews with nine key informants (male and female community leaders, conservancy management staff and government officials). The assessment concluded with a second workshop on 31 March, where participants validated results and suggested ideas for action. A very late start reduced this workshop to just four hours, so participants were only able to review results and discuss ideas for action for three of the five principles – participation, benefit sharing and accountability.

Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making

Strengths of the current arrangements include respecting community members as key actors and the involvement of some community members in decision making. Actors reported that this has led to better decision making and, in turn, increased harmony in relationships between actors, improved security and increased investment in the community.

Regarding challenges, there is a group of issues relating to the board of the conservancy, its way of working and its relationship with members. In general, there is a feeling that board members spend too much time addressing conflicts and not enough time addressing

members' development needs. Community participation in decision making is said to be limited by poor information flow from the board to members and the conservancy having different governance arrangements from those of the overall Group Ranch. There are also concerns about some external actors having undue influence. Local politicians were mentioned and NRT's insistence that board members should be limited to two terms of office. This is a tricky issue, since it is a widely applied standard for good governance in Kenya, but perhaps the issue is more the perception that NRT are going beyond their legitimate mandate in trying to set 'rules of the game'.

Participants raised a number of concerns about how some external actors work in the conservancy, in particular some of the species-focused national/international conservation NGOs, saying they do not keep community members informed of their programmes or involve members in their decision making. Members feel this shows that they have little interest in the communities. This could be seen as a broader issue of recognition and respect for the community as partners in conservation and owners of the conservancy.

In general, there is a view that there are not enough community meetings on conservancy issues and, when such meetings do take place, there is often very little notice, making it difficult to attend.

Fair sharing of benefits according to criteria agreed by relevant actors

GAPA participants identified school bursaries, job opportunities and assistance with expenses and transport needs associated with emergencies and deaths as particularly valuable benefits. In terms of benefit sharing processes, they highlighted a number of strengths, including transparency in how benefits are shared, community participation in deciding who should receive school bursaries and that all the available funds go to the community without any deduction for management costs.

When the words 'fair' or 'equitable' are used in relation to benefit sharing, they refer to:

- Who receives what types of benefit (distributive equity)
- The processes of decision making, monitoring/transparency and accountability that determine and check who has received what (procedural equity), and
- Who is eligible to be considered as a potential beneficiary (recognition).

These are the three dimensions of equity we described in Section 1.3, and participants identified challenges in all three.

Regarding the distribution of benefits, there are undoubtedly many different concerns. However, those raised by a number of participants were the distribution of employment opportunities where there are concerns over nepotism and men being favoured over women, the proportion of the conservancy's revenue that is shared with members as a dividend and the fact that this has not increased in recent years.

In terms of benefit sharing processes, the challenges identified relate to community members' limited participation in deciding who gets what, a lack of transparency on decisions made, the illiteracy of some board members, a lack of timely information from the board and management and, in some but not all zones, poor accountability for use of funds and suspicions of nepotism. The concern over transparency does not contradict the earlier comment about transparency being a strength, because it refers to differences in the level of transparency between the three settlement/development zones where community members live – in other words, some zones seem to be doing rather better than others.

Finally, there is a set of underlying issues that participants believed are causing or at least contributing to the challenges listed above. In this category we have a concern that board members' term of office is too long as well as a concern over frequent turnover of management staff. More generally, participants noted a lack of trust and related to this a concern that benefit sharing may be biased by the self-interest of some powerful actors. Another concern is around recognition: who is eligible to be a beneficiary of the benefit sharing? According to conservancy policy, only registered conservancy members should benefit, but it takes a very long time for applications – mainly from dependents of existing members and immigrants – to be approved.

Accountability for responsibilities, other actions and inactions

Strengths of the current systems regarding accountability include an annual AGM that all members can attend, a good flow of information (depending on the zone) and in general, good cooperation between the conservancy management and members. Examples of outcomes that indicate accountability strengths include conservancy staff's quick response to emergencies and the conservancy making its vehicle available to assist with medical emergencies.

A number of challenges relate to monitoring and reporting, especially gathering, documenting and disseminating information on whether/how key actors are fulfilling their responsibilities. Key issues include delays in collection and submitting financial information, a lack of information flow to community level, some

information being hidden during board meetings and again the illiteracy of some board members.

There are also challenges around structures and processes, particularly those that facilitate upward and downward accountability, performance assessment and incentives to encourage good performance and discourage poor performance. Key issues include a lack of community meetings with board members, the lack of appraisals for board members and other check mechanisms to determine whether board members, community members and conservancy staff are fulfilling their responsibilities.

A couple of challenges may be best classified under cross-cutting themes of honesty and strong morality and the opposite: dishonesty and corruption. Two issues mentioned were suspicions of misuse of funds related to the fuelling of the conservancy vehicle and a general concern over favouritism based on ethnic group, or clannism.

Recognition and respect for the rights of all relevant actors

There was much less information for this and the next principle because they were only covered in key informant interviews. The late start meant there was not time to review and validate them at the final workshop. For this reason, we should regard the results as tentative.

On the positive side (strengths), most community members and other key actors are aware of their rights and when there are community meetings, all community members are invited to attend. That said, on the negative side (challenges), participants reported that some members do not understand their rights. In particular, some members do not know the provisions of the Group Ranch and conservancy constitutions.

Achievement of conservation and other objectives

In terms of strengths, participants gave several examples of positive contributions to the achievement of conservancy objectives. In terms of natural resource management, these included good planning for access to dry and wet season grazing, reduced poaching, members actively participating in wildlife management, grass reseeding and clearing invasive species. In terms of purely social objectives, positive impacts include making water available to the community and providing the community vehicle to assist with community needs such as social events and medical emergencies.

There are three key challenges over and above those mentioned under the previous principles. Participants

noted that law enforcement rangers sometimes face a clash between what they are required to do according to the legal regulations and the values of their Samburu culture, notably when they find a relative involved in illegal grazing. At the other end of the spectrum, some board members are considered not compliant in their work: in other words, they are not doing enough at a strategic level to enable the conservancy to fully meet its objectives. Reflecting on their own role, community participants reported that they lack community ownership of the programmes of several external actors, such as the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), NRT, and Save the Elephant NGO.

3.3 Agusan Marsh Wildlife Reserve, Philippines

Authors: Phil Franks, Joy Mirasol, Nicole Bendsen, Adonis Gonzales, Mach Fabe and Rudolph Elmo Dela Cruz

Agusan Marsh Wildlife Sanctuary (AMWS) is the Philippines' largest and most important freshwater wetland. It includes a complex network of marshes, rivers, lakes and ponds and is situated in the Greater Mindanao Biogeographic Region, Agusan del Sur Province. It covers six municipalities and 38 *barangays* (local government units) and includes four ancestral domains where indigenous peoples (IPs) have legal land titles and full control over the land.

The marsh plays an important ecological role in Caraga Region. At the confluence of tributaries of the Agusan river, which drains the mountain ranges in Bukidnon and the hills of Davao del Norte in the south, it acts like a giant sponge, retaining excess water at times of high flow and ensuring adequate water flow during dry periods. It protects settlements in the downstream basin, including Butuan City, from catastrophic floods.

The Philippines has been pioneering an inclusive, shared governance approach to PA management for over 20 years. All PAs in the country have an apex decision-making body called the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB). Chaired by the regional director of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, other government members include the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and provincial, municipal and *barangay*-level government officials and other line agencies operating in the Agusan Marsh. Indigenous peoples from the four ancestral domains within the PAs also have representatives at the PAMB. Community representatives dominate the 64-member AMWS PAMB, giving them substantial influence over PA management and governance.

Assessment principles and process

GIZ's 'Conflict-sensitive resource and asset management programme' in the Philippines convened the AMWS GAPA, which was facilitated by programme staff Nicole Bendsen, Adonis Gonzales, Mach Fabe and Rudolph Elmo Dela Cruz and Dr Joy Mirasol from Bukidnon State University. The assessment took place over nine days in April 2017. At the scoping workshop, key actor representatives prioritised six good governance principles, which we discuss below.

In the four days of information gathering that followed this workshop, facilitators covered all six principles with six focus groups and 12 key informant interviews. The assessment concluded with a second workshop on 26 April, where participants validated the results and discussed ideas for improving governance in AMWS.

Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making

The PAMB, where all key actors should be represented, makes all significant decisions related to the PA. So in representation of the key actors, the AMWS PAMB is considered strong. The environmental offices that exist under the local government structure represent another decision-making platform, dealing with all development and environmental issues and at times addressing PA-related issues. Participants consider this approach to mainstreaming of PA issues another strength that an inclusive approach to PA management can build on.

The challenges with actor participation in decision making that were identified all relate to the PAMB. There are issues around weak representation of women and IPs; the latter is partly because the selection processes for IP representatives are not always conducted according to indigenous political structures. There are also challenges on both the community and government side around poor performance of representatives in terms of sharing information with the people they represent. The communities also feel that the PAMB's decision-making role is weakened by some government officials' lack of commitment and the common practice of delegating attendance to alternates who have no decision-making authority, leaving the PAMB unable to make decisions and at times without quorum. This is also a consequence of the timing, logistics and location of meetings being unfavourable for community participation.

Recognition and respect for the rights of all relevant actors

AMWS was formally proclaimed a PA of around 19,000 hectares in 1996. Since then, an extension has been proposed and formalised, increasing the area to 41,000 hectares. Of these, the four ancestral IP domains cover

23,000 hectares (more than 50 per cent). Participants in the assessment reported that all key actor groups generally respect Indigenous People's (IP's) rights to this land and its resources and the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) law, which underpins recognition and respect for IP rights in the Philippines. IPs' knowledge and customary laws are also widely respected. Furthermore, IPs are generally aware of their rights.

That said, there are some cases within the AMWS boundary where IP rights are not recognised and non-IPs have been given land titles. This is particularly an issue in the 22,000-hectare extension to AMWS, where government agencies have issued some titles that overlap with existing certificates of ancestral domains titles. These situations of contested rights have caused and are still causing conflict and need to be addressed via dialogue, as described in the ideas for action; some dialogue on this issue has already started.

Although the ancestral domains are widely respected and have become an integral part of the PA, they are not without their challenges, notably disputes between IP groups on the boundaries between their domains and some cases of IPs abusing the system by selling land within their ancestral domains and then, on occasions, reclaiming it.

The duty of developers, government agencies, academia and NGOs to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) from IPs for any activity that may affect them and their ancestral domains has been well established in Filipino law for many years. Nonetheless, there are still cases in AMWS (and many other parts of the country) where a proper FPIC process is not followed and activities have proceeded without IP consent. There are also instances of FPIC being obtained in a way that did not provide space for proper dialogue with IPs or conducted without full disclosure of information, preventing informed decision making by the IPs.

Fair and effective processes for dispute resolution, and recourse of justice

In terms of strengths of existing dispute resolution arrangements, participants reported that both the statutory local justice system (*Katarungang Pambarangay*) and the customary justice system that exists within IP communities through the council of elders generally work well and as a result, most disputes related to the AMWS are resolved locally. That said, disputes resolution involving IPs within AMWS have been frustrated by lack of clarity over which government agency or local government level should be supporting such processes – the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, which is responsible for PAs, or the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. Also, it seems that policy is unclear on how to deal with land titles within the PA that have been improperly issued.

Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information

Reflecting the importance of the PAMB as the apex governance body, two of the five strengths identified relate to timely delivery of information needed for its operations – notably regular reports from the PA superintendent and the *bantay danao*, community-based conservation groups that take the lead in law enforcement activities. In terms of transparency, participants see great variation across agencies and the local government units that border the PA; there are examples of very good practice and of bad practice. Some *barangays* have a special notice board where information that is important for strong transparency is posted.

In terms of challenges, participants reported that both government and NGOs are frequently poor at sharing information internally and with each other, resulting in agencies working in the same communities having little or no idea of what others are doing. Furthermore, these organisations lack openness with communities on their budgets and transparency on the criteria they use to determine which communities and individuals will benefit from their input. Specifically directed at PA management, communities are concerned about the lack of information on the boundaries of different zones within AMWS, which leads to community members being unclear on what they can and cannot do in different areas.

Several actor groups also complained about academics conducting research within and around the PA failing to inform communities of what they are doing or to share the results with them. This observation was no doubt partly directed at this governance assessment.

Achievement of conservation and other objectives efficiently and as planned

Many participants highlighted the major contribution to conservation made by IPs and local communities as a strength of the current PA management system, in particular the role of the *bantay danao* as the central pillar of the law enforcement system. Each of the 38 PA adjacent *barangays* has a *bantay danao*, which generally works on a voluntary basis under tough conditions, often receiving threats for reporting illegal activities. In some *barangays*, support for the conservation of the AMWS has gone as far as the *barangay* developing its own by-law (ordinance) to help support conservation. There was also widespread recognition of the impact of external agencies' projects that support livelihoods and local communities' culture.

Most of the challenges identified under this principle relate to law enforcement. Many participants in the assessment reported that the *bantay danao*, which

are central to the law enforcement system, are neither given the respect they deserve nor paid for their efforts. Furthermore, their efforts to enforce the regulations are often undermined by their lack of authority, threats from powerful actors and those arrested for illegal activities being released without prosecution. A contributing factor is the lack of presence of the national agencies that support law enforcement on the ground.

Other objectives of the AMWS include the contribution of tourism to local development in the few areas that have tourism infrastructure and the contribution to livelihoods of permitted fishing practices. Managing the trade-offs between national conservation goals and local people's and local government's socio-economic goals is a challenge that is increasingly recognised, but little is being done to facilitate the dialogue between key actor groups that is needed to better understand and manage these trade-offs.

Effective coordination of policies and plans with those of other sectors and levels

Participants recognised that there is some effective coordination between the 38 *barangays* that border the PA, PA-related functions such as community-based law enforcement and the PA management itself, although with a lot of variation from one area to another. Not so effective from the community perspective is coordination between government agencies that have operations within the same *barangays* – for example, the government agencies responsible for environment, agriculture and indigenous peoples. Some of the issues here go beyond PA-related matters. While the PAMB is a well-known and understood body within government agencies, its role and functions appear to be much less clear to local communities and IPs, which undermines the ability of the 50+ community representatives on the PAMB to effectively represent their constituency.

3.4 Mara North Conservancy, Kenya

Authors: Daniel ole Muli, Angela Sanau and Eric Reson, Francesca Booker and Phil Franks

Mara North Conservancy (MNC) is one of four conservancies in the Maasai Mara that have been created from the former Koiyaki Group Ranch. Mara North was established in 2009 and covers 310km² of grassland and open woodland bordering the Maasai Mara National Game Reserve in Narok County, Kenya.

MNC land is owned by around 750 individuals who have titles ranging from 20–150 acres. Mara North Conservancy Ltd, the company responsible for

managing the MNC, has negotiated leases of 15 years for the majority of these individual land plots. The MNC Company is made up of 12 tourism businesses ('tourism partners') who operate safari camps and lodges on land within the conservancy. Under the terms of the lease, the company has full authority to manage the land for wildlife conservation-based tourism subject to allowing the landowners to graze their cattle within the conservancy according to an agreed grazing plan. In return, the landowners get regular lease payments and they and their families benefit from a range of development projects funded by the MNC Company and donations from tourists through development trusts of individuals. The landowners are represented by an elected Land Owners' Committee (LOC) of 19 individuals, and their leases are held by Mara North Holdings Ltd – a company controlled by the landowners. To date, decision making has been coordinated through the MNC board, which comprises representatives of the tourism partners, the LOC and the management company. A new governance structure is being put in place based on one company jointly owned by landowners and tourism partners and this will have a board with equal representation.

Assessment principles and process

Staff from the Maasai Mara Wildlife Conservancies Association convened and facilitated MNC GAPA between 8 and 14 June 2017. At the scoping workshop, representatives of the key actors prioritised the following good governance principles which we discuss below.

In the four days of information gathering that followed this workshop, facilitators discussed the three core principles – participation, benefit sharing and transparency – with focus groups of men and women (separately) in four communities and all six principles with male and female community leaders, MNC staff and government officials in 12 key informant interviews. The assessment concluded with a second workshop on 14 June, where participants reviewed and validated the results and further discussed concrete ideas for action to improve the governance of MNC.

Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making

A key strength of participation in decision making at MNC is the decision of individual landowners to lease the land to tourism partners for the creation of the conservancy. All actors represented in the governance assessment process agreed that landowners took this decision collectively and in partnership with the tourism partners. Other strengths acknowledged by actors include the involvement of landowners in decisions about the grazing zone and agreements between actors on conservation by-laws including compensation for human-wildlife conflict.

Landowners are keen to be involved more in decision making related to the conservancy. There are concerns that LOC members are not elected and some LOC members do not truly represent all landowners' interests – in other words, that personal interests can take precedence. But a number of participants felt that this might be addressed by introducing the proposed new governance structure.

A major issue for MNC is their under-representation of women in decision making. For example, there are no women representatives on the LOC and its sub committees. This is a reflection of the traditional patriarchal nature of the Maasai community, which also means that land leases are in men's names, leaving many women with little understanding of the terms of the lease. However, women are interested in the LOC decision making and many women participants felt that they should be represented in the LOC and its sub-committees such as the bursaries sub-committee.

One of the key challenges the conservancy will face in bringing men and women together to participate more effectively in decision making is the expense involved. Assessment participants underlined that transport and food costs can be a barrier to bringing people together to share information about decision making and raise issues for consideration by the members of LOC and the management company.

Fair sharing of benefits according to criteria agreed by relevant actors

Landowners noted that their lease payments from the MNC Company are consistent and timely. One benefit is improved access to loans for land-owners at lower rates of interest. Other major benefits to landowners and their families include development projects to improve schools and water supplies, training and employment and access to grazing.

But many participants reported that not all landowners and their families are benefiting from bursaries and development projects, and it is not clear what criteria are used to allocate benefits between areas and within communities. Participants also complained that women and men do not always have the opportunity to explain their needs for development projects. One of the key issues here is that the tourism partners operate their own trusts for supporting development projects, so there are multiple trusts attached to MNC. Tourism partners may allocate funds to communities near their operations, so those living further away can miss out. Areas with fewer tourism operations also reported that they do not benefit from opportunities for training and employment as tour guides or rangers. Women participants similarly emphasised that few of these opportunities are given to them, again highlighting the gender inequality they face.

An important concern of poorer members is that MNC's grazing plan does not recognise the differing number of cattle heads among conservancy members. Members with few cattle emphasised that those with large numbers of cattle unfairly benefit from the conservancy's grazing benefits. MNC's management already recognises this issue and is currently considering options such as assigning an equal number of tradeable cattle grazing rights among conservancy members. Another issue reported by poorer members, especially women, is that their sheep are not permitted to access grazing within the conservancy.

A key strength of the grazing plan is that it permits some access to cattle owners from neighbouring communities to grazing areas during times of drought. Many perceive this as the reason MNC has avoided conflicts that have plagued other Kenyan conservancies such as those in Laikipia.

Another key issue for landowners is compensation for livestock injured or killed by wildlife from MNC. Many participants described a compensation scheme that is slow to respond to reports of cattle injury/death, makes low payments that are often only partially paid and delays disbursement.

While all the tourism partners fully support current benefit sharing arrangements, a number feel that the landowners do not fully appreciate the level of risk that they shoulder by committing to fixed lease payments. This is a particular issue when there may be a downturn in tourism revenue, and some partners feel that landowners could better acknowledge this risk and perhaps share it more equitably through a transparent revenue collection mechanism that differentiates between times of peak and non-peak tourism.

Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information

Male participants reported that they are well informed by MNC management about grazing zones and opening times. They are also well informed by management regarding how much they should earn through land leasing and are warned in advance of any delays in payment processing. But there is concern over the ad hoc nature of meetings between landowners and managers, as there is no formal provision for an AGM. There also needs to be more transparency around development activities, eg many people reported that they do not know the amount of money available for school bursaries.

Unlike the well-informed men, women emphasised that they lack basic information on what the conservancy is, what it means to have land under lease and their rights regarding the conservancy. For example, women do not know why they are banned from collecting firewood within the conservancy and consider this unfair as men

are still allowed to graze their cattle. When women are widowed, they can find themselves in vulnerable positions if they do not know about, or understand, their land lease and rights.

A key issue of some urgency for landowners is receiving a signed copy of their lease agreement. Participants emphasised that few of the 750 have a copy of their lease agreement with the MNC Company. As a result, they do not know all the terms and conditions of their lease agreement and their rights.

A further challenge is the perception that tourism partners lack transparency about their earnings. Participants claimed that tourism partners do not disclose financial reports on their occupancy. In fact, they do publish this information on the MNC Company website, but it appears that the information is not accessible to the majority of landowners. This perceived lack of transparency fuels suspicion that landowners are being underpaid for their leases.

Effective and fair enforcement of laws and regulations

Participants were generally positive about law enforcement. For example, some noted that illegal logging and poaching in the conservancy is not common. Rules and regulations are well respected and rangers were described as vigilant, though limited by the lack of some equipment, including weapons. The police and courts were also reported to be supportive of law enforcement efforts within the conservancy. But some participants noted that there are cases of political interference in prosecuting wrong-doers and all actors complained about fraudulent land deals with officials in the Ministry of Land.

Illegal grazing remains a serious challenge for law enforcement within MNC. Participants acknowledged that not all landowners abide by grazing rules. When members are caught illegally grazing, they are fined, but many feel that it is not clear where the money collected through fines goes and how it is used. One way that MNC management is trying to better control illegal grazing is by establishing grazing zones, each with its own grazing committee. This is generally regarded as a constructive way forward.

Fair and effective processes for dispute resolution

Some participants reported examples of disputes – for example, the ban on grazing around tourism camps causing tension between landowners and tourism partners in the dry season. Some participants also stated that there is increasing resentment among some landowners about the number of cattle allowed in the conservancy and the lack of clarity on the conservancy's

carrying capacity. Crucially, there does not appear to be an adequate forum or mechanism to prevent such tensions escalating into more serious disputes, or to resolve such disputes.

Achieving conservation and other objectives efficiently and as planned

Some participants in the assessment recognised the value of the conservancy's role in preventing land degradation and feel that it is also improving wellbeing through income generation and development projects. The conservancy's management is also planning to put more land under conservation, which some landowners welcome as sign of a strengthening conservancy. Other participants recognise how MNC has become internationally known as a successful conservation initiative based on Maasai culture.

But some participants noted that crucial challenges to MNC persist – for example, not all landowners have signed their leases and there are unsustainably high cattle numbers despite MNC management efforts to reduce livestock numbers and upgrade the quality of breeds. Several actors also highlighted that the county government is not supportive of MNC, suggesting that this is because it sees the conservancy as a threat to its income from the Maasai Mara National Game Reserve.

3.5 Kanamai co-management area and *tengefu*, Kenya

Authors: Joan Kawaka, Joachim Cheupe, Francesca Booker and Phil Franks

Kanamai is on the north coast of Kenya. Its locally managed marine area (LMMA) is a small (0.22km²) no-take zone called a *tengefu* in Swahili. Established in 2010 by the Kanamai Beach Management Unit (BMU), the *tengefu* is embedded within a larger (around 3km²) co-management area. Both areas are yet to be formally approved and work is underway to complete a co-management plan. Approval of this plan will allow for the formal designation of the co-management area and *tengefu* and will give the BMU the authority to control illegal activities there. So at present Kanamai is a CA rather than a formally recognised PA.

A BMU is the key governance structure that allows local people to govern and benefit from fishery resources in Kenya. Kanamai BMU was established in 2008, building on an existing 'beach leaders' institution. The key structure for BMU governance is an executive committee, answerable to the general assembly of members. Mandated by the Fisheries Management

and Development Act, the BMU has sub-committees for: monitoring control and surveillance, sanitation, conflict resolution, environment/ conservation, finance and welfare. The Kenya Fisheries Service has strong influence over the BMU's co-management plan, a mandate to monitor BMU performance and the power to intervene where necessary.

Local fishers in Kanamai are called foot fishers because they fish in the inter-tidal zone on foot, using minimal equipment. Catches are generally poor due to overfishing and destructive practices. Few of the fishers in the area have experience of deep-sea fishing, as this is not a traditional practice and very few people have boats capable of going beyond the reef. Limited catches and an inability or reluctance to join the BMU and pay the membership fee (due poverty and doubts over the value of membership) greatly constrain the funds available to the BMU. This impacts on the unit's ability to conserve the co-management area and *tengefu* and restore the productivity of the fisheries.

Assessment principles and process

Coastal Oceans Research and Development (CORDIO) convened the Kanamai GAPA and it was facilitated by a staff member and consultant between 5 and 12 September 2017. Committee members of the Kanamai BMU supported the process and two committee members acted as notetakers. At the scoping workshop, key actor representatives prioritised five good governance principles, which we discuss below.

In the three days of information gathering that followed this workshop, facilitators discussed the three core principles – participation, benefit sharing and transparency – with four community focus groups (two men's groups, two women's) and all five principles in 19 key informant interviews. The assessment concluded with a second workshop on 11–12 September, where participants reviewed and validated the results and further discussed concrete ideas for action to improve the governance of both areas.

Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making

At Kanamai, an important strength of the Beach Management Unit (BMU) is that it meets quarterly and gives members a chance to ask questions to the committee about the co-management area and *tengefu*. The county government's fisheries officer attends the BMU annual general assembly to answer BMU members' questions.

A related challenge is that people from the area often do not attend BMU meetings because they are busy with other activities such as fishing or household chores. The underlying issue is that people do not see much benefit from participating in the BMU's decision making – for

them the BMU is about restricting fishing areas, not improving their livelihoods. There were some reports that members expected to be paid to attend BMU meetings, indicating confused expectations over why members should participate in BMU decision making and what benefits they are entitled to.

For non-BMU members, a common issue was the lack of information about the BMU and its purpose; many of the non-members who participated in the assessment complained that they are not informed about BMU meetings. But BMU committee members contended that only members are invited to meetings as the its regulations do not allow for inclusion of non-members.

A useful source of information for BMU decision making is the annual Fishers Forum – where members from BMUs across the coast meet to discuss recommendations from research and how they can take these up. But a major challenge for Kanamai BMU to lead decision making now and into the future is the lack of cooperation among its members and limited resources for implementing decisions.

Fair benefit sharing according to criteria agreed by relevant actors

Benefits that BMU members can receive include the opportunity to get loans to support their business, and training opportunities with the Fishers Forum and NGOs like the Wildlife Conservation Society on fishing methods and ecological monitoring. However, a crucial challenge is that there are very few benefits associated with the BMU. Participants of the assessment noted that there are limited communal benefits from the co-management area and *tengefu* and, if fishery recovery occurs, any benefits will probably be in the long term. This creates a difficult situation for people in the local area who live in poverty and have limited livelihood opportunities beyond near-shore fishing.

Kanamai BMU is also reported to be in significant debt to the Kilifi County Fisheries Department for deep sea fishing equipment rental (fishing gear and a boat).

One idea the BMU committee has pursued to increase the benefits available to members is charging a levy on researchers and private companies that operate in the co-management area. For example, an Aquarium Fisheries business operates along this area of the coast. This proposal has yet to receive support from Kilifi County Fisheries Department.

Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information

BMU committee members reported that they inform members about upcoming meetings by letter, phone and word of mouth. The BMU typically holds meetings every three months, and its committee has, in the past, held a

meeting to inform members of the responsibilities of the BMU officials. There are, though, evident challenges in the sharing of information among BMU members and non-members.

BMU members complained that they do not receive timely information about meetings – especially when external organisations are visiting the community. Newer BMU members reported that they have not been informed about the hiring of a lawyer to settle the ongoing land dispute (see next section). There was also confusion among both members and non-members over the cost of BMU membership. Non-members also reported that they have not received information about the *tengefu* from the BMU – particularly about the importance of the area and the reasons for its establishment.

There were also suspicions over the availability of financial information. While BMU committee members reported that they share information on their accounts in quarterly meetings and produce an annual report, some participants complained that the BMU's financial expenditure is not open to members. Reasons given for this lack of financial transparency include an alleged incident of loss of money through mismanagement and a lack of financial capacity among BMU committee officials.

The BMU committee and some BMU members perceived that 'everyone' in the local area had been informed about the existence of the *tengefu* and associated restrictions on fishing activities. They described how information regarding restrictions on gear use and efforts to restore and maintain resources has been forthcoming from government departments (Kilifi County Fisheries, Kenya Wildlife Service and Kenya Fisheries Service) as well as NGOs that support BMUs along the coast, such as CORDIO and the Wildlife Conservation Society. Yet, while there does seem to be a good level of information sharing between the BMU and external supporting organisations, there are also challenges. For example, BMU members contend that they did not receive timely information from Kilifi County Fisheries about the charges owed for the renting of deep sea fishing equipment.

Fair and effective processes for dispute resolution

Kanamai BMU has a conflict resolution sub-committee that is normally responsible for dealing with poaching issues. While the BMU has written rules to help resolve conflicts – for example, provisions for how to share catch undertaken with a stolen fishing net – these are not used in practice. Where there are significant sources of conflict, BMU members tend to rely on informal, traditional dispute resolution processes, seeking help from the assistant chief and village elders.

An important source of potential disputes raised by women fish traders in this assessment is that they do not receive information from fishers on when and why fish prices fluctuate. The women described that fishers (mainly men) often tell them the price of the fish and there is little opportunity for negotiation or information to explain why prices have changed. This issue has received little attention from the BMU committee to date.

An ongoing issue for the committee is an unresolved land dispute; BMU committee members allege that a plot of land on the coast designated for a BMU fish market has been grabbed by outsiders. The BMU have little power to resolve this use and have hired a lawyer at great expense. They have received little support from external actors such as the assistant chief and Kilifi Country Fisheries, but these parties underlined during the assessment that they have little power to help the BMU resolve this issue.

Achieving conservation and other objectives efficiently and as planned

There is a lot of positivity among both the committee and members over what the BMU has achieved since beginning the process of designating a co-management area and *tengefu* with locally defined by-laws. The BMU committee felt that their interaction with government departments and NGOs had led to the successful proposal of the co-management area and *tengefu*, while some members felt that the *tengefu* has started acting as a nursery for turtles and others reported an increase in fish biomass and coral cover in the *tengefu*.

Regardless, there are continued challenges with achieving conservation and social objectives at Kanamai co-management area and *tengefu*, neither of which has been formally recognised. The committee is challenged by conservation and social objectives that are too ambitious or hard to achieve given the lack of experience or skills within the BMU.

While the BMU has established some patrolling of the *tengefu* and there are cases of arrest for illegal fishing, law enforcement is far from effective due to the BMU's limited resources. There were reports, for example, of people continuing to use non-legal fishing gear and offenders being able to avoid prosecution. Law enforcement can also be difficult when the BMU members are having to warn or arrest family members or friends. There is also reportedly resentment among local people because the BMU has arrested people for fishing in the *tengefu*. Ultimately, GAPA participants underlined the importance of remembering that illegal fishing continues in the co-management area and the *tengefu* because there is serious poverty along this coastal area.

3.6 Lake Mburo National Park, Uganda

Authors: Medard Twinamatsiko, Charles Muchunguzi, Clementia Murembe and Francesca Booker

Lake Mburo National Park (LMNP) is Uganda's smallest savannah national park, covering 370km². Located in the drier southwestern part of Uganda known as the cattle corridor, its 13 lakes form part of a 50km-long wetland system, providing important habitat to some 350 bird species as well as eland, impala, leopards, buffaloes and waterbucks. Once characterised by open savanna, the loss of elephants means there is now much more acacia woodland. Recently, giraffes have been translocated to LMNP from Murchison Falls National Park.

LMNP was gazetted a national park in 1983 after being designated a controlled hunting area in 1933 and a game reserve in 1963. Following gazettement, all resource access within the park was prohibited including grazing, fishing and hunting and the rangeland outside the park was subdivided into small ranges and subsistence farming plots. Many people living in the area were negatively impacted, fuelling resentment and conflict with the park. In 1986, some adjustments were made to the boundaries to appease local people.

Today, the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) has responsibility for governing and managing the LMNP, so the PA has state governance. UWA allows access to some resources, such as fish, water, firewood and building materials, through resource access agreements. It operates a revenue sharing scheme, sharing 20 per cent of gate entry fees with people living in communities bordering the park. These funds are typically used to rehabilitate roads, build dams, schools and health centres and support alternative livelihood projects. There are also sport hunting concessions that share revenue with local communities.

Assessment principles and process

UWA convened the Lake Mburo National Park GAPA between 24 and 31 August 2017 with facilitation support from Medard Twinamatsiko, Charles Muchunguzi and Clementia Neema Murembe of Mbarara University of Science and Technology. Key actor representatives attended the first workshop on 24 August, where they prioritised six good governance principles, which we discuss below.

In the four days of information gathering that followed this workshop, facilitators discussed three principles – participation, benefit sharing and accountability – with six community focus groups (three women's groups and

three men's) and all six principles with 13 key informant interviewees. The assessment concluded with second workshop on 31 August, where participants reviewed and validated the results and further discussed concrete ideas for action to improve the governance of Lake Mburo National Park.

Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making

For many actors represented in the governance assessment, a strength of the current governance system is the election of local people to roles of authority such as local council chairpersons, who are responsible for identifying local priorities for projects to be funded by revenue sharing. Another strength is that local council representatives and community leaders are invited to participate in park-related meetings where the General Management Plan or memoranda of understanding for resource access are discussed. But actors also highlighted a related challenge: that local council representatives and community leaders have limited influence and, while they might be invited to attend park meetings, they cannot impact on decision making, which is dominated by park officials and government representatives.

Women participants in the assessment noted that, while they might be part of decision making to identify their needs for revenue sharing projects (for example, livestock or handicraft projects), they generally felt excluded from LMNP decision making. They protested that it is unfair that they are not able to participate in decision making related to access to resources, especially regarding resources that they depend on such as fish and firewood.

Beyond the park level, another challenge community actors and their elected representatives identified is the limited representation of local people in the formulation of national policies and site-level guidelines despite their implications for people's lives. Actors offered examples including the Revenue Sharing Guidelines and Fishing Guidelines.

Fair sharing of benefits according to criteria agreed by relevant actors

Important benefits that all actors associated with LMNP include access to natural resources such as fish, handicraft materials, water, firewood, poles and medicinal plants, community projects funded by revenue sharing from tourism and sport hunting and some casual employment.

For community members, there are clear governance challenges in the way particular benefits are shared at LMNP. There is suspicion, for example, that fishing permit holders rent their permits to people migrating

from areas outside of communities bordering LMNP, in contravention with the rules that govern these resource access permits. They also perceive unfairness in the way that revenue from sports hunting and tourism is distributed: they see sports hunting as benefiting only one community around LMNP and tourism revenue favouring Kiruhura district over Isingiro and Mbarara. Community members also reported non-payment and delays in the disbursement of tourism revenue sharing with little or no explanation from government officials.

The evident feelings of resentment towards LMNP and park officials due to the negative impacts of conservation on people's lives – including by restricting resource access and from human-wildlife conflict – present an important challenge for LMNP. In particular, women and men in the communities that border LMNP are concerned that wild animals leave the park and pose a risk to their lives or the lives of their families through death or injury. Wild animals also inflict damage on crops and can kill livestock, incurring significant costs to households. All actors highlighted that there is no official compensation policy in Uganda, but households may receive a small payment known locally as 'compassion' at the discretion of park officials.

Accountability for fulfilling responsibilities, other actions and inactions

Participants in the governance assessment made statements that illustrate a lack of transparency and information sharing between actors at LMNP. Community members and their representatives reported that park and district government officials give little information and explanation to local people on issues concerning LMNP. Some accused local leaders of not being proactive at obtaining park-related information from officials or sharing information with the people they represent. But local leaders and officials noted that there are regular meetings on updates relevant to LMNP between park officials and local council chairpersons and when there are public meetings, there can be low attendance by community members. All actors thought the limited awareness among actors of each of the actors' responsibilities is an important issue.

Community members noted that they hear announcements on the radio regarding the available tourism revenue funds that will be shared locally and described this as a strength of the current governance system. Despite this, community members highlighted that typically local people do not know the requirement by law to share 20 per cent of LMNP's gate entrance fees with local communities and local people are not aware of the formula for distributing these funds between districts and communities.

Many of the actors underlined that a lack of awareness about revenue sharing limits local people's ability to hold accountable those responsible for managing revenue sharing funds – including village-level project management and project procurement committees, district and sub-county government officials and UWA officials. This is concerning, given that all actors suggested that there is leakage and loss of finance as revenue-sharing funds pass through these various levels of administration. There were also other allegations of community projects not representing value for money due to embezzlement of funds and more generally, a lack of follow-up and monitoring of revenue-sharing projects. We have seen such governance issues with tourism revenue-sharing elsewhere in Uganda at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Franks and Twinamatsiko 2017).

Local people reported that they have contact details – a mobile phone number – for park officials, to report incidences of human wildlife conflicts. Yet, people felt that there is limited commitment from park officials to effective and timely responses to human-wildlife conflict. Some community members noted that responsiveness to human-wildlife conflict can differ according to the integrity of the responsible park official.

Similarly, community members noted that benefits from the park can change according to the integrity, will and commitment of leadership (this applies to both park and local government officials). All actors alleged that some people illegally access resources within LMNP by bribing park officials.

Recognition and respect for rights of all relevant actors

Recognition and respect for rights between all relevant actors was a difficult principle to discuss due to contextual sensitivities around talking about community actors' rights. For local people, an important governance challenge is that many government and park leaders interpret rights as privileges. There are issues related to access rights to historical – for example, spiritual – sites and some areas of pasture within the park. Additionally, some community actors detailed unresolved historical cases of human rights abuses by park officials when dealing with people suspected of poaching or illegally harvesting other natural resources within LMNP.

Reported strengths of the current governance system from a rights perspective include permission for local pastoralists to access water within LMNP during

extremely dry periods and for women to access medicinal plants. Every Saturday in Rubare market, only local people have permission to sell fish, to ensure that communities access fish at low prices for improved nutrition, and all local people get free entry to visit LMNP on 31 December every year.

Fair and effective processes for dispute resolution

Local council and park officials have formed conflict resolution committees / tribunals to respond to grievances around LMNP. At times, communities also may hold dialogue meetings – especially following events of human-wildlife conflict. But for communities, unresolved governance challenges – including grievances around resource access, human-wildlife conflict and prosecution or penalties for illegal resource use such as animal confiscation – fuel their feelings of resentment towards the LMNP. Even where there are processes to deal with grievances, local people feel that park officials often ignore the agreed process. For example, some community actors perceive that local people are arrested on suspicion of illegal resource use without sufficient investigation or consultation with community conflict resolution committees. A scheme that is helping to reduce disputes is UWA's user resource access programme, which has allowed permitted access to Lake Kibikwa.

Achieving conservation and other objectives efficiently and as planned

Facilitators discussed the results for this principle in key informant interviews but these were not validated at the second workshop. In this summary, we only include results for which we have two sources and we should regard these as tentative.

A strength related to achieving conservation at LMNP includes the presence of informers in bordering communities, who alert UWA intelligence staff about poachers. That said, some government representatives highlighted during information gathering that, at times, local people have protected and hidden poachers or wrong-doers from being penalised.

An important challenge for achieving conservation at LMNP is the continuing growth of human populations around LMNP and uncontrolled increases in the number of domestic animals.

4

Synthesis of experience and results from six sites

In this section, we provide an overview of the types of governance challenges that emerge from this form of assessment and identify commonalities. We also review the types of ideas for action that are emerging from the assessments in terms of their potential for strengthening governance at a site level and, finally, the validity and utility of our analytical framework for governance assessment.

But there are a number of important caveats:

- Most of the results are very site-specific. While this is a strength in terms of value to actors at the site, it is a limitation for aggregating to a higher level and drawing broader conclusions.
- Our sample of PAs is unbalanced in terms of PA governance type, since our choice of PA was opportunistic and based mainly on the interests of our partners GIZ and IUCN.
- While our open-ended questioning approach serves us well in terms of actor engagement (focusing on issues that participants consider important), there is a risk of missing important issues if they do not emerge spontaneously. Much depends on facilitators' understanding of governance and facilitation skills to enable discussions to explore the full scope of a principle. Participants' lack of knowledge of an issue can also be a key constraint, notably with rights. So, for example, if nothing emerges at a certain site on the performance of community representatives or rights, we cannot conclude that these are non-issues.

- Among a set of issues under a given principle, we assume that those that bubble up spontaneously are more important than those that are only revealed by probing. However, we have little idea of the relative importance of one challenge versus another, and what is important for one group of actors may be less important for another.

4.1 Governance challenges

This section focuses on the nine governance principles for which we gathered at least ten challenges across the six PA sites and mainly on the common issues that emerged at more than one site. The two principles we are excluding – recognition of actors and mitigation of negative impacts – were not selected at any site, although a few challenges did emerge through discussion of other principles. For example, discussions of benefit-sharing brought up some issues on mitigating negative impact.

4.1.1 Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making

Since none of the PA governance types apart from shared governance require that anyone other than the lead actor have influence on decision making, we need to use a broad understanding of participation that recognises consultation to be a light form of participation. Otherwise, the participation principle

would be non-applicable to many PAs, which in turn would imply that they could never achieve good governance.

Because GAPA can distinguish between consultation and true participation, it can identify a difference between reality on the ground and what might exist in theory according to policy. This proved to be the case in the Sundarbans where, despite having three tiers of co-management committee, only the BFD has real influence over many PA management decisions, with the committee's mandate largely confined to development projects in neighbouring communities. We found no such disconnect between rhetoric and reality in the other sites, where participation was largely true to governance type: shared in Agusan Marsh, Mara North and Kanamai, community in Kalama and state governance in Lake Mbuuro.

Across the six sites, challenges with participation seem to revolve around three main issues:

Exclusion of marginalised groups: Women in Mara North and Lake Mbuuro raised concerns about their exclusion from decision making and in Agusan Marsh, indigenous people felt under-represented given their ownership of large sections of the PA and their contribution to law enforcement.

Representation: How groups of actors – for example, different villages, men and women, farmers and pastoralists – engage in decision making through representatives. Participants in Sundarbans, Agusan Marsh and Mara North reported a lack of proper selection process for representatives or political interference in the process. Participants in Agusan Marsh, Mara North and Lake Mbuuro also complained about poor communication between representatives and the people they are supposed to represent. This is fundamental for downward accountability and effective participation.

Contribution and influence: With the exception of Lake Mbuuro, all the sites have a high-level governance committee with key actor representation. We found a tendency across all sites to equate the notion of participation with attending committee meetings. In reality, there are a number of obstacles to committee members having any influence, including:

- Lacking motivation – particularly among poorer people – to attend due to few benefits and significant opportunity costs (Kanamai)
- Invitations for meetings sent too late for people to attend (Kalama)
- Meetings consistently held at venues that were difficult to access for some, especially women (Sundarbans, Agusan Marsh)

- Fear of speaking in front of senior government staff or community leaders, particularly among marginalised groups (Sundarbans, Mara North)
- Lacking relevant information to make an informed contribution, and
- Having little influence even when they speak out – in other words, not being listened to or because the decisions are actually made elsewhere.

4.1.2 Recognition and respect for the rights of all relevant actors

Participants at three of the six sites selected respect for rights, while the others did not consider it a priority. In Mara North and Kanamai, this was because local people's rights to resources are well established and respected. In the other site that did not select rights – Sundarbans – the reason was the reverse: local people are unaware that they have rights that might be being infringed or violated and so do not recognise this as a problem.

In contrast to Sundarbans, participants in the other state-governed PA, Lake Mbuuro, selected the rights principle, but this was against the wishes of PA management and only after a long debate. In the end, little of substance came from discussions of this principle, partly because of a general lack of awareness and understanding of the relevant rights and partly because of political sensitivities. In Kalama, discussion of rights also produced little of substance. This experience raises concerns over the suitability for rights assessment of methodologies based on open-ended questioning that rely on participants having a reasonable understanding of the basic concepts of rights and responsibilities.

The comments above relate to substantive rights. Procedural rights are a different matter. Although understanding of procedural rights is weaker still, this is not an issue in a governance assessment where the key procedural rights – access to participation, information and justice – are core governance issues, each represented by a specific principle.

4.1.3 Fair and effective processes for dispute resolution

The four sites that selected this principle – Agusan Marsh, Mara North, Kanamai and Lake Mbuuro – claimed to have one or more formal dispute resolution process, but only used them for certain types of dispute, while others remained unresolved. For example, in Lake Mbuuro, there is a process for human-wildlife conflict but not for complaints about wrongful arrest. We did not find a situation where a single dispute resolution

process is used for all kinds of PA-related disputes, and this is probably not advisable in any case.

One site – Mara North – raised a concern about women's lack of involvement in dispute resolution, believing that a more gender-balanced process would work better, despite contravening cultural norms. It is likely the same applies in Kalama.

4.1.4 Fair sharing of benefits according to a strategy agreed by relevant actors

In the context of GAPA, benefit sharing refers to decision making and associated management arrangements to share specific benefits to members of PA-adjacent communities. Some benefits, such as permission to harvest a PA resource, support for an income generating activity or a school bursary, are individual, while others – a new classroom, water tanks, a women's group's income-generating activity – are communal. Normally there is a strategy that specifies the type of benefits to be shared and targeting criteria. Based on experience from many different schemes (Pascual *et al.* 2014), we have identified five common criteria, often used in combination, each representing a different interpretation of what constitutes a fair basis for sharing benefits:

1. Equally
2. According to contribution to conservation – for example, assisting with law enforcement
3. According to costs incurred – for example, crop damage by wildlife
4. According to need, targeting benefits on the poorest to help reduce poverty, and
5. Based on rights – for example, prioritising those who own the land.

Three of the six sites – Kalama, Mara North, Lake Mburo – have substantial benefit-sharing schemes funded by tourism revenue. Some communities around Lake Mburo also benefit from a share of hunting revenues. In these three sites, discussions around benefit sharing generated considerably more issues – strengths as well as challenges – than any other. This is not surprising since many, if not most, community members have benefited from the schemes and have practical experience of their strengths and challenges.

In the Sundarbans, the benefits are also considerable – with 12,000 fishing licences and many development projects – but these are distributed among a large population of more than 250,000 households. Kanamai, on the other hand, has no significant revenue to share

and the BMU has no law enforcement capacity to control access to fishing. At the other end of the spectrum, the 750 households that own Mara North each receive more than US\$1,000 a year in benefits.

Unsurprisingly, there were claims of unfair benefit sharing in all sites, but for different reasons. At Agusan Marsh, the concern was a lack of targeting criteria, which resulted in the basis for sharing between different households within PA-adjacent communities being unclear and not transparent. In contrast, at Mara North, the criteria for sharing the largest benefit – the concession fee based on landownerships – are clear and accepted. However, there are concerns about the lack of clear criteria and thus elite capture in how tourism operations select the projects they fund. There are similar concerns at Lake Mburo where, according to policy, benefits should be targeted on those suffering most from human-wildlife conflict – in other words, sharing based on cost incurred – but there is little evidence that this is the case. These are all issues of equity in a horizontal dimension between actors at the same level (see Figure 4).


Claims of unfair benefit sharing can also relate to how a flow of revenue is allocated between different actors in a value chain, which is sometimes referred to as vertical equity (see Figure 4). GAPA participants raised this at Mara North, where there is ongoing debate around the proportion of tourism revenue paid to landowners and whether the community should share the risks associated with fluctuations in tourism volumes.

Women at the two sites with mainly indigenous peoples raised concerns that men benefit much more than women. This is not surprising, as few women are on benefit sharing committees.

Another common concern about unfair benefit sharing relates to spatial distribution across PA-adjacent communities, with areas that are further from tourism centres and PA management offices often disadvantaged (Franks and Small, 2016b).

All four sites that are sharing significant benefits report a lack of information on the targeting criteria and how decisions are made, and that this raises suspicions over irregularities. In each case, there were genuine grounds for suspicion and even where nothing is wrong, the lack of trust in the system can undermine the conservation impact of benefit sharing. For example, a SAPA-based assessment at Kenya's OI Pejeta Conservancy in 2015 highlighted a widespread belief that PA-related jobs go mainly to people from outside the local community, but this is not the case (Franks and Small, 2016b).

Figure 4. Horizontal and vertical equity in a payment for ecosystem services value chain



All sites other than Mara North and Agusan Marsh reported concerns over corruption within benefit-sharing schemes, including bribes for priority access to benefits (Sundarbans), favouring friends and relations (Kalama) and siphoning off funds before they reach beneficiaries (Lake Mburo).

The assessments also highlight the issue of timeliness of benefit delivery. In Mara North, participants identified prompt payment of lease fees as a much-appreciated strength of the system, but in Lake Mburo and other Ugandan PAs, delays of up to two years are common. We have seen how in nearby Bwindi National Park, such delays and resulting frustration reduce the conservation impact of the scheme (Franks and Twinamatsiko 2017) and how resentment from those who suffer crop damage from wildlife without any form of compensation can be a major motivating factor for poaching and other illegal activities (Harrison *et al.* 2015).

4.1.5 Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information

GAPA guidance specifies that all sites should select accountability or the related principle of transparency as one of their three core principles. We advise facilitators to encourage actors to select accountability if they

seem to understand the concept and will accept open discussions of such issues. Otherwise, we advise selecting transparency as a stepping stone towards accountability. Three sites selected each, but in all those that selected accountability, the issues that emerged were mainly around transparency, so we have transparency results for all six sites.

Our analysis identifies four broad categories of transparency issues:

- A culture of openness around sharing information
- Collection, analysis and information sharing processes
- The types of information that have/have not been shared and its utility to the user, and
- Whether there is an increase in actors' awareness of key information.

We could regard the last category as the ultimate desired outcome and the first three as steps along the way where we may encounter constraints, barriers or even opportunities.

Nobody identified challenges under 'openness', but as we noted in our earlier caveat, this does not indicate that there are no strengths or challenges related to

openness; just that the issues that were foremost in people minds were presented in different terms.

The second category is about the flow of information from source to user, including any necessary data collection and analysis. Three sites reported challenges around poor community attendance at public meetings, due to bad advertising or because community members saw little benefit in spending time attending these meetings.

The failure of community leaders to share key information with other community members was another challenge for information flow in Mara North and Kalama. For example, although tourism operators in Mara North openly share information on revenue generated from tourism operations with community leaders, community members remain in the dark and blame the operators for withholding the information. In this case, the blockage lies further down with the community's representatives.

There can be big differences between different PA-adjacent communities in terms of access to information. In Agusan Marsh, for example, where local government has a key role, some communities are very good at sharing information and some are poor. Although only highlighted by participants in Mara North, gender seems to be a major factor in differential access to information in all sites, due to lower literacy levels among women and the deliberate exclusion of women from some PA-related meetings.

4.1.6 Accountability for fulfilling responsibilities, other actions and inactions

Our analysis identified three broad categories of accountability issues:

- Actors' performance versus what is expected of them
- Capacity, structures and processes for holding actors to account, and
- Accountability shortfalls that have been identified and response (if any) to these.

Under the first category, a major issue in communities with state governance PAs – Sundarbans and Lake Mburo – is the lack of clarity over the responsibilities of different actors, which makes it very difficult to hold anyone to account.

In relation to the second and third categories, three of the six sites raised issues of financial practice/malpractice. The success of efforts to hold actors to account for poor performance was limited by several

factors, including illiteracy of some board members (Kalama) who could not understand the reports they were given and a lack of information on how much PA revenue was available for sharing with communities (Lake Mburo). Also, in cases where there was clear evidence of poor performance, there was no system for appraising actors' performance and mandating sanctions or rewards. Unsurprisingly, while there was much talk of poor performance of responsibilities, no site came up with an example of an organisation or individual being held to account for failing to fulfil its responsibilities.

Fair and effective enforcement of laws and regulations

Although only two sites selected law enforcement for assessment, all sites selected achievement of conservation objectives, and a number of law enforcement issues emerged under this principle. The following were common to at least two sites:

- Lack of awareness among community members of detailed regulations such as fines for different types of illegal activity
- Corrupt behaviour of law enforcement agents, notably accepting bribes to overlook illegal activities or dropping prosecutions because of interference by powerful people, and
- Reluctance among law enforcement staff to arrest friends and family members caught doing illegal activities, especially in PAs managed by local people.

Having local people doing most of the law enforcement patrols is common with PAs that are owned by local people, but less common in shared governance PAs. An exception is Agusan Marsh, where the bulk of field patrolling, including in state-owned areas of the PA, is done by the local indigenous people whose ancestral domains cover part of the PA. For many years, they have done this on a voluntary basis. A key result, endorsed by both indigenous and non-indigenous people, is that they are not given the respect that they deserve. There was discussion of payment, but from their perspective, fair law enforcement is as much about respect as financial reward.

Achievement of conservation and other objectives

This principle is about achieving site-level objectives which the relevant actors control, or at least have substantial influence over. With the exception of Kanamai, which is far from achieving its objectives due to its very degraded condition, the PAs in this study are in relatively good condition ecologically.

Our synthesis under this principle is based on two broad categories of issues:

- Content of strategies and plans, the process used to develop them and the sources and type of knowledge – scientific, experiential, local, traditional – on which they are based, and
- Level of achievement of objectives (effectiveness) and adaptive management to improve effectiveness, informed by relevant learning.

A range of site-specific issues emerged in terms of strategies and plans, but there were no commonalities across sites. Issues of effectiveness were also very site-specific, except for two, which are common concerns in conservation in almost every developing country. These are the lack of success with measures to reduce demand for PA resources and an increasing population with little change in absolute numbers of people in acute poverty, a major driver of illegal PA resource use.

In terms of adaptive management and learning, not a single issue was raised across the six sites, but this may be because participants did not make the link between the principle and adaptive management, suggesting a need for a specific question on learning and adaptive management.

Effective coordination and collaboration between different actors, sectors and levels

As with the previous principle, many of the challenges of coordination and collaboration are site-specific. However, three challenges emerged that are common to at least two sites:

- Poor information sharing between actors that are trying to coordinate/collaborate, particularly around sharing technical information such as research results
- Overlapping mandates leading to uncoordinated and conflicting efforts – for example, four different government agencies play a role in land titling in and around Agusan Marsh, each with different interests, and
- Lack of clarity within shared governance arrangements on what decisions should be shared versus what should remain under one of the collaborating organisations – in other words, the boundaries of shared governance.

4.2 Ideas for action

Part of the key informant interview and focus group discussion process is exploring ideas for action to address the identified challenge. As we described in the methodology section, we frame this as a simple brainstorming both to encourage contributions and to avoid lengthy discussion on the pros and cons of a particular idea. Participants review these ideas in the second workshop, clarifying them where necessary, adding additional ideas and deleting those where there is a consensus that they are not viable.

There is no formal process of discussing priorities or commitment to implementation, so the assessing phase (Phase IV) ends simply with a set of options. Then in the initial months after the assessment, there will be an organic process of uptake of some ideas that are not controversial or costly, and a follow-up workshop 6 to 12 months after the assessment to review progress and systematically define some priorities.

This section does not set out to look for patterns of similar ideas emerging across the sites. However, facilitating the identification and review of ideas for action at six very different sites has yielded a few broad learning points that have important implications for GAPA's final taking action phase, which is in progress in all sites.

Ideas for action can be framed at different levels, from a general objective, such as sharing information on job opportunities, to a specific task such as putting details of job opportunities on village notice boards. They need to be specific enough to be clear what needs to be done, but not so specific to rule out thinking of alternatives if an idea is not practical. The second workshop includes a filtering process to reject vague and/or impractical ideas, although this was not consistently applied.

Table 3 provides a few examples of ideas for action that participants identified for challenges that are common to two or more sites.

Table 3. Ideas for action

PRINCIPLE	CHALLENGES	IDEAS FOR ACTION
Effective participation of relevant actors in decision making	Weak and in cases no representation of women in decision making	Comply with statutory provision of 1/3 women on decision-making bodies Build men's understanding of the importance of women's participation and capacity
	Poor performance of community representatives	Fresh elections for representatives Community representatives must provide feedback to their communities
Recognition and respect for the rights of all relevant actors	Indigenous lands not recognised and respected by some migrants (and vice versa)	Joint assessment of titled lands within and outside
	Government agencies often overlook indigenous permissions in programme and project implementation (no FPIC process)	Education of key actors on FPIC policy and regulations
Fair and effective processes for dispute resolution	Unresolved disputes related to human-wildlife conflict	Establish local wildlife committees as already mandated by law
Fair benefit sharing according to a strategy agreed by relevant actors	Limited consultation with community members on their priorities	Benefit-sharing decisions to be made by lower-level village committees Tourism operators to consult community men and women on their needs
	Benefits go mainly to powerful elites	Draw up priority beneficiary lists (eg resource users losing access, poorer students, disadvantaged areas)
Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information	Little information sharing from PA managers to other key stakeholders	Clarify responsibilities for information sharing Ensure an AGM is held every year
	Some local government and project financial information is not shared with communities	Ensure financial information is posted and updated on local government unit transparency boards
Accountability for fulfilling responsibilities, other actions and inactions	Lack of clarity over responsibilities of different actors	Co-management committees should be asked to clarify the responsibilities of their members
	Lack of checks to see whether board members, community members and PA/CA staff are fulfilling their responsibilities	Establish a responsibility check system
Fair and effective enforcement of laws and regulations	Prosecutions dropped following interference by powerful people	Refer corruption within the police to the anti-corruption unit
	Community rangers find it hard to arrest family members and friends	Conservancy board should deal with non-compliant rangers
Achievement of conservation and other objectives	Failure to reduce cattle numbers in local communities by introducing improved breeds	Introducing a tradeable quota system
	Acute poverty of local fishermen	Add value to conservation, (eg promote tourism, octopus enclosures)

Beyond the specifics of proposed actions, these ideas seem to differ in terms of:

Level where decision to act can be made: This can be local, provincial, PA/CA system or national. Local level includes PA/CA governance and management bodies, units of local government that cover the PA/CA and adjacent communities and other key actors based in the area. All but two of the activities in Table 3 – the joint assessment of titled lands and referring corruption within the police to the anti-corruption unit – fall into the local category, although some may need endorsement from higher levels.

Financial/human resources needed to implement the action: Most of the actions in Table 3 have either no significant requirement for human/financial resources or requirements that can be met through existing resources. Only the last action would require significant resources over and above that currently available, or likely to be available from higher levels and/or small donors.

Amount of political support needed to overcome resistance to governance strengthening measures that seek to change power relationships. Nine of the 19 actions are about implementing policies that organisations are already required to follow. The key is generating the will to act and collective commitment to mutual accountability.

The time it will take to see clear signs of success:

This is a crucial consideration in the early stages of any new initiative. Rapid success helps build the motivation and trust needed to continue efforts and to tackle more difficult challenges. Knowing the context of each site, we can say with some confidence that of the 19 actions, only four seem likely to encounter real barriers that could delay their implementation beyond a year or completely block it. Almost half could be implemented within six months if there is the will to do so. Seeing clear signs of success refers purely to successful implementation of the action as intended; it does not imply that higher-level social and ecological outcomes will be visible within a year, although early indications may be visible in some cases.

While measures to address results of social assessment and ecological monitoring can be costly and take years to show clear indications of success, measures to strengthen governance tend to be less costly and deliver visible success more rapidly. This boosts confidence and mutual trust. Since these are the building blocks of good governance, we could see, under the right conditions, a relatively rapidly evolving virtuous cycle.

5

Applying the GAPA methodology: lessons learnt

Refining the GAPA methodology has been a key objective of the work we document in this report. In this chapter, we report on the learning from our experience of using the GAPA methodology at the six different types of PA as described in Chapter 3. We cover the learning up to completion of Phase IV and related adjustments to the methodology. We do not cover the final action phase, which is ongoing at all sites.

Although the process (see Table 1) has remained the same throughout, we have significantly adapted specific methods and tools and the formulation of the good governance principles from one assessment to the next. This has made the methodology easier to use, more effective in terms of its governance strengthening objective and more efficient by reducing costs and time needed. Needless to say, these are competing objectives and therefore significant trade-offs.

The GAPA methodology users' manual, to be published in early 2019, will describe the final product of this development process. However, we will continue to develop the methodology beyond that and expect to produce a revised manual in 2020/21 after the next cycle of assessments.

5.1 Under what conditions is GAPA appropriate?

Although GAPA has been piloted mainly in PAs, it can also be used in CAs that are not formally designated as PAs. The CBD recently designated these areas 'other effective area-based conservation measures' (OECMs). One of the six sites of our first phase of assessments – Kanamai co-management area and LMMA – could probably be classified as an OECM (ie a CA), since the Kenyan authorities have not formally recognised it as a PA and it is not listed in the World PA Database.

Like our SAPA methodology (Franks and Small 2016a), GAPA is not appropriate for all PAs and CAs. This applies more to GAPA than SAPA because governance issues – notably transparency and accountability – can be much more sensitive than social impact issues, which are generally more visible. So we have developed and used the criteria below, based on SAPA criteria, to vet sites for governance assessment.

Key actors are willing and able to engage in the process. While it is easy to understand the idea of social assessment (how the PA/CA contributes to local people's wellbeing), governance is generally poorly understood, partly because of a narrow interpretation of widely used terms like participation, transparency and accountability. Key PA management and governance actors need to have a good shared understanding of the possible outcomes of the GAPA process, including potentially sensitive issues such as allegations of elite capture and corruption. All key actors must also understand that discussion of governance revolves as much around opinion and perception as objectively verifiable facts. As such, they must appreciate the legitimacy of perceptions different from their own and the importance of understanding why people feel the way they do. Initial discussions should go into some depth on what to expect, with everyone prepared to conclude that a site may not be ready for governance assessment.

Facilitators are competent, respected by key actors and viewed as relatively impartial. In SAPA, information is gathered through public meetings and a household survey. The largely quantitative data and analysis leaves little room for interpretation that might bias the results. However, GAPA uses focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews, with notetakers capturing qualitative data. As a result, the qualitative analysis has a stronger element of individual judgement. The credibility of the GAPA process depends on whether actors regard the facilitators as competent and impartial and its success in identifying the key issues depends on their facilitation skills. So investing time in finding the right facilitators is vital; and if in doubt, train more than you need and select the best.

Key actors are willing, and have the power and resources, to tackle at least some of the results. The key actors at all our selected sites have the power and resources to address some key results, but whether they are willing to do so is a different matter. This is not the same as the first criteria on willingness to engage in the assessment. In Bangladesh, the Forest Department was willing to engage in the assessment, but seemed reluctant at the time of the assessment to address a number of governance challenges on their side. When this happens, there is risk that the other actors who have invested in the process get so frustrated that the process proves counter-productive. The Bangladesh site was borderline on this criterion, but we had no such concerns at other sites.

The assessment process is not likely to cause conflict, exacerbate existing conflict or have negative impacts on vulnerable social groups. This has proved the most difficult criterion to apply because existing conflict and potential negative social impacts

may not be visible to the assessment convenor and could only surface once the assessment is under way. A systematic, in-depth feasibility assessment is therefore important, no matter how much a few champions like the idea of a governance assessment.

5.2 Limited understanding of key governance concepts and terms

During the first assessment in Bangladesh, facilitation team members spent a lot of time translating the principles from English to Bangla. However, on translating their efforts back into English, we often found that the statement had become narrowed to one particular aspect or biased in some other way. For example, participation implied people attending meetings but not the extent to which participants influenced decisions there. We also found that less experienced facilitators had little understanding of key governance concepts, despite being frequently used terms, and concluded that facilitator training needed to include a substantial session on understanding PA/CA governance. We have now incorporated this as a training session. This concludes with the facilitators working together to develop and agree a heading for each principle that conveys the overall concept and a set of agreed terms/phrases they can use to further explain the concept. The good governance themes we developed as a way of unpacking our 11 good governance principles have proved very useful in the understanding PA/CA governance training.

5.3 Who to engage when

Like SAPA, GAPA is a methodology based on the notion that actors make their own assessment of a situation – in this case, the quality of governance of a PA/CA and any related conservation and development activities.

But unlike SAPA, where communities are the main source of social impact information, an assessment of governance quality must engage a wide range of actors as information sources, reviewers and validators of results. The cost and complexity of trying to involve representatives of all groups with some level of interest in a PA/CA would be unmanageable in all but very small PAs/CAs, so we need to prioritise actor engagement to ensure the more significant actors are engaged but without overwhelming the process.

A standard, two-stage stakeholder analysis will help determine which actor groups to engage. This should involve:

- An initial stakeholder analysis well in advance of the first workshop to determine who to invite. This analysis must be well facilitated – most likely by the convenor at this early stage – and include a range of actor perspectives. All key groups do not need to be represented, as it is a technical exercise at this point.
- Repeating the analysis at the first workshop to identify any key actors (groups or individuals) you missed. This is a political as well as a technical exercise. Allow for a few days between the first workshop and the start of key informant interviews to add any key actors you missed off the initial list.

It was hard to get anything close to a 50:50 gender balance in any of the stakeholder workshops except those in the Philippines. The reality is that government and conservation officials and local leaders are typically male. Women are often not formally represented or empowered, so rarely attend workshops even when invited. There are many reasons for this, including traditional expectations over a woman's role, a lack of information and involvement of women in conservation and the high transaction costs of attending such meetings. Actors using the GAPA methodology can address this issue through affirmative action by, for example:

- Holding separate focus groups for men and women to give them the same opportunity to input into information gathering
- Inviting women to workshops in pairs for mutual support, and
- Ensuring facilitators are highly skilled and empathetic to gender issues.

5.4 Can we quantify and aggregate GAPA results?

Information generated by GAPA is largely qualitative, but when it comes to providing evidence of a certain type of governance and/or equity challenge, quantitative information can be useful (Zafra-Calvo *et al.* 2017). To generate numbers, we developed a governance scorecard for use at the end of interviews and focus groups. This proved problematic because of the time required. More fundamentally, at this stage in the assessment, the facilitation team did not understand the site governance issues well enough to develop good indicators. We found that it was not until the end of the assessment that they gained the level of understanding needed to develop a good scorecard. So, rather than a data-gathering tool that contributes to the assessment,

the scorecard is an output of the assessment that we can subsequently use to generate a baseline against which to monitor change over time.

Another reason to want results in quantitative form is the desire of managers of PA/CA systems to compare performance between sites and aggregate data so they can generate numbers for the system as a whole (and include them in national reports to CBD). As with PA/CA management effectiveness assessment tracking tools, this is problematic because the questions on the scorecard and/or the sampling plan may differ between sites. We could partially overcome this by using a standard scorecard for PAs/CAs of a similar type/context and a standard plan for sampling different types of actor, as well as having the same people oversee the exercise. However, we remain sceptical of the idea of using scorecards to compare performance across sites and generating multi-site averages.

5.5 Advantages and disadvantages of open questioning

Using the same open questioning technique (see Section 2.3) in all focus groups and interviews has the following advantages:

- It avoids the use of leading questions that might be seen as biasing the assessment. Even a question as simple as 'What are the challenges for community participation in the co-management committee?' implies that the facilitator thinks this is a problem.
- Efficient use of time. Rather than working through a list of possible challenges that may or may not be relevant, we invite participants to talk about what they feel is most important.
- It makes the whole exercise less of an interview and more of an interactive conversation, encouraging a wider range of viewpoints.
- It enables standardisation of guidance, reducing the burden of assessment preparation and facilitator training. For example, the guidance in Section 2.3 should work for any PA/CA.

But we have encountered some genuine concerns with open questioning. First, even the most experienced and skilled facilitators can face challenges with open questioning – in terms of the energy and focus needed to facilitate the conversation and the phrasing and framing of follow-up and probing questions. Facilitators must be confident with the good governance principles

and themes so they know when to probe for more information and when the conversation has gone off on a tangent and needs to be brought back. They also need to know when not to push the conversation because the subject matter is sensitive, making participants uncomfortable or exposing them to risk. SAPA is very different in this respect; its more prescriptive approach to information gathering results from having a subject matter – impact on people’s livelihoods – that is better understood and less a matter of individual opinion.

5.6 Getting to root causes

Actions to strengthen governance are focused on the challenges. Governance challenges and their causes are usually multi-layered with the deeper, underlying levels often being sensitive issues related to the power dynamics and relationships that determine whose voice is heard, who wins and who loses.

Discussion of what is not working with respect to a key principle such as participation usually starts with the symptom of a problem – for example, limited participation of women. To get people to recognise and own the problem, and to identify actions that can effectively, equitably and sustainably address it, requires a deeper understanding of the underlying causes.

In our first assessments, our guidance to facilitators did not sufficiently emphasise the necessary follow-up questions such as ‘Why is the situation like this?’ As a result, when facilitators started down this road, they did not know when to stop and move on to another issue. This became easier to manage in subsequent assessments: because facilitators had undergone some training on governance principles, they had a better sense of the kind of information they were looking for. The rule of thumb “keep digging until there is obviously nothing more to ask or people start becoming uncomfortable” proved useful.

Given the time constraints, there is also a trade-off in balancing the time spent digging down on one issue, the number of issues we can explore and the need to keep the length of discussions and interviews within acceptable limits. As facilitators became more experienced, some were able to cut key informant interviews from over one and a half hours to one hour and focus group discussions from three to two hours.

5.7 Accuracy of results

Focus group discussions and key informant interviews generate raw qualitative data from multiple sources. Our analysis of such data is based on identifying patterns in the data, notably similar responses from more than one source. At our first site in Bangladesh, there was very little time for the analysis, so IIED staff did it. However, for subsequent assessments, we designed a simple process so the facilitation team could undertake this analysis.

Using **triangulation** to improve accuracy enabled more transparency and helped facilitators better understand the assessment results, improving their facilitation of discussions at the final workshop.

Accuracy depends on minimising sources of bias – for example, ensuring samples are genuinely representative and avoiding techniques such as leading questions.

Credibility depends on whether the key actors believe the results. This can depend as much on the process as the accuracy of the result – for example, whether they feel that the process was balanced in considering different perspectives.

Precision: The statistical significance of the results depends on the sample size for a given level of variation in responses. A precise result can still be completely wrong due to bias.

Our second technique for promoting accuracy is **validation** in the final workshop. Participants review the strengths and challenges generated in the analysis stage and discuss whether they are accurate reflections of the situation. If there is a consensus in support (there was in around 75 per cent of cases), the finding is validated (ticked). If there is a consensus against it, the finding is rejected (crossed). No consensus leads to the issue being marked ‘?’ and parked for later discussion. In general, this process appeared to work well, but at one site a key actor raised a concern about the risk of ‘group think’.⁷ This is a risk with any process that looks for consensus, especially where the process moves rapidly through many issues. However, the concern is valid, particularly where facilitators do not challenge

⁷ Where a group makes bad decisions because its members do not want to express opinions or suggest new ideas that others may disagree with (Cambridge English Dictionary).

workshop participants individually and collectively to give reasons why they think results should be validated or rejected; facilitators need to keep probing to check that group think has not taken over.

From our perspective, the main problem with validating strengths and challenges was rejection of marginalised groups' issues. In the Maasai communities in Kenya, there were several incidences of women's issues being rejected – for example, their concerns about sourcing firewood and their exclusion from decision making on the allocation of school bursaries to children. Where the facilitators did not encourage the women to speak up, their issue was often rejected. But a consensus of support might have been generated if women had been encouraged to argue their case. This is an issue that skilled facilitators can easily handle but it can be hard for the less experienced and in the MNC assessment, the female facilitator, on the day, felt unable to share facilitation with her male colleague.

There is no triangulation or validation process for ideas for action. We must regard these merely as a set of ideas actors can choose from according to what they consider to be valid and useful, at least until the workshop in Phase V, where they can systematically review and prioritise them.

Ultimately, there is a trade-off between our objectives of accuracy, credibility and precision, not only because of funding constraints, but also participants' patience. For example, while a two-day workshop to review and validate results may be better than one day in terms of accuracy, half the results would have little credibility if representatives do not turn up for the second day. Similarly, having a larger number of focus groups and/or informant interviews should improve the precision of results, but if there is bias in the method – for example, because some groups are left out or the interviewer uses leading questions – results will be inaccurate or incorrect even if they are more precise. Having an important result that some actors know to be wrong could undermine the credibility of the entire assessment.

We have learnt that the credibility of these assessments – key to local ownership and action – is as much about the process of actor engagement as about conventional notions of accuracy and precision, and that there will be inevitable trade-offs that we have to recognise and carefully manage.

5.8 Differences between GAPA and the IUCN guidelines processes

GAPA is based on the governance assessment approach outlined in IUCN's 'Best practice guidelines' but with one substantial difference: the IUCN assesses governance diversity and quality while GAPA focuses on quality only. This reflects the GAPA theory of change, which assumes a gradual process of improving governance quality driven largely by site-level actors who do not have the power to change governance type (although they can bring about major change within a type). This contrasts with system-level governance assessment, where major changes in governance type may result through changes in system-level policy and strategy.

PHASES OF THE IUCN ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Phase 1: Preparatory workshop

Phase 2: Period of gathering and analysing information, identifying technical expertise and support, communicating with rightsholders and actors and, as necessary, helping them organise

Phase 3: Core workshop dedicated to assessing and evaluating governance, and planning for action on the basis of the evaluation results

Phase 4: Taking action according to the plan driven by site-level actors

In Chapter 2, we discuss the GAPA methodology's five phases, which mirror the IUCN guidance process, but split IUCN's Phase 1 into two – preparation and scoping workshop – to reduce the duration of the first workshop.

In Bangladesh, we limited the workshops to two days each, which was still problematic in terms of continuity of participation and cost. So we moved more of the assessment process outside of the first workshop,

Table 4. Five key issues: a comparison of IUCN and GAPA governance assessment processes

KEY ISSUE	IUCN	GAPA
History and culture	Examine national and local history, and people's cultural traits and values vis-a-vis a) the concept and practice of the PA/CA and b) the people and the PA/CA	Literature review in Phase I Environmental and social histories session in Phase II workshop (only at the last of the pilot sites)
PA/CA governance type	Clarify the PA/CA's governance type	Not directly discussed, but we can infer the <i>de facto</i> type by assessing actor participation
Actors and institutions	Identify the actors and institution(s) directly concerned with the PA/CA and its natural resources Distinguish them on the basis of legal and customary rights, interests, concerns and capacities	Stakeholder analysis in Phase II workshop, but does not assess capacity of different groups or legal and customary rights The latter is covered by the governance assessment if actors select the rights principle
Management units	Examine the PA/CA and its surroundings to identify any relevant management units and the actors with the capacity and willingness to contribute to governing those units	Not covered. This amounts to changing the governance type of certain zones of the PA/CA. We believe this is best addressed in a separate workshop on this topic once there has been progress on other issues. For example, this could emerge as an idea for action in the progress review workshop
Governance process	Determine how decision making takes place for the key issues related to the PA/CA Assess whether authority and responsibility are exercised legitimately, purposefully, effectively, accountably and fairly	Effectiveness, accountability and equity of decision making are largely covered by the assessment of governance quality

prioritising quality of validation over quantity of results validated in the second workshop and reducing both workshops to one day. In some cases, this meant actors ran out of time and did not validate the results for one or two principles. See the country reports in Chapter 3 for more details.

The main stakeholder workshop – IUCN Phase 3 and GAPA Phase IV – is where actors assess governance quality. In the IUCN process, it is preceded by a review of existing information on five key issues (see Table 4). In GAPA, we reduced the scope of these discussions and moved them to the scoping workshop, making them more of a context analysis that informs the design and facilitation of focus group discussions and informant interviews than something to explicitly assess.

In contrast to the IUCN process, the final GAPA workshop does not proceed from identifying ideas for action to making concrete plans to implement these ideas. This is for two reasons:

1. The senior decision makers who can commit an organisation to implementing follow-up activities are unlikely to be at the workshop or, if they are, to immediately commit to action.
2. We believe that the workshop's confidence-building objective will be better served by ending with positive ideas than in what could end up being a wrangle over who should do what.

There does, however, need to be a planning process in GAPA's final action phase (Phase V) without which there is a real risk of GAPA grinding to a halt at the end of Phase IV. This would have happened in most of our sites if GIZ and IUCN had not provided ongoing follow-up support. We have concluded that an action phase of at least six months after the end of Phase IV is vital. Assessment convenors need to accept responsibility – and be held accountable – for supporting the four activities of this action phase.

6

Framework of good governance principles and themes

The framework of good governance principles and themes that we developed and used for training and analysis is an important output of this work. This framework unpacks the 11 good governance principles into five to eight themes per principle. First developed in early April 2017, we have further refined the framework to take account of learning from later assessments and align it with the equity framework for PA management and governance that IIED and our partners have developed over the last three years (Franks *et al.* 2018).

We made a final iteration of adjustments during the analysis and synthesis for this report to:

- Make it easier to classify strengths and challenges by theme
- Ensure that we had covered all issues
- Avoid a situation where a large proportion of the issues ended up under one theme, and
- Make it as simple as possible.


The latest version of our framework of good governance principles and themes for PAs is included as Appendix 1.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of governance issues (strengths and challenges) emerging from the six assessments by theme for the six principles where there are enough issues for this analysis to be meaningful (>25). Not surprisingly, it shows that the distribution is far from even. This is only a concern where a category is blank; if there is no obvious explanation, this may indicate a need to adjust the guidance for facilitating key informant interviews and focus group discussions or that the theme is redundant.

Learning from further assessments will no doubt lead to further tweaks and so this framework remains work in progress. However, we are confident that it is fit for purpose:

- As a tool for PA/CA governance capacity building (as used for training GAPA facilitators)
- As a tool for coding and then analysing qualitative GAPA data (as used for our analysis and synthesis), and
- For developing a governance scorecard comprising, in principle, one indicator for each of three themes of the five to six principles – in other words, a total of 15–18 indicators.

Figure 5. Dominant and missing themes for principles with 25 or more strengths and challenges



Even after 15 months of iterative improvement of the framework, the process of coding strengths and challenges and developing indicators remains a challenge, requiring a clear logic to avoid a situation where we classify a pre-condition, cause or effect of an issue as an aspect of that issue. For example, recognition of rights is a pre-condition for respecting rights; they are not the same thing. Likewise, an actor sharing information – for example, through an announcement at a meeting – is not the same as certain

actors having an increased awareness of that issue, as much depends on the way they share the information.

While the difficulty of coding governance strengths and challenges and developing indicators will be a constraint on developing a scorecard, cross-site analysis and aggregating results to higher levels, it does not detract from GAPA's primary objective, which is to identify and build support for practical actions to strengthen governance.

7

Conclusion

A fundamental takeaway from conducting the assessments is that there is little understanding of good governance beyond jargon. By unpacking good governance concepts, our framework of principles and themes helps improve understanding and pinpoint where the challenges and strengths lie.

Based on the IUCN framework of five principles, we have boiled down the IUCN's 40 key considerations to a smaller set of simpler statements, dropping a few elements of the IUCN framework in the process, particularly from the principles of performance and direction, where some of the issues overlap with management effectiveness assessment. However, even after boiling down, there are still too many aspects of governance for a process that wants to genuinely engage the key actors. So a scoping process is a crucial element of the GAPA methodology.

The governance strengths and challenges that consistently appeared over several sites – such as the exclusion of key social groups from influencing strategies, plans and specific decisions, the poor performance of community representatives and a deliberate lack of transparency on benefit-sharing strategies and their implementation leading to elite capture of benefits – are new to some site-level actors. However, they are not new issues. A standardised methodology like GAPA should help us get a better sense of the scale of problem and cross-site analysis will help us differentiate between what is site-specific and what is systemic.

Although we have focused on site-level assessment, it is clear that a sample of site-level assessments could make a major contribution to system-level governance assessments that may otherwise lack credible information on governance quality, and in turn to assessing progress against global conservation targets. Where trade-offs exist between these higher-level and site-level objectives, we prioritise the latter – for example, emphasising qualitative over quantitative information and practicality over scientific rigour.

We have a real concern (and obligation) to ensure that at least some of the results of a governance assessment are actually applied. We have not covered this aspect in this report, as the six sites are still in the process of planning and implementing action. But our experience of supporting the action phase is showing that there is much that can be done to encourage action, and we will incorporate this learning in the GAPA users' manual, which we will publish in early 2019.

The GAPA methodology has its limitations, notably that a multi-stakeholder assessment approach will only work under certain conditions, and needs strong and impartial facilitation. In situations where in-depth governance assessment is not advisable or feasible, IIED's Social Assessment for Protected and Conserved Areas methodology (SAPA for short) can serve as a stepping stone.

Governance assessment has truly transformative potential to bridge the gulf between the rhetoric of good governance and equity and the reality of poor conservation performance and ongoing social inequity in many protected areas. We have the tools, but do key actors have the incentive to look in the governance mirror and take action that may challenge powerful interests and the status quo?

Formal recognition of good governance performance is one incentive. The IUCN Green List has great potential for this and we are developing GAPA with this in mind. Another incentive from a conservation perspective is the potential for improved governance and equity to lead to better conservation outcomes (Schreckenberg *et al.* 2016). We frequently make this claim, but the evidence base is not as strong as we like to think. In addition to providing a practical tool to strengthen PA/CA governance, scaling up site-level governance assessment using a standardised methodology such as GAPA also provides an opportunity to make a more robust case for the benefits to conservation of investing in good governance.

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Appendix 1: Good governance principles and themes for protected areas

PRINCIPLES	THEMES	EXPLANATORY NOTES	
1. Recognition and respect for the rights of all relevant actors	1.1	Rightsholders' awareness and understanding of their rights	The terms 'recognise', 'respect', 'protect' and 'fulfill' are defined in the legalistic sense that is used when referring to rights. The scope of rights includes all human rights covered by global and regional treaties and conventions, rights defined in a country's legal framework, statutory and customary rights to own or use resources, and the rights of indigenous peoples, including free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) that must be genuinely collective and given freely without coercion. A duty is a responsibility defined in law in relation to a specific right. For every right, one or more duty-bearers should be identified. Primary duties to respect and protect rights are held by the state, while the duty to respect rights may also be held by private sector and civil society actors.
	1.2	Knowledge and skills of rightsholders to claim their rights	
	1.3	Duty of actors to acknowledge and not interfere with a right (recognise and respect rights)	
	1.4	Duty of actors to stop other actors interfering with people's rights (protect rights)	
	1.5	Duty of actors to take positive action to enable people to exercise/enjoy a right (fulfill rights)	
	1.6	Verification, reporting and documentation of any rights violations	
	1.7	Remedies for rights violations (eg enforcement measures, penalties)	
	1.8	Free, prior and informed consent, where applicable	
2. Recognition and respect of all relevant actors and their knowledge, values and institutions	2.1	Acknowledgement of actors' interests, concerns and influence (recognition of actors)	Under this principle 'respect' is defined in the common English sense of having a positive opinion/attitude towards someone rather than in the legal sense used when referring to rights. Relevant actors include all actors who have interests in the PA and related conservation and development activities, whether or not they have influence. 'Institution' is used in the sense of cultural institution as well as an organisation.
	2.2	Acknowledgement of actors' knowledge, values, institutions (recognition of knowledge)	
	2.3	Opinion of other actors (respect for actors)	
	2.4	Opinion of the knowledge, values and institutions of other actors (respect for knowledge)	
3. Full and effective participation of all relevant actors in decision making	3.1	Structures and processes for relevant actors' to participate in decision making	'Full' indicates participation is respectful of community customs, inclusive and iterative. 'Effective' means that participants have influence on decision making but not necessarily in all cases. Participation includes meaningful consultation – a two-way exchange of views but where the lead actor can decide whether a contribution will be taken into account. There is a logical sequence of themes: 3.1 structures and processes for actors' participation in decision making; 3.2 the approach to decision making; 3.3 knowledge and skills for effective participation; 3.4 and 3.5 representation; and finally 3.6 and 3.7 input to decision-making discussions and the influence that this input has on decisions made.
	3.2	Dialogue and consensus in decision-making processes	
	3.3	Knowledge, skills and resources for actors to effectively participate in decision making	
	3.4	Processes for selection of representatives	
	3.5	Two-way communication between representatives and the actors that they represent	
	3.6	Inputs – verbal or written, direct or via representatives – provided to decision making	
	3.7	Influence that these inputs have on decisions that are made	

PRINCIPLES	THEMES	EXPLANATORY NOTES
<p>4. Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information in appropriate forms</p>	<p>4.1 <u>Decision making</u> on what information to make accessible to whom</p> <p>4.2 <u>Information gathering</u> and analysis processes, activities, technology and capacity</p> <p>4.3 <u>Information sharing</u> processes, activities, technology, materials and capacity</p> <p>4.4 <u>Availability of specific information</u></p> <p>4.5 <u>Relevance, accuracy and timeliness of information</u></p> <p>4.6 <u>Knowledge derived</u> by actors from information that is shared/made accessible.</p>	<p>This principle covers availability of information actors need for good PA management and governance. Information sharing may be proactive or in response to a request. There is a sequence of themes: 4.1 decision making on what can be shared with whom; 4.2 and 4.3 processes of gathering, analysing and sharing information; 4.4 and 4.5 examples of information that should be shared/accessible, and its utility to the user; and 4.6 the knowledge that the information user has acquired from the information that has been shared – the ultimate indicator an effective information sharing process.</p>
<p>5. Accountability for fulfilling responsibilities, and other actions and inactions</p>	<p>5.1 <u>Actors' knowledge of responsibilities/duties of other actors</u></p> <p>5.2 <u>Availability of information on actors' performance vs responsibilities</u></p> <p>5.3 <u>Availability of information on actors' performance vs financial policies and regulations</u></p> <p>5.4 <u>Knowledge and skills</u> needed by those wanting to hold responsible actors to account</p> <p>5.5 <u>Structures and processes</u> for holding actors to account</p> <p>5.6 <u>Accountability issues</u> that have been identified and assessed</p> <p>5.7 <u>Response to accountability issues</u>, including capacity building, rewards and sanctions</p>	<p>Accountability is the requirement that an actor – organisation or individual – be answerable for their conduct and specific actions, including, but not limited to, their designated responsibilities/duties. A duty is a responsibility that is defined in law. Accountability may be upward to higher levels of governance, downward, and/or horizontal, and also applies to inaction in a situation when action should have been taken. There is a logical sequence of themes: 5.1 to 5.3 actors' performance versus what is required of them; 5.4 and 5.5 capacity, structures and processes used for holding actors to account; and 5.6 and 5.7 accountability issues that have been identified and what action (if any) has been taken in response.</p>
<p>6. Access to justice including effective dispute resolution processes</p>	<p>6.1 <u>Structures and processes</u> (statutory and customary) that exist for dispute resolution</p> <p>6.2 <u>Awareness of, and the ability to access and use, dispute resolution processes</u></p> <p>6.3 <u>Knowledge and skills</u> of those involved to effectively use dispute resolution processes</p> <p>6.4 <u>Access to the formal legal system</u> (courts) where informal mechanisms do not succeed</p> <p>6.5 <u>Outcomes of dispute resolution</u>, including the fairness of settlement and any redress</p>	<p>Access to justice includes state mechanisms (judicial and non-judicial), as well as non-state remedies where applicable (eg customary arrangements of Indigenous People and local communities). Justice in this context also includes any existing park or conservation area dispute resolution mechanism(s). The scope of PA-related disputes may include the on-going impacts of historical injustice going back many years as well as more recent events.</p>
<p>7. Effective and fair enforcement of laws and regulations</p>	<p>7.1 <u>Awareness of relevant laws and regulations, and codes of conduct</u></p> <p>7.2 <u>Respect for law enforcement agents and other actors who assist them</u></p> <p>7.3 <u>Conduct of enforcement agents, and other actors in fulfilling law enforcement duties</u></p> <p>7.4 <u>Coordination between actors contributing to law enforcement</u></p> <p>7.5 <u>Procedures and sanctions for prosecution of offenders</u></p> <p>7.6 <u>Outcomes of law enforcement</u>, including fairness of law enforcement actions.</p>	<p>Law enforcement is both a management and governance issue. Management relates to planning, implementing and monitoring law enforcement activities. Governance relates to respect, behaviour, procedures, and overall performance of the system in relation to the law and codes of conduct. Although focused here on control of illegal use of PA resources, this principle may be interpreted more broadly as 'rule of law' – the principle that all people and institutions are subject to, and accountable to, law that is fairly applied and enforced.</p>

PRINCIPLES	THEMES	EXPLANATORY NOTES
8. Effective measures to mitigate negative impacts on indigenous peoples and local communities	<p>8.1 Making an <u>assessment of negative impacts (costs)</u>, their effect on wellbeing, and needs</p> <p>8.2 Content of <u>impact mitigation strategy</u> and process used for its development</p> <p>8.3 Allocation of <u>responsibilities for impact mitigation</u> – who is supposed to do what</p> <p>8.4 <u>Monitoring</u> negative impacts as they occur and <u>reporting</u> to the responsible actors</p> <p>8.5 Whether and <u>how</u> the responsible <u>actors respond</u> to avoid/reduce negative impacts</p> <p>8.6 <u>Outcomes of mitigation</u> measures – negative impacts avoided/reduced, and for whom</p>	<p>Negative social impacts include impacts that affect any aspect of human wellbeing, whether, or not, they have a monetary value. They are 'costs' in the broadest sense of this term, including opportunity costs such as loss of access to certain natural resources. Mitigation of negative impacts is based on a combination of measures to avoid negative impacts (as far as possible), measures to minimise any remaining impacts, and lastly measures to remedy any residue of impacts (eg compensation, restitution, and restoration).</p>
9. Benefits equitably shared among relevant actors based on one or more agreed targeting options:	<p>9.1 Making an <u>assessment of benefits</u>, their effect on wellbeing, and needs</p> <p>9.2 Content of <u>benefit sharing strategy</u> and process used for its development & agreement</p> <p>9.3 How, and by whom, <u>benefit sharing decisions</u> are made</p> <p>9.4 <u>Access to information</u> on benefit sharing policy/strategy, decisions and implementation</p> <p>9.5 <u>Integrity of benefit sharing</u>, including avoidance of elite capture, nepotism, corruption</p> <p>9.6 <u>Outcomes of benefit sharing</u> – benefits received by whom (quantity and quality)</p> <p>9.7 <u>Timeliness of receiving benefits</u></p>	<p>Benefit sharing refers to the process and outcomes of a mechanism to allocate certain benefits to certain actors. The scope of benefits may include both those derived directly from PA resources and indirect benefits generated by initiatives associated with the PA (eg employment and projects funded by tourism revenues). A benefit sharing strategy should include a clear strategy for targeting benefits based on one, or a combination of, the following five targeting options: sharing equally, sharing according to contribution to conservation, sharing according to costs incurred, sharing according to needs and/or sharing based on rights.</p>
10. Achievement of conservation and other objectives	<p>10.1 <u>Content of strategies</u>, and <u>plans</u> to deliver objectives</p> <p>10.2 Process used for <u>developing, reviewing and updating strategies and plans</u></p> <p>10.3 Drawing on different <u>sources of knowledge</u> – scientific, experiential, local, traditional</p> <p>10.4 <u>Achievement of objectives</u> and their specific targets (effectiveness)</p> <p>10.5 <u>Adaptive management</u> to improve effectiveness informed by relevant learning.</p>	<p>This concerns achieving site-level objectives over which actors have strong influence, and therefore some level of responsibility to deliver – in this sense a principle of programmatic accountability. These objectives generally relate to policies/regulations, institutional arrangements, procedures, processes, plans and/or implementation. Learning may be generated by internal processes (eg assessments, monitoring and evaluation) or come from external sources (other PAs, community of practice).</p>
11. Effective coordination and collaboration between actors, sectors and levels	<p>11.1 <u>Structures and processes</u> for coordination and collaboration</p> <p>11.2 <u>Clarifying of roles and responsibilities</u> of different actors</p> <p>11.3 <u>Sharing of relevant information</u> between actors</p> <p>11.4 <u>Alignment of related policies and plans</u> of different actors</p> <p>11.5 Working together in a planned, organised way (<u>coordination</u>)</p> <p>11.6 Working together in a planned, organised way with common objectives (<u>collaboration</u>)</p>	<p>This principle concerns the working relationship between the various different organisations involved in leading and supporting PA/CA-related activities (eg PA/CA management, local government, central government agencies, universities, NGOs). The last two points relate to what actually happens on a day to day, month to month basis, and they define the difference between collaboration where actors are working towards one or more common objectives, and coordination where actors work together but with different objectives. Partnership is a particularly strong form of collaboration where actors share not only common objectives but decision-making authority.</p>

Appendix 2: Inventory of governance methodologies and tools

When we began the process of designing GAPA, we commissioned an inventory of existing approaches to governance assessment which identified 27 methodologies, 73 methods and tools, and 103 relevant guides and resources. Our intention was to ensure that GAPA builds on these existing methodologies, methods and tools and guides.

In particular, we closely reviewed 14 methodologies published in English that have been developed for PA governance assessment, plus those developed for forest governance assessment that have been used, or could potentially be used, with PAs. The key characteristics of these methodologies are summarised in the table below (listed in order of publication date).

NAME OF METHODOLOGY	PURPOSE	FOCUS	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	STEPS, METHODS AND TOOLS
<p>Whakatane Mechanism http://whakatane-mechanism.org/</p> <p>The methodology is being designed and supported by IUCN CEESP (Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy) and the Forest Peoples Programme.</p>	<p><i>"The aim of the Whakatane Mechanism is to assess the situation in different protected areas around the world and, where people are negatively affected, to propose solutions and implement them. It also celebrates and supports successful partnerships between peoples and protected areas."</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • PAs 	<p>The conceptual focus is on conservation justice and rights, including redress. The Whakatane Mechanism provides a "consensual approach to generating frameworks that enable indigenous communities and conservation authorities to work together to protect their rights and the environment".</p>	<p>At each site the process has used a similar approach:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Roundtable with the different actors involved in the PA 2. Scoping study to meet with communities and local officials 3. Roundtable to present and agree on the findings and recommendations of the assessment. <p>Specific methods and tools are yet to be published.</p>
<p>Bennett, N J and Dearden, P (2014) From measuring outcomes to providing inputs: Governance, management, and local development for more effective marine protected areas. <i>Marine Policy</i>, 50: 96–110.</p>	<p>The methodology can be used to provide a list of best practices or recommendations; as a monitoring and evaluation tool; and/or to advocate for improved marine PAs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • Marine PAs 	<p>Governance: "[An] umbrella term which refers to the institutions, structures and processes which determine how and whether management can function effectively to address societal or environmental issues."</p> <p>Governance is treated as one of three inputs to marine PA ecological and socio-economic (livelihoods) outcomes. These are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Governance (institutions, processes and structures) 2. Management 3. Local development. 	<p>Provides a framework for analysing marine PA inputs – governance, management, and local development – using indicators that are drawn from a literature review.</p> <p>Methods involve researchers undertaking a semi-structured interview questionnaire, and a series of triangulated qualitative interviews or focus-group discussions with stakeholders. The objective is for researchers to undertake a qualitative exploration of each indicator, including – possibly – assigning a quantitative (numerical or scalar) value.</p>

NAME OF METHODOLOGY	PURPOSE	FOCUS	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	STEPS, METHODS AND TOOLS
Sengchanethavong, S, Phommasane, S and de Koning, M (2014) Governance Assessment in Hin Nam No National Protected Area , Bualapha District, Khammouane Province, Lao PDR. Summary Report.	This governance assessment aims to support the co-management approach at Hin Nam No National PA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • PAs 	Conceptual framework derived and adapted from Borrini-Feyerabend <i>et al.</i> (2013) (see related row below).	Mixed method approach that uses five days of participatory field research including village and district level workshops and interviews. There is an additional multi-stakeholder workshop to share results at provincial level. The assessment questions are adapted from the Borrini-Feyerabend <i>et al.</i> (2013) methodology and are coupled with SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) and problem tree analyses.
UN-REDD (2014) Practical Guide to Participatory Governance Assessments for REDD+ (PGAs) . UN-REDD Programme.	<i>"The PGA is an inclusive and multi-stakeholder process that aims to produce robust and credible governance information as a first step in addressing governance weaknesses and eventually as a basis for policy reform."</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System level (national) 	Good governance is characterised by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transparency • Participation • Accountability • Fairness • Capacity of different actors. 	Relatively general methodology for multi-stakeholder processes, with the specific data types (qualitative or quantitative) and data collection and assessment methods to be decided by stakeholders. Main steps: Step 1. Preparation Step 2. Joint decision making Step 3. Data collection, validation and analysis Step 4. Communication of results and use of data.
Borrini-Feyerabend, G, Dudley, N, Jaeger, T, Lassen, B, Pathak Broome, N, Phillips, A and Sandwith, T (2013) Governance of Protected Areas: From understanding to action . Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No. 20, Gland, Switzerland: IUCN. Xvi + 124pp.	The methodology aims to support assessment of governance type (and its appropriateness) and governance quality.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System level • Site level • PAs 	<p>Governance: <i>"The interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say."</i></p> <p>The conceptual framework for assessing governance quality is built around five principles:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Legitimacy and voice 2. Direction 3. Performance 4. Accountability 5. Fairness and rights. <p>There are over 200 suggested indicators for assessing the five principles.</p>	For site-level PA assessment, the methodology is organized around an eight-step process for assessment (Steps 1 to 5), evaluation (Steps 6 and 7), and reporting and action (Step 8). Step 1. History and culture Step 2. Governance type Step 3. Actors and institutions Step 4. Management units Step 5. Governance process Step 6. Governance options to strengthen the PA Step 7. Improving governance quality Step 8. Reporting and action. The methodology includes supplementary tools such as a checklist for identifying rightsholders and stakeholders and a group exercise to examine and discuss governance quality.

NAME OF METHODOLOGY	PURPOSE	FOCUS	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	STEPS, METHODS AND TOOLS
Davis, C, Goers-Williams, L, Lupberger, S and Daviet, F (2013) Assessing Forest Governance: The Governance of Forests Initiative (GFI) Indicator Framework. World Resources Institute.	To provide "a comprehensive menu of indicators that can be used to diagnose and assess strengths and weaknesses in forest governance".	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System level (national) 	<p>"GFI views governance through a procedural lens that focuses on process of how decisions are made about forests, as opposed to focusing exclusively on what decisions are made or the outcomes of those decisions."</p> <p>The GFI Indicator Framework focuses on three components of forest governance:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Actors 2. Rules 3. Practices. <p>And, five principles of good governance:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Transparency 2. Participation 3. Accountability 4. Coordination 5. Capacity. 	<p>The GFI Indicator Framework does not include a specific, set of methods. Rather, the GFI Guidance Manual (WRI 2013) supports the user in planning a mixed-methods qualitative assessment.</p>
Hill, R, Maclean, K, Pert, P L, Rist, P, Joyce, A, Schmitter, J, and Tawake, L (2013) Participatory evaluation of co-management in wet tropics country. Interim Report. Report to the National Environmental Research Program. Reef and Rainforest Research Centre Limited, Cairns.	Part of a broader co-research initiative to "interrogate the capability of Indigenous Protected Areas (IPAs) and other collaborative planning models... to provide the means for effective engagement of Indigenous knowledge and co-management for biodiversity and cultural protection...".	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Landscape level • Site level • PA 	<p>Co-management is conceptualised as "a continual solution-building process, not a fixed state, involving extensive talking, negotiating together and jointly learning so it gets better over time".</p> <p>The methodology's conceptual framework includes thirteen topics grouped into two overarching features of co-management:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rainforest Aboriginal Peoples keeping strong (eg culture, kin, indigenous leadership) 2. Keeping engagement strong (ie relationships, protocols, power and issue resolution). 	<p>A qualitative, participatory evaluation approach that uses a health indicator assessment sheet and workshop discussions to undertake the evaluation. There are a set of standard questions on structures, processes and results that are used to guide workshop discussions. Discussions are recorded by participants and facilitators and qualitative data is coded using NVIVO software.</p>

NAME OF METHODOLOGY	PURPOSE	FOCUS	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	STEPS, METHODS AND TOOLS
Wilkie, D, Cowles, P and Behrendt, A (2013) Guidelines for Assessing the Strengths and Weaknesses of Natural Resource Governance in Landscapes and Seascapes. USAID.	<i>"The overall purpose of this guide is to: [1] Identify key groups governing access to and use of NRs in a given landscape or seascape [and, 2] Assess the key groups' governance strengths and weaknesses that can then help direct investments to improve governance of natural resources within the landscape or seascape".</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Landscape/ seascape level 	<p>Definition of Governance effectiveness: <i>"When a natural resource governance group makes decisions and enforces rules that ensure the sustainability (ie long-term ecological and economic productivity) of the natural resources under their control. Effective long-term sustainable management of natural resources is predicated on governance that is representative and democratic."</i></p> <p>The methodology uses three broad attributes as strong predictors of effective governance</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Authority 2. Capacity 3. Power. 	<p>Provides a six-step method for assessing and developing an action plan, supported by interview and scoring and a database for analysis.</p> <p>Step 1. Identify and map key governance groups</p> <p>Step 2. Rank the most influential governance groups</p> <p>Step 3. Conduct governance strengths and weakness interviews</p> <p>Step 4. Score the survey results.</p> <p>Step 5. Analyse and present the results</p> <p>Step 6. Develop and implement actions to improve governance.</p>
CARE Nepal (2012) Handbook for Participatory Governance Assessment at Community Forest User Group Level. Haryo Ban Program, CARE Nepal.	To assess and improve good governance practices in community groups.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • Community forests 	<p>Uses the UNDP's conceptualisation of governance <i>"[the] exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, process and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences".</i></p> <p>The conceptual framework for assessing governance is built around four principles:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Transparency 2. Participation 3. Accountability 4. Predictability. 	<p>Participatory, qualitative assessment by community forest user groups (CFUG) and other community member stakeholders.</p> <p>Main steps:</p> <p>Step 1. Planning by the CFUG and program staff</p> <p>Step 2. Participants collectively evaluate whether decision making and management practices meet the four principles of good governance</p> <p>Step 3. Participants agree upon actions which are recorded in the form of a governance improvement plan.</p>

NAME OF METHODOLOGY	PURPOSE	FOCUS	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	STEPS, METHODS AND TOOLS
Ishabakaki, E F (2012) Training of the Trainers Manual for the Implementation of the Community Forest Governance Dashboard . Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, Forest Justice in Tanzania and MJUMITA.	Designed to "assess <i>governance in the context of participatory forest management</i> " and "provide... a framework for communities to plan for improved governance" (MJUMITA and TFCG 2014).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • Participatory forest management • Specific focus on Tanzania 	Principles of good governance: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Accountability 2. Transparency 3. Participation. 	Two independent community members (ie not members of the Village Council or Natural Resource Committee) are elected as focus group leaders to undertake data collection through interviews. MJUMITA Zonal Coordinators analyse the result and prepare village reports, comparing different villages governance status and best practice. MJUMITA provides training to village focus group leaders for results sharing at the Village Assembly. The Village Assembly are tasked with agreeing solutions and action plans.
PROFOR and FAO (2011) Framework for Assessing and monitoring forest governance . The Program on Forests (PROFOR), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome, Italy.	A diagnostic assessment designed for identifying areas of forest governance in need of reform (Kishor and Rosembaum 2012).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systems level • Forest management unit (national or sub-national) 	Key features of good forest governance: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accountability • Effectiveness • Efficiency • Fairness/equity • Participation • Transparency. The conceptual framework defines 130 indicators which are organised under three main 'pillars': <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pillar 1: Policy, legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks 2. Pillar 2: Planning and decision-making processes 3. Pillar 3: Implementation, enforcement and compliance. 	Main steps according to Kishor and Rosembaum (2012): Step 1. Identify organisers, potential users of results Step 2. Form team with the necessary knowledge and skills Step 3. Identify stakeholders and key issues Step 4. Prepare background materials Step 5. Customize the indicator questions Step 6. Hold a stakeholder workshop [to score indicators] Step 7. Produce a report Step 8. Validate and disseminate the report Step 9. Chart follow-up actions.

NAME OF METHODOLOGY	PURPOSE	FOCUS	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	STEPS, METHODS AND TOOLS
Lockwood, M (2010) Good governance for terrestrial protected areas: A framework, principles and performance outcomes. <i>Journal of Environmental Management</i> , 91: 754–76.	To demonstrate a PA's performance and identify where improvement is desirable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • Terrestrial PAs 	<p>"Governance concerns structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how stakeholders have their say." (Graham et al. 2003).</p> <p>There are a set of seven principles that the assessment uses:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Legitimacy 2. Transparency 3. Accountability 4. Inclusiveness 5. Fairness 6. Connectivity 7. Resilience. 	Qualitative assessment and numerical scoring designed to be undertaken by independent assessors based on expert knowledge, secondary data, and interviews. Scoring should reflect the consensus of several independent assessors (Lockwood 2009).
Child, B (2007) The Community Dashboard: Developing a tool for the adaptive management of governance in community conservation in southern Africa. Unpublished.	Part of broader research project with objectives to contribute to the community based natural resource management.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • Community based natural resource / wildlife management 	<p>There is no set conceptual framework for governance. Rather, the first steps of the method involve asking Conservancy leadership to identify governance issues through a mind-map process.</p>	<p>Main steps:</p> <p>Step 1. Meet with leadership to introduce data collection process and test the survey design</p> <p>Step 2. Researchers design the Community Dashboard questionnaire from trialling questionnaires with the community</p> <p>Step 3. Train local survey administrators</p> <p>Step 4. Data collection and analysis by researchers</p> <p>Step 5. Data feedback by the community through feedback workshops.</p>
Abrams, P, Borrini-Feyerabend, G, Gardner, J and Heylings, P (2003) Evaluating Governance: A Handbook to Accompany a Participatory Process for a Protected Area. PARKS CANADA and TILCEPA–Theme on Indigenous and Local Communities, Equity and Protected Areas of IUCN CEESP /WCPA. Draft for Field Testing.	Support participatory protected areas governance assessment (focus on co-management).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site level • PAs 	<p>Governance: "Interactions among institutions, processes and traditions that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken on issues of public and often private concern, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say."</p> <p>The conceptual framework for assessing governance is built around five principles:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Legitimacy and voice 2. Accountability 3. Performance 4. Fairness 5. Direction. <p>There are 231 indicator suggestions for the five principles.</p>	<p>The guide sets out a broad, three-phase assessment process (preparation, assessment, action). A set of mixed methods are suggested – including interviews, mapping, ranking and scoring exercises – and guidance is provided on sampling, data storage, qualitative analysis (qualitative scores, scales, etc). Case studies are also given for more illustrative examples of how governance can be understood and improved.</p>

We are increasingly recognising that governance is key to enhancing the effectiveness, equity and sustainability of conservation efforts. There is abundant literature on the theory of governance and conservation practitioners are increasingly familiar with the concepts of accountability, effective participation and equitable benefit sharing. But what do these terms mean in the context of conservation? How do you assess strengths and challenges with respect to these concepts at a particular site in a way that encourages key stakeholders to work together to improve the situation? This report describes a multi-stakeholder approach to governance assessment where the stakeholders do the assessment. In it, we unpack the key concepts, review existing assessment approaches on which our approach is based, present the results of applying the assessment in Bangladesh, the Philippines, Kenya and Uganda and discuss our learning from this experience.

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