Shelter provision in Mogadishu

Understanding politics for a more inclusive city

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The Human Settlements Group works to reduce poverty and improve health and housing conditions in the urban centres of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It seeks to combine this with promoting good governance and more ecologically sustainable patterns of urban development and rural-urban linkages.

This working paper presents findings and recommendations from research on access to shelter and services in Mogadishu, Somalia. It is part of a three-city study in East Africa also covering Nairobi, Kenya and Hawassa, Ethiopia. Guided by political economy analysis, the two-year research project investigated why and how city dwellers make certain shelter choices, and generated recommendations to improve access to adequate shelter and basic services for the most vulnerable urban residents.

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Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BRA	Benadir Regional Administration
DFID	UK Department for International Development
EARF	East Africa Research Fund
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus group discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
GDP	Gross domestic product
KIIs	Key informant interviews
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ID	Identity document
IDP	Internally displaced person
ISM	Informal settlement manager
JPLG	UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
MoPWRH	Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Housing
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PLWD	People living with disabilities
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nations

Summary

This working paper is one of a series of three reports covering the main findings from a research project led by IIED on shelter in East Africa. This research project examines systems of shelter provision in three East African cities: Nairobi, Hawassa and Mogadishu. It was designed to identify policy-relevant, locally driven solutions to improve shelter at scale for vulnerable groups, including low-income women and men, displaced people, and people with disabilities. The methodology underpinning the study recognises that gender, poverty, displacement and ethnicity can act as major axes of discrimination that impede access to land, shelter and services in East African cities. The research has explored the three cities' histories, political settlements and variations in housing in order to generate new insights that can inform more inclusive, affordable shelter interventions. In addition, the research process has provided opportunities for knowledge-sharing and spaces for dialogue between communities and local officials, using shelter as an entry point to foster more responsive local governance.

It is believed that the history of Mogadishu goes back at least as far as the 10th century, when Iranians from Shiraz founded a coastal city to trade with the Arabian Peninsula, Persia, India and China (Marchal 2006). Like in many African countries, Somalia's current borders have little resemblance to the distribution of the ethnic Somali people who, apart from Somalia, are also present in the neighbouring countries of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. During the colonial period, Somalia was divided into northern British Somaliland and southern Italian Somaliland. On 26 June 1960, Britain granted independence to the north and four days later, the Italian-administered United Nations (UN) Trusteeship Territory of Somalia achieved independence. On 1 July 1960, the people of the former British and Italian territories united to form the Somali Republic (Gardner and El-Bushra 2004).

At independence, the population of Mogadishu was estimated to be 90,000, growing to 250,000 by 1969 (Davies 1987). By the 1980s, shortly before the collapse of the Siad Barre government, this was estimated to have risen to one million, with informal settlements mushrooming with no planning and their inhabitants living in cramped, unhygienic conditions with no access to basic services. Donor-funded initiatives – such as the National Housing Agency's attempt to establish apartment blocks for migrants, or housing projects for low-income families in an area known today as Casa Popolare – were unable to keep up with the flow of newcomers to the city. Outbreaks of violence were common between differing clan members, who had come to live side by side in the city (ibid). Between 1970 and 1984, the central area grew more than fivefold, from 1,500 to 8,000 hectares (ibid). The city was divided into 13 districts and sub-divided into departments (*waah*), sections (*laan*) and neighbourhoods with most districts becoming dominated by a particular clan (or clans) (ibid). The number of districts has now grown to 17, including the accession of Daynile and Kaxda districts, which are dominated by internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Somalia adopted a Provisional Federal Constitution in 2012 that envisages the setting up of a federal system of government through the creation of regional states. In addition to the self-declared state of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous regional state of Puntland, four other regional member states have been formed since then: the Jubaland, South West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle administrations. The status and boundaries of Benadir region, whose capital is Mogadishu, remains unclear and highly contested in the ongoing federalisation process. Not only is Mogadishu the capital of Benadir region, but historically it is also the capital of Somalia, and some argue that it deserves special status as a state of Somalia (Bryden and Thomas 2016). The Provisional Constitution is silent on the issue of Mogadishu and it is hoped that the ongoing constitutional review process will find a way to resolve it.

Unlike in many other countries afflicted by conflict and displacement, Somalia does not have any UN-administered IDP camps. The high levels of insecurity after the collapse of the government in 1991, as well as the eventual withdrawal of the UN operations from the country in 1995, meant that there was no UN presence to organise housing and support for those displaced by the conflict. Instead, local Somalis took on this task – leading to the eventual growth of the gatekeeper system (Bryld *et al*. 2014; see also Section 2.4). The extremely restricted humanitarian space

and the control of Mogadishu by various warlords who engaged in frequent clashes with each other curtailed any meaningful ventures into the capital by humanitarian agencies. The UN started negotiating access to Mogadishu in 2006, but with the fall of the Islamic Courts Union (which attempted to break the strangle-hold of the warlords over the city) and the rise of al-Shabaab, security again degenerated. With the famine of 2011–2012, agencies again had access to the city, by which time the gatekeeper system was well established in the face of weak or un-operational government structures (Bryld *et al.* 2013; Drumtra 2015).

Mogadishu was selected as one of the case-study countries for the East Africa Research Fund (EARF) research on shelter provisions in East African countries as it presents a case of high need for low-cost shelter accessibility and a unique mix of longstanding formal and informal processes governing access to land and shelter. The shelter situation is exacerbated by decades of civil war since the fall of the government in 1991 that have resulted in high levels of internal displacement, with approximately 25 per cent of the city's population comprising IDPs. As a result, and going back over 25 years, informal settlements have been appearing in and around the city, densely populated by these displaced populations but also by refugees from neighbouring countries (some Ethiopians, and more recently, a number of Yemenis), returnees and urban poor who cannot afford to reside anywhere else. With this research, the team hopes to shed more light on the practices and provision of shelter in the city and provide recommendations for enhancing the response by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) (the city administration), the international community and development practitioners.

The research was divided into three phases:

• A desk-study phase assessed existing legislation and previous research and identified gaps that needed to be addressed in the field research stage.

• A first field research phase focused on the production of shelter across the city. This included (a) semi-structured interviews with key informants, from government and development practitioners to representatives from banks, notaries, real-estate developers, and private utility companies (25 respondents); (b) a number of cross-city excursions aimed at identifying shelter types and spatial patterns in Mogadishu; and (c) a cross-city questionnaire survey (using KoBo[1] tablet data collection and processing) interviewing residents of different shelter types across the city identified in the excursions (35 respondents). The findings from Phase I were validated through a workshop with government, BRA and private-sector representatives.

• A second field research phase focused on selected settlements comprising poor urban residents or people classified in Mogadishu as IDPs in three districts ranging from the centre to the periphery of the city (63 respondents). Key tools for data collection in the second fieldwork phase included semi-structured interviews with residents (male- and female-headed households and youth) and focus group discussions (FGDs) (with mixed groups, women and youth), followed by social mapping exercises where groups of women and young men from Hodan and Kaxda districts were asked to draw their settlements, describe their external living spaces and identify social spatial patterns (40 participants). Specific sessions were held with women as well as young single men, who comprise some of the most vulnerable groups in Mogadishu.

Note the following for the specific sections:

• The political settlement section, in addition to interviews with IDPs, gatekeepers, urban poor, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the local and national government in this EARF research brings in notaries, real-estate agents and service providers as new informants (no other data set from previous research, including Tana's own research, has involved these stakeholders in the past). This allowed the team to assess the actual process of transaction of property and rental agreements beyond informal settlements, and provides new perspectives on the political settlement. These findings are based on qualitative interviews and were cross-referenced across interviews where feasible. The informants were identified through Tana's networks in Mogadishu. Lack of access meant that they were brought to the safe guest house for interview.

• The two case studies presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2 were chosen as they represent two contrasting locations for informal settlements: Shangani is an old settlement in Shangani district in the centre of Mogadishu with long-term residents, while Alkhodar is a new settlement in the remote (and new) Kaxda district of Mogadishu characterised by newly arrived IDPs and migrants (neither of these settlements has been included in previous Tana research). The interviewees were selected based on their availability in the settlements.

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[1] KoBo produces open-source mobile data-collection software. See www.kobotoolbox.org.

- In the two case studies, the team undertook key informant interviews (KIIs) in the settlements. Based on these, issues of vulnerability related to women and young men were identified. To explore these areas further, three groups of women and three groups of young men were identified and invited to participate in FGDs and social mapping exercises in the safe guest house in Mogadishu. The social mapping exercises were used to provide graphic and spatial dimensions to the discussion of vulnerability, illustrating physical locations of shelters in relation to security perimeters, access points, services and gatekeeper and police locations, as well as to identify types of shelter across the settlements. The FGDs with women were conducted by female staff only.

- The findings in the remainder of this working paper also draw on EARF research from other settlements (see Annex I for an overview).

The security situation in Mogadishu meant that on each visit, the core team members could only access the selected settlements and government offices for short periods and when the security agencies were confident that there was no imminent threat. However, the Somali staff on the team had long-term access throughout. These visits were combined with transporting interviewees to a secure guest house where the core team could conduct interviews, social mapping, and so on. The security situation meant that the international team was not in a position to undertake longer-term observations in the informal settlements, but rather had to rely on national staff and interviewees brought to them. The team has worked in the informal settlements in Mogadishu since 2012, however, and thus has previous experience to work from. Despite this, the access challenges are a limitation to the research. We have sought to overcome this limitation through triangulation with other actors working in the areas, and the team believes that the research is representative of the situation in and around informal settlements in the city.

Mogadishu's history renders it particularly appropriate for the consideration of a number of core issues. The main findings from this research fall into three categories:

- **The connection between urban poverty and internal displacement.** As mentioned above, Mogadishu's informal settlements are inhabited by a mix of people displaced from other regions and poor Mogadish residents. While there are large flows of external displacement into the city, there are also important flows of displacement within the city. This is in part due to the fact that the urban poor live in areas with high tenure insecurity and can be evicted with little or no notice by the landlord or property owner.

- **The role of informal networks and relations** as a key part of the political settlement around land and shelter in Mogadishu. As access to land and shelter is governed by a complex system of formal and informal rules, for vulnerable groups especially, being well known in a community and having contacts with powerful actors in Mogadishu's informal settlements is key to finding a place to live. While there are formal processes involving notaries and banks, the majority of the population cannot afford these services; for them, personal networks are the only avenue through which they can secure a home (Landinfo 2016).

- **Vulnerabilities around female-headed households and women, people with disabilities, as well as young single men**, who we found face specific challenges related to accessing shelter in the city. In Somalia's patriarchal society, the male-headed family is the fundamental social unit and people who fall outside of this category are heavily disadvantaged when it comes to accessing housing. Furthermore, there is no infrastructure or enabling policies that take into account the special needs of people with disabilities. These categories of people are often socially isolated, but paradoxically are that much more dependent on community support or charitable neighbours to find shelter.

For an overview of Mogadishu city, see Figure 1.[2]

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[2] The Somali language is mainly oral, and has been written using a number of different scripts. There is often some variation in the spelling of names of places. In Figure 1, Shangani is spelled Shingani, but it refers to the same area referred to as Shangani in the rest of the paper.

Figure 1. City plan of Mogadishu

Source: UNHCR with Tana additions (http://bit.ly/2W3cx8t)

1

Introduction and background

On attaining independence, a democratically elected civilian government was subsequently established in Somalia, which stayed in power for nine years until 1969, when it was overthrown and replaced by Siad Barre's dictatorial regime. Mogadishu remained the base of the new administration. Under Barre, the central state in Somalia was notoriously corrupt, authoritarian and patronage-based. In 1970, the Law for Social Protection was passed that abolished all forms of customary rights and privileges over land and water, which were then claimed by the state. Consequently, a large number of people in rural areas lost their land to Barre loyalists, resulting in the first waves of displacement fuelled by loss of property (Rift Valley Institute 2017).

In 1973, the regime introduced the Urban Land Distribution Law that allowed for land to be bought at a fixed price, but the bureaucracy associated with the land and property acquisition process locked out the majority of Somalis, meaning that elites and government actors who could navigate the process gained control of large areas of land in Mogadishu in a process characterised by bureaucracy, greed, violence and corruption (Gardner and El-Bushra 2004).

After the fall of Siad Barre's authoritarian regime in 1991, Somalia was plunged into decades-long civil war and different military factions rose to power. In Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) ousted the Barre regime, resulting in the expulsion from the city of the Barre loyalist clans and the appropriation of real estate by the new rulers. Similarly, across the southern and central parts of the country, other groups seized valuable arable land and urban land from minority clan and non-clan ethnic groups.[3] The process resulted in a mass reallocation of people across the Somali territory and the first of many waves of displacement across the Horn of Africa region. The ICU youth wing, al-Shabaab, emerged as the leading Islamic militant group post-2006 and regained control of large parts of the South Central region, including Mogadishu – once more rearranging the power dynamics of the city. However, in 2011, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), together with the Somalia National Army and regional militia loyal to the FGS, managed to oust al-Shabaab from all major cities, including Mogadishu in 2011 (and Kismayo in 2013), allowing the BRA to start a process of enhancing its control over the city as the formal municipal government.

Somalia remains a conflict-torn country with significant violence over large swathes of the territory, in particular the southern and central regions (though less in some parts compared to the early 2000s), and Mogadishu still suffers from regular terrorist attacks. However, as Table 1 shows, there have been improvements – albeit marginal – in the key governance indicators for Somalia.[4] Notably, in 2017, the country's GDP reached an all-time high of US$7.052 billion (World Bank Group undated a).

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[3] Somali society is divided into an intricate hierarchy of clans. Clans control districts, land and businesses and influence most aspects of Somali life. However, there are also different ethnic minorities within Somali society outside of the clan system who face unequal rights and autonomy compared to the majority groups.
[4] It should be noted that there are little recent data available for many key indicators for Somalia, including the Human Development Index and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals.

Table 1. Key governance indicators for Somalia, 2010–2015 and 2015–2017

KEY INDICATORS	2010–2015	2015–2017
Freedom in the world (0.0–7.0, 0 = Most free, 7 = Least free)*	7.0	7.0
Voice and accountability (-2.5–2.5)**	-2.08	-1.89
Government effectiveness (-2.5–2.5)**	-2.23	-2.19
Political stability & absence of violence (approx.-2.5–2.5)**	-2.78	-2.35
Rule of law (-2.5–2.5)***	-2.37	-2.34

Sources: * Freedom House (undated) ** World Bank (undated) *** The Global Economy (undated)
For all indicators, apart from Freedom in the world, -2.5 = weak, 2.5 = strong

The level of conflict in the country is also evidenced by the large number of IDPs, which has risen substantially in the last 10 years, as well as the high levels of corruption and lack of basic freedoms. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2.6 million people are displaced in Somalia today (IDMC 2018) due to conflict and, in particular, to natural disasters, especially floods and droughts. Data collated by IDMC (2018) state that the number of new IDPs displaced by conflict was 388,000 in 2017 and the first half of 2018, while the number displaced by natural disasters was 899,000 over the same period (UNOCHA undated).

The most recent drought in 2017 severely affected Puntland and Somaliland, causing devastating damage to communities and their livelihoods and resulting in out-migration to the south of the country and the death of livestock, a valuable means of income and wealth. As a result, humanitarian needs are high, as an estimated 6.2 million people – half of the country's population – are in need of humanitarian assistance, with women and children particularly vulnerable (Reliefweb undated).

This has caused a mass exodus from rural to urban areas: 44.4 per cent of Somalia's population was urban in 2015 (World Bank Group undated b). The majority have flocked to the capital of Mogadishu, seeking security, aid and livelihood opportunities, especially from the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions. Today, Mogadishu is said to be the most crowded city in Africa and has the second-highest urban population density in the world.[5]

1.1 Mogadishu

Table 2 presents an overview of key statistics on the populations of Somalia and Mogadishu and on access to basic services, relying on data from the last three years.

The history of land-fuelled conflict in Somalia can arguably be traced back to the Siad Barre regime which, after a coup against the elected government in 1969, imposed a centralised governance system in the country and nationalised resources, including land.[6]

Table 2. Demographic statistics and access to services

DESCRIPTION	DATA 2016–2018
Somalia population	14.74 million (2018 estimates)
Mogadishu population	1.97 million (2018 estimates)
Urban share of population	40.5% (2015 data)*
Fertility rate	6.26 (4th highest in the world)
Access to clean drinking water	31%**
Access to improved sanitation facilities	23%**
Access to electricity	32.2% (2017 data)**
Employment rate	39.91% (2018 data)**

Sources: * FAOstat and ** World Bank Open Data

[5] The accuracy of comparisons of population densities between cities is limited by the different criteria used to set city boundaries and thus also city areas (NRC 2018).
[6] See, among others, Gardner and El-Bushra (2004), Gajraj et al. (2005), Menkhaus (2007), Gundel (2009), Menkhaus (2014), Gardner and El-Bushra (2016) and Bryld (2019).

This resulted in deadly competition between the clans for control of the government and its resources, which was a key contributing factor to the regime's collapse in 1991 and continues to have repercussions to date, evidenced by the zero-sum politics and power plays in Somalia. The clan structure is both a unifying and a divisive element in Somalia, and alliances between different clans remain fluid. Clan-based claims over ancestral lands remain contentious and will be a significant element in determining how the peace process evolves in the country. In Mogadishu, the co-opting of some clan leaders by certain private-sector actors complicates matters, leading to land disputes between private owners and clan groups.

The general security situation in Mogadishu fluctuates. Frequent terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Shaabab plague the city, but these predominantly target government buildings or representatives of donor agencies or international organisations, not the general population. However, in 2017, President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed declared Somalia a war zone (Al-Jazeera 2017) in the wake of several deadly bombings by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, worsening the security situation. Today, Mogadishu is controlled by mostly Ugandan troops from AMISOM, and there is still restricted movement within the city. However, the situation has improved considerably over the last few years. Businesses are opening, markets are bustling, the tourism industry is developing, and local residents can walk freely on the streets within the limits of the curfew imposed by AMISOM. However, insecurity in informal settlements is rife – not due to car bombings and armed attacks so much, but because local police forces are struggling to protect residents from robbery, theft, assault, gender-based violence, trafficking and murder.

Various interventions by international and regional actors led to the setting up of a transitional national authority: first, the Transitional National Government (TNG) and then the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The end of the transition period in 2012 and the liberation of the city from al-Shabaab control have triggered reconstruction and development initiatives – not only supported by the international community, but also driven by the Somali diaspora – that have resulted in increased growth of the city's population, buoyed by a relative improvement in the security situation as well as economic opportunities driven by a revived private sector. Along with agriculture, the growth of the private sector in areas such as telecommunications, construction and money transfer services are credited with contributing to this new impetus.

Although foreign direct investment is considered to lag significantly behind that in other countries in the region, efforts by local and returning diaspora Somalis is changing the economic scene in Mogadishu. According to an IMF review of Somalia's economic situation between 2012 and 2014 – the first such review in over 25 years – Somalia's real GDP grew by 3.7 per cent over the period (IMF 2015), and was projected to grow by 3.1 per cent (IMF 2018) in 2018. Although this is still much lower than other countries in the region, it does indicate some level of progress. As the seat of the federal government, Mogadishu plays an important role in the formal economy of south Somalia, and this has grown with the return of the diaspora who are driving new investments in the country, as well as with the economic activities of countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have invested in areas such as infrastructure and the port. They have done this not only in Mogadishu, but also in Puntland and Somaliland. However, due to the instability of Mogadishu relative to other cities in Puntland and Somaliland, it is yet to achieve the coveted status as the economic hub of Somalia. The economic activities of these countries further strain the already tense relations that the federal member states have with Mogadishu. Attempts by the FGS to exert more control over their political and economic activities (in particular with regard to revenue collection from these foreign investments) have recently caused a major rift with all member states, with some of them cutting ties with the FGS in Mogadishu (Crisis Group 2019).

Related to construction and real estate, land prices are estimated to have increased perhaps as much as tenfold since 2012 (Willenberg 2017). Factors underpinning this rapid price increase include:

- Confusion over ownership and entitlements, creating a situation where speculation and an individual's ability to pay go a long way in determining who ends up gaining ownership of property, as well as lack of clarity about official rules governing land and property

- Irregular acquisition of public land by private actors

- The influx of IDPs

- Increasing numbers of returnees (including diaspora Somalis) seeking to reclaim their property, and

- The presence of foreigners, including from international development agencies, who are able to pay higher prices for properties.

A population estimation survey carried out in 2014 found that of all the regions of Somalia, Benadir region (covering the same area as the city of Mogadishu) had the highest percentage of people living in urban areas (24.6 per cent) and the largest share of the country's displaced persons (33.4 per cent). The location with the second-highest number of IDPs was Galgaduud, hosting just 10.8 per cent (UNFPA and Federal Republic of Somalia 2014). The continued and increasing influx of people coming to the city puts

enormous pressure on already-fragile urban systems and infrastructure, causing people to settle in informal settlements in and around the city.

In 2017, there were over 480 of these informal settlements spread across Mogadishu (Bryld et al. 2017). This number includes both planned and spontaneous sites. Most of them are located in the northwestern part of the city (eg Hodan, Daynile), though some also exist in the city centre (eg Shangani) and to the southwest (eg Kaxda). Living conditions in these settlements are dire, as housing predominantly consists of corrugated metal sheet shacks or *buuls* (temporary shelters made out of sticks, plastic and fabric). The settlements are often referred to as IDP settlements, as the population mostly consists of displaced people arriving from other Somali regions (mostly Lower and Middle Shabelle; see Figure 2). There are various reasons why people are forced or choose to move to Mogadishu and other major cities in Somalia. Aside from fleeing conflict and the control of al-Shabaab – which is stronger in rural Somalia – economic migration is also an important driver, especially among the youth. The unpredictable climatic conditions in the country, which is prone to frequent bouts of drought and, at the other extreme, floods, deplete the population's productive assets (animals and farmland), resulting in very low resilience capacity. Many who lose their ability to survive in the face of recurrent shocks move to the cities, where they are considered to be IDPs.

However, poor residents are also being pushed into informal IDP settlements as land and real-estate prices skyrocket and they can no longer afford decent housing. According to a KII with a former Benadir public notary,

Poor people always prefer to give up their lands if it is located in prime locations, they sell or rent it out and moves to cheaper areas. Land and property traders are another dominant provider of land and property, they always buy empty lands or old houses, they build or renovate it and then offer it in the market – through dealers/brokers – for sale or for rent.

Yet, these settlements often lack the most basic services (electricity, access to water and sanitation, proper buildings) and, most of all, they offer no tenure security to their residents. Forced evictions are a huge threat to Mogadishu's IDPs and urban poor. Benadir is the region most affected by evictions: in the first two months of 2019 there were 60,157 evictions in the region (UN-Habitat 2019). The vast majority of evictions are forced, with only very few lawful evictions or evictions with dignified relocations. In the majority of cases, evictions are enforced by a private citizen from his or her property in order to develop their land, where, as often happens, the residents had no formal (written) agreement in place with the landlord. This causes intra-city migration flows from district to district, as illustrated in Figure 3 (data from 2017) (IDMC 2018). The figure shows that most of these intra-city flows take place between three of the most densely IDP-populated areas of Mogadishu (Kaxda, Hodan and Daynile) and the city centre (Dharkenley), where people are most likely to secure casual employment.

We are worried about eviction because the land is not ours. We were evicted about four months ago. The owner wanted to develop his land so he asked us to leave. No resettlement was offered. We had to look for land ourselves.

Male camp leader, Alkodhar Camp, Kaxda district

Examples of *buuls* in Mogadishu – temporary shelters made out of sticks, plastic and fabric © Tana Copenhagen

Figure 2. Regions of Somalia

Source: Wikipedia Commons

Yes [we are worried about eviction]. In fact, the owner of the house has already informed us that she is expecting her family members to join her soon and that she will want the house back. I don't know what we are going to do because after two months, I still can't afford to build a small shack for us.

IDP, female head of household, Kaxda district

While we cannot state with certainty why these internal migration patterns take place the way they do, interviews show that when evicted, households often move to settlements on the outskirts of the city, where they are more likely to find a plot of land at a cheaper rate. However, as is the case when choosing a settlement in the first place before being evicted, people migrate

to a different settlement or district because they have relatives or clan members there who will help them become accepted and settle in. In many cases, these displacements create new settlements or enlarge smaller existing ones. Figure 3 provides an overview of these internal displacements in Mogadishu in 2017, which, combined with movements towards the capital, account for about 35 per cent of all displacements in Somalia (IDMC 2018).[7]

The arrival of large numbers of IDPs in a locale also means the development of a largely informal economy in the form of shops and services such as water trucking or suppliers, local artisans and so on – services that eventually lead to the growth, albeit unplanned, of the area. The availability of services attracts new people to

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[7] The accuracy of these numbers can be questioned, as the source (IDMC 2018) states that, "[t]he information shown on the following maps and charts has been compiled from diverse sources and may not be accurately displayed. The information represented is used for illustrative purposes." However, they do provide an insight into the importance of internal migration within the city.

Figure 3. Overview of internal displacements in Mogadishu in 2017

Source: IDMC (2018).

the area, and in the process drives up the land market prices. For the IDPs, the challenge remains that they are liable to eviction at any time. Interviews with an informal settlement manager (ISM) and an IDP in August 2019 indicate that one of the settlements in the research has since been subject to evictions. Displacement thus plays a major role in the urbanisation and spatial pattern of Mogadishu and is key to understanding access to shelter for vulnerable groups in the city.

1.2 Urban poor

In addition to IDPs, there are also other urban poor living in Mogadishu. They are made up of various groups, including the following:

• Long-term Mogadishu residents or those born in the city

• Returning Somalis who were refugees in neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, and

• Refugees from countries such as Ethiopia (although these make up a very small percentage of the population).

• Across all these groups, female-headed households, single/widowed/divorced women, youth-headed households, and people living with disabilities (PLWDs) are particularly vulnerable.

Poor long-term residents of Mogadishu enjoy the same rights as better-off residents and, compared to IDPs, enjoy better protection, especially if they belong

to one of the major clans. For example, according to interviewees, it is easier for established Mogadishu residents to obtain an identity document (ID) compared to an IDP. A Mogadishu ID confirms the holder as a resident of Mogadishu rather than an IDP, and accords one access to a number of services: the ability to rent shelter in the formal sector (better-quality housing than that rented by informal settlement residents), the ability to take part in formal land and property transactions, ease of acquiring other legal documents like passports and driving licences, and access to formal banking services, including loans. Not all Mogadishu residents hold ID, and in practice, people can usually get around the requirements if they have powerful contacts or can pay extra. But those that do hold ID generally have an easier time, especially when travelling within the city where security road blocks abound. In contrast, IDPs do not usually have recourse to powerful individuals or to money.

Some urban poor reside in public buildings and, despite the spate of evictions, their ejection from these properties is a challenge. Many of these belong to a majority clan (unlike IDPs who are often from Southern Somalia and primarily of Bantu origin). Their eviction would therefore likely be seen as a politically motivated move and could be a destabilising factor for a government struggling to establish its authority. Many low-income households are forced to relocate to the outskirts of the city due to rising prices of land, property and rental housing. Some also end up living in IDP settlements as this is the only shelter they can afford.

2

Political settlements and access to shelter and services

2.1 The IDP status quo

The political settlement around shelter and land in Mogadishu in particular provides a challenge for new migrants and IDPs. Tana's research since 2012, confirmed by interviews during the EARF research, has shown that the IDP label is not used in accordance with the UN IDP guidelines (UNOCHA 2004). Instead, any newcomer to the city in the last 20 years, especially if they are poor/low-income, who is not related to an existing Mogadishu resident, is classified as an IDP, even though they end up being, in fact, a poor urban resident. The research has also found that there is an unholy alliance between different actors in Mogadishu which ensures that the IDP classification remains – and that IDPs remain largely in the informal IDP settlements on the outskirts of the city. First, relinquishing the term IDP would put many NGOs assisting humanitarian agencies and their work in Somalia in jeopardy as their *raison d' être* would no longer exist (in addition, the arrival of huge amounts of humanitarian aid as well as foreign aid also affects the market as it increases the demand for rental houses and land purchases). Second (and as mentioned before), accepting IDPs as full residents of Mogadishu would interfere with the clan balance in the city, compromising the power balance of some actors in the city (Bryld *et al.* 2014;

2017). Despite this, however, there is some integration for those that can afford to eventually move out of the settlements.

In brief, according to respondents, the factors that help to retain the IDP status quo in Mogadishu include:

- Local landowners who benefit from the 'gatekeeper' schemes (see below) and see the value of their property increase with population growth. IDPs settling on land means that a social and economic ecosystem develops around them in terms of provision of services, setting up of small shops, community organising, and so on. This in turn drives up the value of land, particularly if the property lies in the periphery of the city.

- Local humanitarian service providers who have a business interest in delivering humanitarian assistance, and who benefit from having IDPs in the city.

- Dominant chieftaincies that want to retain the status quo for future control of Mogadishu (and thus prevent newcomers from being recognised as Mogadishuites).[8]

- IDPs themselves who are better able to access (some) humanitarian assistance as IDPs rather than urban poor.

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[8] Some interviews indicate that accepting the IDPs as Mogadishu residents could potentially affect the political outlook of the city, especially with the ongoing developments that are meant to lead to a 'one-person-one-vote' election process.

- Gatekeepers (or ISMs) who make a living from the IDP situation by taxing IDPs in return for the provision of safe shelter (Bryld et al. 2014; 2017).

The lack of a comprehensive land registry and informal powerholders' (local chieftaincies, 'gatekeepers', guarantors, etc) influence on land allocation is a challenge for the city in terms of providing land for shelter for the poor and IDPs. For the EARF research, specific attention was given to the urban poor. In the case of Mogadishu, this includes the long-term urban poor residing in the city centre and the newcomers classified in Mogadishu as IDPs (as evident from the case studies presented in Section 4).

According to the BRA, there is a need for land on which to locate public services, and on which they can settle migrants and IDPs as a long-term solution to the protracted IDP situation in Somalia. However, from the EARF research excursions through the city, it is evident that there is unoccupied land available in Kaxda and Daynile districts. According to interviews with BRA and other resource persons, however, this land has been 'grabbed' as 'community land' by powerful local chieftaincies. Land grabbing refers to persons illegally inhabiting abandoned public and private land (this can be IDPs, urban poor or other so-called squatters, or private persons claiming abandoned land as theirs and exploiting it in some way without having legal documents proving their ownership of the land). This land grabbing stands in contrast to the provision in the constitution which states that all "new land" should be owned by the government. However, as interviews revealed, for many Somalis landownership is very much entwined with a sense of belonging and of identity, and given the historical use/misuse of land by the Barre regime, it remains an explosive topic. This also means that repossessing this grabbed land would need careful negotiations with the local chieftaincies.

2.2 A mix of formal and informal systems to access shelter

As is discussed further in Section 3, there is no coherent system (legal and formal framework) for developing and managing land and shelter in Mogadishu. Considering that land has been, and continues to be, one of the key causes of conflict in Somalia, the process of formalising and ensuring a single and transparent process for regulating land will affect the existing political settlement in Mogadishu.

Access to land and shelter is managed through a mix of formal and informal processes all related to networks among residents and money flows. For this reason, attempts so far to change this have failed to enhance transparency and accountability in the processes around land and property transactions, access and usage. Soon after the collapse of the government, the very first attempts at peace and reconciliation in Somalia recognised the paramountcy of land: the March 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement that framed UN state-building and peace-building efforts during the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) mission had a provision tackling the restoration of property and settlement of disputes, but General Aidid[9] later renounced this. A national reconciliation conference in 1997 that sought to reconcile the warring clans and agree the distribution of land in Mogadishu also failed; the May 2000 Somalia National Peace Conference held in Arta, Djibouti that culminated in the Arta Peace Agreement also had provisions related to land and property restoration under the then Transitional National Government (TNG). The inability to agree on the sensitive issues of land was one of the reasons that led to the collapse of the TNG. As recently as 2015, under the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery, the UN supported the government to develop a spatial strategic development plan for Mogadishu, and UN-Habitat provided support to develop an updated cadastre and to streamline the operations of the lands office within the BRA. Despite all these efforts, land and property remains a thorny issue, especially in Mogadishu (Rift Valley Institute 2017).

The EARF research has shown that, for the average resident, the mix of formal and informal systems for managing shelter and land allows for some degree of flexibility in terms of which process an individual or family chooses to pursue to access land and shelter. According to a KII with a former Benadir public notary,

The informal rules have different forms; most of the people focus on writing their own papers with the presence and signature of witnesses and others record videos as means of verification for informal transactions related to land purchases. Informality is very common in rental houses as Somalis do not prefer documenting their rental agreements in public notaries and in most cases written papers signed by the parties and witnesses, a guarantor or even a dealer's is considered sufficient.

As is described later, interviewees have explained how negotiations may be undertaken with landlords and/or through the local chieftaincy in the area of interest, and the transaction (be it up-market rental, cheaper

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[9] General Mohamed Farrah Aidid was the leader of the opposition and other armed groups that ousted the Somali President Siad Barre from power, and later became president of Somalia.

properties or land purchase) is then registered by a notary. However, the interviews reveal that due to the cost of using notaries, some people choose to only involve the local chieftaincy or to document the transaction process themselves through video. Interviews with a broad range of stakeholders and residents in Mogadishu show that getting to the stage of shelter access requires acceptance at the local level as well – that is, by the neighbourhood residents.

For example, during EARF focus group discussions, young men living in different settlements in Hodan illustrated their difficulty in being accepted by the settlement community, as they are perceived as a security threat. As one commented,

A young man wishing to settle in the camp has to bring a guarantor before being allowed to move in, given all the negative perception associated with young men. The guarantor is responsible for the young man in case an incident occurs and this makes it difficult for young men to find one.

2.3 The role of the guarantor

According to interviews with notaries and real-estate agents and using questionnaires with residents, for key land-related transactions to take place, the person looking to undertake the transaction first and foremost requires a guarantor. This guarantor can be a relative or acquaintance of the person trying to make a transaction, but the more status the guarantor has in the settlement or community in question, the higher the chances of the transaction being successful. A guarantor is needed:

- For obtaining a loan through a formal bank or informally from one's network (additional requirements for the loan include having proof of employment/ steady income and possible collateral).

- To facilitate the local chieftaincy's agreement. For informal approval of the transaction, especially for an outsider to an area, the guarantor is often needed to assist with the negotiation process with the local leaders/elders.

- For finalising the transaction, the notary needs the guarantor to vouch for the person wanting to perform the transaction. Several interviewees further stated that the BRA could be called on to demarcate the land and issue a certificate of ownership, but only after the local chieftaincy confirms this.

- For accessing formal rental opportunities, the guarantor is needed to facilitate the acceptance of the house/landowner with the resident community. This is linked primarily to security, as people still feel more secure living in locations dominated by people from their own network.

Thus, it is clear that the guarantor plays a crucial role in accessing shelter and housing finance for new residents. A new family arriving in a settlement seeking housing from a faraway region or with no existing connections in Mogadishu is in a very vulnerable position in terms of finding a guarantor that will help them secure a place to live.

The informal guarantor system effectively works to keep a certain level of status quo across the city, thus cementing the demographic settlement pattern from the sea to the Afgooye corridor (see Figure 1). Those who can produce the appropriate guarantor also have enhanced access to shelter and land and have greater settlement options/alternatives. Our research (KoBo questionnaires, interviews and excursions to selected districts) shows that in Mogadishu, the elite and those with long-established network connections live closer to Villa Somalia (the president's office) and the BRA offices in the centre, while people without these links live further out on the outskirts, where the land is significantly cheaper but service provision is largely absent.

This settlement pattern is not only financially determined, but also by relations and networks. An example of this is the substantial number of informal settlers living on prime land in the centre of Mogadishu in Shangani, as well as in the inner parts of Daynile and Hodan districts. Most of these informal settlers reside on government-owned land and were identified as poor by interviewees, not as IDP (although some self-identify as IDPs depending on who is asking, in the hope of accessing humanitarian aid). The majority have been in Mogadishu for decades and have developed networks and relations with the people from the areas where they reside – through social connections but also because people from the same clan tend to congregate in the same living areas. In contrast to newer settlers, they have not faced evictions in spite of the location of their settlement.

Although the settlement pattern in Mogadishu is not openly discussed in terms of clans, and indeed, respondents shied away from making specific mention of this fact, those informants that did respond to this question explained that there are locations within the city that are dominated by specific clans. With the collapse of the government, people's clans became their main protection mechanism – a situation that persists to date. This, however, is not the case for IDPs who are mixed up in the IDP settlements, although the majority tend to be from the Bay and Bakool regions that are dominated by the Bantu. A study back in 1987 mentioned some of these patterns; for example, Casa Popolare in Hodan district was said to be populated by 'northerners' and Yaqshid district to have many people from Middle Shabelle (Davies 1987).

2.4 The power of the 'gatekeeper'

Aside from one IDP settlement in Kaxda district that is administered by the BRA, there are no BRA or UN-managed IDP settlement areas. IDPs in Mogadishu and other urban poor wishing to settle in IDP settlements need to go through the so-called gatekeeper system to access shelter (Davies 1987, Human Rights Watch 2013, Rubin *et al.* 2017). Gatekeepers are entrepreneurial Mogadishuites or former IDPs who arrange for land with the local landlords or chieftaincies and then provide access to shelter in the form of land, security and basic services (services are, primarily, provided by NGOs but also facilitated by the gatekeeper in the case of funeral services and conflict mediation) (Rubin *et al.* 2017, Bryld *et al.* 2017).

BOX 1. GATEKEEPERS (ALSO CALLED INFORMAL SETTLEMENT MANAGERS)

Gatekeepers emerged in Somalia as humanitarian conditions deteriorated during the 1990s, and especially following the devastating famine in 2011–12. Since then, in some locations of Somalia, gatekeepers have established themselves as unavoidable actors in relation to aid delivery to IDPs. In Mogadishu, ISMs have created a business around accommodating the numerous IDPs coming into the city in what outsiders have labelled the 'gatekeeper system'. As Tana's previous research revealed, ISMs can attain their position in different ways. Some are IDPs themselves and have been appointed by their communities; some are long-term Mogadishu residents who own or have grabbed land and welcome displaced populations on it at a cost. They may be women or men – their common characteristic is that they are in a position of power, either because they have earnt legitimacy and trust in their community, or because they belong to a majority clan, are well-connected or have control over some land.

This system has led to a situation where gatekeepers now largely control access to the IDP settlements. They have managed to position themselves as unavoidable intermediaries between the IDPs and external actors, including the local government and the humanitarian community. As such, gatekeepers are an informal power structure stepping in to provide what the formal power structures – in this case, the FGS – has not been able to provide in terms of protection and services. There are approximately 140 gatekeepers in Mogadishu who provide a plot of land and basic services to the IDPs inhabiting their settlements in return for payment in cash or in kind. This typically takes the form of a tax of approximately 10 per cent of the amount of humanitarian aid the IDPs receive from international organisations and aid providers, though the amount may vary from ISM to ISM. Because of a lack of formal accountability systems by which gatekeepers are required to operate, some have been known to act in abusive and exploitative ways towards the IDPs living in their settlements.

Since the appearance of the first gatekeepers, the BRA has refused to engage with them because of the predatory ways some of them exploit their positions, and also because they were considered to be criminals taking advantage of an institutional vacuum as the government struggled to get a handle on what was taking place in the informal settlements. However, as time has gone by, gatekeepers have become unavoidable actors in all aspects of life in the settlements. Tana's research has revealed that while there are abuses, there are also a large number of dedicated ISMs who put enormous efforts into welcoming new residents and making the settlements better and safer.

The BRA is currently in the process of developing settlement management guidelines, which are meant to establish a government presence in the settlements and give the BRA control over how these are managed. The aim is to make the existing system more transparent and accountable, and the guidelines contain provisions for rooting out exploitative gatekeepers.

Source: Based on Tana's research on accountability in informal settlements of Mogadishu for the IAAAP Programme, 2015–2018.

BOX 2. THE BRA POLICY FOR IDPS AND RETURNEES IN MOGADISHU

In January 2019, the BRA launched a policy for IDPs and returnees which is intended to support the mayor's vision of having zero IDPs in Mogadishu by 2022 – that is, that all people who are currently IDPs will be given permanent resident status in the city. Achieving this goal requires finding durable solutions for the city's displaced. The policy is a living document that guides the BRA's work in addressing the IDP challenge in a way that ensures that IDP rights are taken into account and, at the same time, protects displaced populations from further displacement. The policy is informed by ongoing efforts by the FGS to articulate a national IDP policy.

The policy presents the commitments and responsibilities of the BRA and the different national ministries involved, and outlines the administrative framework including the roles of district commissioners, ISMs, NGOs and international actors.

Shelter is thus accessible to IDPs and some urban poor through private informal means. However, there is limited accountability and transparency around this process, and our semi-structured interviews and social mapping confirm previous research documenting high levels of vulnerability among IDPs. As is evident from the case studies in Section 4, IDPs in new settlements in Kaxda district in particular have enhanced security concerns, protection concerns, and poorer access to services and livelihoods, while the more long-term settlements in Hodan and Shangani, for example, have higher levels of security and service facilities.

During the social mapping exercises, groups drew their settlements, showing locations of shelters in relation to security perimeters, access points, services, gatekeepers and police and types of shelter
© Tana Copenhagen

The interviews also show, however, that the rental schemes for IDPs remain informal and the risk of evictions is substantial, with 60,000 evictions in the first two months of 2019 alone (UNHCR 2019). Evictions vary in scale from a few households on a specific plot to large numbers residing over a larger area, depending on the size of the property that the landowner wishes to repossess and the number of households residing in it at the time. The BRA has formally committed to dealing with this issue through the introduction of the first Mogadishu IDP policy launched in January 2019 (see Box 2). The political economy around IDPs and the political settlement in Mogadishu thus provides a basis for shelter access to IDPs, but this comes with significant protection issues. As explained in detail in Section 5, these protection issues particularly affect female-headed households and single/divorced/ widowed women, as well as young single men.

Until 2017, the political economy around IDPs in Mogadishu was not openly recognised by the international community, and there was no active approach towards dealing with the gatekeeper system. Nonetheless, the system has been operational since the 1990s and has become stronger in the last seven years, partly driven by the increasing number of IDP evictions from Mogadishu proper as well as the new influx following the 2012–2013 and 2017 droughts. In the previous IDP policy vacuum, the gatekeeper system coalesced and strengthened, leading to a situation in which settlements are unified by a well-organised governance structure that allows the ISMs to enhance their monopoly over the settlement of IDPs, in a bid to improve their business (Bryld *et al.* 2017, Rubin *et al.* 2017). The new IDP policy is a first move by the BRA to eventually get rid of this monopoly (Tana Copenhagen 2019). Based on the policy, the BRA is drafting settlement management guidelines aimed at enhancing accountability and transparency in the system. However, effective implementation of these guidelines will still require the acceptance of the informal powerholders who remain the champions of the political settlement of Mogadishu.

3

Current state of housing provision

In this section, we provide an overview of the legal framework, shelter financing and actors involved in shelter production. We also briefly look at the challenges facing the urban poor in this context, which is further exemplified in the case studies in Section 4.

3.1 Legal framework, finance and actors involved in producing shelter

Land is formally referred to in the 2012 Provisional Constitution in Article 43, Chapter 3 (Federal Republic of Somalia 2012):

The Federal Government shall develop a national land policy, which shall be subject to constant review. That policy shall ensure:
(a) Equity in land allocation and the use of its resources;
(b) The guarantee of land ownership and registration;
(c) That land is utilised without causing harm to the land;
(d) That any land and property dispute is resolved promptly and satisfactorily for all;
(e) That the amount of land that a person or a company can own is specified;
(f) That the land and property market is regulated in a manner that prevents violations of the rights of small land owners; and
(g) That the Federal Member States may formulate land policies at their level.

In spite of this, the constitution remains vague with regard to the critical issue of property dispute resolution. Additionally, the lack of a codified legal framework to adjudicate land and property claims, along with the multiplicity of alternative avenues of recourse, have complicated transfers, acquisition and ownership processes in Mogadishu. Actors can seek redress from a number of sources, some of which are contradictory:

- **Customary law**, where clan elders and (to a certain extent) religious leaders hold sway, given that culture is intrinsically intertwined with Islam. The challenge is that Somali customary laws (*Xeer*) often circumvent women's inheritance rights, giving greater credence to men's inheritance claims. Secondly, the customary law system favours majority clans, making it difficult for minority clans and ethnic groups to assert their rights.

- **Legal channels through formal courts**, although interviewees asserted that 'money talks', suggesting that these channels are weakened by low levels of integrity. Furthermore, the capacity of legal actors is curtailed not only by their complicity in the above corruption allegations, but also by the lack of an updated legal framework and an inadequate understanding of the law (according to interviewees, the most qualified practitioners either fled the country or were trained in the law of other countries, predominantly Sudan).

- **Shari'a, where religious leaders (*Ulema*) adjudicate.** The challenge is that Shari'a stipulates inheritance rights for women, which is often in conflict with the patriarchal nature of customary law.[10]

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[10] Under Shari'a inheritance law, male relatives are entitled to twice the value of inheritance that is due to female relatives. However, women overall enjoy greater protections under Shari'a compared to customary law.

However, in the case of inheritance disputes, Shari'a is, according to interviewees, still considered to be the most trustworthy mechanism for resolution.

The lack of a codified legal framework is further complicated by the fact that maintaining security remains a key challenge in Mogadishu. The FGS needs to consolidate its authority, and this means that security matters remain the crucial concern for the state, at the expense of many other equally important issues. Land remains a critical trigger for conflict, but issues of property are often sidelined despite the fact that for sustainable peace to take root, the issue of access and landownership needs to be resolved. Private actors influencing land and property in Mogadishu include brokers/middlemen who are not registered with government institutions, gatekeepers, business people, clan elders, land and property owners, dealers and land surveyors and diaspora.

In the last couple of years, a number of development partners have begun supporting the government and the BRA in resolving some of these issues. Interventions include:

• The **European Union's Reintegration Programme (EU RE-INTEG)**,[11] implemented in various locations in Somalia, including Mogadishu, and managed through the BRA. The programme is working towards a durable solutions approach to development programming by supporting the sustainable and durable reintegration of refugees and returnees from Yemen, Kenya, Europe and other areas of departure, as well as IDPs in Somalia, and populations to settle permanently within Somalia. The project will also enhance the capacities of the relevant government institutions to assume their primary responsibility for reintegrating their citizens and facilitating their access to basic rights and services within a more adequate framework (EU undated).

• The **UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG),** whose objective is to support local governance to contribute to peace and equitable service delivery for all Somalis. The programme works with central administrations and local district councils to establish and strengthen policy, institutional frameworks, structures and systems to improve local governance and the delivery of basic services at the local level (ILO undated). JPLG has recently started building capacity for planning and budgeting within the BRA and related planning around durable solutions.

• **Tana's own work** on gatekeepers, the IDP policy and settlement management guidelines with the BRA[12] has contributed to a better understanding of the situation on the ground in the settlements: who the different key actors are, how they interact with each other, and where opportunities exist to increase transparency and accountability towards the authorities and the settlement residents.

3.1.1 Land transfers and ownership

During the civil war, much of the privately owned land in Mogadishu was abandoned and property titles lost. Since then, many owners who have returned to claim their land have found it occupied by other people, or sometimes claimed by the government (federal as well as city level). While notaries and the BRA are responsible for keeping records on property and rental housing in the city, it is difficult to know exactly how much land is privately owned and by whom, as land transfers have been taking place outside of formal procedures for many years. A summary of the current situation with regards to access to and ownership of land and property is provided below.

Land leasing: The process is mainly informal as there is currently no law that regulates land leases. Anyone can buy land from legal owners or lease it from customary landlords of undocumented land on the city's outskirts if they have the necessary guarantor. The leases cannot exceed nine years, and the process is documented by hired public notaries. In these instances, the BRA is responsible for issuing the related legal documentation. If the lease is longer than nine years, many people do not certify their lease agreements with notaries.

Rental housing: The rental market is largely informal, with very little oversight from the BRA or the FGS. Residents must provide an ID, a fee of US$10 to the BRA, a guarantor, and an upfront payment of between one and three months' rent. The property owners have to present a court- or notary-certified deed. The notary (or middleman) is usually paid an equivalent of one month's rent, payable by the property owner. These rules vary by location and also by transaction. For mid-level to high-end properties, notaries are generally used, while for lower-income areas and informal arrangements, middlemen come into play (although notaries can be engaged in some cases).

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[11] The RE-INTEG (Enhancing Somalia's responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows) programme is implemented by UN-Habitat (as lead), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Cesvi, the Somali Women's Development Centre (SWDC) and the Somali Innovation and Development Organisation (SIDO).

[12] Land issues remain one of the key areas still to be addressed in the constitutional review process as well as in federal and state legislation.

According to Somali civil law, landlords can only evict tenants who violate a tenancy contract, or otherwise by mutual arrangement. However, this only applies if a formal agreement exists and has been registered with a notary. Even where a contract exists, application of the law is, according to interviewees, patchy at best. If no formal agreement exists, then the landlords can act as they see fit. Many residents do not document rental agreements with public notaries due to associated costs, which leaves both the landlord and tenant unprotected. However, landlords usually benefit from this arrangement as it allows flexibility to evict tenants and raise rents. This is one reason why tenure is so insecure, as tenants are liable to eviction with mostly no notice.

Purchasing land and property: As with lease agreements, land and property purchases are open to everyone. Land can be purchased privately if both parties agree and the owner has an authentic title deed. The sale is made with the participation of a notary (in many cases), a guarantor and a witness. Some people choose to undertake the sale informally, in which case they draft the sale documents themselves and effect the sale/purchase in the presence of witnesses. To further document the process, some people video the transaction.[13]

From the 1960s until 1991, a land registry and cadastral records existed, held by the municipal authorities. These covered up to 70 per cent of Mogadishu's land at the time. However, these records are now in the possession of a diaspora Somali living in Sweden who – through his office in Mogadishu – charges a percentage fee for the verification of deeds.[14]

For customary land tenure-holders wishing to sell their land, the transfer is formalised through the BRA, which also makes an assessment of the dimensions of the plot. In lieu of a fee, tenure-holders usually allocate around 20 per cent of the land for sale to middlemen (usually dealers and clan elders) as these actors bear the costs associated with the formalisation process. The middlemen also pay the landowners an initial one-time fee.

Inheritance: Formal courts usually certify deed documents to inherited land. An inheritance can be allocated either through a will (enacted in the presence of witnesses) or a legal representative. A will is considered formal when it is registered with a notary. Informal transfers are done by handing over property to family members in the presence of adult members of the same family.

Informal settlements: There are no legal mechanisms regulating informal settlements or the rights of people residing in informal settlements. However, and especially in the case of informal settlers, city residents usually refer to 'adverse possession' where legal claimants lose their right to ownership if those residing on the land have had uncontested use for an extended length of time (notably when the owner has been absent for 25 years or more). In Mogadishu, the common narrative is to claim that the legal owners were friends or accomplices of former dictator Siad Barre and were therefore allocated the land illegally in the first place. Another approach is for the current occupants to claim large sums to be paid for supposed maintenance, renovations and upkeep of such properties over the years, which can often be beyond the reach of the deed owner (Rift Valley Institute 2017). These arguments, however, do not usually apply to government-owned land and property.

In Mogadishu, disused government-owned buildings are often inhabited by long-term residents, including IDPs and other urban poor. These buildings offer better protection from the elements than *buuls* © Tana Copenhagen

3.1.2 Access to finance

People have greater trust in real estate than in other investment avenues and prefer it to using banks, especially since formal banking is only just returning to Mogadishu after over 20 years.

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[13] Many believe housing-related disputes are private matters and opt for traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms where elders and the guarantors also get involved. The cost and length of time that such disputes can take in formal courts are also a hindrance to using formal mechanisms, as is the perception of their greater liability for corruption.
[14] Confirmed by independent interviewees from the private and public sector.

Access to finance and loan requirements: Banks and a few real-estate developers provide housing finance. However, only 15 per cent of the population has an account with a formal bank (CAHF 2018), and the more vulnerable populations in Mogadishu do not have access to formal housing finance. This is because the borrower is required to raise 20–30 per cent of the value of a property as a down payment and be represented by a suitable guarantor. The banks retain the documents until full repayment is completed – otherwise, the property is repossessed and sold off. Banks do not charge interest, but take a commission on the amount borrowed, with each bank having a different rate. The borrower is required to show identification (ID or passport), proof of a regular income and availability of collateral (in case of non-property loans), and to have a guarantor who can vouch for the individual and is of good standing in the community. The majority of bank loans are payable in a maximum of 36 months.

These requirements put financing beyond the reach of the majority of Mogadishu's residents, especially for the poor because they cannot raise the 20–30 per cent down payment, many lack ID, and in particular IDPs have difficulties in identifying a relevant guarantor. Additionally, the guarantor needs to have a good financial standing to be acceptable to the banks. Access to such a person is particularly difficult for the poor and for IDPs. Therefore, in the absence of access to formal housing finance, vulnerable groups rely on their networks to find the money to house themselves. They may borrow small sums from friends or relatives; this can take the form of remittances from other parts of the country or abroad. Mobile money is increasingly used to lend or borrow money. Otherwise, some settlement residents have reported being allowed to occupy a parcel of land or a shelter for free for the first few months, until they had saved enough money earnt through casual jobs to pay back a charitable ISM or landlord.

Studies[15] indicate that the microfinance sector is growing. Microfinance institutions offer loans to their members, which they can then use to access affordable housing. Like banks, these institutions also charge a commission, ranging between 10 and 20 per cent of the amount borrowed, and their loans are usually payable within six months (CAHF undated). Family members are also a source of finance for many, especially with the existing vibrant remittance system. For the vulnerable populations of Mogadishu, this is the most prevalent form of housing credit; none of the informal settlement residents interviewed has used a banking institution of any type to access housing finance.

There are no regulations yet around borrowing and lending, and each bank sets its own guidelines. Some banks, such as Premier Bank, do not lend for land purchase in order to discourage people from using their land as an asset rather than keeping savings in the bank.

3.2 Access to shelter and services for the urban poor in Mogadishu

3.2.1 Income levels and access to shelter

Based on the World Bank's definition of urban poverty (Baker 2008), a significant proportion of Mogadishu's residents can be termed as poor. They lack access to services such as health, water and sanitation, encounter difficulties in securing appropriate shelter and sufficient livelihood options, and are primarily locked out of the mainstream financial sector. According to a Word Bank study, 51 per cent of Somalis have a daily per capita consumption expenditure below the international poverty line of US$1.90 at 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) (World Bank 2017). While some long-term or original residents of Mogadishu fall within this category of urban poor, and suffer similar deprivations to those experienced by other urban poor who are not original residents, it is IDPs[16] that most people associate with urban poverty in the city.

A Somalia-wide poverty and vulnerability assessment carried out by the World Bank in 2019 found that along with rural populations, IDPs suffer some of the highest levels of poverty, with more than three out of four IDPs living on less than US$1.90 per day (World Bank 2019). Recurring shocks, both manmade and environmental, have eroded the resilience capacity of many households, with many falling below the poverty line as a result. Residents of informal settlements, especially those spatially isolated from Mogadishu's city centre, have few livelihood opportunities outside of casual or manual labour. The 35 people who took part in our survey described their occupations (see Table 3), which reflected the large diversity of socioeconomic categories residing in the settlements.

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[15] See CAHF (undated). It should be noted that the scale of poverty is very much influenced by how poverty is defined, and there is a long history of poverty lines being applied in urban areas that do not make sufficient provision for housing costs and other non-food essentials.
[16] As of July 2018, there were an estimated 375,900 IDPs living in Mogadishu (UNOCHA 2018). Other estimates place IDP numbers closer to 500,000.

Table 3. Occupations of survey respondents

WHAT IS HIS/HER OCCUPATION/ WHAT DO THEY DO FOR A LIVING? (ASK EVEN FOR THE UNEMPLOYED)	
Hawker	1
Kiosk seller	1
Stay at home	4
Quranic teacher	1
Porter	2
Builder	1
Wheelbarrow porter	1
Rock extraction quarry worker	1
Cloth washer	1
Cloth dealer	2
Shop seller	1
Worker at ICE factory	1
Exchanger	1
Butcher	2
Works at money transfer	2
Khat dealer	1
Petrol station	1
Bank manager	1
Cashier at hotel	1
Engineer at Hanad Construction	1
Lecturer at a university	1
Bank manager	1
Shopkeeper	2
Employee at Ministry of Interior	1
At government institution	1
Works at Benadir Regional Administration	1
Owner of construction company	1

Source: KoBo questionnaire results table, Question 18d: What is his/her occupation/What do they do for a living? (Ask even if unemployed). Retrieved 21 June 2018.

Comprehensive research on urban poverty in Mogadishu is lacking. For now, it is not possible to state with certainty how many people in the city live within specific income categories. Opinions expressed during conversations with city residents, however, indicate that many consider a large proportion of the city's population to be living at the lower-income level of US$250–450 per month. Those considered to be poor earn about US$200 per month or less.

A study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2016) that explored youth employment and migration in Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu found that, although the capital offers opportunities for higher income, the cost of living is also very high. For example, a skilled worker such as a teacher or an engineer earns around US$400 per month, while the estimated living expenses for someone with a much lower income, such as an IDP, were estimated to be around US$250 if this person were to be relatively comfortable (ibid). The study found that the average income of Mogadishu residents is around US$360 per household per month.

Keeping these estimates in mind, an assessment of shelter typology in Mogadishu gives an indication of accessibility.[17] A corrugated iron-sheet house, for example, costs an average of US$140 per month to rent, without considering other costs such as water, energy sources and other living expenses. A quick assessment of apartment prices on real-estate sites indicates that an apartment costs between US$350 and US$500 per month (MyProperty undated), putting such housing well beyond the reach of the average Mogadishu resident.

3.2.2 Shelter typology

An analysis of shelter typology[18] in the city reveals that the following types of shelter are available in the city:

• *Buuls* or temporary shelters made out of mud, sticks and plastic/cloth. These are usually self-constructed by the owners with help from their family or friends.

• **Corrugated iron-sheet housing.** These are usually better constructed. The owners typically hire out the construction to builders, but the quality varies depending on the money available. They owners either rent them out or live in them themselves. The owners and renters tend to be part of the middle class in Mogadishu.

• **Villas and apartment buildings.** These are at the higher end of the spectrum. Their construction is usually contracted out to construction firms. However, due to the lack of building regulations, interviews revealed that the quality of some is suspect and has led to some fatalities from buildings collapsing, and to some accidental fires and deaths resulting from faulty electrical connections. The few property owners who can afford it hire construction firms and workers from

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[17] Developed through KoBo data collection, city excursions and interviews with selected residents of the different shelter types.
[18] The shelter typology is based on research drive-throughs in Mogadishu documenting shelter types, followed by interviews using KoBo digital platforms with 60 residents of various types of shelter across Mogadishu, based on the shelter types.

In Mogadishu, an apartment costs between US$350 and US$500 per month — prices well beyond the reach of the average resident
© Tana Copenhagen

Corrugated iron-sheet housing is more durable than *buuls*. The owners and renters of this type of housing tend to be part of the middle class in Mogadishu © Tana Copenhagen

neighbouring countries, but the cost of doing this is high. They are usually owned by the more well-off.

- **Government-owned buildings.** These are usually old buildings dating from before the collapse of the government. They are well constructed, but due to their previous purpose as public office buildings are usually not suitably laid out to offer ideal living premises. But taking into account the condition of some of the *buuls*, these buildings offer better protection from the elements. Most are inhabited by long-term residents of Mogadishu, both IDPs and other urban poor who identify as belonging in Mogadishu.

Obviously, the masonry shelter is much more expensive than the iron-sheet one and the buul *shelter used by the IDPs is the cheapest […] The iron-sheet shelter is very cheap and takes little time to construct but it does not have enough strength to support the occupants from big external effects and it does not last more time — while the masonry shelter structure costs more and takes more time to construct but it is very durable and protects its occupants from most of the external effects.*

KII, General manager of Geedi Construction and Real-Estate Company

Table 4 provides a snapshot of the kind of housing available and who has access to what. As indicated earlier, the last few years have witnessed a real-estate boom in Mogadishu, which has seen more and more of the urban poor pushed out to the periphery of the city.

Table 4. Housing types in Mogadishu and categories of residents

HOUSING TYPE	CATEGORY OF RESIDENT	LOCATION	COMMENTS
Buul	Mainly inhabited by IDPs and other Mogadishu residents that are locked out of the regular housing market in the city. The average rent cost is about US$13 per month. However, many *buuls* are self-built, therefore residents do not pay rent.	Most *buuls* are located in the periphery of the city due to rising housing prices and the prohibitive cost of land in the city proper.	Some IDPs who belong to one of the majority clans also reside (squat) in government-owned buildings. However, evicting them could cause political upheaval as it might be construed as a challenge to one of the clans.
Corrugated iron sheet	Usually inhabited by low-income earners as well as lower-middle-class residents. Despite their quality, the average building cost reported is US$140 per month.	Within the city as well as on the periphery where land is comparatively more available for new developments.	Regardless of their low quality, the pricing of these houses places them beyond the reach of lower-income earners in the city.
Government-owned buildings	Usually IDPs belonging to one of the majority clans, who reside informally (squat) in affected government buildings.	Most of these abandoned government buildings are located close to, but outside of, informal settlements in and around the city.	While living in these buildings presents some advantages (concrete structures), many of the respondents living there stated that they would prefer to move into less-permanent shelter types within the settlements, as being in a settlement facilitates access to services and a community.
Apartment	Inhabited by middle-class and upper-middle-class Somalis. Average cost is between US$350 and US$500 per month.	Many of these are built within the city close to the city centre.	The majority have come up in the period since al-Shabaab was pushed out of its strongholds in Mogadishu in 2012.
Villa	This is a detached house with its own compound. Accessible to upper-middle-class and wealthy Mogadishu residents. Some villas are also rented out to foreign nationals and to local and international organisations.	Older sections of the city, meaning that they are both in the city proper as well as on the periphery where historically there was greater space to build large dwellings.	Many of the older villas lie empty as their owners – many of them well-off Mogadishu residents – have fled the country. New villas are being constructed within the city by wealthy Somalis.

3.2.3 People affected by displacement and other vulnerable groups

Although the majority of IDPs fall within the category of 'poor' in Mogadishu, one issue with the label 'IDP' is that there is as yet no commonly understood agreement on when one ceases to be an IDP in Mogadishu, especially in situations of protracted displacement. For those in Mogadishu who have been displaced for over 25 years, the question remains as to whether they can still be referred to as IDPs, and this creates difficulty in agreeing on who is a long-term resident of the city and who is an IDP. In addition to IDPs, as indicated earlier, other categories of people that comprise the urban poor in the city are regular Mogadishu residents, refugee returnees from neighbouring countries, and a small proportion of refugees from Ethiopia and Yemen.

With regard to IDPs, apart from a few cases such as the BRA-administered IDP settlement in Kaxda district[19] established in 2014,[20] IDPs primarily reside on privately owned land, with the majority having been evicted from government land and property. Through gatekeepers (see Section 2.4), IDPs gain access to small plots of land on which to build their shelters. The gatekeepers organise to rent land from private owners and negotiate the means of payment that apply to all who choose to reside on the property.[21] Lease terms are insecure and with the above-mentioned growth of Mogadishu and rising land prices, evictions have become rampant.

The influx of IDPs is perceived to have generated demographic changes in some locations, with clan concentrations diminishing and the resulting population becoming more mixed than before the city's liberation from al-Shabaab in 2011. In some cases, the living conditions of IDPs and the urban poor are similar in terms of quality of housing and access to services. However, having an ID is usually a prerequisite for land and housing transactions, which presents a significant barrier to access to housing in the city for IDPs, the small number of refugees mentioned earlier and returnees. Realising the need to provide protection, ID cards, land and services for IDPs, in January 2019 the BRA launched its first IDP policy outlining the rights of IDPs and the obligations of the BRA, NGOs and other stakeholders. The BRA is currently working on a set of settlement management guidelines, which will guide the implementation of this policy.

3.2.4 Service provision

Until its collapse, the Siad Barre government was responsible for service provision in Mogadishu. Electricity outages and water shortages are considered to have been more common under the Barre government as compared to now, when services are provided by the private sector, albeit at a higher cost. The service providers are responsible for furnishing the associated materials such as water pipes or taps, and lines and meters for electricity supply. Where they exist, water and electricity service providers use old government installations for their supply, but many of these are poorly maintained and require new installations (with pressures on service delivery heightened by the city's growing population).

Water and sanitation: Looking more broadly at Somalia, it is estimated that only about 31 per cent of households have access to clean drinking water and only 23 per cent to improved sanitation facilities (World Population Review undated). In Mogadishu, private companies providing water estimate that their market for piped water is 50 per cent to corrugated iron-sheet houses, 40 per cent to villas and 10 per cent to multi-storey concrete buildings.[22] Water tankers also procure water to transport it to the IDPs settlements. These ratios suggest the majority of the population live in lower-income shelter types. They also illustrate the paucity of services to IDP settlements. There are an estimated 600 water wells in Mogadishu, comprised of hand-dug wells and boreholes. There are no standards and regulatory bodies to check on water quality or related matters like water storage. Additionally, there are no regulations relating to the laying of water pipes and how to engage with landlords, and this is exacerbated by the illegal occupation of public spaces. Extending piped water supply to the outskirts of the city is therefore especially difficult.

Electricity: Electricity is provided by a few private service providers, with the power company Beco by far the largest with close to a monopoly. While there are no exact numbers on how many Mogadishuites are connected to the grid, nationwide the energy access rate is estimated to be 15 per cent, with up to 33 per cent in urban areas (World Bank 2018). However, almost none of the informal settlement residents interviewed had access to the grid, as it is extremely expensive (among the most costly in the world). In some

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[19] Due to the inadequate capacity of the BRA to fully take control of the management requirements of the settlement, settlement managers have taken control of it and the same gatekeeping practices witnessed in other locations of Mogadishu have taken root here. The settlement manager is the overall authority in the day-to-day life of IDPs, rather than the BRA taking on this role.
[20] In 2013, the government embarked on a plan to relocate thousands of IDPs from central Mogadishu to the outskirts of the city to make way for the reconstruction and development of the capital.
[21] See details in Bryld et al. (2017).
[22] This perhaps is a proxy indicator of the housing typology in the city, although it does not take into account villas that remain vacant in some sections of Mogadishu.

informal settlements, there is access to solar powered electricity, and many informal settlement households use solar lamps[23] for lighting at night. There is no evidence of differences in prices across types of houses and poverty indicators. Electricity is relatively more accessible in the city compared to the outskirts, where the infrastructure for service provision is still sorely underdeveloped.

Garbage collection: The urban poor usually organise garbage disposal on their own by pooling resources, but for the most part they burn their waste. The BRA used to provide the service periodically, but this halted altogether around 2014–2015. Residents indicated a cost of about US$5 per month for garbage collection, which for the poor, and particularly for IDPs, is almost the equivalent of a month's rent.

Planning permission and building inspection are not enforced, which has resulted in some of the above-mentioned access concerns, especially in relation to water (inability to lay new water pipes and extend water connectivity) and sanitation facilities. Furthermore, poor drainage often results in flooding and open sewerage regularly contaminates water sources, causing disease outbreaks, especially in the rainy seasons. Additionally, the quality of construction of many of these buildings is a safety concern, with building collapses having caused deaths in the city.

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[23] Many of these are provided by aid agencies.

4

Two different locations (and contexts) for urban poor settlements

This section offers two case studies from Mogadishu IDP settlements illustrating the differences in accessing shelter and services depending on location in the city. The case studies are based on semi-structured interviews, social mapping exercises, and FGDs with IDPs in the two settlements. The locations of the settlements are shown in Figure 4.

4.1 Alkodhar settlement

Alkodhar settlement is located in Kaxda, a new district on the outskirts of Mogadishu formed in 2012, making it the 17th district of the city. It is one of two districts hosting the highest numbers of IDPs in the city, with many of the IDPs moving here in 2012. The 2011–2012 drought in East Africa led to an influx of IDPs into Mogadishu, with the resulting congestion prompting the BRA to find an alternative settlement location on the outskirts of the city. The most recent large-scale profiling of IDPs carried out in 2016 found that there were 120 IDP settlements in the district (UNHCR 2016). Taking into account that evictions from the city have been ongoing over the last two years and the significant increase of IDPs since the 2017 drought, it

is likely that this number is now much higher. Initially, Kaxda was populated by newer IDPs – those displaced in 2012–2013 – but with the evictions, especially from 2013 when the government started taking steps to reclaim public buildings, Kaxda now has a mix of both older and more protracted IDPs.

In general, the processes of gaining access to an IDP settlement are similar across the city. When moving to Mogadishu, people usually prefer to move to areas where they have relatives and networks (and thus clan or ethnic affiliations) – often a relative or a friend. Referrals and word of mouth are strong determinants of where IDPs settle, but there are other considerations as well. Some of the IDP priorities in selecting where to settle include:

• Access to services (water, latrines, security) and humanitarian assistance

• Security of tenure

• Distance from place of work, and

• Proximity to other relatives or networks from their places of origin.

Figure 4. Locations of the two case-study IDP settlements in Mogadishu

Source: adapted from Human Rights Watch (2014)

IDPs are responsible for building their shelters, but many receive initial help from the ISMs or from friends and relatives. Household sizes range between seven and twelve members. The size of the shelters varies from 3x2m² to 7x5m² and they have between one and three rooms, depending on the financial ability of each IDP household. In the IDP settlements, most of the shelters are *buuls* – temporary shelters made from sticks, cartons, plastic or pieces of cloth. For most of the IDPs, these are the most affordable shelter options, with those interviewed placing their rent at US$2–30 per month, based on the size of the plot allocated. Since the IDPs construct their own shelters, the rent is not for the structure but for the plot of land on which it is located.

4.1.1 Barriers to accessing shelter and services

Evictions in Kaxda have not yet started to take place at the rate of those in the city centre. Due to the presence of IDPs, the area is beginning to develop in terms of people slowly moving into the area and grading of roads, which in turn means that real-estate prices are expected to rise. The IDPs interviewed are quite sure that although in the shortterm they are likely to stay at this location, as soon as land prices begin to climb the risk of eviction will become very high, probably within the next three years. The ISM and IDPs complained of overcrowding as more people move into the settlement:

Overcrowding is key challenge. I live in this 5m by 10m land. I have no space for extension to construct an extra room for privacy. I can't host a guest. Latrines are shared among neighbours and children cannot access schools due to peer influence[24] and distance from the schools.

IDP female head of household, Israac settlement, Hodan district

The relative safety of living in the settlement, along with the affordability of shelter therein, means that most IDPs prefer to be located in the settlements rather than trying to survive outside of them.

The location of Kaxda presents a challenge in terms of accessing livelihood opportunities in central Mogadishu. Road infrastructure to the area has yet to be developed, making transportation between the settlements and Mogadishu problematic in terms of cost and access. Despite the settlements being congested, the area surrounding the settlement is sparsely populated, posing a security risk for those venturing beyond the settlement on their own, in particular for unaccompanied women and girls. To travel to the city, most women indicated that for security, they band together to walk to the main road for transport, which is an advantage as they can also share the cost of the vehicles – the popular small three-wheeled vehicles locally known as *bajaj*.

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[24] Parents who cannot afford to send their children to school send them out to work instead. This ability to earn even a small amount of cash influences others to leave school and attempt the same.

For security, women, especially female-headed households, prefer to live in the centre of the settlements, where they feel better protected from attacks, especially at night. It is also closer to the latrines and to the water taps. At night, a number of male IDP volunteers patrol the settlement to keep out potential criminals.

Access to electricity is limited in Kaxda, with almost all IDPs using either solar lamps (provided by NGOs) or kerosene lamps. The few that can afford it also have battery-powered lamps. There are communal water taps built by NGOs in the settlements, although at times this is not enough, and the IDPs have to access water from mobile vendors. A number of entrepreneurial business people have wells from which they pipe water to the settlements at a cost. Apart from the communal taps, buying water is expensive for the IDPs, and many households make do with the minimum when the communal taps run dry.

Sanitation is a challenge in Alkodhar. The settlement has seven latrines for 307 households which are free to use. As such, there are long queues, especially in the morning, when one can wait in line for 15–30 minutes. For those living with disability, this is particularly challenging. Many of the residents have no choice but to go out to the bush, and at night this is a security risk for women and girls. Interviewees mentioned specific incidents during FGDs among women where they were attacked or assaulted by men.

> *Most women do not feel safe at night due to security incidents they experienced in the past and due to the fact that there are no lights in the settlement […] Camp managers usually solve rape cases; they involve elders in these cases if the perpetrator admits it. Parents of the victim and elders usually negotiate to reach a settlement about these cases. Unfortunately elders negotiate a settlement and decide compensation, fines and apology penalties and they also deduct a portion of these penalties paid by elders of the rapist for themselves while the only punishment for the rapist is to pay a fine […] The family of the victim usually inform their complaint to the police if perpetrators didn't admit their offence or crime. The police always contacts with the camp manager so as to record their statement and due to their importance, since camp managers are responsible for solving problems of IDPs within the settlement.*

> Collection of quotes from FGD with women from Kaxda

Further exacerbating the sanitation problem is the lack of proper garbage disposal or collection service serving the settlement because the private companies are too expensive for the IDPs to afford. Garbage is burnt just outside the settlement, but since this is not controlled, there is a lot of litter around the settlement, posing a health hazard, especially for children who play in these locations.

The majority of those interviewed during the household survey expressed a desire to relocate closer to the city proper, to access services and livelihoods. But of even greater importance was the need for security of tenure.

> *I say it is better to create jobs for the community so that they can afford to rent normal houses and move closer to the city instead of being isolated in camps at the outskirts of the city.*

> Female daily labourer, Safari settlement in Kaxda district

They also indicated the need for more involvement of the local authorities in the welfare of IDPs, especially with regard to having a 'voice' in Mogadishu and to advocate for better access to services such as water, adequate sanitation facilities and garbage collection. For the time being, even while recognising the role of the local authorities in the formal governance structure of the city, they expressed greater trust in their ISM than in the local authorities to advocate on their behalf, especially with humanitarian and aid providers who are thought to have greater support capacity than the government. This is partly due to the fact that government authorities are absent from the settlements, and none of the informal settlement residents interviewed reported ever having had any interaction with them. A few of the newly displaced IDPs expressed a desire to move back to their places of origin, while those who had been displaced for more than 10 years preferred to stay on in Mogadishu.

4.2 Shangani settlement

Shangani settlement is located in Shangani district in central Mogadishu. There are urban poor living in the district alongside IDPs, and it is therefore not easy to distinguish between the two. Most of the IDPs in Shangani have been living there for over 25 years, and there could be an argument that differentiating between IDPs and the urban poor is in fact unnecessary. Most of those displaced for protracted periods of time show little indication or desire to relocate back to their areas of origin. For protection and access to livelihoods, the IDPs rely on the networks and relationships that they have formed over the years, and the likelihood of a desire to leave this and return to an uncertain future in their places of origin is low.

IDPs and other urban poor in Shangani primarily reside in government-owned property (eg former government offices), meaning that compared to IDP shelters on the periphery of the city or on private land, the dwellings in Shangani are more sturdy – made from bricks, iron sheets, wood or a combination of all these. A few have

built temporary shelters in these compounds, which also tends to be cheaper than renting a more permanent shelter. Some of those interviewed have lived in this location for over 25 years and have invested in more permanent housing despite the fact they do not own the land, thereby demonstrating– in contrast to those in the periphery – greater confidence in their ability to stay in these locations in the short to medium term, though not necessarily security of tenure. For example, most Shangani residents interviewed during the household survey stated that their home was made of stone, bricks or wood and some have a metal-sheet roof. Like in other locations in Mogadishu, people move to the settlement mainly on the recommendation of a friend or family member, and of course based on available space. Sharing of living space with relatives other than the immediate nuclear family is common.

The settlement is centrally located in Mogadishu, meaning that it is highly sought after due to its proximity to city-based livelihood opportunities, which tend to be more varied than at the outskirts of the city. On the other hand, its location is also a cause for concern considering that evictions in the city are ongoing as land prices continue to rise, with many IDPs and urban poor being pushed out to the periphery of the city. As one respondent stated:

> *Yes, all the time I am worried that the government will show up and force us to evacuate. Yes, we have seen many IDPs occupying government buildings who were forced to evacuate and even though the government promised them resettlement they have not heard anything and this worries me a lot.*

Female IDP, divorced, Shangani district

Over the last two years, between 2017 and February 2019, an estimated 364,731 IDPs relocated to a new location in Mogadishu due to evictions (NRC and UN-Habitat 2019). Considering that the estimated number of IDPs in the city is around 600,000 (UN-Habitat and EU 2018), this means that close to 60 per cent of the IDP population suffered from eviction in this period.

4.2.1 Barriers to accessing shelter and services

Based on interviews carried out under this EARF research, it appears that the cost of shelter is considerably higher in Shangani than in other IDP locations due to its location as well as the quality of the housing. This leads to overcrowding as people, especially relatives, tend to share housing in order to afford the rent. On the other hand, its location within the city means that the IDPs are better able to access livelihood opportunities much more easily, without the additional cost of high transport costs.

In terms of access to services, the majority of the houses have electricity and water connections, but usage is constrained by the household's ability to pay. Out of 20 households surveyed, 12 had access to privately piped water. Those who could not afford to pay for this used a communal tap close to their houses, or bought jerrycans of water from water vendors. General sanitation, however, is a challenge. About 45 per cent of the households surveyed have private toilets, with the majority sharing with their neighbours or otherwise using the bush at night. In terms of garbage, there is a private company that collects it although the cost is high at US$4 per month. To put this into perspective, this is almost equivalent to the rent per month for IDPs living in *buuls*. As a result, most households opt to burn their household waste, meaning that items which cannot burn such as glass, metal or plastics liberally litter the properties.

Female-headed households appeared to be worse off in terms of their ability to access services. Of those that indicated that they have no electricity, water or access to latrines, all were female heads of households, pointing to greater vulnerability in this group in terms of socioeconomic status.

The settlements are located close to a police station, and security is therefore better than in other IDP locations, especially those in the periphery of the city. However, for women, night-time still presents a security challenge in terms of movement, especially for those who do not have access to latrines close to their houses.

Although security of tenure is not such an immediate concern for the residents in Shangani, they still do recognise that they will eventually need to relocate when the government decides to repossess their premises. All those interviewed indicated that when the need arose, they would relocate to another location of Mogadishu, preferably staying in the centre of the city.

The regional government, the BRA, is largely absent from these two settlements, as it is from Mogadishu's informal settlements in general. District commissioners are the only government representatives present on the ground in the settlements. They visit the settlements occasionally as well as having meetings with residents, predominantly in case of incidents where the police and judiciary need to be involved. The government recognises that living conditions in the settlements are problematic, and a first step towards durably improving living conditions was the launch of the IDP policy. The government is currently working on developing settlement management guidelines, including a set of minimum standards and requirements for the baseline provision of services that an informal settlement should provide.

In Shangani, residents who cannot not afford to pay for piped water often buy jerrycans of water from water vendors © Tana Copenhagen

5

Gender and inclusion: impacts on access to shelter and services

In terms of access to housing in Mogadishu, the biggest discriminating factor is wealth. Any person who cannot afford property or to rent can be considered vulnerable, because they will have limited options and will most likely have to find shelter in the city's informal settlements or its poorer sections. In this context, those who have sufficient wealth to house themselves decently (that is, in permanent housing with access to basic services) are minority upper- and middle-class Mogadishuites, for example successful businesspeople, those who have mid- to high-ranking government jobs, or who combine one or several jobs with receiving remittances from abroad that allow them to have a sufficient income. This category of people largely excludes the displaced community, who often lost their livelihoods when they left their place of origin and whose savings (if they had any) dwindled as they made their way to Mogadishu to find a new home.

IDPs make up the majority of the informal settlement residents, but the city's poor also reside there for a variety of reasons, including affordability of shelter, access to services and security. Within these two groups, there are cross-sectional categories of vulnerable people: female- and youth-headed households, PLWDs, and also young single men, identified as marginalised people through Tana's research. Somalia's patriarchal society limits women's rights and opportunities to access decent housing, and the poor infrastructure in the settlements does not cater in any way to the special needs of physically or mentally disabled people. Young men often carry the stigma of being assumed likely to cause trouble or to join the ranks of al-Shabaab, so are denied access to shelter. During our in-depth interviews with vulnerable persons from these categories across two informal settlements in Mogadishu, different ways of accessing housing emerged.

Single/widowed/divorced women and female-headed households mentioned receiving assistance with building materials from humanitarian agencies, building the shelter themselves with relatives or being given temporary shelter by a charitable neighbour, a relative or by the settlement manager.

It was given to me by a sympathetic woman on a temporary basis until I am able to build my own house. The house I live in is next to hers. I have been living here now for two months but I am still unable to afford to build my own house.

Jamila, female IDP, Kaxda district, during household interview

In this camp of Israac camp, the camp leader welcomed us when we spoke to a man called Hassan who was my neighbour back home before the displacement. Hassan arrived here before us and when I contacted him, he facilitated me to meet the camp leader who provided me a piece of land.

Anonymous female IDP and head of household, Israac settlement, Hodan district, during household interview

Young men and youth-headed households mentioned receiving assistance with building materials from humanitarian agencies and squatting in government buildings.

> *Except from one house which is all made of metal sheet and wood, all houses are made of plastic with metal roofs.*

> Young man, Kaxda district, during social mapping exercise

People living with disabilities mentioned living on public and private land (in IDP settlements) and receiving help from relatives or community members to build their shelter.

> *I get a lot of support from my family but they are also poor, so, the support I get from them is the best they can give but it is not adequate. When I am sick no person in the family can afford to take me to the hospital. But they give food and they have built for me a room. We rarely get support from the NGOs. I have never got support from the local government. The disabled in this society are not looked after. The only people who will help you is your family. If you don't have family, you will suffer a lot.*

> Male, Kaxda district, during household interview

These differences in ways of accessing shelter based on categories of vulnerability show that while all are dependent on external support, whether from relatives/community or humanitarian organisations, young single men seem to be the most isolated from personal networks for securing housing.

PLWDs are a group of residents that are especially disadvantaged in all areas of social and economic life in the city. In all housing categories assessed, consideration for the needs of people with physical disabilities is almost non-existent. Currently, there is no specific national legal or policy framework regarding persons with disabilities, although the Provisional Constitution does recognise and provide for the protection of their rights. Girls and women with a disability are especially challenged due to the patriarchal nature of Somali society. Although some agencies offering support to IDPs do consider disability, due to their degree of marginalisation even within the settlements, PLWDs tend to be left out of the support offered. Some IDPs with disabilities have banded together in one settlement for security and mutual support (Tana Copenhagen 2016).

Somali society is governed by a combination of customary law (Xeer) and religious law (Shari'a). Xeer and Shari'a are both very powerful institutions but intervene at different levels and in some instances contradict each other. The consequence is that women are significantly discriminated against in terms of access to shelter and services. Shari'a stipulates inheritance

rights for women, while Xeer often circumvents these rights and gives greater credence to men's inheritance claims. In cases of inheritance disputes, however, informants state that Shari'a is still considered to be the most trustworthy mechanism for resolution: women express that their rights are more likely to be recognised by Shari'a than in formal courts. The law of the land is anchored in Shari'a, but issues of integrity and a poor grasp of the law also disadvantage women caught up in inheritance disputes (Kamau *et al.* 2019). The customary law does not only put women at a disadvantage; it favours majority clans, making it difficult for minority clans and certain ethnic groups (eg Bantu and people of Arab origin) to assert their rights.

Patriarchal values have wider implications for women, as they create a system of inequality in many aspects of society that limits women's access to shelter. Women are very dependent on men to acquire property, rental housing or even temporary shelter. As several women stated during semi-structured field interviews, "women can't fight as aggressively for their right to land as men can." They have significantly fewer economic opportunities that would enable them to afford housing by themselves; they also have less access to relevant personal connections necessary to acquire housing than men. In this sense, a personal connection can sometimes be the most valuable asset for women to secure shelter – a charitable neighbour is more likely to offer help to a single, widowed or divorced woman than to a man, especially if she has children.

During an FGD with women in Hodan district, they described the process they go through when trying to access shelter. They first assess the security situation in a given camp, because "being a single woman means you are in danger and it is not easy for you to settle in a place you are not sure to which extent you can rely on its security". They then contact the settlement elders and ISM, which must happen through a contact person in the settlement who can connect them to the ISM.

During social mapping exercises, young men explained that when seeking shelter in the settlements, they have to bring a guarantor before being allowed to move in, given all the negative perceptions associated with young men. Finding a guarantor can often prove difficult for them, as the guarantor is responsible for the young man in case an incident occurs. It is especially difficult to be accepted into the camp when one is an IDP or has no family ties in the settlement. A group of young men from Kaxda district reported that they experience discrimination from the ISMs, who often do not consider them as vulnerable and sometimes even require them to front some money before they are allowed to settle in the settlement. When they do find somebody to vouch for them and are allowed into the settlement, they will often be relegated to disadvantaged areas on the outskirts of the settlement, or not be let in at all, on the

suspicion that they will cause trouble. The settlement residents see young men as a security threat, especially as the houses are made of plastic and they fear that these youths can easily commit burglaries. During an FGD, young men from Hodan district spoke about these challenges.

> The challenges to access to settlements faced by young men include security, young men are seen as a security threat, the houses are made of plastic and the residents fear that the young men might have easy access in case of attempted burglary. Another is the perception that young men often abuse drugs and this reduces their chance of getting a settlement.

The perception that young men often abuse drugs further reduces their chance of finding shelter. During an FGD with young men from Hodan district, they illustrated the consequences of these prejudices.

> There was one incidence where a young man threw a lit cigarette on the ground, causing fire within the settlement, and such cases cause bad reputations for young men. If a burglary or theft occurs, young men, especially single young men are often the first to be suspected.

Furthermore, the young men said that they are excluded from the settlement community's social and political gatherings as they often are away at work or are not considered to have interest in such gatherings. Neither are they represented in camp committees, which prevents them from bringing their challenges to the settlement leadership and increases their sense of isolation.

A common challenge that both women and young men face points to a key element of Somali society: rumours and reputation. As shown above, young men suffer from a negative stereotype based on experiences and stories told and retold within the settlement communities that then give them a bad reputation. Women likewise stated that rumours and accusations against single women are common and widely held within IDP settlements. As one woman remarked, "[i]f settlers in the camp see a single woman having a friendly conversation with a man, they believe that she is having an intimate relation with him and they spread false allegations about her". This can significantly threaten her place in the community and the settlement.

Formal government institutions are largely absent from the process of accessing housing in the informal settlements, which allows the 'gatekeeping' system to proliferate. The absence of a strong government presence and interest in the IDP settlements means that there is no special protection provided for women or other vulnerable groups by a formal institution, whether governmental or non-governmental. Only one woman respondent noted that, "[w]hen donations or support is received from humanitarian aid or the government, female-headed households are prioritised".

For women especially, the biggest issue with the absence of formal institutions in the settlements is security: those living in settlements far away from a police presence feel very unsafe at night. This is another example of how community or informal institutions step in to fill the vacuum of formal authorities. Some settlements organise their own surveillance patrols at night, and women organise to go in groups when they have to relieve themselves at night. Yet people in situations of intersectional vulnerability can still be left out of these initiatives. As a female member of a minority clan residing in Safari settlement described,

> Most of the residents in this camp came from the same area in Bay and Bakol and speak the same dialect which is Maay, and they don't like outsiders. Very few of us are different and we often don't feel welcome or embraced. This is worrisome to me as I am away for most of the day to earn a living, and leaving my sick husband and children at home with neighbours who do not want us there is difficult.

It should be noted that there is a great variation in women's sense of security in the different settlements. On very few occasions, the settlement community cooperates with local police, who are in contact with the ISM and camp committee to improve security, and this helps women feel more secure. However, in the majority of cases when women report feeling relatively safe, it is thanks to self-organising.

There is no evidence in the data collected suggesting any new efforts to address gender equality in access to shelter in Mogadishu. None of the persons interviewed knew of any specific support given to women – only one mentioned "some associations in the town that advocate the rights of females in IDP camps".

Our research reveals that for vulnerable people, one area that needs urgent attention is services, specifically access to latrines. Nearly all women speak about the danger they face when using the few and overcrowded latrines, and most of the people interviewed acknowledge that latrines are inaccessible and/or completely inadequate for PLWDs. During a social mapping exercise in which a group of women were asked to draw their settlement on a piece of paper, they explained that if a female-headed household has a latrine in their compound[25] the head of the household will let neighbouring families use it, giving privileged access to other women. Carrying out the same exercise with young single men showed that this

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[25] In informal settlements, a compound refers to a small plot on which there is one or more small huts or rooms, usually fenced in with wooden stakes and plastic.

Women described the dangers of using the few overcrowded latrines at night. Latrines are also inaccessible and/or completely inadequate for PLWDs © Tana Copenhagen

in turn discriminates against them, as they are often living on the outskirts of a settlement, far away from a public latrine and without one on their plot. They will be denied entry to a privately owned latrine, whether female or male owned, because they are often suspected of attacking women. This forces them to relieve themselves out in the open, although this exposes them to less risk than it does women.

The majority of settlement residents interviewed on the ground during household surveys agreed that women's needs in terms of shelter differ from men's. While a number of women thought that both genders just need a safe space to sleep at night, most women and men identified key differences.

Women need a house with strong and lockable doors, having a kitchen and toilet with running water and electricity. Men do not care about all these things because they can sleep under a tree or even in an open area and all they need is a place with a roof and a toilet.

Male, urban poor, Zone K settlement

People living with disability in the informal settlements have **no options**, and their numbers are increasing due to terrorist attacks in the city. With one exception, none of the interviewed described receiving support from NGOs or local government and instead rely entirely on their relatives. When the family is too poor to provide assistance, the community leaders and members sometimes step in – as a disabled male IDP stated, "[i]f

you don't have family, you will suffer a lot". However, one man stated that the ISMs may favour having disabled persons in the community:

It is not harder for the disabled to get somewhere to live because managers of the camps in the neighbourhood prefer giving plots to disabled people as they believe that humanitarian agencies will assist IDP camps if disabled people are residing in it.

The mix of formal and informal systems governing access to shelter in Mogadishu is unpredictable, and having a broad and powerful personal network is the best asset to navigate these systems and secure housing. For vulnerable populations living in informal settlements this is even more crucial, as social capital is often the only kind they have. However, women, young men and PLWDs are often in a position where they do not have access to a strong network to the same extent as adult married men. In these situations, the community can step in and act as relatives who will provide support or charity to people in need. Female-headed households with young children and disabled persons are more likely to receive this kind of help from the settlement leadership or the community than young single men, who will turn to each other for support. Women form support systems among each other, for example for childcare and protection, since virtually no assistance is available for their needs. However, women and single men are also more exposed to prejudice and slandering by the community, which can put their access to housing at risk.

6

Conclusions and areas for further research

This EARF research documents the lack of a coherent system for developing and managing land and shelter in Mogadishu, with the poor and displaced bearing the brunt of this problem. Land, a significant factor in shelter development, has been and continues to be one of the key causes of conflict in Somalia. Considering the history of property and landownership in the country, especially in Mogadishu, formalising and ensuring a single and transparent process for regulating this valuable resource will likely shake up the existing political settlement in Mogadishu. This partly explains the present system of shelter production. Access to land and shelter is managed through a mix of formal and informal processes, all related to closed and tightly controlled networks and money flows. For this reason, any attempts to change this status quo have fallen short in terms of enhancing transparency and accountability in the processes around land and property transactions, access and usage.

Despite this, for the average Mogadishu resident, the mix of formal and informal systems managing shelter and land in Mogadishu allows for some degree of flexibility in terms of which process they pursue to access land and shelter. However, undertaking land and property transactions is not led or coordinated through a single planning and registration process. Instead, multiple formal and informal actors are involved in ensuring access to shelter. The viability of ensuring your family a safe place to stay, work and access services is dependent on your financial situation and your relationship with the people residing in the area where you wish to settle.

Having said that, this research has documented how the most disadvantaged face the greatest difficulties in accessing shelter. This group comprises, firstly, the IDPs residing in Mogadishu. In particular, newer arrivals settling in Kaxda district – exemplified in our Alkodhar case study – are facing the greatest challenges in terms of accessing secure tenure, including services and livelihood opportunities. The second case study from Shangani shows how people who have resided there for longer periods of time and have the right network can remain closer to the centre of the city with better facilities and services, though this group also faces considerable hardship. The research also finds that a distinction between IDPs and the urban poor is not always possible or helpful when discussing access to shelter, and on occasion, the label of IDP is applied based on different motivations by the various actors operating in the Mogadishu context.

In terms of access to finance, there are as yet no regulations around borrowing and lending, and each bank sets its own guidelines. In the meantime, people have greater trust in real estate than in other investment avenues, especially since formal banking is only just returning to Mogadishu after over 20 years. Housing finance and attendant loan requirements are an important limiting factor to accessing land and shelter for regular Mogadishu residents, and the more vulnerable the person, the more they are excluded from the formal financial system.

Among the IDPs in particular, three groups emerged as being particularly vulnerable: single/widowed/divorced

women and female-headed households, young men and youth-headed households, and PLWDs. For these groups, accessing shelter is especially challenging, and in the case of young men, they are further disadvantaged by the limited attention of humanitarian and other aid agencies to their shelter needs.

The challenges around ensuring durable, affordable and secure access to shelter is arguably closely linked to the lack of clear leadership in ensuring the development and implementation of relevant policies and regulations. The demarcation of roles and responsibilities between the different authorities managing shelter and related policy and planning in Mogadishu – from the FGS to the BRA and private-service providers – needs to be agreed on and turned into law, preferably starting with an updated constitution, which is currently under review. Key to this process will be to ensure that, once and for all, land rights and registration are anchored in the constitution and that from the state to the municipal level, legislation around land-planning processes is developed. Taking into account the political realities at play in Mogadishu, this change will not happen overnight. As our research shows, there are vested interests around issues such as relationships/networks and land speculation, and concerns around security, which mean that local actors, especially informal powerholders, are keen to keep the status quo. Thus, any change is likely to be incremental over the medium to long term and non-linear, as has been the case in Somalia for decades.

There is movement towards improving the formalisation of shelter access in Somalia. Parliament is discussing land and housing policies as well as national policies for IDPs. In Benadir, the BRA is launching a new IDP policy and drafting settlement management guidelines. Similarly, at the private-sector level monopolies (for example, in the electricity sector) are being challenged by new companies paving the way for more competitive and therefore affordable services. These developments will likely only bear fruit in the long term.

In the medium term, however, over the last couple of years, development partners have started supporting these shelter provision processes. One example is the EU RE-INTEG programme, which is working in Mogadishu towards a durable solutions approach to development programming through the BRA. Also, the UN JPLG has recently started capacitating the planning and budgeting process of the BRA and related planning around durable solutions. Tana has conducted its own work on gatekeepers, the IDP policy and settlement management guidelines with the BRA. In the short term, efforts by humanitarian actors to negotiate and advocate for access to land for IDPs and other urban poor are most likely to have an immediate effect in alleviating the shelter challenge. However, for this does need buy-in from powerholders and property owners in the city,

meaning that it will take lengthy engagements in order to come to fruition.

6.1 Recommendations

Based on the research and conclusions presented above, it is clear that the city of Mogadishu faces many challenges to securing quality, durable housing and services solutions for its most vulnerable inhabitants, who make up the bulk of its total population: IDPs, refugees, returnees and the urban poor. The central issue is that of land. Until the government finds a way to allocate public land to resettle informal settlement residents durably, they will not be able to build permanent, quality housing or get access to piped water, grid electricity and other basic services, because they will remain under the constant threat of eviction. Therefore, we have centred our recommendations around policy and legislative interventions at the federal government level, and around better management of settlements and protection of vulnerable groups at the regional government level.

The following recommendations should be considered:

For the Federal Government of Somalia:

• Continue the process of constitutional review and ensure that this addresses the issue of land rights around land and property management, as well as concrete dispute resolution mechanisms. To ensure ownership of such changes and their eventual implementation, the review process should build on substantial consultative procedures, while taking into consideration the current hybrid governance system of formal and informal practices around land transfer.

• In parallel with the constitutional review, engage in the development of the necessary attendant laws, bylaws and regulations around land and shelter transactions and management. This should include a clear delineation of responsibilities between the different levels of government: central, state, city and community. As the constitutional review process may be prolonged and delayed given the sensitivities around the state formation process, we suggest that the FGS start developing the new laws and regulations and then revise as needed once a new constitution is in place.

• New policies, laws and regulations should take into consideration the vulnerabilities of segments of the Somali population. For Mogadishu specifically, as documented in this research, this includes IDPs, female-headed households, single women and young men, and PLWDs. There are currently laws being debated around gender-based violence, for example, but these have yet to be passed in parliament. What is not clear is how much minority groups such as IDPs

will be protected even if these laws are passed. There is also an urgent need to deal with the issue of youth employment and social inclusion of minority groups – issues that are complicated by cultural and historical factors and that are still contentious.

- The FGS should explore ways in which it can enhance guidelines by which banks operate. Considering that the banking sector is still in its infancy in Somalia, such guidelines should be negotiated and agreed by these institutions as well as with civil society in order to find modalities that are to the advantage of both. The aim of these guidelines should not only be to streamline the 'rules of engagement' by which banks operate, but also to extend the coverage of formal finance to regular and vulnerable members of society.

For the Benadir Regional Administration:

- Agree with the FGS on a common land register for Mogadishu and engage in a new process of demarcating land and ownership of the same across the city.

- Almost all the informal settlement residents interviewed reported that the local authorities are largely absent from the settlements and are not interested in providing solutions to issues affecting the urban poor and IDPs. The BRA should therefore continue the development of settlement management guidelines that adapt and respond to the context as the displacement situation in Mogadishu evolves over time. The guidelines should ensure enhanced transparency in the settlement management process and accountability between district commissioners, ISMs and IDPs. Furthermore, they should relate to the vulnerabilities of segments of the Mogadishu population including IDPs, female-headed households, single women and young men, and PLWDs.

- Develop a process of oversight of key institutions and actors involved in shelter and settlement management, including notaries, community leaders and ISMs.

For the international community:

- Support the ongoing constitutional review process with a specific focus on land and property registration and management.

- In the meantime, support relevant new opportunities for improving policy development (around social inclusion of vulnerable and minority groups), legislation around rights and protection of all citizens. Past experience from Mogadishu shows that policy and legislative processes can take a long time, but that change is feasible when the right opportunity emerges.[26]

- Consider further research in areas around vulnerability less well covered by this or previous research on shelter in Mogadishu. This in particular concerns PLWDs and single young men's access to shelter.

- Carry out research on alternative housing finance options and opportunities in order to increase the degree of access that vulnerable people have.

- For international and local NGOs providing essential services to the informal settlement residents: engage in closer cooperation with authorities on an integrated plan to provide quality, affordable and sustainable services to **all** residents of the city. The key is to ensure the provision of these services in a way that does not leave room for the proliferation of predatory mechanisms (eg people with private latrines charging large sums of money to let people use their facilities or excluding some groups from access) or for the further expansion of the gatekeeper system, which has been the de facto consequence of new humanitarian aid to Kaxda since the 2017 drought. NGOs should work for durable solutions while at the same time ensuring that they are not further cementing the negative aspects of the current political settlement in Mogadishu city.

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[26] See for example Somalia Accountability Programme (2018).

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Annex 1. Methodology

The findings presented in this paper are the result of in-depth qualitative and quantitative research conducted over nearly two years between 2017 and 2019. The fieldwork was carried out by Tana staff and enumerators on the ground in three distinct phases.

Phase I consisted of 25 key informant interviews (KIIs) collected by our Somali staff in Mogadishu, as well as a survey conducted among 35 respondents using mobile data-collection technology.

NUMBER OF INFORMANTS	CATEGORIES/GROUPS OF INFORMANTS	LOCATION(S)	DATA-COLLECTION METHODS USED
25	• Officials from MoPWRH • Urban planning experts • Lecturers/academics • Banks • Notaries • Real-estate companies • Architects • INGOs/donor agencies • BRA staff • Utility suppliers	Mogadishu	KIIs
35	Informal settlement residents: different categories across gender, age, occupation, household type, housing type, marital status, place of origin, status of IDP, length of time lived in Mogadishu, etc	Various districts/ neighbourhoods in Mogadishu: • Hawlewadag • Daynile • Waberi • Wadajir • Abdiaziz • Wardhigley • Hamar Jajab • Hamar Weyne	KoBo mobile data collection tool

Phase II consisted of 63 KIIs collected by our Somali staff in Mogadishu among targeted vulnerable groups residing in the informal settlements.

NUMBER OF INFORMANTS	CATEGORIES/GROUPS OF INFORMANTS	LOCATION(S)	DATA-COLLECTION METHODS USED
63	• Urban poor • IDPs • Female-headed households • Disabled persons • Youth-headed households • People belonging to minority clans • Informal settlement managers	Different IDP settlements in districts across the city: • Samawade, Hodan district • Fargaduud, Hodan district • Israac, Hodan district • Zone K, Hodan district • Safari, Kaxda district • Shangani, Kaxda district	KIIs

Phase III consisted of four focus group discussions and social mapping exercises with two target groups of respondents from two selected informal settlements, each group containing 10 respondents in total.

NUMBER OF INFORMANTS	CATEGORIES/GROUPS OF INFORMANTS	LOCATION(S)	DATA-COLLECTION METHODS USED
40 (2 groups of 10 women and 2 groups of 10 men from Kaxda and Hodan districts)	• Women, female heads of households, widowed/divorced women, young married women • Young men, both married and single	Different IDP settlements in districts across the city: • Samawade, Hodan district • Fargaduud, Hodan district • Israac, Hodan district • Zone K, Hodan district • Safari, Kaxda district • Shangani, Kaxda district	• FGDs • Social mapping exercises

This working paper presents findings and recommendations from research on access to shelter and services in Mogadishu, Somalia. It is part of a three-city study in East Africa also covering Nairobi, Kenya and Hawassa, Ethiopia. Guided by political economy analysis, the two-year research project investigated why and how city dwellers make certain shelter choices, and generated recommendations to improve access to adequate shelter and basic services for the most vulnerable urban residents.

IIED is a policy and action research organisation. We promote sustainable development to improve livelihoods and protect the environments on which these livelihoods are built. We specialise in linking local priorities to global challenges. IIED is based in London and works in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and the Pacific, with some of the world's most vulnerable people. We work with them to strengthen their voice in the decision-making arenas that affect them – from village councils to international conventions.

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