

Tacloban after Haiyan

Working together towards recovery

Gerald Paragas, Amillah Rodil and
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The Human Settlements Group works to reduce poverty and improve health and housing conditions in the urban centres of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It seeks to combine this with promoting good governance and more ecologically sustainable patterns of urban development and rural-urban linkages.

Purpose

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), on behalf of the Department for International Development (DFID), has commissioned this paper as part of their 'Urban Crises Learning Fund'. The purpose of this paper is to provide an initial review of literature as a foundation for informing practice and policy decisions of humanitarian actors, as well as identifying gaps in documentation and knowledge for further research.

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On 8 November 2013, Tacloban city was devastated by typhoon Haiyan, the strongest typhoon on record to make landfall. Despite crippling damage, the local government strove to coordinate recovery efforts towards a better, more resilient city. This paper describes the experience, challenges, successes and lessons of the Tacloban city government as the city transitioned from the humanitarian response to the recovery and development phases following the disaster. It elaborates on the institutional mechanisms that the city government set up (and related national government and humanitarian mechanisms) to coordinate the humanitarian response, and how these transitioned into mechanisms to coordinate early recovery and longer-term development.

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Acronyms

| | |
|--------|--|
| CDRRMC | City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| CHCDO | City Housing and Community Development Office |
| DRRM | Disaster Risk Reduction and Management |
| LIAC | Local Inter-Agency Committee |
| LRRP | Local Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan |
| NDRRMC | National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| NEDA | National Economic Development Authority |
| NHA | National Housing Authority |
| OCD | Office of Civil Defence |
| OCHA | Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs |
| OPARR | Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation |
| PARR | Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation |
| RAY | Rehabilitation Assistance for Yolanda |
| RDRRMC | Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| TACDEV | Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group |
| TRRP | Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan |
| TRSDG | Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group |
| TWG | Technical Working Group |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

Summary

Prior to typhoon Haiyan, Tacloban was a growing regional urban centre. Despite preparations, people underestimated the force of the typhoon, which resulted in 2,669 dead and 40,192 houses damaged, with about 10,000 of these belonging to urban poor in coastal areas. Breakdowns in power, communications, water supply and damage to homes also led to widespread looting, which affected many businesses and consequently city income.

Based on the various challenges, successes and lessons learned during the Haiyan emergency response and recovery in Tacloban, this study makes the following recommendations for enhancing capacity for coordination, improving the recovery process and monitoring recovery programmes.

Enhancing capacity for coordination

The activation of Level 3 response by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) brought in a surge of humanitarian actors. Mechanisms such as the cluster system, national and regional government task forces and the city-led Tindog Tacloban were quickly set up to coordinate emergency response. Despite being badly affected, the local government provided an enabling environment for responders, facilitating the flow of aid and providing information to the national government, various organisations and the media.

To improve coordination in emergency response, national government has to increase capacity in key agencies, so they can take on the lead role in coordination as intended in the Philippine cluster system through, first, educating them on international humanitarian architecture and the cluster system and second, developing leader-managers with facilitation and coordination skills and a strong secretariat with information management and mapping capacity.

Similarly, local governments have to strengthen the capacities of their local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council in coordination with national government. Local governments should also strengthen middle management to take on coordination roles.

The national government should study further how local government capacity can be increased when it is crippled by a widespread disaster. During the emergency phase, local government may need emergency managers for response coordination, debris removal, relief distribution, medical response, etc., while during the recovery phase more technical experts, project managers and communications specialists may be needed. This could be increased by providing funding to the local government for hiring dedicated staff for emergency coordination and planning, or by forming a 'surge team' or emergency management or planning team to support the city during response and recovery.

Other ways to improve capacity would be to involve the private sector in the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, particularly in contingency planning, so they can contribute resources. Also, enhance inter-local governmental cooperation by planning with other cities/ municipalities on how they could complement each other's resources in a region-wide disaster.

National government has to develop government guidance/ protocols for local governments for dealing with humanitarian organisations. This could include relevant national policies and standards and examples of local protocols and ordinances for the regulation or facilitation of humanitarian assistance. In turn, the government can also develop a guidance note for humanitarian organisations for dealing with local authorities, such as identifying the appropriate level of coordination and the legal and institutional frameworks they need to operate within.

Humanitarian organisations should invest resources to engage with local government particularly if their programme is in an urban area, to set the stage for forming a productive partnership. Their programme could include providing not just direct humanitarian assistance to affected communities but also organisational support and technical assistance to increase city capacity for the emergency response and recovery.

Improving the recovery process

The task forces formed for the response were eventually dissolved as the city normalised and initial needs were addressed, although the cluster system continued for a year after the typhoon. UN-Habitat helped form the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TACDEV), a multi-stakeholder group intended to lead the formulation of the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) through a participatory process.

Despite the short planning period, Tacloban was able to submit its recovery plan to the newly created body, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR), which was tasked with consolidating local and agency plans for the National Comprehensive Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan. About 30 per cent of the total estimated cost of proposed projects under the TRRP was funded by multiple sources, including I/NGOs, but mostly by national government.

The main concern now in rehabilitation is housing for those coastal communities that were affected. A new city extension, Tacloban North, is being envisioned but faces slow implementation and gaps in basic services and livelihood opportunities. The city is currently updating its development and land use plans with the aim to build a better and more sustainable Tacloban.

To improve on future recovery programmes, national government needs to provide sufficient support for national-level ad hoc bodies for recovery planning. This includes strong leadership, good secretariat and technical support and sufficient capacity for information management. It also needs to issue clear guidelines on how recovery funding for local projects will be approved and how these will be implemented; also the expected scope and level of detail of recovery plans so that local governments can tailor plans to this end.

To give local governments more control during their recovery, national government can explore further the transfer of recovery funds to local government, including providing a budget to increase project management capacity, and some flexibility to allow for variation and changes in the recovery programme based on more detailed plans and changing conditions on the ground. The definition of recovery funding could also include 'development' projects that support building back better.

Both national and local governments need to plan more clearly and provide sufficient resources for the transitional phase of housing displaced families. This allows more time to plan for a variety of longer-term housing options using a more participatory 'people's process'.

National government also ought to examine further how to help businesses during calamities, with loans that require less collateral especially when there is large-scale damage to properties.

Local governments need to strengthen their planning offices so they can take the lead or provide the necessary support in planning. This includes putting in place people with strong leadership and facilitation skills and basic knowledge of the Philippine planning and disaster risk management system. Planning offices also need to have basic capacities in information management and mapping, and need to know how to contract and manage consultants and engage potential partners as technical capacity often needs to be outsourced. In general, local governments need to improve the competencies, skills and knowledge of city staff to implement city plans. Each department needs to be evaluated on its capacity depending on the goals of the recovery and development plans, and its role in achieving these.

Monitoring recovery programmes

National government has to continue and improve support for monitoring the implementation of numerous recovery projects still ongoing. This includes funding for personnel and a leadership who can resolve issues with concerned agencies. Coordination with local governments also needs to be sustained to ensure projects complement each other.

Tacloban still needs improved support for managing and monitoring recovery projects. Continued coordination for the development of Tacloban North (the resettlement area) and support for families in transition is crucial. It also needs additional capacity in social preparation, community organisation and urban/ site planning.

1

Introduction

1.1 Background to typhoon Haiyan

Typhoon Haiyan – the world's strongest tropical cyclone on record to make landfall – hit the central Philippines on 8 November 2013, with maximum sustained winds of 315kph (170 knots) and gusts of up to 379kph (205 knots) just before landfall (JTWC, 2013). This equates to a Category 5 typhoon on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale (NOAA, 2013a) and has the capacity to cause catastrophic damage.

This super typhoon, known locally as Yolanda¹, caused more than 6,300 casualties, displaced more than four million people and destroyed or damaged more than one million houses due to high wind speeds and storm surges (NDRRMC 3 April 2014). In total, 171 municipalities in 14 provinces across 5 regions of the Philippines were affected by the storm.

Haiyan was considered one of the three deadliest and most powerful typhoons to have hit the country in the past 117 years. The first occurred in October 1897, with a death toll of 7,000, and the second was in November 1912, which left 15,000 people dead. Haiyan cemented the reputation of the Philippines as one of the world's most vulnerable countries to natural disasters. Due to the impacts of Haiyan, the Global Climate Risk Index 2015 (Germanwatch) ranked the Philippines as number one most affected by extreme weather events in 2013.

Tacloban city is the largest urban area in the Eastern Visayas region of the Philippines and sustained the worst damage, estimated at Php 7 billion – Php 2.5 billion on infrastructure, Php 726 million within the productive sectors and Php 3.4 billion within the social sector (Office of Civil Defense, 2014).

The human cost in Tacloban was also staggering, with 2,669 dead and 701 missing (www.gov.ph). The typhoon caused damage to 40,192 houses, with 28,734 totally damaged and 17,643 partially damaged (as of 18 December 2013), accounting for five per cent of all damaged houses at the national level.

1.2 Need for urban resilience

Haiyan's severe impact on Tacloban highlights the need to develop resilience in similar urban centres facing threats from extreme hazard events and climate change. Resilience here refers to the ability of human settlements to withstand and to recover quickly from any hazard event. This not only means reducing risks and damage from disasters (ie loss of lives and assets) but also the ability to quickly bounce back to a stable state (UN-Habitat, 2016).

According to UN-Habitat (2016), 80 per cent of the world's largest cities are vulnerable to severe impacts from earthquakes, 60 per cent are at risk from storm

¹ Yolanda and Haiyan are used interchangeably throughout the text to refer to the same super typhoon.

surges and tsunamis, and all face new impacts caused by climate change. Rapid urbanisation has meant the formation of uncontrolled and densely populated informal settlements in hazard-prone areas, significantly increasing the number of people at risk.

Furthermore, UN-Habitat (2016) says that with 50 per cent of the world's population already in urban areas, and substantial urban population growth projected over the coming decades, there is a pressing need to strengthen local administrations and citizens to better protect the human, economic and natural assets of towns and cities.

Local governments have a huge role to play in achieving urban resilience – not only in delivering the basic infrastructure and services that protect lives and assets but also in coordinating the efforts of various development actors within the city. When a major disaster strikes, local governments come under huge pressure to deal with a new set of humanitarian actors, while facilitating the city's return to normalcy. The aftermath of Haiyan presents a great opportunity to learn how a major urban area such as Tacloban responded to and is recovering from such a disaster.

The collapse of basic infrastructure and services, pressing humanitarian needs and the sheer scale of the disaster presented huge coordination and operational challenges to the city and the surrounding regions; its recovery then was hard to imagine.

More than two years after Haiyan, Tacloban is again a bustling city and a far cry from its state right after the typhoon. Although new housing for those who were displaced is still far from complete, the downtown is busy and new investment is pouring in. It has shown its resilience through the efforts of its citizens and assistance from humanitarian organisations and the government.

The Asian Development Bank vice president for East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Stephen Groff, has been quoted as saying that despite challenges, rehabilitation efforts in Eastern Visayas were “*moving [even] faster*” than after the earthquake and tsunami that struck Aceh, Indonesia, ten years ago (Casuay, 2014).

1.3 Stages of disaster response

Depending on the type and scale of a disaster, the response usually goes through two or three major stages: the emergency/ response stage, the rehabilitation/ recovery stage and the reconstruction/ development stage. These may overlap with each other and the length of each depends on the scale of the disaster and how the community is able to cope. Every stage has a different, although overlapping, set of needs. International agencies, government, non-government organisations, local organisations and private entities that wish to help the affected populations have to consider these needs in order to be effective.

In other countries where disasters are rare this might be a linear process, but in the Philippines where natural and man-made disasters occur almost every year, the process is cyclical: the post-disaster phase merges with the pre-disaster phase. Thus, it is particularly important for the Philippines to learn the lessons from this experience as preparation for the next super typhoon and to ensure that its cities, led by its local governments, develop sustainably and reduce vulnerability over time.

1.4 Objectives of the research

This paper focuses on the experience, challenges, successes and lessons of Tacloban city government as the city transitioned from the humanitarian response, to the recovery and development phases after the disaster.

The main goal of this paper is to illustrate the continuum from emergency response to recovery and sustainable development, or the interface of post-disaster response measures and actions with long-term development needs. The research will elaborate on the institutional mechanisms that the Tacloban city government set up (and related national government and humanitarian mechanisms) to coordinate humanitarian response and how these transitioned into mechanisms coordinating early recovery and longer-term development.

In the aftermath of the super typhoon, the city government created a task force called Tindog Tacloban to "... coordinate the needs of the public and optimise communication between the national government and the different international organisations with the local government" (CDRRMC Resolution No. 05, Series of 2013). Later, the local government began to conduct a purposive recovery and rehabilitation planning process that led to the creation of the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP). The TRRP is a product of the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TACDEV), a multi-actor group chaired by the city government of Tacloban in partnership with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), with key government agencies and key stakeholders from the city as members.

The specific objectives of the research were the following:

- To identify the objectives, coordination process and immediate actions of Task Force Tindog Tacloban, the local government's cluster approach for disaster response (*tindog* is local dialect for 'rise up').
 - To detail the institutional structure of TACDEV and the development of a framework for the recovery and rehabilitation planning process.
 - To examine the transitions in action continuum (from task force to TACDEV) and the role of development and humanitarian support actors; also key socioeconomic and political realities.
- To explain the focus, priorities and action points of the TRRP as TACDEV's roadmap for action and a normalisation of the city system in general.
 - To reflect on the achievements, gaps and challenges of TACDEV in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the TRRP, and how these are integrated into the current development planning of the city.

The in-depth qualitative research takes the form of a case study, drawing from a review of secondary data (situation reports, after-action reviews of UN and other concerned agencies, city and national policy issuances, draft plans and other relevant documents), as well as key informant interviews with local government personnel and representatives from national government and non-government organisations who were involved in the emergency response and recovery and rehabilitation of Tacloban. The study covers the period from November 2013 to March 2016.

Key interviewees were chosen from those occupying key leadership positions (chairpersons and cluster heads of Task Force Tindog Tacloban, TACDEV) as well as those with relevant positions in national agencies and I/NGOs who worked in Tacloban. Key findings and recommendations of the study were presented to interviewees and representatives of city departments in Tacloban as well as UN and I/NGO representatives in Manila for validation.

2

The impact of Haiyan

Tacloban was a growing regional urban centre prior to Yolanda. Although preparations were made, people underestimated the force of the typhoon, which crippled city systems including the city government. The city-wide scale of the damage affected many city personnel, which limited response capacity. Breakdowns in power, communications, water supply and damage to homes led to widespread looting, which affected many businesses and consequently city income.

2.1 Tacloban before Haiyan

Tacloban is a highly urbanised city (with a land area of 201.7km² and a population of 221,174 as of 2010) that serves not only as a central business and trading centre but also as a food warehouse and education, health, banking and government hub for Eastern Visayas. The city acts as a net importer of food and hosts 7 hospitals, 43 banks, including a branch of the Central Bank of the Philippines, an airport and seaport, and 141 government and private learning institutions.

The backbone of the city's economy is centred on trade and services, which accounted for around 54 per cent (or around Php 69.3 million) of its annual tax revenues in 2013 and provides employment to 60 per cent of Tacloban's citizens. The industrial sector, including the construction/ real estate sub-sector, is the second highest revenue earner (26 per cent, or around Php 33.2 million).

The economy of the region is linked extensively with the urban facilities and services provided by Tacloban, due to its ideal location and its transportation infrastructure such as ports, airports and terminals that provide links to different areas of the country.

2.2 Preparations for Haiyan

Multi-agency emergency preparations for the arrival of super typhoon Yolanda started on 6 November with a series of coordination meetings with members of the City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (CDRRMC), *barangay* leaders, the Philippine National Red Cross and other city-based emergency rescue teams. Press briefings were issued and an inventory of resources such as health facilities, transportation and logistics were made as well as the setting up of 24-hour on-alert disaster command centre in the city hall boardroom.

Almost 1,000 families from 12 danger-prone *barangays* had been evacuated a day before Yolanda was expected to make landfall in the province of Leyte and nearby Samar. People were starting to panic-buy in grocery stores in anticipation of the storm.

Upon receipt of information from the local weather warning agency PAGASA and memos from higher headquarters, the Tacloban City Police Office was put on full alert status. Philippine national police and search and rescue-trained personnel were deployed early to the designated evacuation centres.

There were signs however that the communication on the storm's landfall and possible impact was not as clear as it should have been. Tacloban former city administrator Tecson Lim recounts that on November 7, there was a meeting with the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council in Camp Pitik (Leyte), where PAGASA (the national weather bureau) said that the typhoon would make landfall at 10am the following day. This was later revised by PAGASA as the typhoon made landfall at dawn – but the national and local governments made preparations according to the 10am time announced during the meeting. Although PAGASA had officially predicted storm surges, according to other attendees there was also no mention of storm surge or its implications in the meeting.

On 7 November, the city mayor issued a directive for the forced evacuation of villages at risk and ordered a work suspension for government employees, effective that afternoon. The private sector and businesses were also furnished with copies of the order as a basis for suspending work within their offices, and the Office of the City Administrator also inspected all city hall departments to check on their disaster preparedness (City Administrator's Office, 2014).


However, as claimed by local officials, all the preparations were overwhelmed by the magnitude and strength of Yolanda.

2.3 The force of Haiyan

Haiyan entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility early on the morning of 7 November and made its first landfall over Guiuan in Eastern Samar province at 4:40am on 8 November (Philippine time). It maintained its strength, due to the warm seawater surface temperatures (greater than 30°C), as the typhoon 'eye' passed Tacloban. Figure 1 shows the track of Haiyan as it headed towards the West Philippine Sea, crossing the majority of the Visayas region at a speed of 40.7kph (22 knots) (NASA, 2013).

Tacloban is situated in the mid-section of the country's Pacific coast, an area that is susceptible to the direct and indirect effects of the roughly 22 typhoons that hit the country each year. Based on fact-finding missions and on-site surveys, storm surge heights of up to six metres were measured near the shoreline and survivors reported waves of up to four metres high atop the storm surge. Tacloban was worst hit, along with Basey in Samar, due to their location and the shape and orientation of the coastline (winds blowing perpendicular to the coast) relative to the path of typhoon. The storm surge travelled north in the Samar-Leyte straits, devastating the coastal communities of Tacloban and Basey. Local river flooding and landslides due to heavy rainfall were also observed at several points in the city (IRIDeS, 2015).

Figure 1: Storm track of Haiyan/Yolanda



Source: RAY 8: Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda for Eastern Visayas (March 24, 2014), National Economic and Development Authority – Region 8

2.4 The city post-Haiyan

Survivors describe the aftermath of the typhoon in the city as akin to being in a war zone, with widespread destruction everywhere and piles of dead bodies and debris littering the streets. The collapse of basic support systems – power, water, communications, transportation – left people tense, desperate and hopeless, with many 'walking around like zombies'. The week after the typhoon was marked by a panic-driven search for food and ensuing looting, which affected many businesses (see Box 1). Oliver Cam, a hotel owner, relates:

"You saw regular citizens looting. It was a collective effect ... The frustration and desperation started hitting people. People were asking ... where do we get our next meal? How can I stay alive tomorrow? ... Everyone was hoping for government to have been at least prepared ... but where were they?"

The airport was inundated by the storm surge and debris from the typhoon blocked roads, disrupting access to other regions and affecting supply chains; thus it took a few days before government could scale up its response. For the first few weeks, people in Tacloban felt abandoned and were angry at the national government, which was perceived as ill-prepared. There was an exodus of people from Tacloban – for those who were able to secure transport.

Of the 28 hardest-hit *barangays* or villages along the coast (out of a total of 138 *barangays*), the areas of San Jose, Sagkahan and Anibong were the most severely affected. Most of the 2,669 people found dead and 701 reported missing came from these densely occupied urban areas, where large pockets of informal settlers lived in makeshift dwellings. About 10,000 houses (out of the 40,000 damaged houses reported) were destroyed in these areas and most belonged to the urban poor.

Even before Haiyan wrought havoc on the region, Eastern Visayas was the second poorest region in the country, with 45 per cent of the population living under the poverty line in 2012-2013. Estimates for the first quarter of 2014 published by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) show the region now has the highest poverty incidence level, with 55 per cent of the Eastern Visayas population earning below the poverty threshold due to the immediate impacts of Haiyan.

Tacloban's economy was affected by the looting and business confidence took time to return. According to businessman Oliver Cam:

"Security was increased only about five days after the typhoon, and it took three to four weeks for transport links coming into the region to stabilise. [In] the first few weeks only about 50 establishments had opened – which was not much considering the size of the city."

Paralysed businesses affected not just Tacloban but the region as well, including nearby cities. Relates Cam:

"The main warehouses for logistics, for distribution are here. Only a few warehouses were lucky enough to survive. But most of them got looted. The other cities close by – Catbalogan City, Ormoc City – began immediately to feel the effect ... in a span of a few days the stocks in these other cities also ran out."

2.5 Impact on local governance

The city government was not able to respond adequately as the typhoon affected its personnel and assets critical to any response (such as vehicles and medical facilities) were severely damaged. The week after the typhoon the city administration was reduced to a skeleton crew. Of its 885-strong workforce, only around 20 employees came in on the third day after Haiyan – the supposed first day of work (see Box 2). Eight city hall employees died and there was a loss in productivity due to staff displacement, shortened working hours and damaged facilities and equipment.

Total damage to the assets of Tacloban city government was estimated at P476.6 million.

The damage to executive and legislative buildings, health units and frontline offices such as the Mayor Alfred Social Action (MASA) Centre affected city government operations in the delivery of basic services. Likewise, damage to office equipment such as computers resulted in the loss of important databases and office files. For example, the loss of civil registry documents caused delays and problems and additional expense to residents, who had to go as far as Cebu and Manila to obtain their documents.

BOX 1. IMPACT OF HAIYAN ON CITY SECTORS

According to the TRRP (2014), various sectors of the city were affected in the following ways:

- All of the city's hospitals (two government and five private hospitals), 17 public health facilities, 90 per cent of all educational facilities (pre-schools, elementary, high schools and colleges/ universities) and some 36 public buildings in the city were badly damaged.
- Power lines were affected across the region. Although main lines had been restored by December 2013, fewer than one per cent of connections were fully functional by then. By 31 March 2014 about 82 per cent (29,784 out of 35,937 connections) had been restored.
- All communications services were initially cut, with mobile services coming back within days after the typhoon. Water services were also affected and were restored before the end of November 2013.
- Wind and storm surge damage, along with disrupted power and water supplies, interrupted the operations of most businesses and many were forced to shorten their business hours. As of 30 April 2014, only 20 per cent (3,340 out of 16,473 registered in 2013) of the city's total establishments had renewed their business licences.
- In terms of livelihood, 80 per cent of those directly or indirectly engaged in coconut and copra production were affected. Trading in fish and produce was severely disrupted, affecting mainly poor fishermen and small traders.
- Prior to the typhoon, Tacloban's 59.3-hectare mangrove areas were already near depleted and Yolanda destroyed what remained.
- Haiyan left behind massive amounts of debris and rubble. According to the national government plan Rehabilitation Assistance for Yolanda (RAY), the estimated cost of clearing this for Tacloban alone was P53 million.

BOX 2. A CITY GOVERNMENT CRIPPLED

The first few days after Haiyan were not easy. Tacloban city officials recount below some of the challenges they faced manning city hall immediately after the storm.

Tecson Lim, former city administrator

"Because it was a city-wide disaster, our department heads and personnel were unable to function because they had to see to their family and friends. They would report [in] but would be gone after an hour. They were just there to seek information on whether there was food, relief. Our emergency rescue team was inconsistent, they would be gone for three days. We didn't know when they were going to come back; their families were missing. There were many times when you just couldn't find people to work. I made a British volunteer a temporary city engineer in charge of clearing roads because of his construction background. These people were not part of the city government. We didn't have people."

Maria Lagman, head of the City Housing and Community Development Office

"I think it was an advantage that my family was not here so I had the time to just be one of the personnel to man city hall. Drove of people who were wounded, who lost everything, who didn't have families anymore, started just going to city hall. I lived here for the first week, working almost 24 hours. There so were many wounded people coming. We organised doctors, nurses who were available. We were just 20 to 30 [personnel] available, because everybody was a victim. Because you have to walk to go to city hall it took time before other employees came because they couldn't pass by the roads, everything was blocked. So for a week we were all by ourselves."

Moreover, because the city government focused its resources on relief operations, the delivery of other frontline services and the usual priority programmes and projects were temporarily put on hold. Local legislation was also affected because sessions were not held on a regular basis due to damage to legislative buildings and staff being affected. Most legislative action focused on the passing of resolutions requesting funding from various agencies and organisations; and other equally important ordinances requiring city council action or deliberation were left pending.

The disaster also had an impact on the city's revenue generation. Local taxes generated in the first half of 2014 plunged to an all-time low as the business community struggled for survival. The City Treasurer's Office reported that tax collections were only P159.2 million as of June 2014, less than half the P379.6 million collected in the same period for 2013. This was the lowest in the past decade, as Tacloban had been generating P400 to P500 million in taxes every year, making the city less dependent on its internal revenue allotment (IRA) share.



Photo 1. First flag ceremony on Tacloban city hall grounds on 18 November 2013
Source: Tacloban city government.

3

Emergency response phase

The emergency response in Tacloban was seriously hampered by the breakdown in access and communications and inadequate preparation and response capacity; however, actors on the ground were able to address these breakdowns step by step despite the severe capacity constraints. The activation of Level 3 response brought in a surge of humanitarian actors and the cluster coordination was set up (see Section 3.3 for details of the cluster system). Despite being heavily affected itself, the local government provided an enabling environment for international responders, hosting initial meetings of humanitarian agencies and providing them with initial assessment reports. It played a significant role in facilitating the flow of aid and providing information to the national government, organisations and the media.

3.1 Early challenges

For the government, the period immediately after the typhoon was a scramble to restore access (clearing the roads, making the airport operational), establish communications and mobility (finding vehicles and gasoline) and to find the resources (medicine, food, water, shelter) to help those who were affected.

According to the law, local governments are responsible for first response – be it emergency rescue or food relief – and the national government is there to increase and support the response of the local government. But the disaster overwhelmed both local and national capacity.

One of the major challenges was providing food relief, which was crucial given the breakdown of normal supply lines. Prior to the typhoon, both local and national government had prepositioned relief goods. The protocol is for local government to provide food for at least one to two days – with national government intervening in case of extended evacuation. Restituto Macuto, OIC-Regional Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Eastern Visayas related that some local governments had already sent requests to increase their relief stocks before the typhoon.

Unfortunately, the typhoon damaged the warehouses and the government's prepositioned relief goods. The national government was able to procure replacement stock from local traders whose warehouses were not affected, but at a high price. When these stocks ran out, they were unable to replenish immediately because there was no local supply available.

The first C130 planes to land in Tacloban carried limited relief goods, as they prioritised the transport of responders, emergency communications equipment and medicine. National government offices from surrounding regions that were not hit as hard sent goods – but access was impeded due to blocked and damaged roads, thus delaying delivery. Because of the lack of supplies and restricted access in Tacloban, the national government decided to make Cebu, a metropolitan city in another region, the logistics coordination hub for any assistance coming in.

The lack of security that led to looting was also the result of the local police being affected. According to former city administrator Tecson Lim, only 32 policemen out of a full complement of 389 came out immediately after the typhoon: *“The president criticized the city police ... but our local police who live in the city were either dead, injured or trying to secure their families.”* The police were eventually reinforced with troops from the national police headquarters and the armed forces.

Fire broke out in a downtown building the night after the typhoon but the fire station could not respond. According to them, the fire trucks – acquired as early as the 1950s – were too old and dilapidated and inadequate for serving the city, even prior to the typhoon. The trucks were further overstretched because of the large-scale disaster relief operations, such as rescue, water rationing, relief distribution, and medical assistance and cadaver retrieval.

Aside from the damage to local government assets, key national government offices, assets and infrastructure in Tacloban and nearby Palo – the provincial centre – were also damaged. These included the offices of the weather bureau PAGASA and the Office of Civil Defence (designated as the coordinating office for the disaster council), both located on the peninsula of San Jose and which were inundated by the storm surge.

Despite these challenges, Lenie Duran-Alegre, chief of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and head secretariat for the Office of Civil Defence, believes national government was able to deliver:

“The armed forces led the clearing of the airport to make it function, despite the fact that they were also affected. The national government established command posts. The UN cannot enter without our clearance. Coordination was made at all levels – maybe it was just not that cohesive and organised.”

One lesson cited by city officials is the need to increase staff numbers when city personnel are affected. According to former city administrator Tecson Lim, there should be a team that can temporarily take over the jobs of those in local government:

“The national government must have a particular team ready to provide management services to a certain locality, especially when it’s hit that bad. I know our law provides for such a system. However, I think there should be clear-cut guidelines so as not to put any possibility that, in the minds of our leaders, that this can be used against them.”

The national government sent in staff to their regional offices, such as the Department of Social Work and Development, but not directly under local government control. One recommendation is that a system to increase staff could be arranged with ‘sister cities’ with a similar structure to Tacloban.

Other cities were actually the first to send in outside help for the first three days after the typhoon. These included Catbalogan on nearby Samar Island, and the cities of Legazpi and Makati (in the north) and Davao in the south. They sent in water and food supplies, trucks for clearing the debris, medical teams and relief workers, and dogs and trained personnel for cadaver retrieval. Later, almost 60 local governments sent financial donations to the city government, amounting to Php 30 million.

The local private sector also played a key role in supporting the response by allowing their resources (such as trucks, gasoline stations, warehouses) to be used for emergency purposes (see Box 3). Almost 40 private sector donors also donated about Php 38 million to the local government.

3.2 Level 3 activation

On 14 November 2013, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)² declared a humanitarian system-wide emergency response (Level 3 response) in the Philippines following the national government’s acceptance of an offer of international assistance. A Level 3 response activates a system-wide mobilisation of capacity (leadership, staffing and funding) to enable accelerated and scaled-up delivery of assistance by setting up enhanced leadership and coordination capacities of the humanitarian system; it also engages IASC member organisations to ensure that they put in place the right systems and urgently mobilise resources

² The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is the primary mechanism for inter-agency communication of humanitarian assistance. It involves key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.

BOX 3. BUSINESS LENDS A HAND

Oliver Cam, a businessman and hotel owner who eventually became involved in the rehabilitation planning of Tacloban relates how he and other businessmen were able to help in the response effort. His hotel, the Welcome Home Pensione, was used as a hub by national government officials for the first few weeks – as it was one of the buildings in the downtown area that had not been damaged by the sea surge and strong winds, and its generator and water pumps were intact.

“[The] majority of the businessmen took their families and evacuated them to the nearest urban centres that weren’t badly affected by the typhoon. The few business people who had the capacity to resume operations felt it was not really viable to do business and so decided they would rather just help out in the humanitarian immediate relief effort, which was what I did.

The secretaries for local government, national defence, and social welfare and development, and local officials such as the vice mayor and department heads stayed in our hotel. The cabinet officials would

hold meetings early in the morning, calling over the local officials staying in the hotel for updates, before they went to the formal coordination meetings. This went on for about two weeks.

The day after the typhoon there were only six trucks operated by the government that could be used for debris removal, cadaver retrieval and relief distribution – serving not just Tacloban but the surrounding municipalities. The expected transport augmentation was expected to arrive only a week later. We were able to help the national government find and negotiate with a road contractor [for] the use of a backhoe and four dump trucks.

When the diesel for the hotel was running out, I was able to contact a gasoline station owner who had 8,000 litres in storage. The pump was washed out so we had to manually retrieve the diesel from the underground tank via 20-litre containers. The gas station owner turned over to the national government the gas station and just asked us to monitor how much diesel was being retrieved. The diesel in that station lasted almost a month.”

to contribute to the response as per their mandate/ focus areas. Level 3 is activated when the capacity to lead, coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance and protection on the ground does not match the scale, complexity and urgency of the crisis.

After the activation of the Level 3 response, more than 20 countries immediately responded by funding and supporting search and rescue operations, providing basic and survival needs, and deploying military and civil defence assets among others.

This was the first time that the UN had declared a Level 3 response in the context of a natural disaster. According to Lenie Duran-Alegre of the Office of Civil Defence, this made the Philippines a laboratory for the Level 3 response:

“They [the UN] learned their lessons together with us. It was extra difficult coordinating with the UN because they set aside their local resource and brought in new ones. That’s the big problem because if you are new, for us Filipinos if you haven’t established a relationship, we don’t really trust each other and we don’t have the same perspective, because we have different experiences. That was one of the biggest challenges we experienced.”

Prior to Yolanda, there had been other disasters in the Philippines where national government had worked with the UN and other I/NGOs (typhoons Pablo/Bopha, Sendong/Washi, Ondoy/Ketsana, Reming/Durian). This allowed the Philippine government and UN/ I/ NGO humanitarian managers to establish relationships. This dynamic was disrupted with the arrival of different leadership, but despite this coordination challenge, the Haiyan humanitarian response has largely been viewed as effective.

3.3 The humanitarian cluster system

The scale and nature of the impact of Haiyan created one of the worst humanitarian crises the Philippines has ever faced, and to fulfill the overwhelming task of coordination, the cluster coordination system was applied. This approach strengthens coordination and response through mobilising clusters of humanitarian agencies (UN/ Red Cross-Red Crescent/ international or non-government organizations I/NGOs) to respond in particular sectors or areas of activity. It aims to ensure predictability and accountability in international responses to humanitarian emergencies by clarifying the division of labour among organisations and better defining their roles and responsibilities within the different sectors of the response.

Each cluster has a clearly designated and accountable lead, as agreed upon by the humanitarian coordinator (appointed by the UN resident coordinator) and the humanitarian country team (a decision-making forum consisting of UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations). While the UN and I/NGOs are designated as cluster leads at the global level, clusters may be led by other organisations, including government entities, at the country and local levels (UN-OCHA, 2013).

This was not the first time the cluster coordination system had been used in the Philippines. According to UN-OCHA (2013), there is a wide diversity in how clusters are activated and deactivated at country level:

“In the Philippines, clusters were introduced to respond to large-scale floods in 2006. However, due to recurrent disasters, the government was encouraged to institutionalise the coordination approach via a national decree. As a result, clusters are now a permanent coordination mechanism in the country, managed by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). Representatives of government entities function as the cluster leads in the country.”

The cluster approach was formally institutionalised by the then-named National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) in the Philippine Disaster Management System in May 2007. Government cluster leads are designated for each of the key sectors (see Annex 1) and are expected to orchestrate the crafting of cluster operational strategies that cover the phases before, during and after disasters. An IASC team counterpart (UN agency/ I/NGO) is designated as co-lead for each sector.

Furthermore, under Philippine law, various government departments, non-government organisations, the civil sector and the private sector are supposed to coordinate through the NDRRMC (see Annex 2). The Office of Civil Defence, under the Department of National Defence, serves as the secretariat and operating arm of the national council, and local chief executives (governors, mayors) convene and chair local councils. The cluster system is supposed to operate under this system.

Under the law the set-up for the cluster system is clear, yet the perceptions of actors on the ground indicate that it was not implemented as well as imagined. One perception is that there were two parallel coordination systems, one led by the government and another led by international humanitarian organisations.

According to a study by Dy and Stephens (2015) on the response to Haiyan, it was easier for the internationals to work with their own structures rather than navigate those of government structures with uneven capacities. This may have been due to the Level 3 response, which brought managers unfamiliar with the government system and who also assumed that government structures had been overwhelmed.

Another study conducted by various I/NGOs (CAfOD *et al.*, 2014) found that once the cluster system had been established, government had limited influence over it due to the lack of capacity and familiarity of government officials tasked to engage with it.

The cluster system in Tacloban was seemingly internationally led but some cluster co-leads made the effort to recognise the government’s lead role. This largely depended on who led the cluster and their willingness to engage with the government, and vice versa for the government department tasked to engage with the specific cluster.

The government also set up task forces (see section 3.4), mainly for internal coordination, which could have contributed to the perception of multiple and parallel coordination systems.

3.3.1 Lack of familiarity with cluster system and local government

Local governments were unsure of how to deal with the influx of humanitarian organisations and were also unfamiliar with the cluster system. According to Tecson Lim, the former city administrator of Tacloban (and now convener of the movement Haiyan Disaster Governance Initiative), he did not receive any briefing or training or any material providing information about the cluster system during his tenure as city administrator or when he was provincial administrator in another province prior to his posting to Tacloban. He eventually learned about it through representatives of the World Food Programme, who were one of the first organisations to arrive, and the UN-Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA).

The reverse is also true, with I/NGOs being unfamiliar with the local government system. Some humanitarian organisations expressed frustration regarding coordinating with the Tacloban city government, not knowing who to talk to, or being ignored. Irene Chiu, a lawyer from the City Mayor's Office said that one I/NGO had approached her after their project was completed, complaining that they had been in the city for two years and that they had never met the mayor and people didn't know what they had done (Tacloban City Sharing Session, 2016).

3.3.2 Registration for humanitarian organisations

Most of the government actors interviewed for this study believe that there should have been a centralised system of registration for humanitarian organisations, which would have helped to filter and direct the organisations coming in. Dr Edgar Posadas, acting regional director of the Office of Civil Defence Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) believes that this is the government's role:

"We need to see their credentials, what help they are bringing, either in terms of personnel or training or whatever resource they may have. These should be checked into one system so that they [could] see if they are still needed in the affected areas or if they should go somewhere else."

The problem is, he says, government may not have the capacity to profile them.

Duran-Alegre from the national headquarters of the Office of Civil Defence says that there should be a system where ideally, each organisation should check in and pre-register with the government's incident command centre. But this didn't happen on the ground: *"The only preregistration that we had [was] UN-OCHA. UN-OCHA helped us on the ground but they have their own [system]."* UN-OCHA's information management system was seen as a separate system and thus, may have had limited use on the government side.

Former city administrator Tecson Lim said that it was a challenge to filter who was legitimate or not:

"The first few days we were providing information to the UN agencies, I/NGOs and those pretending to be I/NGOs – at that point we could not tell the difference. And then there were groups constantly asking us 'What do you need?' as if they could cover everything. And it turned out they didn't have any capacity."

According to Maria Lagman, head of the City Housing and Community Development Office (CHCDO), the constant requests for data was tiring and irritating, especially when the organisations were not able to fulfil the need. She said about 60 to 70 per cent of organisations were just asking for data.

Apart from the registration of organisations in the Securities and Exchange Commission, the city said they weren't aware of any laws compelling humanitarian organisations to register in a centralised system. Government officials believed there were many organisations that worked independently of government, and they couldn't control everyone. In Tacloban alone, the number of organisations registered with UN-OCHA was 157 in December 2013, and this rose to a high of 335 in June 2014. This does not include those who did not register with UN-OCHA.

The city government also feels that it was underserved in terms of assistance with emergency shelter kits from I/NGOs. Maria Lagman of the CHCDO said that many I/NGOs believed that Tacloban was 'over served'. But this perception, according to her, was mainly because many I/NGOs had set up base in Tacloban and were actually assisting other municipalities. Shelter cluster data validates this, mainly because the need in Tacloban was also so much higher than in surrounding areas due to the concentration of population.

3.3.3 Simple systems of registration

Establishing simple systems of registration on the ground helped in the beginning, when there was no power or computers. Malou Tabao, currently chief of staff at the City Mayor's Office and assigned to the secretariat of the operations centre in charge of registering I/NGOs, recounts:

"We put up desks with labels so that people knew visually where to go. We had two logbooks for international organisations, one for those who planned to stay in Tacloban and another for those who planned to go to other areas. Then we would ask them how many days they planned to stay and which barangays they wanted to work in. If they didn't know where, we would refer them to the social welfare office."

Still, some donors went directly to city department offices without going through the registration system, so the city administrator had to ask departments to submit donations that passed through their offices. Daily meetings with city clusters helped them to check what was going on. Maria Lagman believes that the majority of organisations did coordinate with them.

The city later established a system whereby organisations were directed to the City Mayor's Office first to present a letter of intent before being dispatched to coordinate with concerned departments. The CHCDO also came up with a 'wall of data' that organisations could look at or take a picture of. Maria Lagman says this weeded out those who were just looking for information. *"We cannot entertain everyone who is asking for data,"* she said.

3.3.4 Reporting of *barangays*

Aside from inadequate capacity, the various levels of government in the Philippines make a centralised registration system difficult. According to Dr Gloria Fabrigas, acting head of Tacloban's Social Welfare and Development Office:

"Some I/NGOs would work directly with a barangay [lowest administrative level of government] without consultation with the city, which brings chaos. Some barangays were well attended to, while other barangays were not. There's no law preventing organisations from working directly with the barangay because it has local autonomy, which is protected by the local government."

For the first two months after the typhoon the *barangays* reported back to the city, but Ted Jopson of the CHCDO said that when help started coming in, particularly shelter kits, they stopped reporting: *"They each have their own interest[s] – every barangay wants everything to go to them, the more aid they can get it's better for them."* (Tacloban Sharing Session, 2016)

City officials say there needs to be a legal instrument such as an ordinance and a culture of reporting established. Furthermore, *barangays* also need to be equipped with communications equipment such as radios – in the early days after the typhoon some far-flung *barangays* couldn't report back because they were too far from city hall and didn't have any means of communication.

3.4 Formation of national and regional task forces

Apart from the cluster system, task forces were set up by the national government to address specific issues such as relief distribution, management of the dead and missing, and dealing with the debris. A national inter-agency task group was also assigned to begin planning for rehabilitation.

3.4.1 Task Force Yolanda (regional)

Task Force Yolanda was activated by the national government at the regional level on 19 November 2013. It was headed by a military general and the Office of Civil Defence functioned as secretariat. Under the task force were sub-task forces that dealt with clearing up the debris, with law and order, food and water, cadaver collection and normalisation (see Annex 3). National government agencies headed the first four sub-task forces while local government (the vice governor of Leyte province and the Tacloban city administrator) headed the normalisation task force.

Primary concerns of the task force included cadaver collection in Tacloban and nearby Tanauan and the creation of a 'conveyor belt system' for the distribution of relief goods landing in Guiuan and Ormoc. Among the responsibilities of the normalisation task force were the restoration of street lighting and the re-opening of gasoline stations and other businesses.

The task force met twice a week and concerns from the different agencies were consolidated by the Office of Civil Defence and fed to the daily UN-OCHA-led inter-humanitarian cluster meeting at the UN operations centre in Tacloban. The On-Site Operations Coordination Centre was set up in the grounds of the Leyte provincial sports complex, which also housed the government's N/RDRRMC operations centre.

3.4.2 The Inter-Agency Rehabilitation Task Group (national)

To hasten the transition from relief efforts into a full-scale rehabilitation and rebuilding of typhoon-ravaged areas, on 21 November 2013 President Aquino announced the creation of an inter-agency task group. The group would craft the rehabilitation plan to *"... serve as basis for coordinating recovery and reconstruction efforts, including donor assistance."*

The president also directed the former energy cabinet secretary, who previously served as governor of Leyte province, to be the 'task group coordinator'. Various other cabinet secretaries were also appointed representatives to the task group in charge of recovery and reconstruction (see Annex 4).

The economic planning secretary was designated to oversee planning coordination and the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) will be in charge of synthesising and integrating all proposed programmes and projects for submission to the president and the cabinet. The justice secretary meanwhile was asked to do a post-typhoon assessment and to explain the reasons for the high number of casualties.

The functions of this task group, particularly the planning, were eventually superseded by the creation of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR).

3.5 Task Force Tindog Tacloban

The first meeting with the president after the typhoon was in city hall with the city mayor and city department heads on 10 November. This was to allow the local government to assess its capacity and determine what was needed in terms of number of food relief packs. After this meeting the mayor met with department heads and others in the City Mayor's Office, where they agreed to meet daily for the first two weeks after the typhoon.

Realising the need to coordinate response and relief efforts, a resolution was passed on 18 November by the Tacloban City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (CDRRMC) convening Task Force Tindog Tacloban. This task force, which mirrors the UN cluster approach for humanitarian coordination, comprised the city mayor as chairperson, the city administrator as vice chairperson and 14 clusters: health, shelter, relief distribution and evacuation centre management and local child protection, solid waste management, normalisation, cadaver retrieval, human resource, education, peace and order, environmental

protection, logistics, disaster risk reduction, protection for women and children, and urban planning and rehabilitation (see Annex 5).

According to Tecson Lim, lawyer and former city administrator:

"We adapted to respond to the cluster system of the UN and the cluster system of the national government. We created this structure where people were assigned to participate in various clusters. For example, for [the] management of the dead, we assigned someone who became a part of the management of the dead cluster of the national government. And then they would come back and share this information [with] the city. Getting information so we know what everybody else is doing is important."

City engagement with the clusters was possible despite the fact that not all city personnel were aware of the system and were intimidated by foreign styles of meetings.

The challenge was being able to attend all the meetings that were taking place. The regional and national government meetings were held in the morning – with each agency giving an update on the damage, needs and what was being done. Then there were the individual UN cluster meetings, and at the end of the day, the inter-cluster meeting addressed the issues that



Photo 2. Tacloban city mayor Alfred Romualdez and city administrator Tecson Lim in one of the first media briefings after Haiyan

Source: Gerald Paragas, 12 November 2013.

could not be addressed in each cluster. For the first few weeks the meetings were daily. Lim recalls that he just tried to stay in city hall so he could be the source of information while city representatives went to the other meetings. In addition, they were constantly besieged by the media. Lim relates:

“Somebody advised me to hold a daily press conference and only answer questions during the press conference. It was a brilliant idea. When I do the press briefing the departments had to be there so the information is passed on at one time.”

The media briefings were usually held after the regular meetings of Task Force Tindog Tacloban and were attended by aid agencies as well as the media. Cluster reports were also posted in city hall bulletins and relayed to the public through an emergency broadcast radio station.

The task force also faced practical challenges; foremost was the difficulty of focusing management attention on it during the major humanitarian response and the familiar issue of staff turnover.

Although city staff were working directly with national government counterparts, politics strained the relationship and hampered open coordination between the national and local government. For the same reason (political alliances), coordination with the provincial government was near non-existent.

4

Recovery and rehabilitation phase

The task forces that were formed at the beginning were eventually dissolved as the city normalised and initial needs were addressed. When the situation had stabilised, UN-Habitat came to help the city with its recovery plan. At the national level, the government created a new body to lead the recovery planning, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR), and local governments were asked to submit plans to this new body. Although it was a challenge to be planning while implementing recovery actions at the same time, Tacloban submitted its recovery plan, which was done through a participatory process. About 30 per cent of the total estimated cost of the proposed projects was eventually funded by multiple sources including I/NGOs but mostly by national government.

The main concern of rehabilitation now is housing for those coastal communities that were affected. Many challenges remain, especially in establishing the new city extension and this is the main work of the Tacloban North Technical Working Group (TWG). Currently, the city is laying the groundwork for the longer-term development of Tacloban by updating its Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) with the support of its UN and I/NGO partners.

4.1 Transition to recovery

About one month after Haiyan, the restoration of peace and order, road access, airport operations, water supply and the distribution of relief and assistance from humanitarian organisations had brought some stability to the city.

It took some time to get the power back – by the first week of December the main lines had been restored but only 0.3 per cent of connections had power. To speed up the process, the city council waived fees for all electrical permits that related to the reconnection of electricity lines with the local electricity cooperative (LEYECO II).

City government records show that of the total 5,464 business establishments in 2013, only 3,538 renewed their business permits. To encourage businesses to resume operations, the city government, through its legislative council, passed ordinances condoning penalties on delinquent properties and business permits and suspended all ordinances increasing the rates of taxes and fees under Tacloban's revenue code.

Local officials, however, were showing signs of burnout considering the enormous challenges they had faced in the past month, affecting their efficiency and motivation and ultimately the performance of local government. Flexible work schedules and psychosocial help were offered to employees. The Human Resource Management Office, in an effort to boost morale, awarded special recognition to outstanding personnel. City hall workers were also listed as recipients for cash assistance by a Buddhist organisation.

Thousands of affected families, however, were still displaced. As of 4 December 2013, about 2,634 families (12,542 persons) were living in 23 evacuation sites (a mix of schools, public buildings and tented camps). This had gone down from the initial count of about 15,152 families (84,901 persons) in 47 sites immediately after Haiyan struck.

4.2. Local recovery planning

4.2.1 UN-Habitat and UNDP assistance

By December, the city government had started to think about planning for the recovery of Tacloban. According to former city administrator Tecson Lim: *"In the first few weeks we were just concerned how to get by. When UN-Habitat came, it was timely. At that point in time we were already stabilised."*

Immediately after Haiyan, UN-Habitat held dialogues and consultations with key local government officials as well as the coordinators of the four key humanitarian clusters (early recovery, shelter, camp coordination and management, and water, sanitation and health). Based on this, UN-Habitat together with UNDP decided to provide critical support to Local Government Units (LGUs) to ensure they could lead the early recovery planning process for areas such as shelter and longer-term housing needs, community infrastructure, spatial planning and post-disaster service provision. Initial funding was provided for the cities of Tacloban, Ormoc and Guiuan to build up the capacity of their local governments to perform their planning and management roles regarding recovery and rehabilitation.

According to Christopher Rollo, the country programme manager of UN-Habitat, their support for Tacloban was part of their mandate to support coordination of the shelter response as well as promote sustainable urban development:

"We wanted to assist the government to already think about the medium- to long-term implications of what they were doing, because relief and response should be building blocks for the longer-term recovery and rehabilitation of the city. The damage gave us almost a blank slate. But the challenge is how do you rebuild so that it becomes a better, more resilient and sustainable city? It was an opportunity to rethink and re-imagine Tacloban."

4.2.2 Formation of TACDEV

On 3 December 2013, the city government and UN-Habitat held a preparatory meeting that resulted in the development of the framework for the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) and the formalisation of the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TACDEV), which was to lead the formulation of the plan..

TACDEV was conceptualised as a multi-actor group led by the city in partnership with UN-Habitat, with key government agencies and key stakeholders from the city as members (see Box 4). This was the first time such an approach had been proposed by UN-Habitat Philippines in a post-disaster context. TACDEV was mandated to lead a purposive recovery and rehabilitation planning process to catalyse and harmonise the actions of all stakeholders, to build back a better and safer Tacloban. It superseded Task Force Tindog Tacloban,

BOX 4: KEY FEATURES OF THE TACLOBAN RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GROUP (TACDEV) ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

- A steering committee composed of the mayor, city council, city administrator and other key officials of the city (and national government agencies as needed).
- The mayor as chairperson, with an alternative chairperson from the city in case of his absence. UN-Habitat provided technical support as co-chairperson.
- Five technical working groups for the key result areas of shelter, social, economic, environment and infrastructure. A livelihood group was added later. Focal points were also assigned to the cross-cutting issues of disaster risk reduction and management, land use and zoning, and public information.
- A convener and co-convener for each technical working group, with the convener coming from a city department and the co-convener coming from either a national agency or a representative from an NGO/private sector. The conveners were also expected to work closely with each other on different cross-sectoral issues that may require coordination.
- Each working group could have members from the local government, the private sector, humanitarian agencies, civil society organisations and national government agencies.
- A secretariat co-headed by the City Planning and Development Office and the Human Resource Management Office. Each key result area was assigned at least one member of the secretariat group.

which was also winding down on the emergency response coordination activities.

After the formulation of the TRRP, the key functions of TACDEV were project monitoring, coordination and further detailing of the plans for each key result area and cross-cutting concerns under the TRRP.

4.2.3 Participatory approach

Rollo stressed that implementing an inclusive, participatory process for the recovery planning was important:

“Many well-meaning development partners, investors, even national government wanted to do many things in the city. But they have different perspectives, mandates and objectives. The city has that very important role of trying to consolidate, synergise and harmonise these so that they come up with a unified vision of a new Tacloban.”

He added that the process also needed to be technically informed: *“Decisions should be based on scientific and empirical data, [an] understanding of the dynamics of the economy and even of politics.”* Also critical to the recovery plan was a recognition of Tacloban’s role not just as a city but also as a regional centre, as a hub for services – lifelines for the whole region.

From November 2013 to April 2014, TACDEV organised and facilitated two major charrettes, or intensive planning workshops, attended by roughly 150 participants from different local, national and international agencies and organisations as well as urban planners and other technical professionals working and supporting the city recovery after Yolanda.

These charrettes gathered stakeholder inputs and reached initial agreement on priorities and action points for the five key result areas – social, economic, environment, infrastructure and shelter – for further refinement by the city. It was also a venue to discuss strategies for the overall spatial framework and development strategies for key areas such as Tacloban North (proposed city expansion area) and coastal areas.

Despite this process, Oliver Cam the businessman who was co-convenor for the economic sector said that some key business people felt excluded. Right after the typhoon, many business people left Tacloban and it wasn’t clearly defined who would represent the business sector. There was also a technical charrette, which some key business people wished to attend because they wanted to share their inputs but they were told that sector representatives were limited to two due to limited space at the venue.

To provide technical input into the results from the planning charrettes, UN-Habitat fielded a team of urban planning experts from Arcadis, an international design and consultancy firm that had a global partnership with UN-Habitat on promoting sustainable shelter and urban development, and members of the Alliance for Safe and Sustainable Reconstruction (ASSURE), a non-profit group of planners based in the Philippines. All the results were further discussed with TACDEV in small workshops and technical discussions.

The city organised a major public consultation on 18 March 2014. The main features of the recovery plan were presented to about 5,000 people (Tacloban residents, representatives from the humanitarian organisations, civil society organisations and the private sector) in the city astrodome. A couple of smaller consultations were also conducted in communities in highly affected coastal areas, focusing on shelter and relocation plans.



Photo 3. Mayor Alfred Romualdez speaking to the crowd during the public consultation for the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) on 18 March 2014. Source: Tacloban city government

4.2.4 The Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan

The Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) identified the immediate actions and operational strategies towards recovery, rehabilitation and sustainable development of Tacloban after Yolanda (see Box 5). It was envisioned to be a living document, intended to be updated when new information and emerging challenges and opportunities arose. A look at project monitoring as of March 2015 shows that the plan has been updated with additional projects, with the estimated cost of projects increasing from Php 25 billion to Php 38 billion. Additional studies have since been conducted to support the plan, such as a climate and disaster risk assessment supported by UN-Habitat and a coastal protection study by a team sent by the government of the Netherlands.

4.2.5 Challenges in the recovery planning

The formulation of the TRRP was an important signal (to both residents and assisting organisations) that Tacloban was moving forward. Although the actors involved agreed that TACDEV was an effective mechanism for focusing efforts on the recovery plan, there were still some challenges in the process. These were the following:

- Although the mayor strongly supported the planning process, he did not seem to fully appreciate the structure of TACDEV and initially did not lead it or use it to its full advantage. This could be because the structure was a new system, not integral to the LGU, and because of the lack of participation of personnel from the City Mayor's Office and the City Administrator's office. There was also no signed executive order for TACDEV, which meant members

BOX 5. GOALS OF THE TACLOBAN RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION PLAN (TRRP)

The TRRP envisioned Tacloban becoming a 'resilient, vibrant and liveable' city. In view of this vision, sector development goals were identified and include:

- Shelter: provide housing options to affected families; ensure the supply of adequate land; prepare supportive plans and policies; and ensure provision of basic services and economic opportunities to all. Proposed interventions include provision of temporary shelter, on-site repair assistance and the development of new permanent housing sites.
- Social services: improve quality of life through the restoration of essential community services for health, education, social welfare, and peace and order given post-Yolanda realities. Proposed interventions include the repair of social service facilities and support to the improvement of basic services through training/ capacity building.
- Economic revitalisation: revive the economy and increase the productivity of disaster-affected communities/ families; diversify the economy; increase food security; and maintain the security of businesses. Proposed interventions include financial assistance such as soft loans to businesses; livelihood programmes for vulnerable populations; and repair/ upgrading of key infrastructure such the airport, port, markets and terminals.
- Physical infrastructure: fast-track repair and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, taking into consideration risk resilience and environmental and social responsiveness. Aside from repair of key infrastructure mentioned above, proposed interventions include repair of local government buildings and facilities, as well as new infrastructure for new housing areas.
- Environment: enhance coastal protection, water resource quality and waste management; update land use plan and local building guidelines; and improve early warning and evacuation systems. Proposed projects include mangrove planting to improve coastal protection.

Disaster risk reduction is seen as a cross-cutting concern that can be integrated across all the key result areas. One element that is crucial to the integration of risk reduction is sustainable land use and urban design. This was realised in the plan through providing a spatial framework to guide the projects under each key result area. This framework identifies areas for redevelopment/ revitalisation and safer areas for city expansion including potential new townships. A large portion of the built-up area of Tacloban is at risk from storm surge and much of the damage occurred in coastal areas. It is crucial that the city encourage development in lower-risk locations while providing mitigating measures in high-risk areas.

- were apprehensive because they lacked an official mandate. Eventually, the group decided to let the city administrator be the main convener, which led to better coordination with the City Mayor's Office.
- Although UN-Habitat was meant to have only a facilitating role, there was still the perception that *"Tacloban let UN-Habitat do the planning"* (Edwin Corvera of OPARR), and on several occasions UN-Habitat was pushed by the city government to present the plan. Maria Lagman of the CHCDO confirms that this was a calculated move to fend off the politics and bring legitimacy to the plan: *"A lot of things were being thrown at the mayor; with UN-Habitat they can't criticize too much, the expertise is not questionable."*
 - According to Teofila Brosas, former secretariat head of TACDEV and head of the Human Resource Management Office, there was inadequate internal coordination within the city government as some department heads didn't know what was happening with the plan and were unaware of its contents. Also, some offices were not involved in the process at all and there were some who were supposed to be involved but were not reporting back.
 - TACDEV conveners were busy coordinating with humanitarian partners and managing projects and thus had little time to plan. They were also beginning to suffer from workshop and meeting fatigue and couldn't rely on junior staff as the city government was also understaffed due to income constraints. UN-Habitat had to step in to provide support for information management as well as in following up and consolidating reports and developing presentations.
 - As the plan was formulated and entered the implementation phase, there was less participation from different stakeholders. According to Dr Gloria Fabrigas, convener for the social sector: *"Initially, many were involved in the first part but later on when I/NGOs were shutting down, we were left alone. At the end of the day, it will still be the local government who will own the things to do and the projects."*
 - The short five-month period for recovery planning allowed little preparation time for workshops and consultations, leading to key inputs not being fully integrated into the plan nor ideas not being fully developed. For example, the post-disaster needs assessment report (completed by the national government only in May 2014) had not been finished when the plan document was being written.
 - While consultants provided technical input for the plan, this was only for a short period and some ideas
- were left at a conceptual level. For example, the city wanted to have a masterplan for Tacloban North, which was being conceived as a city extension that would contain the resettlement areas. The TRRP only shows a conceptual plan for this, and detailing of the plan would not continue until more than a year later when the city was able to activate the Tacloban North TWG.
- Plans for coastal areas also needed further detail. According to Tulio Mateo, programme manager for disaster risk reduction and urban planning for Catholic Relief Services – an I/NGO that worked in 17 coastal *barangays* in Tacloban, providing assistance in shelter, community infrastructure and disaster risk reduction – one big challenge was the lack of clear guidance regarding the no-build zone (a 40-metre zone along the coast) declared by the national government:

"They said they did not want people living in the no-build zone but there was no implementation. If they had a stronger opinion on what they wanted to do we could have matched our projects better, such as the community infrastructure."
 - The TRRP was initially criticized as being too 'development oriented', particularly by the national government. According to Edwin Corvera of OPARR, it was the national government's view that:

"What Tacloban did was not a rehab plan, it was a development plan. For OPARR, the rehab plan only covers whatever was damaged. But Tacloban was insisting that these development plans were included in the rehabilitation. The agenda of UN-Habitat was to integrate long-term recovery. But the national government will only fund the rehabilitation."
- For example, the national government refused to fund items such as new water lines to resettlement areas as this was deemed to be a 'new' project.

4.2.6 Establishment of city-level clusters

Aside from providing technical support to TACDEV, UN-Habitat supported stronger coordination between the Tacloban local government and the UN cluster system by supporting and participating in the formation of city-level clusters/ working groups, particularly in shelter, livelihoods and disaster risk reduction. These city-level clusters/ working groups supported operational coordination in the implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes within Tacloban, a need that was not entirely addressed by regional-level clusters.

UN-Habitat linked the shelter cluster (co-led by International Federation of the Red Cross and the Department of Social Welfare and Development at a regional level) with the Tacloban CHCDO, and the shelter cluster assigned a focal person to co-facilitate this link and provide information management support. The CHCDO also formed a working group with interested I/NGOs to brainstorm on the livelihoods for families who had transferred to the transit sites in the north of Tacloban. The Tacloban disaster risk reduction cluster focused on harmonising the implementation of community-level capacity building on disaster response and risk reduction by various I/NGOs.

The city-level clusters on shelter and disaster risk reduction were initially well-attended and were good venues for the city to meet with the organisations on the city's plans and answer queries from organisations that had programmes within the city. But the city found these difficult to sustain, mainly due to the lack of staff who could devote their time to managing the groups. Tulio Mateo commented that coordination had not been consistent because the people involved from local government seemed to have had other responsibilities. Only the city livelihood working group was sustained because it eventually became part of the overarching Tacloban North TWG.

4.2.7 Tacloban North Technical Working Group

The city government created the Tacloban North Technical Working Group (TWG) in response to the need to formalise the coordination efforts being exerted in the north. Tacloban North is the new residential area of the city, and more than 14,000 families from Tacloban's danger areas are to be relocated in its *barangays*. After the city's Legislative Department issued a resolution designating areas along the city's coast as 'no-dwelling zones', families affected by the resolution were identified by the CHCDO for qualification for the housing projects of the National Housing Authority (NHA) in the north.

The Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC) headed by the NHA and co-chaired by the local government with members representing national government agencies, civil society groups and humanitarian organisations was organised to monitor the implementation of the relocation programmes. Beneficiaries were identified and screened through LIAC and are now slowly being transferred to each of the 14 housing projects of the NHA. As the population in the north will grow substantially in the next two years, the need to expand existing social programmes is crucial in providing the needed services to the families.

Although LIAC represents various agencies tasked with overseeing all rehabilitation programmes for housing, social services, livelihoods and infrastructure, the city government saw the need for close coordination between its departments, which will eventually take charge of providing services, with a focus on the development of the north. As the number of families to be transferred to the north is very large, a greater, more concerted and centralised response will be required.

Thus, the Tacloban North TWG was formed in March 2015 by the CHCDO with support from the City Mayor's Office as a mechanism to institutionalise coordination support for activities in the northern *barangays*. With only a few members constituting the TWG – mainly TACDEV members – the TWG started discussions on the central issues in the north, such as the provision of water and electricity, livelihood support for families and the schedule of transfers to the north.

The TWG is chaired by the head of the CHCDO, and staff from the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) provided secretariat support during its first few meetings. UN-Habitat was later appointed as secretariat when the previously assigned secretariat shifted focus to managing the community-based monitoring system census.

The TWG was structured according to the need in the north, matching it with specific departments in the city government such as the Architecture and Engineering Offices for the development of the urban master plan and infrastructure projects, the CHCDO for housing concerns, Cristina's Learn and Earn Programme (CLEP) with the support of the city's livelihood cluster for livelihood concerns, the Social Welfare and Development Office for social services, the Environment and Natural Resources Office for environmental concerns, the Special Projects head from the City Mayor's Office for water concerns, the Tacloban City Police Office for peace and security, and the Department of Education Tacloban City Division for educational concerns.

To formalise the TWG and enforce strict attendance among the sectoral representatives, the City Mayor's Office issued a memorandum to create the Tacloban North TWG. Aside from the above-mentioned offices, the General Services, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management, and Health Offices were also included as members.

Since its inception, the Tacloban North TWG has welcomed observers from academia, humanitarian organisations and research groups at its meetings, and throughout 2015 the number of attendees increased. OPARR and the UN Resident Coordinator's Liaison Team were invited by the city administrator to be observers at the meetings, and interns and volunteers from France, the USA and Spain have provided assistance in developing the master plan and economic strategy for the Tacloban North as well as facilitating discussions and providing solutions to concerns raised by the various sectors. An urban planner from UN-Habitat also provided help for the concept plan for Tacloban North.

Since September 2015, the TWG has been holding fortnightly meetings to allow members to address the concerns of their sectors. This was also due to the decreasing number of attendees at the meetings, with sectoral representatives busy with their regular office functions.

4.3 National government recovery planning

The national government initiated several parallel and overlapping activities to come up with a national recovery plan for Haiyan-affected areas. These were the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY), the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP).

The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the agency mandated under the Philippine Risk Reduction and Management Act to lead rehabilitation and recovery, initiated the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY). RAY was designed to guide rapid action to address critical, immediate needs, as well as aid in the development and implementation of a full set of recovery and reconstruction interventions over the medium term. Completed in December 2013, it was also meant to facilitate international donor assistance.

The Office of Civil Defence also started conducting a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment in December 2013. It covered the damage and loss assessment and human recovery needs assessment, and also included a recovery and reconstruction framework. It was finished in May 2014 and eventually integrated into the CRRP.

4.3.1 The Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

The Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) led the formulation of the CRRP. The PARR was created by presidential memorandum on 6 December 2013 to act as the overall manager and coordinator of all rehabilitation efforts of the government and non-government sectors.

The coordinating powers vested in the PARR and past presidential task forces superseded the mechanism prescribed under RA10121 (and the function of NEDA to lead the rehabilitation). The creation of such temporary government bodies to deal with large disasters affecting multiple administrative regions of the country is not new for the Philippines. For example, the national government established a task force when typhoon Bopha (locally known as Pablo) devastated Mindanao in late 2012; and it is also observed practice among countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which experienced recovery challenges after large-scale disasters (GFDRR, 2015).

The establishment of PARR caused some confusion – for example, NEDA Region VIII (which covers Tacloban) initiated the formulation of a regional recovery plan after RAY was released. Although completed, this regional plan was shelved when PARR came in and started a separate process for the CRRP.

4.3.2 Operational challenges for OPARR

An operational team known as the Office of the PARR (OPARR) helped with the daily administrative and technical operations of PARR. With PARR having a rank equivalent to a cabinet secretary reporting directly to the president, OPARR was supposed to be the alter ego and link of the national government to other stakeholders, especially the affected local governments.

As a temporary government body, however, OPARR initially did not have clear funding and administrative support and it took some time to get people and resources on the ground to fulfill its functions. Edwin Corvera was appointed provincial coordinator for OPARR for Region VIII in April 2014. He recounts that when he arrived they had just hired two staff members but didn't yet have an office or a salary; nor had he been briefed on UN-OCHA and the UN cluster system.

Corvera added that they were eventually able to form partnerships and get additional support. The regional OCHA office, and later UNDP, provided them with space to work and to conduct meetings for about six months; the salaries of OPARR staff were supported by USAID; and the Leyte provincial government provided them with a space to put up a temporary office building.

4.3.3 OPARR clusters structure

To maximise coordination among different agencies, PARR organised cabinet secretaries and national agency heads under five core clusters (resettlement, livelihoods, social services, infrastructure and support) at the national level (see Annex 6). This was the framework used as the recovery activities picked up pace and national authorities moved away from humanitarian interventions.

Regarding the UN humanitarian clusters, a physical and strategic realignment had to take place to ensure that international actors were working to support government recovery efforts both at the national and regional level. OCHA initially framed its transition plan with the institutional arrangement of the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (see Annex 7) and not the sectoral set-up by PARR.

According to the head of OCHA Philippines, despite initial delays in the transition, a transitional framework could have helped build momentum and made it more coherent. The challenges faced by actors in the Philippines in overseeing this handover have highlighted the systematic disconnect between humanitarian and development approaches – a disconnect made all the more apparent during a rapid-onset emergency with early opportunities for recovery (Carden and Ashley, 2015).

4.3.4 Engagement with local government


OPARR also engaged directly with provincial governors and city mayors at the local government level. The Local Government Coordination Unit-Provincial Rehabilitation and Recovery Offices (LGCU-PRROs) were deployed to support the flow of funds from line agencies to local governments and to guide these local governments regarding planning, project coordination and implementation (ie contracting) as needed (see Figure 2).

The roll-out of this LGCU took time, however. When Tacloban initiated its recovery planning process, OPARR had just recently been formed. Oliver Cam, the businessman who was part of the secretariat for the economic sector plan in Tacloban, states that at the time it didn't seem clear to the national government how to handle the recovery plans: *"The structure was not clear and there was a lack of templates and protocols and formats. We had to brainstorm our own structure."* Eventually, OPARR did issue a template in April 2014 but by then the Tacloban recovery plan was almost complete.

4.3.5 The Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan

In about February 2014, PARR initiated the preparation of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP). It directed each cluster to submit various cluster action plans and for Yolanda-affected LGUs to submit their respective Local Recovery and Rehabilitation Plans (LRRPs). These were to be deliberated upon, vetted and endorsed by cluster heads for approval by the president.

Figure 2: The coordination mechanism of OPARR's LGCU-PRRO



Source: Local Government Coordination Unit of OPARR

Asking local governments to submit plans was not easy. OPARR regional coordinator Edwin Corvera relates that they lacked the capacity in terms of knowledge and skills. Further, their planning processes were not uniform:

“They each had their own style. Cebu created a task force. Leyte used its provincial Planning Office. Tacloban had UN-Habitat. Others lodged it in the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office or with the city administrator.”

OPARR eventually partnered with USAID and the Development Academy of the Philippines to increase local government capacity by providing a scholarship for a Masters in Management major in Local Government Planning and Development to planners from local governments affected by Haiyan. The scholarship however was rolled out only after the submission of the recovery plans.

Tacloban presented its recovery plan to the national government in May 2014 and it was approved by the president on 25 July 2014. PARR submitted the Yolanda CRRP to the president for approval on 1 August and this was finally signed on 29 October 2014. But despite official approval, there was no official communication from OPARR to local governments on which items were to be funded or not.

4.3.6 Transfer of OPARR functions to NEDA

On 22 April 2015, the president issued a memorandum that transferred the functions of the PARR to the director general of NEDA as the NDRRMC vice chairperson for rehabilitation and recovery, to monitor the recovery and rehabilitation programmes, projects and activities for Yolanda-affected areas.

Although NEDA, like PARR, oversees the implementation of the rehabilitation plan, neither agency has an implementing mandate. NEDA consolidates plans based on its mandate as the country's social and economic development planning and policy coordinating body.

NEDA now faces the challenge of taking on the responsibilities of PARR after taking the back seat for almost two years. A reduced number of staff from OPARR are now within the Yolanda Programme Monitoring Office, located within the NEDA regional offices, with the responsibility of monitoring the large number projects still ongoing under the CRRP. It remains to be seen whether it has the capacity to address strategic issues and implementation

bottlenecks, which was also cited as a challenge by PARR. One issue is that staff salaries in the Yolanda Programme Monitoring Office are supported by USAID, which would end in June 2016.

The OPARR Local Government Coordination Unit Exit Report (2015) cites that there is still major work to be done under the resettlement cluster, which accounts for P75 billion (45 per cent) of the total CRRP budget, covering infrastructure development, housing construction, and provision of support for livelihood, social and other services. In its report, PARR recommended the institutionalisation of its functions to a permanent department with primary authority to effectively address and manage disasters. The national DRRM law is currently under review, with bills filed in the Philippine congress to create a permanent department or a stand-alone agency to handle disasters and rehabilitation.

4.4 Funding and implementation of the recovery plan

As of March 2015, the total estimated cost for the identified projects in the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) was Php 38 billion. Of this, about 30 per cent (Php 11.7 billion) had been funded. The bulk of funding had gone to shelter and infrastructure, which together made up Php 11.1 billion. The budget for shelter and infrastructure mainly came from the national government (93 per cent or Php 10.4 billion). I/NGOs and external donors made up six per cent (Php 662 million) and local government 0.69 per cent (Php 77 million).

The national government also transferred Php 1.3 billion to the local government for implementation. This included the RAY-Department of Interior and Local Government Fund (for repair of public infrastructure); the Department of Social Work and Development Emergency Shelter Assistance (cash for work and pilot evacuation centre); and livelihood assistance funds from the Bureau of Fisheries and Agriculture, the Department of Labour and Employment and the Department of Trade and Industry.

According to Dr Gloria Fabrigas, convener of the social sector, the city is highly dependent on outside sources for recovery and rehabilitation, with the bulk of their own budget devoted to professional services, maintenance and operating expenses. Due to this, she stresses that the local government has to be creative and strategic in terms of tapping resources.

One strategy implemented by the local government is partnering with other organisations who will provide counterpart funds. For example, the city spent about Php 50 million to buy lots where temporary shelters funded by I/NGOs and the national government could be built.

To fund infrastructure projects from the recovery plan that were not funded by recovery funds (possibly the ones deemed too 'development oriented' by national government), the city is planning to take out a Php 391 million loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines. These projects include the construction of a new slaughterhouse (the existing one had been damaged by the typhoon), a new drainage system and a sanitary landfill (Eastern Visayas Mail, 2016).

The mayor of Tacloban said in a press conference that he had been compelled to contract this loan with high interest rates because the president had prevented a Php three billion concession loan (90 per cent grant and 10 per cent loan at one per cent interest) offered by the World Bank by refusing to grant a sovereign guarantee for the loan (Herrera, 2016).

Edwin Corvera of OPARR felt that the amount transferred to local governments was too little, saying they had almost no say in the implementation because the funds were given to national agencies. Maria Lagman of the CHCDO agrees that more flexible funding could have been provided to the local government:

"We know better, we can do it cheaper, we can do it faster, with assistance of course [from] the national government, I/NGOs and other agencies. The national government can be a bottleneck."

There are some issues, however with how the city government has spent the funds transferred to them. A 2015 report by the Commission on Audit released in July 2016 stated that there were irregularities in the use of rehab funds by the Tacloban city government, such as delays in the implementation of infrastructure projects, suspension of contracts because of lack of detailed engineering plans, and not following guidelines for disbursement of emergency shelter assistance. The former Mayor has denied the misuse of funds, stating that they were merely implementing national guidelines (Rappler, 2016).

Other city officials have suggested that the transfer of the funds could be performance based. Maria Lagman also feels that the local government needs more assistance in terms of capacity building, administration and staffing because of the huge amount of work necessary to implement the recovery projects. Even if they weren't the direct implementer (for example, for the permanent housing development), they still had to undertake coordination work. She mentions that the city government asked UNDP for funds to increase staffing levels but this did not materialise.

Table 1. Cost of proposed projects and amount funded in the TRRP (as of March 2015)

| KEY RESULT AREA | TOTAL COST (PHP) | AMOUNT FUNDED (PHP) | PERCENTAGE FUNDED | PERCENTAGE FUNDING PER KEY RESULT AREA |
|-------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--|
| Shelter | 9.4 billion | 8.5 billion | 91 | 72.9 |
| Social | 423 million | 268 million | 63 | 2.2 |
| Economic | 13.2 billion | 126 million | 1 | 1.1 |
| Infrastructure | 14.6 billion | 2.6 billion | 18 | 22.1 |
| Environment | 529 million | 45 million | 8 | 0.4 |
| Disaster risk reduction | 143 million | 142 million | 99 | 1.2 |
| Total | 38.4 billion | 11.7 billion | 30 | 99.9 |

Source: TACDEV secretariat

4.4.1 Infrastructure

Infrastructure is the highest cost (Php 14 billion) and is mostly for the repair/ rehabilitation of public infrastructure, including Tacloban airport. It forms the second largest portion of total funding at 22 per cent. Most of the projects being implemented come under the Department of Public Works and Highways (national roads and bridges) and the RAY–Department of Interior and Local Government fund, which was transferred to the city by the national government. These projects include repairs to city government offices and public facilities such as market buildings. The city report also indicates that the rehabilitation of educational and health facilities was funded by the national government and external donors, but unfortunately the information on these is incomplete.

Infrastructure projects that are not yet funded form part of the proposal for the World Bank loan, and include drainage construction, road reblocking, road and bridge rehabilitation and river embankments. Some support facilities for Tacloban North (the resettlement site) and the construction of evacuation centres are also not funded.

One major infrastructure project being planned by the national government is the Leyte tidal embankment project that will run along the Pacific coastline of the towns of Tanauan, Palo and Tacloban. It is planned to be a 27-kilometre long, 4-metre high sea wall intended to protect the various towns from storm surges. The total project cost is estimated at PHP 7.9 billion for civil works and right of way acquisition and is meant to be implemented between 2015 and 2020 with the support of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

The mayor of Tacloban has expressed his reservations about the project, saying that a giant sea wall may provide a false sense of security. Affected residents have also opposed the project, seeking explanations from the government as to why the tidal embankment is a priority over other needs such as housing, livelihoods and water systems in relocation sites (Cahinhinan, 2015). A local scientist has also criticized the project, saying that it will not significantly reduce the impact of an incoming storm surge and could instead raise water levels near rivers and funnel water at great speed towards neighbouring areas. Fishermen have protested that this could affect their livelihood and have asked the government to fund evacuation centres instead (Herrera, 2016).

Maria Lagman of the CHCDO shares the city's view:

“We are waiting for the result[s] of studies so the mayor can decide on the best option for Tacloban. There is a lot of pressure to do the project but we have to do this very carefully because it will change the landscape of Tacloban city.”

Experts from the Netherlands are also examining the project, doing simulations for various options. Engineer Roberto Muñoz, head of the Special Projects Office of Tacloban says that they don't really have the technical capacity to evaluate the project.

4.4.2 Economy

Economic development and livelihood was the second biggest cost (Php 13 billion) in the TRRP, mainly due to proposed loan assistance to affected businesses; it also included livelihood assistance to various groups. But the economic sector was the most poorly funded at one per cent (about Php 125 million) and this has gone mainly to supporting agriculture and fisheries.

The business community initially approached government banks and the private banking sector to come up with a calamity loan package for the businesses affected by the typhoon, but they were turned down. According to businessman Oliver Cam:

“It was extremely frustrating ... they [national government] were asking us to conduct our own feasibility study, which could take six months to a year, but we needed [the loans] in the immediate term, within the first 90 days at least.”

When local businesses could not meet demand because they had no capital, businesses from other regions saw an opportunity to bring their goods to Tacloban. Businesses that owned properties in the city centre rented these to outside businessmen and used any savings from the rents to build up capital.

Despite inadequate funding support from the public sector, figures indicate that the economic sector, mainly dependent on trade and services, has bounced back two years after Haiyan. The number of registered commercial establishments in Tacloban fell to 4,474 in 2014 from 5,464 in 2013, mainly because existing establishments did not re-register. By 2015, the number of registered commercial establishments had risen to 5,614, with an increase in renewals of existing establishments and the registration of new ones. The number of newly registered establishments in 2015 was also the highest since 2012 (City Treasurer's Office, 2016).

The number of hotels in Tacloban has also increased, with a total of 68 (up from 48 before Yolanda) – an increase of about 300 beds. There are still hotels under construction and the number is expected to reach at least 70 by November 2016. The initial increase in the number of hotels may be attributed to the increase in demand due to the influx of humanitarian workers. But hotel construction continued even after most of the humanitarian organisations had left – so the sustained demand might be due to Tacloban becoming a venue for regional and even national events. In November 2016, for example, Tacloban is hosting the national Information, Communications and Technology (ICT) Convention, with 800 delegates expected to attend.

The unemployment rate in Eastern Visayas dropped to 5.3 per cent in 2015 compared to 5.6 per cent in 2014. DOLE assistant regional director Exequiel Ronie Guzman said that increased job opportunities could be the result of higher spending on reconstruction projects, especially for retail and service establishments, which comprise 98 per cent of the total number of businesses in the region (Leyte Samar Daily Express, 2016). Oliver Cam perceives that the business sector has recovered in the sense that the majority have resumed operations, even grown. But, he adds:

“Unfortunately, the recovery period [from] the losses could take anywhere from three to as [long] as 10 to 15 years depending on the amount of losses to the business. So even though we have resumed operations that doesn’t mean we have fully recovered.”

4.4.3 Shelter

Shelter formed the third highest cost (Php 9.4 billion) and includes land acquisition costs, site development and housing construction. Compared to other key result areas, shelter has the largest share of total funding at 73 per cent, mainly due to the national government’s housing programme. It also has the highest percentage share in terms of amount funded (91 per cent). It is, however, one of the slowest moving in terms of implementation, as only seven per cent of target new housing has been completed.

According to Maria Lagman, head of the CHCDO, the plan to build a new township, a ‘city extension’ north of Tacloban where close to 14,000 families will be rehoused, is taking time. After two years, only about 1,000 families had been moved, and she says this is

due to the time needed to acquire land and undertake planning, site development and construction:

“The city had 86 hectares on that site but the National Housing Authority decided not to use that because the landscape is challenging, so they preferred to just buy new lots that are less mountainous. And preparing the sites, doing the plans, building the houses – this takes time.”

Another huge challenge is that because the site is about 20 kilometres from the city centre, there is no water, electricity, amenities or livelihood opportunities. Maria Lagman notes:

“What we did was to have a Tacloban North Technical Working Group to see to it that social, economic and infrastructure services and necessities are there, but that also takes time. It needs a lot of pressure and technical follow-through to make things work.”

Maria Lagman reflects that they should have had a longer transition plan for the families, but they were constrained by a lack of resources:

“The permanent houses were all built by the national government and we only had so little for the transitional sites. We could only coordinate with them and stretch what we had to be able to fast-track and solve problems.”

She believes that in terms of housing there should have been funds for a transitional phase of two to three years so that families in transition could participate in the planning for the township and the settlement. *“We still believe that this should be participatory but we can only do so much because we were rushed and we didn’t have other choices.”*

There is also tension with the national government regarding the provision of a temporary water supply to remaining bunkhouses and transit and relocation sites (in some sites the water is still being delivered by truck, paid for by the national government). The mayor has accused the president of ordering the cut-off of the water supply by the end of April 2016. Restituto Macuto of from the Department of Social Welfare and Development comments:

“Supposedly we would set it up and they would manage it. But they said they had no capacity. So until now, we are paying for the water and electricity although it’s not our mandate.”

4.4.4 Land use planning

The city government is laying the groundwork for the longer-term development of Tacloban. Just before Haiyan struck, the city had completed its Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), although it has not yet been approved. The city decided to update it again taking into account the new considerations brought about by the impact of the typhoon.

The TRRP was used as a reference for updating the Tacloban CLUP, which was conducted between December 2015 and April 2016. Janis Claire Canta, who leads the Plans and Programmes Division of the City Planning and Development Office notes: *“The TRRP really helped us in providing the framework for the CLUP, in terms of its direction and vision.”*

According to Christopher Rollo, country programme manager of UN-Habitat, the TRRP was designed from the outset as a document that could integrate well with the mandated, official local government plans by using the same sectors and baseline information (although enhanced) from the old CLUP.

Canta admits that the time frame for updating the CLUP was very tight, but they went ahead despite data gaps because of the mayor’s directive. *“He wants to put the long-term vision in place.”* And even though the mayor’s wife was elected as the new mayor (campaigning with the slogan of a better, not just recovered, Tacloban), according to Canta, they couldn’t assume continuity.

The city government has forged partnerships with several organisations to obtain financial and technical support for updating the CLUP. UN-Habitat supported a climate and disaster risk assessment and a local climate change action plan, which will serve as input to the CLUP. It is also sponsoring the Urban Lab, which brings in international experts to provide a theoretical grounding to the planning in Tacloban, as well as providing inputs to the crafting of a local building code. Other organisations involved in providing technical and financial support include JICA (for mapping) and Oxfam and USAID for financial and technical support in planning workshops.

UNDP also proposed that the city become part of the RAPID project, which aimed to undertake more detailed risk assessments of hydro-meteorological hazards in Leyte and Samar, but the city said the three-year timeline for the project was too long. Tacloban will still be included in the RAPID project but the results will be used only in the next round of CLUP updating.

Canta says that one challenge for them is managing the interests of these various partner organisations: *“For example, USAID is interested in water projects, while JICA is interested in the tide embankment. The city needs to very clear [about] what it wants – on what are the non-negotiables.”*

There was also an internal challenge, with some resistance from the head of the City Planning and Development Office who felt that they didn’t need to update the CLUP. But she said the partnerships forged with external organisations and the available funding became the leverage to push the Planning Office to support and lead the updating of the plan.

Another challenge was dealing with communities, especially those in coastal areas. Canta notes:

“We didn’t want to come in with a set development thrust and for the community to just confirm. We really wanted to consult them. And they said, ‘we want coastal protection, we don’t want to be erased’.”

But she also said the communities wanted things that were not negotiable for the city, such as residential areas near the airport that they wanted to reclassify as protection areas and where further development would be discouraged. The process was necessary, she says, to legitimise the results: *“If you do not go through the process, your results will be questionable.”*

4.4.5 Disaster preparedness

The experience of Yolanda brought to the forefront key lessons in disaster preparedness for Tacloban. When typhoon Ruby (known locally as Hagupit), also a Category 5 typhoon, struck the Philippines a year later on 6 December 2014, the city was better prepared. Although it didn’t hit Tacloban directly (it made landfall in Eastern Samar, a province north of Tacloban), strong winds still affected the city. Dr Gloria Fabrigas notes: *“Even if we had the [Task Force] Tindog Tacloban, not all members of the task force knew what they were supposed to do. Ruby was better, because they were prepared with lessons from Yolanda.”*

The following are some of the lessons learned and how the city implemented these, post-Yolanda:

- After Yolanda, Tacloban conducted community drills and information dissemination on disaster preparedness in partnership with I/NGOs such as Oxfam, IOM, CRS and Plan in selected coastal communities. This was meant to increase awareness levels among residents and their participation in reducing their own personal risks during disasters. This, coupled with the lessons that communities learned from Yolanda, ensured that evacuation was more orderly during typhoon Ruby.
- Although the national government did predict storm surges during Yolanda, this was largely misunderstood and the potential scenario not communicated well enough to communities. Although the government had been tracking the storm and issuing warnings, the public and local governments could not imagine its magnitude because they had lived through seriously strong and destructive events before. They were also warned about a possible storm surge but did not know what it meant (NDRRMC, 2014). The storm surge hazard map that Tacloban had at the time did not accurately predict the inundation that occurred during Yolanda. During typhoon Ruby, Project NOAH (Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards), a national government-funded initiative, issued storm surge warnings showing not only the height of the waves but how far inland the flooding would reach, based on updated maps of coastal communities.
- The city council has enacted an ordinance for pre-emptive and forced evacuation in case of potential massive disasters. One major consideration for Tacloban is that because it is a regional centre, the daytime population is about five times the size of its resident population. During typhoon Ruby, the mayor declared that all work and classes were to be suspended three days before the typhoon so that those studying and working in the city could go back to their home towns.
- Evacuating vehicles from the downtown area was another lesson learnt, as any vehicles parked there during Yolanda were swept away by the storm surge, blocking roads and damaging buildings. During typhoon Ruby, all vehicles were moved to higher ground in designated parking areas, so there were no vehicles on the streets.
- For typhoon Ruby, city government employees were asked a day before to prepare and make sure their families were safe so they could be on call in city hall when the typhoon struck.
- Store owners also learned from Yolanda – during typhoon Ruby, many establishments were boarded up and there was increased police and military presence to help prevent looting.

- The city's aim is for every *barangay* (smallest unit of government) to have its own mobile emergency telecommunications unit to establish communication with city, provincial, regional or national government agencies. UNDP has so far provided city responders with two-way radios to improve communication.
- A resolution for a permanent City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office is already with the city council, while the updating of the City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan is underway.

4.4.6 City organisation

Due to the loss of income, the city government had to lay off about 1,000 casual workers (mainly working for labour-intensive departments such as the Engineering Office and the General Services Office). About a year later, it had restored half of the workers and two years later it was back to its original capacity. It is now reassessing its human resources.

Teofila Brosas, head of the Human Resource Management Office says that there is still a need to improve the competencies, skills and knowledge of city staff to be able to implement city plans and help Tacloban become the resilient city that it is aiming to be: *“Each department needs to be evaluated on its capacity, depending on the goals in the development plans and its role in achieving them.”* Brosas adds that there is much to be improved in the city's project prioritisation, budgeting and monitoring and evaluation system.

Engineer Roberto Muñoz, head of special projects, notes that the city planning and engineering departments in particular need more technical capacity: *“The Planning Office should be the think tank.”* Muñoz adds that the city organisation needs to be updated:

“The organisation has to be dynamic. You must have leadership, management skills, technical know-how. It's a big city. If you want development then you have to start with the basics such as internal organisation and capacity. If that's not covered, you still have the same kind of problem for the next administration, for the next generation.”

5

Key findings and recommendations

The findings and recommendations have been grouped into the two phases, emergency response and recovery. The challenges, successes and lessons learnt are discussed for each phase, with particular focus on the coordination process and the institutional systems put in place. The recommendations for each phase are directed at national government, local government and humanitarian organisations.

5.1 Emergency response phase

The key mistake that exacerbated the impact of typhoon Yolanda in Tacloban and other areas was the widespread underestimation, lack of understanding and inadequate warning about the potential impact of the super typhoon and storm surge. This was reflected in the inadequate evacuation, faulty prepositioning of personnel and goods and the lack of backup systems. This led to the main challenges in emergency response capacity that came after the typhoon, which were mainly the affected responders and damage to prepositioned relief goods, key infrastructure, utilities, communications and transport systems.

Albeit delayed, the government was able to restore access through the airport, clear road debris and deliver initial relief. Some of the resource gaps were filled by the private sector and other cities who sent in response teams.

Yolanda eventually brought a massive humanitarian response to Tacloban from both international and local actors. Since 2007, the Philippines has institutionalised the cluster approach in order to systematise coordination, and it has a legal framework under the Philippine disaster management law for inter-governmental coordination. Hence, government and humanitarian actors were quick to establish coordination systems within the first two weeks after the typhoon and regular meetings were set up at various levels.

These mechanisms included the following: the cluster coordination system with government cluster leads and UN agency/ I/NGOs as co-leads for each cluster; Task Force Yolanda (regional level) to deal with clearing of debris, law and order, food and water, cadaver collection and normalisation; the Inter-Agency Rehabilitation Task Group (national level), to focus on crafting a rehabilitation plan; and the Task Force Tindog Tacloban (Tacloban city government) to coordinate response and relief efforts in the city, with 14 clusters mirroring the UN clusters.

There were certain circumstances that made Haiyan extra challenging. One is that the Level 3 declaration brought in a surge of foreign humanitarian expertise, which was difficult for the national government who was used to dealing with the UN and I/NGOs local resource and with whom they had a more established relationship. Partly due to this and to the differences in capacities at various levels of government, the government's and international humanitarian organisations' systems of organisation were perceived as being parallel rather than integrated, as conceived under the Philippines cluster approach.

A widespread disaster is bound to impact local government and its responders, especially if they are caught unprepared. However, local government capacity should not be discounted. Despite being understaffed, the Tacloban city government was still able to facilitate the flow of aid and coordinate with government and various humanitarian agencies. After a month, it had stabilised enough to begin the recovery planning process, and six months after the typhoon it had come up with a recovery plan that was submitted to the national government.

Furthermore, government actors identified the lack of a centralised database or central focal point where humanitarian organisations could register and check in. National government admits it didn't have the capacity to set this up for the response and UN-OCHA had its own system. Government actors also said that despite having coordination mechanisms there were still organisations that would go directly to communities without consultation, leading to a duplication of efforts and a concentration of assistance in certain areas.

The Tacloban city government in particular was unsure of how to deal with the influx of humanitarian organisations with their various agendas and requests for information, and didn't have enough personnel to attend all the coordination meetings. The influx of media also put pressure on them to produce information. Politics also put a strain on relationships and hampered open coordination between the Tacloban city government and the national and provincial governments.

Although Tacloban city government officials were initially unfamiliar with the cluster system, this soon changed with the help of UN-OCHA, and they assigned focal points that could participate in the UN cluster system as well as the national government task forces. They were able to organise the humanitarian response within the first few days after the typhoon, through visual cues such as desks with signs and logbooks as well as an 'information wall'. They held daily press briefings where they answered requests for information from the media.

5.1.1 Recommendations

Based on the above-mentioned challenges and successes, the following are recommendations for improving humanitarian coordination in emergency response:

For national government:

- Increase capacity in the Office of Civil Defence, key national agencies (designated as cluster leads) and local disaster risk reduction and management offices so they can take on the lead role in coordination. This can be done through first, educating them on international humanitarian architecture and the cluster system – when to put it into action, how it operates and the government's role; and second, help these departments to develop leader-managers with the skills to lead and facilitate coordination meetings, and a strong secretariat to serve as a focal point for registration, information management and mapping of humanitarian assistance.
- The national government can also look into how local government capacity can be increased when it is crippled by a disaster. This can differ depending on the particular stage: during the emergency response phase there may be a need for emergency managers for the removal of debris, the distribution of relief aid, medical response and so on, while during the recovery phase there may be a need more for technical experts, project managers and communications specialists.

Funding could also be provided to local government to hire dedicated staff for emergency coordination and planning, or by forming a 'surge team' or emergency management team to support the city during the response phase. Experience in Tacloban shows that they had limited personnel and energy to keep up with regular cluster meetings. This surge team could help establish and maintain cluster coordination where appropriate, as well as provide technical support until such time that the local team can take over.

- Develop government guidance/ protocols for local government for dealing with humanitarian organisations. This could include relevant national policies and standards and local protocols that can be set up to facilitate speedy humanitarian assistance (such as streamlining local permit approval systems).
- Similarly, the government can also develop a guidance note for humanitarian organisations during emergency response for dealing with local authorities, to include measures such as identifying a point of registration/ coordination (*barangay*, local government, province, national, etc.) depending on which level the organisation is working at and the type of assistance.

For local governments:

- Strengthen the local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office capacities as mentioned above, in coordination with national government. Members of the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (likely to be department heads) should also have the same orientation on the cluster system and increased capacity as leaders-managers-facilitators. In addition, middle management should be strengthened to make sure that there are people with sufficient technical knowledge and authority to ensure coordination, should the department heads be busy with other functions.
- Involve the private sector in the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council and include them in contingency planning so they can ready their resources in case of need.
- Enhance further inter-local government cooperation in terms of emergency response. This means planning with other cities/ municipalities on a regional level on how they could complement each other's resources when there is a region-wide disaster. This could mean sending not only relief or response teams but also sending people to support specific offices where personnel have been affected.

For humanitarian organisations:

- Invest resources in engaging with local government, particularly if the programme is in an urban area. There is mutual benefit when humanitarian organisations engage with city governments early on, as they are able to form a relationship and understand each other and set the stage for forming productive partnerships. This could include assigning a specific person who understands local dynamics to act as liaison; and providing not just direct humanitarian assistance but also organisational support and technical assistance as a means of increasing city capacity for the emergency response.

5.2 Recovery phase

About a month after typhoon Haiyan, UN-Habitat together with UNDP decided to provide critical support to LGUs in Ormoc, Guiuan and Tacloban so they could lead the early recovery planning process. This was to ensure that relief and response activities would become building blocks for longer-term recovery and rehabilitation. As part of this support, UN-Habitat, in partnership with the Tacloban city government, formed the multi-stakeholder Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TACDEV) to enable the city government to focus on crafting the recovery plan.

Even though UN-Habitat intended to have only a facilitating role, there was the perception that it led the planning. However, putting UN-Habitat at the forefront was intentional on the part of the city in order to neutralise the political tension between the then-mayor of Tacloban and the national government.

At about the same time, the national government formed the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation (OPARR) to coordinate recovery planning. But it took time to get people on the ground to fulfil its functions due to an initial lack of funding and administrative support. Local governments as well as international organisations were initially unsure of how to deal with this new body, which had its own organisational clusters. Eventually, OPARR was able to clarify its main role, which was to consolidate local and agency plans and come up with the national Comprehensive Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (CRRP), which became the basis for further funding of rehabilitation programmes.

TACDEV started work on the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) ahead of OPARR's directive to submit the plans. The experience of Tacloban shows that recovery planning can start once the situation on the ground is stable, even though the emergency phase might not have formally ended (the ending of the relief phase was declared by the national government and the UN on 4 July 2014).

The main challenge for Tacloban was undertaking recovery planning while still in the midst of coordinating humanitarian assistance. The short planning period (December–April 2014) also led to some key inputs such as the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (not integrated into the plan) and some proposed interventions not yet fully developed.

City officials have said that it would have been good to have had at least a year for planning instead of just three to four months. But this early start enabled them to send a signal that Tacloban was ready to move forward. The city was one of the first local governments to submit its plan to the national government. The presentation of the recovery plan provided a vision of the future, a 'symbol of hope' that gave the people of Tacloban a boost.

TACDEV implemented a participatory process in crafting the TRRP. From December 2013 to April 2014, TACDEV organised and facilitated planning charrettes or intensive planning workshops attended by at least 150 representatives from national government agencies, humanitarian clusters, non-government organisations, private sector representatives and other groups in Tacloban. Public consultations were conducted as part of the planning process, including on-the-ground consultations with selected communities. But not all communities were covered due to a lack of time and personnel.

One challenge was maintaining adequate representation and continuity of participation. A few sectors such as businessmen felt inadequately represented, which was due to a lack of consensus on representation and also the limited number of representatives allowed in consultation workshops. Initially, many non-government actors were involved but when organisations ended their humanitarian assistance it was mostly the local government actors who were left.

Different actors had varying expectations of the scope and level of detail of the recovery plan. Some I/NGOs and coastal communities found it lacked detail in terms of plans for coastal areas. The national government felt it was too development oriented. The lack of detail may have been due to the limited time, while the wide scope was due to the initial lack of guidance from the national government on the expected content of the plan, as well as the city and national governments having different frameworks.

However, the city government perceived being 'development oriented' as a strength, not a weakness. They considered the recovery plan as a way to build a better city, thus including medium- to long-term plans to improve its resiliency, while the national government was only looking to fund rehabilitation of what was damaged, basically a 'repair list'.

The recovery plan also set down a framework for the longer-term development of the city, which became useful for updating its existing development plans. The city government was able to use the recovery plan as a reference to update its Comprehensive Land Use Plan, Local Climate Change Action Plan, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, and Economic Development Framework for Tacloban North.

City government actors involved agree that TACDEV was an effective mechanism for guiding the formulation of the recovery plan. Internally, its main challenge was coordination and continuity – particularly getting the main actors on board and to remain active throughout the process, given that the actors were also busy with ongoing humanitarian assistance.

After the recovery plan was submitted to the national government, the city created the Tacloban North TWG. This enabled close coordination between departments as well as with national government and humanitarian agencies to meet the need to plan and coordinate

interventions in Tacloban North, the city's planned resettlement area for about 14,000 families. The city Planning Office and eventually UN-Habitat functioned as secretariat for the TWG. The main challenge in the TWG was similar to TACDEV – sustaining participation of the different departments and agencies as they were also busy with regular office functions.

Both TACDEV and the TWG lacked internal technical capacity for planning. Although UN-Habitat provided initial support, technical assistance wasn't sustained so some aspects, such as the masterplan for the resettlement area, were left at a conceptual level although implementation of resettlement projects was already ongoing.

The city has strived to overcome limitations in terms of its human resources by forming partnerships with a number of organisations to help improve its technical capacity. Aside from UN-Habitat, it has also formed partnerships with UNDP, USAID and Oxfam. It has also maximised the use of volunteers with technical expertise.

About 30 per cent of the TRRP was eventually funded by the government and I/NGOs. Although the national government asked local governments to submit recovery plans, they gave them little control in the implementation. The funding was mainly transferred to national government agencies. Some funds were transferred to local governments but these were limited in scope (eg rehabilitation of public buildings) or limited to the implementation of national recovery programmes. A large part of the unfunded portion of the recovery plan was for emergency loans to the business sector.

Despite these challenges, the local government was creative and strategic in terms of tapping resources. It was able to coordinate and form partnerships with various I/NGOs to fund and co-implement projects in the recovery plan. Businesses were able to recover by renting out their properties or relying on external investors. Government did also provide some loans later on, but these were deemed late and insufficient. Direct cash assistance from humanitarian organisations to affected communities as well as the 'expat economy' – humanitarian organisations and workers booking hotels, using transportation and patronising local restaurants – also helped boost Tacloban's economy.

5.2.1 Recommendations

Based on the above-mentioned challenges and successes, the following are recommendations for improving recovery planning and implementation:

For national government:

- Improve support for monitoring the implementation of the numerous recovery projects still ongoing. This includes a budget for the necessary personnel (who are, at time of writing, still externally funded) as well as a leadership that can resolve issues with concerned agencies. Coordination with local governments also needs to be sustained to ensure complementation of projects. For Tacloban in particular, coordination for the development of Tacloban North and continued support for families in transition is crucial.
- Improve on future recovery programmes; the following are recommended:
 - Provide sufficient support for national-level ad hoc bodies/ coordinating mechanisms for recovery planning. This includes strong leadership, good secretariat and technical support, and sufficient capacity for information management.
 - Issue clear guidelines on how recovery funding for local projects will be approved and how these will be implemented; also the expected scope and level of detail of recovery plans so that local governments can tailor plans toward this end.
 - Explore further the transfer of recovery funds to local government for the implementation of recovery plans, including the budget to increase its project management capacity. There needs to be trust and open communication, unhindered by politics, and sufficient controls (such as performance monitoring) to ensure that projects are implemented well.
 - In line with the above, to also explore flexible recovery funding. As Tacloban's recovery plan was developed in such a short time, it was inevitable that some aspects of it would need further study and detailing. As a result, some interventions, such as the permanent shelter programme, tended to have a one-size fits-all approach (previously used by the national government in previous disasters), and did not allow for more variation in terms of shelter options. The rehabilitation plan cannot be perfect from the outset so there must be some flexibility in terms of use of funds.


- Study further how to assist businesses during calamities through loans with reduced requirements for collateral, especially where there is large-scale damage to properties.
- Plan for the transitional phase of housing more clearly and provide sufficient resources for it. Tacloban realised it needed more transitional options for families who wanted to be resettled, as the permanent housing was taking a long time to construct. But they didn't have the resources to do this on a massive scale. More durable transitional housing (good for at least three years), says Maria Lagman of the CHCDO, could have allowed them at least a year to plan for permanent housing using a more participatory 'people's process'.

For local governments:

- For Tacloban, improve support for project management and monitoring of implementation of the numerous recovery projects still ongoing. Mechanisms already exist for coordination but information management capacity is still needed to get a complete picture of the status of all the projects. This should identify what projects still need funding and then approach possible donors, or incorporate them into its development budget.
- Tacloban needs to ensure it has sufficient capacity to manage the implementation of Tacloban North, particularly the social preparation and community organisation. It also needs continued technical support for the detailed planning of the whole area, as well as for an evaluation of the proposed tidal embankment project.
- Strengthen the Planning Office so it can take the lead or provide the necessary planning support. This includes putting in people with strong leadership and facilitation skills and basic knowledge of the Philippine planning and disaster risk management system. It also needs to have capacities in information management and mapping. The office should also know how to contract and manage consultants, in case technical capacity needs to be out sourced.
- Improve the competencies, skills and knowledge of city staff to be able to implement city plans. Each department needs to be evaluated on its capacity, depending on the development plan's goals, and its role in achieving these. There is also much to be improved in project prioritisation, budgeting and the monitoring and evaluation system.

Annexes

Annex 1. The cluster approach in the Philippines



Glossary

Government

- DA** Department of Agriculture
- DOH** Department of Health
- DSWD** Department of Social Welfare and Development
- OCD** Office of Civil Defense
- PDCC** Provincial Disaster Coordinating Council

Non Government

- FAO** Food and Agriculture Organization
- IFRC** International Federation of Red Cross
- ILO** International Labor Organization
- IOM** International Organization of Migration
- OCHA** UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- UNDP** UN Development Programme
- UNICEF** UN Children's Fund
- WFP** World Food Programme
- WHO** World Health Organization


Source: National Disaster Coordinating Council Circular dated 10 May 2007; UN-OCHA Philippines.

Annex 2. The government disaster risk management system


The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) (formerly the NDCC), is a multi-agency working group composed of various government, non-government, civil sector and private sector organisations of the Republic of the Philippines, as established by Republic Act 10121 of 2009. The Office of Civil Defence (under the Department of National Defence) serves as the operating arm of the NDRRMC, supporting the discharge of its functions even at the local level (provincial, city and municipal levels) where the local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) councils are convened and chaired by their respective local chief executives (governors, mayors).

The national government integrates DRRM into the Philippine Development Plan as well as the sectoral DRRM plans of national agencies according to the four priority areas (prevention, preparedness, response and rehabilitation). Agencies are clustered under the different phases of disaster management in order to ensure a more coherent and effective response across all key sectors or areas of activity. Under 'rehabilitation and recovery', NEDA is mandated by the DRRM Act as the lead agency to carry out recovery functions with the support of national and local government bureaucracies and CSOs. These recovery functions include: assessment of damages, losses and needs (through OCD); restoration, strengthening and expansion of economic activities; and integration of DRM elements in human settlements (through the National Housing Authority).


Composition of the NDRRMC with heads of the four DRRM thematic areas




Annex 3: Task Force Yolanda of the RDRRMC



Annex 4. The Inter-Agency Rehabilitation Task Group



Annex 5: Organisation of Task Force Tindog Tacloban




Annex 6. Cluster framework of OPARR

| | OBJECTIVE | MEMBER AGENCIES | |
|-----------------------|--|---|---|
| INFRASTRUCTURE | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All infrastructural-related rehabilitation ▪ Construction, repair and restoration of damaged roads, bridges and other public infrastructure | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DPWH ▪ DepEd ▪ DOE ▪ DENR ▪ DTI ▪ LWUA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DOH ▪ DOST ▪ DOTC ▪ DILG ▪ OCD ▪ DAR |
| RESETTLEMENT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Relocation of affected residents of safe areas and for the development of secure comprehensive and sustainable settlements ▪ Construction of off-site totally damaged houses | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DILG ▪ DA ▪ DAR ▪ DepEd ▪ OCD ▪ HLURB ▪ HUDCC | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DENR ▪ DOH ▪ DOST ▪ DSWD ▪ NCIP ▪ NHA |
| SOCIAL SERVICE | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Relief operations and community services ▪ Food, health, education and emergency shelter assistance and core shelter assistance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DSWD ▪ DND ▪ DA ▪ DepEd ▪ NHA ▪ OCD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DENR ▪ DoH ▪ PNP ▪ HLURB ▪ HUDCC ▪ NCIP |
| LIVELIHOOD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provision of livelihood and emergency employment assistance to affected families ▪ Crop production and industry and trade services, forestry, fishery and livestock & poultry industries | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DTI ▪ DOLE ▪ DOT ▪ DA ▪ DENR ▪ OCD | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DOST ▪ DSWD ▪ HUDCC ▪ NCIP ▪ NHA ▪ GFI |
| SUPPORT | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consolidating the vetted cluster action plans ▪ Identification and provision of funding support to the major programs and projects | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DBM ▪ DFA ▪ DoF ▪ DoJ ▪ DSWD ▪ PMS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NEDA ▪ OCD ▪ OPAPP ▪ PCDSPO ▪ PCOO |
| | | | <p>Other stakeholders will be consulted in this process</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Multilaterals/bilaterals ▪ LGUs ▪ Private Sector ▪ Civil society organisation |

Source: OPARR presentation during coordination meeting with the Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD) and the humanitarian country team, 15 March 2014.

Annex 7. Government transition plan of government relief to recovery



Annex 8. Timeline of selected Haiyan Events

Tacloban City was devastated on 8 November 2013 by Typhoon Haiyan, the strongest typhoon on record to make landfall. Despite the impacts of the mega-disaster the local government strove to coordinate relief and recovery efforts towards a better and more resilient Tacloban. Here is the timeline of Haiyan events in Tacloban, with response and parallel actions of the national government and humanitarian actors, as the city transitioned from the humanitarian response to recovery and rehabilitation phases after the disaster.



EMERGENCY PHASE

2013

NOVEMBER

RECOVERY & REHABILITATION

DECEMBER

2014

JANUARY

FEBRUARY

MARCH

APRIL

MAY

JUNE

JULY

AUGUST

SEPTEMBER

OCTOBER

NOVEMBER

DECEMBER

2015

JANUARY

FEBRUARY

MARCH

APRIL

Nov. 12 Launch of Haiyan Action Plan by the UN, which was later revised and replaced with the Strategic Response Plan to support the Government of the Philippines

Nov. 14 Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), through the Emergency Relief Coordinator, declares Level 3 Humanitarian Emergency in the Philippines

Dec. 3 In partnership with the City Hall, UN-Habitat implements and facilitates the charrette (workshop) to form the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TacDev) and its agenda to formulate the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP)

Feb. 14 IASC deactivates the L3 emergency after 3 months of response

Jan. 23 OCHA packs up its office in Tacloban, signalling end of operations in Region VIII

Nov. 12 First meeting of Tacloban City Hall department heads and employees

Nov. 18 Tacloban City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, through the City Mayor, issues Resolution No. 5 (2013) convening the Task Force Tindog Tacloban

Nov. 10 Meeting of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council at the Tacloban City Police Headquarters (Incident Command Post)

Dec. 6 President Benigno Aquino III appoints former Senator Panfilo Lacson as Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR)

Dec. 16 National government launches Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY8) in a briefing for donors

Dec. 20 Regional Development Council in Eastern Visayas approves the RAY 8, the Rehabilitation Plan in Haiyan-devasted Region 8

Jan. 23 Philippine Congress oversight committee hearing on government's Haiyan/Yolanda response and on the Philippine Disaster risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010

Mar. 18 First public consultation on Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan, at the Tacloban City Astrodome

Apr. 10 City Government receives P230 Million from Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) under the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY) program

May 10 Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group (TacDev) presents in Manila the Tacloban City's Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan to the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR)

Apr. 30 Completion of PDNA: this is transmitted by the OCD to NEDA

May 16 OCD formally presents its PDNA to the President

Jul. 4 DSWD Secretary along with officials of UN OCHA declares that the Philippines had successfully transitioned from the relief phase to the rehabilitation/recovery phase

Aug 1 PARR submits to the President the Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan (CRRP or the Master Rehabilitation Plan)

Oct. 29 President Aquino approves the P167.9-Billion Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP)

Nov. 25 OPARR and DSWD lead the release of Php 315.55-million Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) to affected families with partially- and totally-damaged houses in Tacloban

Jan. 26 The President accepts the resignation submitted by PARR on December 2014 to take effect on 10 February 2015

Apr. 22 President Aquino III signs Memorandum Order No. 79 which provides for the institutional mechanism for the monitoring of rehabilitation and recovery programs, projects and activities for Yolanda-affected areas, thereby transmitting the functions of the PARR to the Director-General/NEDA as the NDRRMC Vice Chairperson for Rehabilitation and Recovery

■ CITY HALL ACTIONS ■ NATIONAL GOVERNMENT MOVE ■ INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Annex 9. Photos of sharing sessions

Tacloban sharing session (25 May 2016)



Manila sharing session (2 June 2016)



Source: Photo by Amillah Rodil, 2 June 2016

Interviewees

Oliver Cam, Chief Operations Officer of Welcome Home Leyte Holdings Inc. and Consultant to the Business Recovery Centre of Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Eastern Visayas, 23 February 2016.

Meylene Rosales, Chief Economic Development Specialist of the Policy Formulation and Planning Division, National Economic and Development Authority, Regional Office VIII, 23 February 2016.

Ma. Loudes Jopson Lagman, Executive Assistant IV and Head of Tacloban City Housing and Community Development Office, 23 February 2016.

Roberto Munoz (Engineer), Consultant for Tacloban City Government on Infrastructure and Special Projects, 24 February 2016.

Teofila Brosas, Department Head of Tacloban City Government Human Resource Management Office, 24 February 2016.

Gloria Fabrigas (Doctor), Officer-in-charge of Tacloban City Social Welfare and Development Office, 25 February 2016.

Janis Claire Canta, Head of Plans and Programme Division of Tacloban City Planning and Development Office, 26 February 2016.

Corazon Alvero, Provincial Planning and Development Officer, Leyte Province, 26 February 2016.

Tulio Mateo, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Programme Manager for DRR and Urban Planning in Tacloban, 26 February 2016.

Tecson Lim (Attorney), Convener of Haiyan Initiative and Former Tacloban City Administrator, 1 March 2016.

Edwin Corvera (Police Chief Superintendent), Rehabilitation and Recovery Coordinator for Leyte Province and Head of Local Government Coordination Unit-Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery, 2 March 2016.

Edgar Posadas (Acting Regional Director) and Rey Gozon (Assistant Regional Director), Office of Civil Defence – Region VIII, 3 March 2016.

Lenie Duran-Alegre, Chief of NDRRM Service and Head Secretariat, Office of Civil Defence National Headquarters, 10 March 2016.

Jonathan Hijada, Tacloban City Environment and Natural Resources Officer, 4 April 2016.

Danny Fuentesbella, City Architect of the Tacloban City Government, 5 April 2016.

Maria Fe Quindor, President of Kapuso Permanent Housing Homeowners Association (Tacloban North area), 6 April 2016.

Restituto Macuto, Director III and Head of Disaster Risk Reduction and Response Operation Office, Department of Social Welfare and Development, 8 April 2016.

Christopher Rollo, Country Programme Manager, UN-Habitat Philippines, 14 April 2016.

Romeo Fajardo, Deputy Administrator of the Office of Civil Defence, OCD National Headquarters in Manila, 14 April 2016.

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On 8 November 2013, Tacloban city was devastated by typhoon Haiyan, the strongest typhoon on record to make landfall. Despite crippling damage, the local government strove to coordinate recovery efforts towards a better, more resilient city. This paper describes the experience, challenges, successes and lessons of the Tacloban city government as the city transitioned from the humanitarian response to the recovery and development phases following the disaster. It elaborates on the institutional mechanisms that the city government set up (and related national government and humanitarian mechanisms) to coordinate the humanitarian response, and how these transitioned into mechanisms to coordinate early recovery and longer-term development.

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